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3ABSTRACT
This thesis argues that international regimes exist
within the international legal order. The use of regime theory
to explain international regulation of an issue-area, although
first introduced as a legal concept, has been primarily
explored in the discipline of international relations. That
discipline has for the most part, however, under-emphasised
international law.
In an effort to promote interdisciplinary research on the
nature of the international legal order, this thesis explores
the concept of international regimes within the international
legal order, using examples of global environmental change.
A discussion of the schools of thought within
international law is undertaken, with the policy-oriented
approach to be utilised in this thesis. The policy-oriented
school, which views international law as a process, can
incorporate the process of regime formation and development
within its framework.
An examination of the general international law
applicable to climate change and ozone layer depletion is then
undertaken, to help explain the need for regime formation in
those areas.	 A discussion of the role of regimes within
international law follows, including their formation,
maintenance, source of legal obligation, and compliance
mechanisms.
The strength of a regime's normative or shared
expectations, or norms and rules, depends on the shaping of
cognitive expectations, or knowledge. These cognitive
expectations are in turn dependent on the degree to which
uncertainty regarding issues critical to the particular regime
has been overcome. An examination of the critical issues
particular to climate change and ozone layer depletion is
made, as well as how regimes can overcome uncertainty. This
is followed by a discussion of regime catalysts. Analyses of
the ozone layer depletion and climate change regimes are then
made, and an argument for their inclusion as law within the
policy-oriented school is made.
The thesis concludes that regimes are present within the
international legal order and play a vital role in maintaining
that order.
Thus, this thesis aims to make an original contribution
to the discipline of international law through the study of
regimes, which signal the presence of the international legal
order where it has previously been ignored or deemed
nonexistent.
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CHAPTER 1
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS
1.1 Introduction
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the ability of
the international legal order to deal effectively with issue-
areas in need of international regulation, specifically
through the concept of international regimes ("regimes").
Numerous definitions of regimes have evolved and these will be
explored in detail in Chapter 3. For the present, it is
enough to cite the oft-quoted definition of Stephen Krasner
whereby regimes are "principles, norms, rules and decision-
making procedures around which actor expectations converge in
a given issue-area."2
While the concept of regimes has been explored for some
time within the discipline of international relations, it has
only recently begun to find favour among legal scholars.3
'This thesis is concerned with international regimes and
not domestic regimes. This does not mean that domestic factors
are not important within international regimes. Rather, the
purpose is to examine international regimes involving more
than one state rather than a domestic regime within one state.
2 "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as
Intervening Variables," in International Re gimes, ed. Stephen
D. Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 1.
3One of the leading international relations scholars in
the area of regimes states: "There is little evidence,
however, that lawyers and legal scholars have made a conscious
effort to examine, much less to debate, the conceptual and
theoretical issues raised by their reliance on the idea of
regimes or legal regimes in international society." Oran
Young, "Understanding International Regimes: Contributions
from Law and the Social Sciences," paper presented at the
annual meeting of the American Society of International Law,
Washington, DC, 1-3 April 1992, p. 32.
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Thus, this thesis contributes to the understanding of
international law through the application and analysis of
regimes within the discipline of international law. This is
done not by way of repetition of the work done in the
international relations field, but from the perspective of the
discipline of law. As Oran Young has stated:
• . . It seems likely that the most important thing the
legal community and the social science community have to
offer each other in broadening and deepening our
understanding of international regimes is their
distinctive modes of reasoning.4
Both regimes to be examined in this thesis involve
aspects of global environmental change: climate change
resulting from global warming, as well as depletion of the
ozone layer. 5
 These have been chosen because both climate
change and ozone layer depletion are global environmental
issues that demand international legal action - unilateral
action will not be able to provide solutions. Therefore, both
"require a high degree of international cooperation with due
respect for national sovereignty of states." 6 They are also
similar environmental problems in terms of their "critical
issues." 7
 These factors justify a comparative evaluation
regarding the respective international regimes formed in the
areas of climate change and ozone layer depletion. Based on
4 lbid., p. 38.
5Although ozone layer depletion may contribute to climate
change by altering the atmospheric climate system, for the
purposes of this thesis it will not be included in the term
"climate change" in order to avoid confusion.
6 lntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),
Policymakers Summary of the Formulation of Response
Strategies, Report of Working Group III, (NY: WMO and UNEP,
1990, p. v. While the IPCC was referring to climate change
resulting from global warming, the statement applies to ozone
layer depletion as well.
7 See, infra, Chapter 4.
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the conclusions drawn from these regimes, an argument will
also be made for the importance of the role of international
regimes within the discipline of international law in general.
An international lawyer might be tempted to "complain
that regime theorists are simply restating the obvious - that
international legal rules,
	 norms and decision-making
procedures facilitate cooperation. q8 Yet "international
lawyers have been all too willing to accept this premise as an
article of faith rather than as a theoretically deducible and
empirically verifiable phenomenon." 9
 Research into how the
international legal order promotes cooperation among states
should be conducted; this will strengthen the argument for the
importance of the legal order. One way of doing this is to
study regimes:
International regimes are more and more salient
features of international.. .law. Since they
visualise complexity as well as flexibility they
facilitate insight especially into a step-by-step
approach... [to international law-making].'°
Global environmental change is an interdisciplinary
matter, encompassing broadly the critical areas of science,
8Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, "International Law and
International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda," American
Journal of International Law Vol. 87, No. 2 (April 1993), p.
221.
9lbid.
'°Winfried Lang, "The international Waste Regime,"
Environmental Protection and International Law, ed. Winfried
Lang, Hanspeter Neuhold and Karl Zemanek (London: Graham &
Trotman, 1991), p. 148.
Although the author was speaking about international
environmental regimes, his comments are applicable to all
international regimes. See, infra, Chapter 7.
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economics and development ' which this thesis will take into
account.	 The study of regimes is also necessarily
interdisciplinary.' 2
 Thus, while this thesis is primarily
concerned with the legal characteristics of regimes, it must
also look at other aspects of the model regimes examined here,
notably their scientific, economic and development aspects.
As Oscar Schachter points out, law has a distinctive
character:
Law is not wholly autonomous; . . . it has causes and
consequences; .. . it involves power and values; .. . it is
an aspect of a larger social and political process...
[but] law is not the same as politics, sociology or
philosophy.'3
Thus, the international lawyer will look for a legal
framework within which to place regimes in the international
legal order. While regimes are influenced by extra-legal
considerations and may include factors influencing state
behaviour that have not yet acquired the status of law, to be
counted as "law" regimes must satisfy the criteria of
international law-making.' 4
 This is necessary in order to
maintain a distinction between legal and non-legal rules and
principles; ie between a legal order requiring behaviour and
"As will be shown below, science, economics and
development are critical issues in the ozone layer depletion
and climate change regimes. See, infra, Chapter 4.
The uncertainty involved is partially attributable to
"politicization." The Oxford Dictionary defines this as the
act of "giving political character to." Politics, then, is
taken into account through politicization of these issues
rather than as a separate critical issue. See, infra, Chapter
4.
'2See, infra, Chapter 3, Section 3.1, Introduction to
International Regimes.
' 3 lnternational Law in Theory and Practice (Dordrecht:
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1991), p. 4.
' 4See, infra, Chapter 3, Section 3.3, Formation of
Regimes.
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a public order conditioning behaviour.
The generally accepted sources of international law
include treaties, customary law and general principles of
law.' 5
 These criteria are well-known and all major schools
of international law accept them. The policy-oriented
school, ' however, is particularly receptive to examining law
as a process of decision-making, including extra-legal policy
considerations. For this reason, the policy-oriented approach
is emphasised in this thesis as the school most conducive to
the development of thought necessary to understand and respond
to the particularly serious environmental challenges in
question, as well as allowing for the incorporation of regimes
within its framework.17
See, infra, Chapter 2, Section 2.2 Sources of
International Law.
See, infra, Chapter 2, Section 2.1.3, Policy-Oriented
School.
' 7 See, infra, Chapter 2, Section 2.1.3, Policy-Oriented
School. In that regard, international law and regime theory
can be brought closer together, thus overcoming perceived
methodological difficulties. See, Young, "Understanding
International Regimes: Contributions from Law and the Social
Sciences," supra, n. 3. While Young does indeed recognize the
"distinctive modes of reasoning" between the legal community
and social science community, the view of this thesis is that
the two can be reconciled, particularly within the policy-
oriented approach to international law. Indeed, Young himself
suggested in a panel discussion of his paper that there are
ways around the "two-cultures problem," but that it requires
breaking down deep-seated mindsets that keep these cultures
separate, and identifying the best intellectual opportunities
for collaboration. He suggests sources of obligation or
determinants of compliance as examples of such opportunities.
Oran Young, "Remarks," American Society of International Law:
Proceedings of the 86th Meeting, Washington, DC (1992), p.
174.
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1.2 Scientific Background on Global Environmental Change'8
"Nothing shocks me. I'm a scientist."
1.2.1	 Climate Change Resulting from Enhanced Global
Warming2°
Global warming is a natural occurrence on our planet. It
results from the entrapment of heat radiated from the Earth.
The sun emits energy in the form of short wavelengths of
radiation, some of which is absorbed by the Earth. The Earth
in turn reflects its own radiation, but in longer wavelengths
because its temperature is lower than the sun's. The
"greenhouse" gases and particles present in the Earth's
atmosphere are opaque to these longer wavelengths of infrared
energy, while at the same time transparent to the shorter
wavelengths emitted by the sun. This prevents the heat from
' AWhile global environmental change involves economic and
development considerations as well as scientific factors, it
is at its core a scientific problem with economic and
development ramifications. Therefore, it is necessary to
explain the scientific basis of the problem in order to
properly evaluate economic and development concerns, as well
as to better understand the scientific uncertainty involved.
These critical issues will be addressed in Chapter 4, infra.
' 9 From the film Indiana Jones and the Temple of Doom.
20 For a general survey of the many social and economic
aspects of climate change see Scientific American: Managing
Planet Earth (Special Issue) Vol. 261, No. 3 (September 1989).
Climate change and global warming are not interchangeable
terms. Global warming is a "symptom" of climate change, which
is the "disease." See, UN Information Unit on Climate Change
(IUCC), Fact Sheet 9, "Why 'Climate Change' and 'Global
Warming' Are Not the Same Thing," Climate Change Dossier
(Geneva: IUCC, 1992).
I am grateful to Myles Allen, formerly of the Dept. of
Atmospheric, Oceanic and Planetary Physics, Clarendon
Laboratory, Oxford University, for his helpful comments on
this portion of my thesis.
20
escaping beyond the Earth's atmosphere and creates a natural
"greenhouse effect," one of the "most well-established
theories in atmospheric science".21
The primary naturally occurring greenhouse gas is water
vapour. Other naturally occurring greenhouse gases include
carbon dioxide (CO 2 ), methane (CR,), nitrous oxide (N 20) and
ozone (03 ). Without the presence of these naturally occurring
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, the temperature of the
Earth would be approximately 33 degrees celsius (°C) cooler,
preventing the existence of life on the planet. 22
 However,
the presence of manmade sources of CO2, 23 CH4, 24 N2O,2
21 Stephen H. Schneider, "The Greenhouse Effect: Science
and Policy", Science Vol. 243 (10 February 1989), p. 771. See,
also, Stephen H. Schneider, Global Warming: Are We Entering
the Greenhouse Century? (Cambridge, England: The Lutterworth
Press, 1990).
22 IPCC, Policymakers Summary of the Scientific Assessment
of Climate Change, Report of Working Group I (NY: WMO and
UNEP, 1990), p. 4.
23 CO 2
 buildup results from the burning of fossil fuels and
the net loss of CO2
 absorption from diminished forest "sinks"
because of deforestation. Other sinks include the atmosphere,
the ocean, the soil, and biomass (plants and animals). See,
for instance, J.T. Houghton, B.A. Callander and S.K. Varney,
Climate Change 1992: The Supplementary Report to the IPCC
Scientific Assessment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1992), pp. 31-34. See, also, National Academy of Science,
Policy Implications of Greenhouse Warming, Report of Synthesis
Panel of the Committee of the National Academy of Sciences,
the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of
Medicine (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1991), pp.
3-9 and IUCC, Fact Sheets 1 & 2, "An Introduction to Man-Made
Climate Change" and "The Role of Greenhouse Gases," Climate
Change Dossier (Geneva: IUCC, 1992).
24 CR, emissions stem from fossil fuel burning, enteric
fermentation, rice cultivation, landfills and deforestation.
The main sink is a chemical reaction with a hydroxyl radical
to form water vapour. Houghton, et al, Climate Change 1992,
supra, n. 23, pp. 35-37. Recent studies, however, have
indicated that the amount of CR, in the atmosphere may be
21
tropospheric 0 , as well as chiorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and
hydrochiorofluorocarbons (HCFCs),27 create an enhanced
greenhouse effect which may increase global temperatures and
lead to climate change. This enhanced greenhouse effect is
exacerbated by the loss of storage or absorption sinks for
these gases through modern human activity. 28
 The possible
effects of climate change are well documented, and include
rising sea levels and a shift in climatic zones, affecting
levelling off, and will stop increasing around 2006. "Methane
in Atmosphere Is Levelling Off," International Herald Tribune,
30 July 1992, p. 8.
25N20 buildup has been thought to result mainly from
biomass burning and fossil fuel combustion. The main sinks are
stratospheric photo-oxidation and photo-dissociation, and
perhaps consumption in soils, but that has not yet been
evaluated. Houghton et al, Climate Change 1992, supra, n. 23,
pp. 37-38. However, new studies have downgraded N 2O production
from fossil fuel combustion and biomass burning, suggesting
that the major source of N2O has yet to be identified or that
a known source has been underestimated. W.R. Cofer et al, "New
Estimates of Nitrous Oxide Emissions From Biomass Burning",
Nature Vol. 349 (21 February 1991), pp. 689-691.
2bTropoSphi 03 results from the interaction of
ultraviolet light and traffic and industry emissions. Sinks
for tropospheric ozone precursors include soil uptake and
stratospheric oxidation. Houghton et al, Climate Change 1992,
supra, n. 23, p. 40.
27The leading source of CFCs and HCFCs is industry use in
ref rigerants, solvents, aerosol propellants and foams. The
main contributors are CFC-ll, CFC-12 and HCFC-22. Because of
their ozone layer depleting effect, CFCs and HCFCs are
regulated by a separate international agreement and protocol.
See, infra, Section 1.2.2, Ozone Layer Depletion, The only
significant sink for these sources is photolysis (slow
destruction by sunlight) in the stratosphere and a chemical
reaction with a hydroxyl in the troposphere. Houghton et al,
Climate Change 1992, supra, n. 23, p. 38.
28 See, supra, n. 23-27, for a description of the sinks for
the greenhouse gases.
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ecosystems,	 agriculture,	 water	 resources	 and	 human
settlement.
The scientific explanation for this warming effect was
first put forward in 1896 when a Swedish chemist, Svante
Arrhenius, calculated that a doubling of CO 2
 in the atmosphere
of the Earth would raise the global temperature by 4-6 C.'0
The majority of scientific opinion supports the theory of
global warming, including the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC), set up under the auspices of the UN
Environmental Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological
Organisation (WMO) to assess the impacts of climate change.3t
The IPCC 1992 Supplementary Report affirmed its earlier 1990
Report placing the climate's sensitivity to doubled CO 2 in the
29 See, for example, IPCC, Policymakers Summary of the
Potential Impacts of Climate Change, Report of Working Group
II (NY: WMO and UNEP, 1990); Department of the Environment,
The Potential Effects of Climate Change in the United Kingdom
(London: HMSO, 1991); and National Academy of Sciences, Policy
Implications of Greenhouse Warming, supra, n. 23.
30 Svante Arrhenius, "On the Influence of Carbonic Acid in
the Air Upon The Temperature of the Ground," Philosophical
Magazine Vol. 41 (April 1896), pp. 237-276. The idea that the
atmosphere acted like a greenhouse, letting in heat but not
allowing heat to escape, was first argued by the French
mathematical physicist, Jean Baptiste Fourier. See, "Les
Temperatures du Globe Terrestre et des Espaces Planetaires,"
Memoires de l'Academie Royale des Sciences de l'Institut de
France Vol. 7 (1824), pp. 569-604. Shortly after, John Tyndall
observed that radiation from certain atmospheric gases was
responsible for the trapping of heat. See, "On Radiation
Through The Earth's Atmosphere," Philosophical Magazine Vol.
4 (March 1863), pp. 200-07.
31 See, IPCC, Report of WGI, supra, n. 22, and Houghton et
al, Climate Change 1992, (IPCC Supplement) supra, n. 23.
The IPCC was established through UN General Assembly
Resolution 43/53, reprinted in UNGA Official Records of the
General Assembly Supplement, 43rd Session, No. 49/A/43/49, p.
133. See, also, supra, Chapter 6.1, International Action
Regarding Climate Change.
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range of 1.5 to 4.5 C, with a best estimate of 2.5 C.'
The extent to which a rising temperature of the Earth's
surface can be attributed to the build up of the greenhouse
gases remains, however, a point of controversy. While there
has been a rise in the average surface temperature of the
Earth over the past century, 33
 a causal link with the buildup
of greenhouse gases and the temperature rise has not been
proved beyond doubt.34
Thus, distinguishing natural warming from warming
attributed to an enhanced greenhouse effect is a problem
32Houghton, Climate Change 1992, supra, n. 23, pp. 17,
101. See also, William K. Stevens, "Estimates of Warming Gain
More Precision And Warn of Disaster," New York Times, 15
December 1992, p. C9.
Unless emission rates change, scientists estimated this
doubling from preindustrial concentrations to occur by the
middle of the next century. National Academy of Sciences,
Policy Implications of Greenhouse Warming, supra, n. 23, p.25.
A revised date of 2100 has been reported, however. "Scientists
Confront Renewed Backlash on Global Warming," New York Times,
14 September 1993, Section C.
33 IPCC, Report of WGI, supra, n. 22, p. 2. See, also,
Peter Aldhous, "1990 Warmest Year on Record", Nature Vol. 349
(17 January 1991), p. 186. The article cautioned that it is
still uncertain whether greenhouse gas buildup was the cause
of the temperature rise, since one year does not of course
indicate a trend. See, also, Michael Grubb, The Greenhouse
Effect: Negotiating Targets (London: Royal Institute of
International. Affairs, 1989), p. 1.
34 See, Philip D. Jones and Tom. M.L. Wigley, "Global
Warming Trends," Scientific American Vol. 263, No. 2 (August
1990), p. 91, where the authors state "it is impossible as yet
to interpret accurately the undeniable global-scale warming
that has occurred during this century." See, also, Houghton,
et al, Climate Change 1992, supra, n. 23, p. 5 where the
authors affirm the finding of the first IPCC assessment that
the observed temperature increase could possibly be a natural
occurrence and not due to a human-induced greenhouse warming.
See, also, Chapter 4, infra, for a discussion of the
issue of scientific uncertainty.
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climatologists must cope with. In effect, these scientists
are searching for a greenhouse "fingerprint" to link a rise in
temperature to the buildup of the greenhouse gases. The
leading climatic changes that might indicate a greenhouse
fingerprint are particular global temperature patterns,
uniform sea surface temperatures, an increase of water vapour
in the atmosphere, and changes in the relative intensity of
the seasons. 36
 Scientists believe that these indicators can
be distinguished from natural changes 37
 in the climatic system
and thus are characteristic of global warming.
Computer simulations utilising general circulation models
(GCM5) are currently considered the best available technology
for predicting the range of possible temperature change. 8
The climatic conditions usually simulated by GCMs are a
'5 See, Houghton, et al, Climate Chan ge 1992, supra, n. 23,
pp. 162-165. See, also, "Global Warming: Search for the
Signs", The New York Times, 29 January 1991, pp. Cl, C7.
3blbid. In greenhouse warming, continents are likely to
warm more than oceans and the troposphere should become warmer
while the stratosphere would cool. Sea surface temperatures
should warm fairly uniformly (while natural warming should
vary temperatures in various parts of the globe). Water vapour
should increase, particularly in the tropics, and amplify the
effect of the greenhouse gases in a feedback mechanism.
Greenhouse warming would most likely be more evident in the
winter than in the summer, especially in high latitudes.
37 Ibid., p. C7. "Natural factors believed to have had the
greatest influences on climate change include changes in solar
radiation, changes in the earth's position relative to the
sun, naturally occurring increases in greenhouse gases and
changes in relationships between the land and the ocean...
brought about by the movement of the earth's crustal plates".
See also, Jones and Wigley, "Global Warming Trends,"
supra, n. 34, where the authors point out the possibility of
the following natural changes affecting the climate:
atmospheric or oceanic circulation, fluctuations in cloud
cover or changes in the sun's luminosity, pp. 84-91.
38 See, IUCC, Fact Sheet 14, "How Climate Models Work,"
Climate Change Dossier (Geneva: IUCC, 1992).
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doubling of pre-industrial CO atmospheric concentrations
which have revealed a range of global average temperature
increases of 1.9 to 5.2C (3.4 to 9.4 degrees fahrenheit).
The inability to refine this estimate further is the result of
the GCMs' limitations." For instance, current GCMs
inadequately depict crucial factors such as cloud cover. In
addition, only a limited number of GCM simulations are
available at present and this results in the inability to
adequately determine a more specific value within the
temperature range or even to eliminate temperature changes of
less than 1 degree or more than 5°C.4'
In addition to the above uncertainties encountered in the
modelling of the impacts of man-made greenhouse gases, a
number of additional unknowns need to be taken into account in
modelling, including the indirect effect on global warming of
other pollutants, as well as the relative effectiveness of the
various greenhouse gases in trapping heat, feedback
mechanisms, and sinks.
Firstly, there are other pollutants that have an indirect
effect on global warming, in particular sulphur emissions.
The cooling effect of sulphur is not, however, included in the
general circulation models for predicting climate change.42
° 9 National Academy of Sciences, Policy Implications of
Greenhouse Warming, supra, n. 23, pp. 17-18.
40m1s contributes to the scientific uncertainty within
the climate change regime. See, infra, Chapter 4, Section
4.1.1.
4t National Academy of Sciences, Policy Implications of
Greenhouse Warming, supra, n. 23, pp. 18-19.
42 US Department of State, Bureau of Oceans and
International	 Environmental	 and	 Scientific	 Affairs,
Environmental Documentation:	 United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, Washington, DC, September 1992,
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Sulphur is emitted in gas form mainly as sulphur dioxide
(SO2 ), but changes to fine aerosol particles when reaching the
atmosphere. 4 ' These aerosols may affect the absorption of
radiation by the atmosphere, as well as affecting the density
and brightness of clouds, increasing their cooling effect.
Both of these consequences may result in significant regional
cooling and an abatement of sulphur emissions might increase
global temperatures. 44
 Indeed, the period of cooling
interrupting the warming trend of the past century, beginning
around the l940s and most prominent in the northern
hemisphere, may be due to the simultaneous and significant
rise in sulphur emissions from industry.45
Aerosols comprised of sulphuric acids and water from
volcanic eruptions could also lead to a cooling which could
counter a global warming temporarily. 46
 Climatologists state
that eruptions such as Mount Pinatubo in 1991 will exert a
marked cooling effect on the planet, delaying by several years
the time when a global warming due to increased greenhouse gas
emissions might become obvious. 47
 That same eruption also
p. 3. See, also, Houghton, et al, Climate Chan ge 1992, supra,
n. 23, p. 40-42, and IPCC, Report of WGI, supra, n. 22, pp.
19-20.
4 Stephen H. Schneider, "The Changing Climate," Scientific
American (Special Issue on Managing Planet Earth) Vol. 261,
No. 3 (September 1989), p. 76. See, also, infra, n. 49.
44Ibid.
"Ibid.
4 See, US EPA, The Potential Effects of Global Climate
Change On The United States: Report To Congress, ed. Joel P.
Smith and Dennis Tirpak, EPA-230-05-89-050 (Washington, DC:
EPA 1989), p. 15.
47 See, Houghton et al, Climate Change 1992, supra, n. 23,
p. 164. See also, James Hansen, Andrew Lacis, Reto Ruedy,
Makiko Sata and Helene Wilson, "How Sensitive is the World's
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probably smothered the potential warming effect stemming from
the return of "El Nina" in l992.' Therefore, rising sulphur
emissions from industry and volcanic eruptions might have an
ephemeral cooling effect and temporarily mask any global
warming.
Other pollutants that can affect global warming
indirectly include nitrogen oxide (NO.), volatile organic
compounds (VOCs), and carbon monoxide (CO). Their relevance
to global warming stems from the fact that they are precursors
of tropospheric ozone, one of the greenhouse gases.4
Climate?" Research and Exploration Vol. 9, No. 2 (Spring
1993), pp. 155-157; "Volcano Causing Temporary Global
Cooling," Reuters Newswire, 18 May 1992, Compuserve, and
William K. Stevens, "Earth's Temperature Has Dropped a Little
After A Warm Spell," New York Times, 24 December 1991, p. C4.
48El Nino is the huge pool of extra warm seawater that
appears in the eastern part of the Pacific Ocean periodically
and changing jet stream patterns temporarily so as to make
some areas of the Earth wetter, drier, or warmer than usual.
For instance, the Indian monsoons could be weaker, the west
coast of S. America could be rainier. Stevens, "Earth's
Temperature," supra, n. 47. The author is quoting Dr. 3ames E.
Hansen of the NASA Goddard Institute of Space Studies in New
York, who estimated the expected cooling of about 1°F from the
volcano to override the 4/10 of 1°F caused by a typical El
Nino event. See, also, Schneider, Global Warming, supra, n.
21, p. 94. Another recent source of sulphur emissions stems
from the burning of Kuwaiti oil wells ignited during the 1991
Gulf War. Estimates had been made of 50,000 tons of sulphur
dioxide entering the atmosphere each day during the height of
the burning, contributing to lower than normal temperatures
and raising fears of a "minor nuclear winter," "Up in Flames,"
Scientific American Vol. 264, No. 5 (May 1991), pp. 17, 20 and
24. The article is relying on Kuwaiti estimates of damages to
wells, which some scientists suspect have been inflated in
order to gain higher war reparations from Iraq.
19 See, supra, n. 26, and Houghton et al, Climate Change
1992, supra, n. 23, p. 40. Other precursors of tropospheric
ozone include non-methane hydrocarbons.
International regulation of NOT, SO 2 , and VOCs fall under
the Geneva Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air
Pollution Convention and Protocols, International Legal
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However, there is difficulty in predicting trends and
distribution of nitrogen oxides since their atmospheric
lifetimes are relatively short compared to other greenhouse
gases, and there are inadequate monitoring procedures.
Trends of the other pollutants are also difficult to
predict.'
A second variable within modelling is that the degree of
"global warming potential" or effectiveness in trapping heat
of each greenhouse gas is different, as is the amount of time
each gas will remain in the atmosphere. 52
 Thus, while CO2 is
considered the main greenhouse gas at present by virtue of
sheer volume emitted, other gases are more effective in
trapping heat and last longer in the atmosphere and so may
take on relatively greater significance in the future.53
Materials Vol. 18, No. 9 (1979), pp. 1442-1455; [NO ), Vol.
28, No. 1 (1989) pp. 212-230; and [SO2 ], Vol. 27, No. 3 (1988)
pp. 707-711. A VOCs Protocol was signed on 19 November 1991,
but is not yet in force, Vol. 31, No. 3 (1992), pp. 568-611.
50 Houghton et al, Climate Change 1992, supra, n. 23, p.
40.
51 Ibid., pp. 40, 90-92.
2 See IUCC, Fact Sheet 7, "Measuring the 'Global Warming
Potential' of Greenhouse Gases," Climate Change Dossier
(Geneva: IUCC, 1992). See also, Robin Churchill, "Controlling
Emissions of Greenhouse Gases," in International Law and
Global Climate Change, ed. Robin Churchill and David Freestone
(London: Graham & Trotman, 1991), p. 148.
"See, Houghton et al, Climate Change 1992, supra, n. 23,
pp . 51-67, and IUCC, Fact Sheet 7, supra, n. 52. For example,
approximate lifetimes are 50-200 years for CO2 . 10 years for
methane, 132 years for N 20 and from 55-500 years for the
various CFCs.
Over a 20 year period, one molecule of methane traps
approximately 35 times more heat than one molecule of CO 2 and
so has a Global Warming Potential (GWP) of 35, relative to
CO . The GWP for N 20 is 260, and for CFCs, the GWP ranges from
4500 to 11,000 depending on the particular CFC.
Over a 100 year time period, the GWP for methane
29
Thirdly, it has been suggested, employing the theory that
warming stimulates the release of carbon dioxide, that global
warming will build on itself in a classic feedback
mechanism. This theory suggests that global warming would
release naturally stored CO and naturally stored methane.
The effects of clouds which both trap and reflect radiation
depending on the circumstances may also contribute to this
feedback mechanism.
A fourth variable in the modelling equation is the
presence of "sinks" such as oceans or forests which aid in the
removal from the atmosphere of the greenhouse gases through
natural assimilation, 67
 another factor not well understood at
this time.
decreases to 11, for N 20 it remains about the same, and for
CFCs, the GWP depends on the CFC in question.
54 See, D. Rind, E.W. Chiou, W. Chu, 3. Larsen, S. Attman,
3. Lerner, M.P. McCormick and L. McMaster, "Positive Water
Vapour Feedback in Climate Models Confirmed By Satellite
Data," Nature Vol. 349 (7 February 1991), pp. 500-502, where
studies suggest a strong case for the existence of water
vapour feedback mechanisms. See, also, Robert D. Cess,
"Positive About Water Feedback," Nature Vol. 349 (7 February
1991), pp. 462-463, and William K. Stevens, "Warming of Globe
Could Build on Itself, Some Scientists Say", The New York
Times, Feb. 19, 1991, p. C4.
"Ibid.
"National Academy of Sciences, Policy Implications of
Greenhouse Warming, supra, n. 23, P. 92.
57 Houghton et al, Climate Change 1992, supra, n. 23, pp.
29-42. See, also, supra, n. 23-27 for the known sinks of the
greenhouse gases.
"For example, research indicates that approximately 40%
of the carbon dioxide released into the atmosphere from human
activity remains there for decades, while about 15% appears to
be assimilated into the ocean. The whereabouts of the
remaining 45% is unknown, thus creating uncertainty as to the
rate of increase of atmospheric carbon dioxide. National
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All these variables contribute to the uncertainty in
modelling regarding the definitive cause and extent of surface
temperature rise. For instance, the IPCC had predicted in
its 1990 report that average global temperatures would rise by
0.3C per decade, but has since revised that figure in its
Supplementary Report of 1992. 	 It is now "expected to be
less," since the GCMs did not include all possible factors.
In addition, the 1992 IPCC Report noted that confidence in the
regional changes simulated by computer models remained low.
Academy of Sciences, Policy Implications of Greenhouse
Warming, supra, n. 23, p. 10.
5 See, IPCC, Report of WG I, supra, n. 22, p. 20, National
Academy of Sciences, Policy Implications of Greenhouse
Warming, supra, n. 23, pp. 17-19, and IUCC Fact Sheets 1, "An
Introduction to Man-made Climate Change," 5, "Is the Earth
Warming Up Yet?", & 8, "How Predictable Is the Climate?"
(UNEP: Geneva, 1992).
Also, ozone layer depletion, see infra, Section 1.2.2,
results in cooling at certain levels of the atmosphere in
northern latitudes, which may mask the greenhouse signal. See,
Houghton et al, Climate Chan ge 1992, supra, n. 23, pp. 6 &
14.
There is also the "El Nino" phenomenon, whereby natural
factors warm equatorial seas resulting in global weather
changes, supra, n. 48.
60Houghton et al, Climate Change 1992, supra, n. 23, p.
17.
61 Ibid., p. 101.
Another recent report on global warming, issued in
April 1991 by the US National Academy of Sciences, stated that
the available climate record and limited proficiency of
climate models did not allow a reliable prediction of the
significance of greenhouse gas build-up in the atmosphere.
See, National Academy of Sciences, Policy Implications of
Climate Change, supra, n. 23, pp. 24-26 Nevertheless, the
report agreed that the atmospheric concentration of carbon
dioxide and methane have increased at rates of 25% and 50%
respectively during the last century, with the global average
temperature increasing between 0.3 and 0.6 C during the same
period. As a result, the NAS concluded that there is a
reasonable chance of a doubling of CO2 by the middle of next
century, leading to a likely 1 - 5 C increase of average
global temperature.
31
However, as techniques improve, models are becoming
more reliable as scientific tools.° 1
 For example, GCMs have
recently been able to incorporate deep sea ocean circulation
factors, allowing the thermal absorbtion capacity of deep
oceans to be taken into account. Preliminary results of the
inclusion of these factors suggest that global temperatures
may not be rising as quickly as previously thought." In
addition, scientists are now working with terrestrial
biogeochemical models (TBMs) which incorporate underlying
biophysical and biochemical processes. These models can be
useful in aiding the understanding of the global carbon cycle
and estimating the change increased anthropogenic CO 2 will
have on the cycle.64
Recently, an independent check on the computer
predictions has been completed, apparently affirming the
See IUCC, Fact Sheet 15, "Are Climate Models Reliable?"
Climate Change Dossier (Geneva: ItJCC, 1992).
See also, Warren E. Leary, "Designers Plan Drones to
Probe Atmosphere," New York Times, 31 March 1992, pp. Cl and
dO, where the author describes the development of robot
airplanes to monitor ozone depletion and global warming in an
area too high for most aircraft and too low for good satellite
observations from space.
63 Graham Chapman, "Editorial," The South-North Centre for
Environmental Policy Newsletter No. 9 (May 1993), p. 4, citing
Sir John Mason, "The Greenhouse Effect and Global Climatic
Change," annual James Forrest Lecture to the Institute of
Civil Engineers, London, 16 April 1993.
Recent studies have found that during the past year the
growth rate of atmospheric CO2 has slowed by an unprecedented
amount, thought to be due to processes in the terrestrial
biosphere or ocean. Jorge L. Sarmiento, "Atmospheric CO
Stalled," Nature Vol. 365, 21 October 1993, pp. 697-698.
64 See, I. Cohn Prentice, "Process and Production," Nature
Vol. 363 (20 May 1993), pp. 209-210.
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conclusions reached by GCMs. In this study, climatic data
from two different era, 20,000 years ago in the depths of the
last Ice-Age when the average global temperature was 3-5 C
cooler than today, and the mid-Cretaceous period of
approximately 100 million years ago when the temperature was
6-12°C warmer, was analyzed to determine how the climate
changed in response to certain forces ("forcing"), including
greenhouse gases. From this information, a calculation was
made of the change in both temperature and "forcing" between
those periods and today. An estimation of climate
sensitivity, as depicted by temperature change resulting from
CO2 . could then be made. The study concluded that during the
Ice-Age, the sensitivity of the climate to a doubling of CO2
would have resulted in raising the average global temperature
by approximately 2°C, while a similar scenario during the mid-
Cretaceous period would have raised the average temperature by
approximately 2.5°C. Combining the two results, the study
predicted that a doubling of CO 2
 will lead to a warming of
2.3°C, plus or minus 0.9 degrees.6
According to scientists, this study is more reliable than
the results of GCM5, since it analyses both a colder and a
warmer climate than that prevailing today, not just the modern
climate observations of GCMs. More importantly, the analysis
includes the effect of key unknowns of GCMs such as the
effects of clouds, which climate modellers do not yet know
65 Eric J. Barron, "Lessons From Past Climates," Nature
Vol. 360 (10 December 1992), p. 533 and Martin I. Hoffert and
Curt Covey, "Deriving Global Climate Sensitivity From
Paleoclimate Reconstructions," Nature Vol. 360 (10 December
1992), pp. 573-576. See also, William K. Stevens, "Estimates
of Warming Gain More Precision And Warn of Disaster," New York
Times, 15 December 1992, pp. Cl and C9.
Barron, "Lessons," supra, n. 65, thus narrowing the
inner and outer limits of the GCM predictions, supra, n. 41.
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enough about.E The study includes these effects since the
actual temperatures of the time periods utilised would include
the net result of such unknowns as clouds.
The importance of global warming depends on the extent of
resulting climate change. Although some states might be
labelled as climate change "winners" and some as "losers",
particularly in terms of agriculture, 68
 it has been stressed
that surveying the situation "on the nation-state level may
not be appropriate," since "[ijf significant climate change
occurs, it's going to be a lot of individuals in the world who
are disadvantaged. At one level, it doesn't matter so much
which country they're in." 	 Nevertheless, a recent study
revealed that crop yields would actually increase in some
' 7 See, supra, n. 41.
See, IUCC, Fact Sheet 110, "Climate Change Scenarios:
The Issue of Winners and Losers," Climate Change Dossier,
(Geneva: IUCC, 1992). See also, National Academy of Sciences,
Policy Implications of Greenhouse Warming, supra, n. 23, which
states that "countries like the United States, which encompass
many climate zones and have active and aggressive agricultural
research and development, would probably be able to adapt
their farming to climatic changes deriving from greenhouse
warming. Poorer countries with less wealth or fewer climate
zones may have more difficulty avoiding problems or taking
advantage of better conditions," p. 37.
69 Statement of Professor Dan Magraw, General Counsel for
International Activities, US EPA, quoted in the New York
Times, "In a Warming World, Who Comes Out Ahead?", 5 Feb.
1991, p. C8. See also, Schneider, Global Warmin g , supra, n.
21, p. 260 where Dr. Schneider disagreed with then-US Senator
Gore's characterization that there would not be any "winners"
of global warming: "I don't want to... say that absolutely
nothing could be positive because then you're going to get
somebody who's going to say it isn't true. What I want to ask
is, What's the net effect? And I think the net effect is
increasingly negative, the faster things change."
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states following a global warming. G
Scientists debate the sources of global warming and the
rate of climate change.' 1
 Recently published scientific
papers have argued that the effects of global warming to date
have been relatively benign. 12
 These papers argue that the
warming has increased nighttime temperature lows rather than
daytime highs, and that, in the northern hemisphere, the
warming is occurring primarily in winter and spring with
summer temperatures no warmer than were present in the 1860s
and l870s. In addition, the increased cloud cover causing the
nighttime warming and daytime cooling is probably caused by
the warming itself and so is likely to moderate a warming
effect by keeping daytime temperatures lower. 73
 Finally, some
scientists question whether a doubling of CO 2
 will occur at
all, partly because of the limited availability of fossil
'°Conducted jointly by the Oxford University Environmental
Change Unit and the US Goddard Institute for Space Studies.
See, Joe Rogaly, "Cost of Norfolk Claret," Financial Times
(London), 8 December 1992, p. 14. See also, Department of the
Environment, Potential Effects, supra, n. 29, pp. 37-45, which
points out some agricultural advantages of global warming in
the UK.
Of course, all this must be judged in light of time
frames and temperature limits, still unknown.
71 See, William W. Kellogg, "Response to Skeptics of Global
Warming," Bulletin American Meteorological Society, Vol. 72,
No. 4 (April 1991), pp. 509-510.
72 See, Research and Development Vol. 9, No. 2 (Spring
1993), particularly Richard Lindzen, "Absence of Scientific
Basis," pp. 191-200, Robert C. Balling, Jr., "The Global
Temperature Data," pp. 201-207, and Patrick J. Michaels,
"Benign Greenhouse," pp. 222-233.
7 'Cloud cover makes nights warmer by absorbing ground heat
and radiating it back to the Earth. Days are cooler since
clouds block sunlight. See, Michaels, "Benign Greenhouse,"
supra, n. 72.
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fuels.
Yet, since "the possibility of major environmental
surprises increases with the rate at which climate changes,"
the debate is beyond mere scientific discourse. Rather, the
outcome of this debate will influence the implications of
science for legal policy. '
1.2.2	 Ozone Layer Depletion
Ozone layer depletion is another contributor to global
environmental change. The ozone layer, located in the
stratosphere approximately 13 to 35 miles above the earth's
surface, prevents the entry of harmful ultraviolet (UV) light
radiated from the sun into the Earth's atmosphere and causing
injury to the world's vast assortment of species, including
77
man.
Concern over possible deleterious effects on the
stratosphere were raised during the 1960's with regard to the
supersonic transport project (SST). 78
 Additional concerns
over ozone layer depletion were raised in respect to nuclear
testing and the agricultural use of fertilisers. But it was
not until 1974 that ozone layer depletion received
74 S. Fred Singer, letter to the editor, New York Times,
28 September 1993. Mr Singer is Director of the Science and
Environmental Policy Project, Arlington, Virginia.
Schneider, Global Warming, supra, n. 21, p. 283.
See, infra, Chapter 4.
' See, for instance, UNEP, Action On Ozone (Nairobi: UNEP,
1989).
7RLynton Keith Caldwell, International Environmental
Policy: Emergence and Dimensions, 2d ed. (Durham: Duke
University Press, 1990), p. 262.
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international attention.	 In that year, a scientific study
revealed that CFCs could deplete the stratospheric ozone
layer.	 CFCs are manmade chemicals used in refrigeration,
air conditioners, aerosols, solvents and plastic foams.
Ultraviolet light acts to break down CFC compounds, releasing
chlorine monoxide, which in turn destroy ozone. Scientists
estimate that for every 1% depletion of the ozone layer,
between 1 and 2% more of harmful ultraviolet radiation reaches
the Earth's surface, depending on seasonal temperatures.
'F.S. Rowland and Mario Molina, "Stratospheric Sink for
Chlorofluoromethanes: Chlorine-Atom Catalyzed Destruction of
Ozone", Nature Vol. 249 (28 June 1974), pp. 810-812.
Since then, other ozone depleting chemicals have been
identified, including halons, HCFCs, supra, n. 27, carbon
tetrachioride, methyl chloroform, methyl bromide and
hydrobromofluorocarbons (HBFCs). Halons are used in
firefighting equipment, carbon tetrachloride and methyl
chloroform are primarily used as solvents, methyl bromide is
primarily used as a pesticide, and HBFCs have no know major
use. World Meteorological Organization, Scientific Assessment
of Stratospheric Ozone, Global Ozone Research and Monitoring
Project (Geneva: WMO, 1989) and Friends of the Earth, Methyl
Bromide-Ozone Destroyer (London: FOE, 1992).
See, US EPA, How Industry is Reducin g Dependence on
Ozone-Depleting Chemicals, Office of Air and Radiation
(Washington, DC: EPA, 1988). See, also, supra, n. 27.
'After the UV light breaks down the CFCs, releasing
chlorine atoms (Cl), the chlorine atoms attack ozone (0):
Cl + 03	ClO + 02
C1O + 0 = Cl + 02
In the first reaction, the chlorine monoxide (C1O) is an
unstable and highly reactive compound with an odd number of
electrons. ClO will then react with a free oxygen atom in the
atmosphere in order to obtain an even number of electrons. The
oxygen in C1O is then attracted to the free oxygen atom to
form an oxygen molecule (0 ), leaving Cl free to start the
cycle all over again. See, Sharon Roan, Ozone Crisis (NY: John
Wiley & Sons, 1989), pp. 8-9.
See, "Ozone Depletion Linked to Rise in Harmful
Radiation, Independent (London), 23 April 1993, p. 2 and
Martin Chipperfield, "Satellite Maps Ozone Destroyer," Nature
Vol. 362 (15 April 1993), p. 592.
37
An ozone "hole" (in actuality, greatly diminished ozone
levels) was discovered above the Antarctic Circle by a British
team in October 1984, and confirmed the following year by NASA
satellite photographs. 1
 In 1987, proof that ozone layer
depletion was definitely linked to chlorine monoxide was
provided by a NASA-sponsored expedition to the Antarctic.
This was followed six months later by the report of the Ozone
Trends Panel, composed of more than 100 scientists from 10
different countries, confirming that chlorine monoxide was the
basis of ozone layer depletion.84
Observations by the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) in 1992 revealed that ozone layer
depletion over Antarctica was beginning earlier and occurring
faster, by as much as 15%, than the previous year of l991.8c
Although scientists are unsure whether the acceleration was
due to manmade or natural causes, such as the Mount Pinatubo
and Mount Hudson volcanic eruptions in 1991,3b the rate of
depletion was a matter for concern. Recently, ozone above
Antarctica reached a record low, with all of the ozone between
8 See, Richard Elliot Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), pp. 18-20, and
Roan, Ozone Crisis, supra, n. 81, pp. 125-141.
84 The Panel was organized by Robert Watson of NASA. See,
Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, supra, n. 83, pp. 108-111, and
Roan, Ozone Crisis, supra, n. 81, pp. 219-220. Along with
chlorine, bromine also has been found to destroy ozone.
85 See, D.J. Hofman, S.J. Oltmans, J.M. Harris, S. Solomon,
T. Deshler, "Observation and Possible Causes of New Ozone
Depletion in Antarctica in 1991," Nature Vol. 359 (24
September 1992), pp. 283-287. See also, "Ozone Depletion Over
South Pole Accelerates," New York Times, 27 September 1992,
section 1, p. 29.
The drop in ozone usually occurs just prior to the break-
up of the polar vortex, a mass of very cold stagnant air, at
the end of the southern winter.
Ibid.
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8 to 11 miles above Antarctica having been destroyed.
In addition, the threat of an Arctic ozone hole remained
high due to the presence of chlorine monoxide and other
chemicals, and was prevented in 1992 only by a warm winter,
according to scientists.' A report of the World
Meteorological Organisation stated that ozone levels in
northern Europe, Canada and Russia the previous year were 12%
below average, "an occurrence never before observed in more
than 35 years of continuous ozone observations." 9
 Early 1993
monitoring figures showed an even greater decrease.
	 NASA
satellites detected that ozone levels over the northern
hemisphere were at their lowest level in 14 years and that
ozone levels in the first three months of 1993 were 10 to 20%
below their normal range in the middle latitudes of the
northern hemisphere.° Scientists cautioned, however, that
the decline may have been a transitory effect from the
eruption of the Mount Pinatubo volcano in l991.'
" Gabrie1le Walker, "Weather Contributes to Record Ozone
Loss," Nature Vol. 365, 21 October 1993, p. 683.
Warren E. Leary, "Scientists Say Warm Winter Prevented
Arctic Ozone Hole," New York Times, 1 May 1992, p. Al2.
Oddly enough, tropospheric pollution, or ground level
ozone, may be helpful in preventing harmful radiation. Thus,
an increase of ultraviolet radiation due to depletion of
stratospheric ozone may be alleviated by tropospheric ozone,
which also screens out the harmful radiation. See, "Germany's
Pollution Offers A Shield," New York Times, 16 September 1992,
p. C4. Tropospheric ozone, however, is a greenhouse gas,
supra, n. 26.
Agency Cites Lowest Recorded Levels for Ozone," The
Boston Globe, 14 November 1992, p. 5.
°See, "Ozone Layer Over Britain Shrinks," Independent,
23 April 1993. p. 1 and "Northern Hemisphere Ozone at 14-Year
Low," New York Times, 23 April 1993, p. A26.
1Ibid.
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In a 1987 study, the US Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), stated that if no action was undertaken to prevent
ozone depletion, there would be a likely dramatic increase in
skin cancer and cataracts, and the human immune system would
be adversely affected. The report also linked UV radiation
with possible damage to phytoplankton, which form the base of
the oceanic food chain. 3
 More recently, researchers have
compiled greater evidence that TJV rays may interfere with
human immune systems, including irregular immune responses to
skin cancer, contact allergies and infectious diseases.4
In April 1991, US EPA Administrator William Reilly
revealed NASA data which indicated that, since 1978, the ozone
layer over the United States has depleted at twice the rate
previously believed." The EPA estimates that based on the
new information, approximately 12 million Americans will
develop skin cancer, with over 200,000 resulting fatalities.
While this was a US-based study, the results can be
extrapolated to other geographic areas with similar ozone
layer depletion levels within the northern hemisphere. The
EPA study does not, however, take into account lifestyle
habits of sunbathing, which, if on the increase, could account
for the extra cases of skin cancer." Nevertheless, in
revealing the 4.5 to 5 percent decrease in the ozone layer,
"US EPA, CFCs and Stratospheric Ozone (Washington, DC:
Office of Public Affairs, 1987).
"Ibid.
4 "Rays of Sun May Affect Body's Immune System," Reading
Eagle (Pennsylvania) 25 December 1992, p. BlO, reprinted from
Chicago Tribune.
"EPA Weighs Fees, Other Options to Expedite Phaseout of
Ozone-Eating Chemicals," Inside EPA, 12 April 1991, p. 3.
"This observation was pointed out to me by Myles Allen,
supra, n. 20, interview, 9 3une 1992.
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the EPA chief stated that: "It is unexpected, it is disturbing
and it possesses implications we have not yet had time to
fully explore," adding that the new data called for a
"reappraisal of both US and international policy on the
control of the ozone-destroying chemicals."
This reappraisal in the form of international action to
curb ozone layer depletion has apparently begun to reap
rewards, notwithstanding the record lows of ozone depletion
reported above in this thesis. Scientists now claim that the
build-up of the industrial chemicals most responsible for
depleting the ozone layer has slowed considerably, and if the
trend continues, the increase in the chemicals should halt
before the end of this decade. The worst of the ozone
destruction should come around the turn of the century, after
the maximum load of chemicals wafts up to the stratosphere.
As the chemicals are gradually destroyed by natural processes,
the ozone layer should begin a recovery lasting 50 to 100
years
1.3 Conclusion
While much research has already been completed in the
91 "Ozone Loss Over US Is Found To Be Twice as Bad as
Predicted," New York Times, 5 April 1991, p. Al. Previous
estimates of skin cancer were only 500,000 with 9,300 deaths.
At the same time, it is important to keep in mind that
safe substitutes may not be readily available for banned CFCs.
HCFCs are currently being substituted for many CFCs, but HCFCs
also have ozone depleting properties. See, infra, Chapter 5,
Section 5.3.2, Economic Uncertainty, for a discussion of the
status of replacements for ozone depleting substances.
See, infra, Chapter 5, Section 5.1, International Action
Regarding Ozone Layer Depletion.
JW Elkins, "Decrease in the Growth Rates of Atmospheric
Chiorofluorocarbons 11 and 12," Nature Vol. 364, 26 August
1993.
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areas of climate change and ozone layer depletion, there is
still some scientific uncertainty as to their potential
effects. This factor plays a critical role regarding
international cooperation within the legal order by making
cooperation more difficult. Without substantiated scientific
data, support for international action is diminished.
Nevertheless, legally binding agreements are sometimes reached
as scientific uncertainty diminishes or even sometimes where
it remains largely undiminished, but where public opinion or
a perception of danger help drive international action. The
ozone layer depletion and climate change regimes provide
evidence of this.'° 2
 Growing scientific knowledge should
contribute to the strengthening of regulations, as within the
ozone layer depletion regime.'° 3
 Uncertainty regarding other
issues critical to the regime must also be overcome as
°°This is less true of ozone layer depletion, where
documented studies have estimated the degree of harm to
humans. Supra, Section 1.2.2, Ozone Layer Depletion.
'°'The importance of scientific certainty will be
discussed in Chapter 4.
2 Other international agreements allow for scientific
research to be taken account of as necessary, such as the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea, Art. 61, and the
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Art.
V, (amendments shall be based on scientific findings, but
other factors can also be taken into account). But as one
scholar points out, the advice taken into account "can be
disregarded or tempered to the extent necessary to secure
political agreement on reductions and on the concomitant
regulations," Patricia Birnie, "International Environmental
Law: Its Adequacy for Present and Future Needs," The
International Politics of the Environment, ed. Andrew Hurrell
and Benedict Kingsbury (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 75.
See, infra, Chapters 5 and 6, in which scientific uncertainty
has been overcome to a sufficient enough degree to allow
regime formation.
See, infra, Chapter 5.
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well, ° for the law-making process to continue.
Regimes help reveal this law-making process through their
step-by-step approach to strengthening the international legal
order, since regimes:
• . .begin with commitments 'merely' to norms and
principles, and either lack regulatory rules or possess
only very weak ones. This is exactly as it should be. If
states waited... until there was enough concern and
scientific understanding to adopt strong rules, they
would wait much too long. . . [as they] are needed early on
to help create the conditions that make strong rules
possible.. 105
The following chapter will examine the schools of thought
in international law, followed by an examination of the law
relevant to climate change and ozone layer depletion prior to
the formation of the regimes concerning those issues. Chapter
3 is concerned with the concept of regimes and why they are an
essential part of the international legal order. Then,
Chapter 4 will examine the critical issues and catalysts
specific to the climate change and ozone layer regimes and how
regimes can address the uncertainty associated with critical
issues. Chapters 5 and 6 are analyses of the climate change
and ozone layer depletion regimes. Finally, conclusions will
be drawn in Chapter 7 as to the viability of regimes within
'° 4 See, infra, Chapter 4.
'° 5 Peter M. Haas, Robert 0. Keohane and Marc A. Levy,
"Improving the Effectiveness of International Environmental
Institutions," in Institutions for the Earth, ed. Peter M.
Haas, Robert 0. Keohane and Marc A. Levy (Cambridge, Mass: MIT
Press, 1993), p. 413.
The authors define institutions as "persistent and
connected sets of rules and practices that prescribe
behavioral rules, constrain activity and shape expectations.
They may take the form of bureaucratic organizations,
regimes...or conventions..." "The Effectiveness of
International Environmental Institutions," in Institutions for
the Earth, ed. Peter M. Haas, Robert 0. Keohane and Marc A.
Levy (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1993), pp. 4-5.
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the framework of the international legal order in general.
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CHAPTER 2
"The 'acceleration of history' and the individualisation of
justice have brought about a situation inimical to the
development of... international law in its classical
sense." °
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER AND GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE
An examination of the general international law broadly
concerning climate change and ozone layer depletion is
outlined below to show the lack of applicable law for these
issue-areas prior to the formation of the climate change and
ozone layer depletion regimes.'°7
It is first necessary to outline the main approaches to
international law, in order to properly place the concept of
regimes within the international legal order and distinguish
it from other forms of controlling behaviour (such as
morality) since:
"the legally binding nature of norms of international law
distinguish them from other social norms which function
in the inter-State system (...political norms, norms of
international morality.. )108
The basic tenets of each of the main schools of thought
will be discussed below. As Oscar Schachter has pointed out,
"one could say, with only slight exaggeration, that at the
'° 6 L.F.E. Goldie,	 "Special Regimes and Pre-emptive
Activities	 In	 International	 Law,"	 International	 And
Comparative Law Quarterly Vol. 11 (July 1962), p. 677.
'° 7 See, infra, Chapters 5 and 6, for descriptions of each
regime.
108 G1 Tunkin, "On the Primacy of International Law in
Politics," in Perestroika and International Law, ed. WE Butler
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1990), pp. 6-7.
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present time the universe of international lawyers divides
roughly into the instrumentalists (ie policy-oriented) and the
positivists." Nevertheless, the naturalist school of
thought will also be addressed. The emphasis, however, is on
the policy-oriented school. It is this approach that is most
conducive to the development of thought necessary to
understand and respond to the particularly serious
environmental challenges in question, and that can best
incorporate regimes within its jurisprudential framework.
2.1 Schools of Thought
"All organised groups and structures require a system
of normative conduct - that is to say, conduct which is
regarded by each actor, and by the group as a whole, as being
°Oscar Schachter, International Law In Theory and
Practice, 2d ed. (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1991), p. 18.
In addition, with regard to a Marxist or Soviet theory of law.
Professor Rein Mullerson questions whether any former Soviet
theory of law ever existed, or if it was labelled as such more
by westerners than by those within the Soviet bloc. Thus,
while the ideology may have been different in terms of
adhering to Marxist theory, the underlying legal theory was
essentially positivist. Professor Mullerson is likewise
sceptical as to whether any Russian theory of international
law will develop any time soon, as most legal scholars there
are pursuing private interests. Even among those who are not,
he believes it may be difficult to ascertain true viewpoints
while the political situation remains unstable. Private
conversation, October 1993.
See, below, Section 2.1.3 Policy-Oriented School. In so
doing, the disciplines of international and international
relations are overcoming their "two-culture problem" in a
collaboration involving the discovery of legal sources of
obligation, as suggested by Oran Young, "Remarks," American
Society of International Law: Proceedings of the 86th Meeting,
Washington, DC (1992), p. 175.
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obligatory, and for which violation carries a price."1
Brierly similarly stated that "there can be no society without
a system of law to regulate the relations of its members with
one another." 2
 Thus, while the conduct of states may be
conditioned by factors in addition to law, a normative system
of international law "makes possible that degree of order if
society is to maximize the common good - and indeed, even to
avoid chaos in the web of bilateral and multilateral
relationships that society embraces." 3 There are, however,
various theories employed to explain the concept of
international law.
2.1.1 Naturalists
For the naturalists, international law is based on
absolute values." 4 Thus, there is an appeal to a superior
source of obligation." 5 Although different values have been
put forward as this superior source of obligation, they can be
roughly placed in two classes: those based on some religious
source, and those based on a secular source, such as a
characteristic of human nature or of the physical
"Rosalyn Higgins, "International Law and the Avoidance,
Containment and Resolution of Disputes" in Recueil des Cours
Vol. 230, 1991-V (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
1993), p. 23.
" 2 J.L. Brierly, The Law of Nations 5th ed. (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 42.
"Higgins, "International Law," supra, n. 111.
" 4 Samuel Pufendorf, On the Law of Nature and Nations
(1672), can be said to exemplify the naturalist school.
' 5 See, for example, Brierly, The Law of Nations, supra,
n. 112, p. 114, and Arthur Nussbaum, A Concise History of the
Law of Nations (NY: Macmillan, 1947).
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environment. lb Whatever the chosen source, however, critics
contend that this school of thought remains "mystic or
ideological, because the basic tenets of . . . [the] theory
ultimately prove scientifically unverifiable by others."
Vattel, while basing his works on natural law,
distinguishes between laws of morality or conscience and laws
of action, thus minimising natural law in the process, but
which nevertheless continued to exert influence over unlimited
state sovereignty. t18
 In the 20th century, the naturalists'
emphasis turned to the purposes and direction of the
international legal system. Thus, Koskenniemi suggests that
natural law obligations, once associated with divine law,
became associated with what is necessary for subsistence and
self-preservation." 9
 A distinction, then, is made between
the
"traditionalist, absolutist point of view holding that
Natural Law is a higher kind of law from which no
derogation is permitted. Positive law has to conform to
this superior law and, if it does not, it must be
considered invalid. In the more modern, relativist
view... Natural Law is a standard to which rules of
positive law should conform without necessarily being
invalidated, if this proves not to be the case."2°
While the naturalists may not at present occupy centre
stage in international legal theory, some of today's
" 6See, G.J.H. van Hoof, Rethinkin g the Sources of
International Law (Deventer: Kluwer, 1983), p. 32.
"7lbid.
" 8Malcolm Shaw, International Law, 3rd ed. (Cambridge:
Grotius Publications Ltd, 1991), p. 25.
Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia (Helsinki:
Finnish Lawyers' Publishing Company, 1989), p. 70.
' 20van Hoof, Rethinking the Sources of International Law,
supra, n. 116, pp. 33-34.
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international legal ideas and principles, such as that of
human rights in international
	 law,	 including inter-
generational rights,	 find their roots in natural law and
the relevance of ethics and justice. In addition, the
concept of international jus cogens was developed under the
strong influence of the naturalists, who claimed that states
were obliged to respect certain fundamental principles of the
international community. 23 Notwithstanding these
contributions, policy-oriented proponents, discussed below,
claim that naturalists make little contribution to a
comprehensive inquiry about empirical processes affecting
decision-making. As a result, the establishment of goals by
the use of exercises in faith, rather than common interest,
can only provoke the assertion of different and possibly
opposing goals by those professing a different faith.'24
Positivists also find fault with the natural law, particularly
its "mysticism" and unverifiability.
2.1.2 Positivists
The positivist school of international law views the
legal order as a body of authoritative rules which determine
the behaviour of individual states. Thus, values and ideals
' 21 See,	 infra,	 this	 Chapter,	 Section	 2.5.2,
Intergenerational Equity.
t22 Shaw, International Law, supra, n. 118, p. 50 and van
Hoof, Rethinking the Sources, supra, n. 116, p. 33.
t23 Thus, the idea that "jus cogens is a form of natural
law of nations... continues to enjoy support in modern legal
theory." G.M. Danilenko, Law-Making in the International
Community (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993), pp.
214-215.
' 4 Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell, Lung-Chu Chen,
Human Rights and World Public Order (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1980), pp. 68-71.
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are not a matter of legal concern for the purely positivist
school. According to Austin, the "founding father" of legal
positivism, law consists of commands from a political superior
to a political inferior:
"Every positive law, or every law simply and strictly so-
called, is set by a sovereign individual or sovereign
body of individuals, to a person or persons in a state of
subjection to its authority."2"
Austin's theory, however, "entails entirely negative
consequences with respect to international law," since it
leads him to deny international law the character of law.'27
Kelsen constructs a complex theory of positive law, which
posits a "grundnorm" from which all subordinate norms derive
their validity. In his "Pure Theory of Law," Kelsen argues
that the grundnorm of international law was international
custom as a law-creating fact: ie that states ought to behave
as they have customarily behaved.' 28
 From this norm
identifying custom as the source of law, Kelsen is able to
trace the validity of all other legal rules, including
treaties which draw their validity from the principle of pacta
sunt servanda, itself a rule of customary international
law.' 29
 In addition, Kelsen's view of a legal order requires
' 25 John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1954).
' 26 John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or the
Philosophy of Positive Law, Vol. I, 5th ed. (London, 1913), p.
34.
' 27van Hoof, Rethinking the Sources, supra, n. 116, p. 36.
"'Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law (NY:
Rinehart, 1952), pp. 307-317.
' 29 Ibid, pp. 317-365.
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the capacity of states to apply sanctions. These
sanctions do not necessarily have to be applied, but "ought"
to be, by which is meant that the application of a sanction to
a breach of a normative standard is legal, i.e. ultimately
sanctioned by the "grundnorm."
Although Kelsen takes into account the role of both
international organisations and individuals within the legal
order,Lhl he views states as the creators of normative
standards. This conviction, along with his view of
international law as a coercive, sanctioning order accentuates
the idea of a formal international legal order, with little
regard for the social processes and choices undertaken.
Kelsen's "pure" view of the primary role of states in
international law, as well as the formal separation of legal
and political processes is representative of the traditional,
positivist school of international law in which customary
norms and treaties create obligations.
Hart views law from a more sociological viewpoint,
although maintaining a positivistic outlook. For Hart, law is
a system of rules, both primary (behaviour standards) and
secondary (means of identifying, developing and changing
primary rules).' 32
 A rule of recognition provides a test for
determining whether a rule is legal; if the rule has been
created or enacted in the way stipulated by the rule of
recognition, then the rule is binding.' 3
	Thus, for Hart
30 Ibid., pp. 22-23.
'Ibid, pp. 124-139.
1 
H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1961).
' Ibid., p. 92. Dworkin finds fault with Hart's rule of
recognition, or what Dworkin refers to as "pedigree,"
disagreeing that pedigree can identify all legal rules. For
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there are two ways for a rule to acquire legal status: the
rule has been created or enacted in conformity with a
secondary rule of recognition and 2) in primitive societies,
a rule can become binding if it is accepted as a standard of
conduct 134
Hart considers international law to consist only of
primary rules, since that legal order lacks a legislature and
compulsory enforcement procedures. Thus, for Hart, the
international legal order was not a system of rules, since a
rule of recognition or basic norm has yet to evolve with which
to trace the validity of other rules. Instead, Hart believes
rules of international law are binding because they are
accepted and function as such.'35
Dworkin, the law consists not just of rules, but of principles
as well, which play a role in judicial decisions and which
cannot be dismissed as extra-legal. Principles cannot be
identified simply by consulting sources, but only through a
moral or political discussion of which principles should be
used to justify black-letter law. Taking Rights Seriously
(London: Duckworth & Co., 1977). As such, Dworkin's view of
law has been called a "natural law of political institutions,"
as well as legal idealism, van Hoof, Rethinking the Sources,
supra, n. 116, p. 50.
' 34 van Hoof, Rethinking the Sources of International Law,
supra, n. 116, p. 49.
' 35Hart, The Concept of Law, supra, n. 132, pp. 225-230.
Dworkin also disagrees with Hart's claim that a lack of
clarity in legal rules is a result of the "open texture" of
rules requiring the exercise of discretion to assist in the
invention of new rules: "The truth may be that when courts
settle previously unenvisaged questions concerning the most
fundamental rules, they g their authority to decide them
accepted after the questions have arisen and the decision has
been given." Ibid. pp. 149-150. Instead, Dworkin argues that
courts discover, and not invent, the proper principle to
determine pre-existing rights and obligations. For Dworkin,
the fundamental right to which everything can be reduced is
the right to equal concern and respect. For this, he is
criticised for resembling too closely a form of legal
idealism, as it could be open to various interpretations, van
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Hart's view of law has been labelled "new positivism" 6
in that it occupies a middle position between traditional
positivism as in Kelsen's pure view of law, and the policy-
oriented approach described below. But the views of what have
come to be called neopositivists are still not free from
criticism. Critics contend that a rule-oriented approach
fails to take account of decision or choice in the legal
process and gives insufficient attention to the policies for
which rules are devised: "divorced from policy and context,
rules are skeletons without body and soul."37
2.1.3 Policy-Oriented School
The principal competing theory to positivism views
international law as a policy-oriented process of decision-
making which conforms to shared expectations derived from
common values. Thus, the policy school arose as a challenge
to the positivists and their view of international law as a
system of rules. In addition, while sharing the view of the
legal realists that law involves policy-choices," 8 the
policy-oriented approach attempts to demonstrate that the role
Hoof, Rethinking the Sources, supra, n. 116, P. 53.
' 16van Hoof, Rethinking the Sources, supra, n. 116, p. 45.
van Hoof prefers "structural positivism."
' 37Lung-Chu Chen, An Introduction to Contemporary
International Law (Yale University Press: New Haven, 1989),
pp. 11-12.
' 38The legal realists were sceptical about claims of legal
objectivity: "the question of whether the action of the courts
is justifiable calls for an answer in nonlegal terms. To
justify or criticize legal rules in purely legal terms is
always to argue in a vicious circle." F. Cohen, Transcendental
Nonsense and the Functional Approach, Columbia Law Review,
Vol. 35 (1935), p. 810. The Realists also claimed that the
study of law must make use of the social sciences, as it does
in practice. Karl Llewellyn, "A Realistic Jurisprudence-The
Next Step," Columbia Law Review Vol. 30 (1930), p. 431.
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of international law in conflict resolution is not limited to
low-conflict situations, something the realists could not
accept. Thus, the school moved beyond the Realists into the
jurisprudence of problem solving. The challenge the approach
presents to international legal scholars is:
"(1) to develop a jurisprudence, a comprehensive theory and
appropriate methods of inquiry, which will assist the peoples
of the world to distinguish public orders based on human
dignity and public orders based either on a law which denies
human dignity or a denial of law itself for the simple
supremacy of naked force; and
(2) to invent and recommend the authority structures
(principles and procedures) necessary to a world public order
that harmonizes with the growing aspirations of the
overwhelming numbers of the peoples of the globe and is in
accord with the proclaimed values of human dignity enunciated
by the moral leaders of mankind."39
This policy-oriented or "New Haven Approach'" 40
 to
international law is best understood in terms of a map
outlining "a continuing process designed to become part of the
intelligence and appraisal	 functions of	 the world
community."" This map includes systems of public order
included within the larger context of a world social process
in which persons pursue values or preferred events through
institutions, organised and unorganised, utilizing available
' 39Myres S. McDougal and Harold D. Lasswell, "The
Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public
Order," American Journal of International Law, Vol. 53, No. 1
(January 1959), p. 28. See, also, Chapter 3, Section 3.2,
infra, Definition of Regimes.
' 40 So-called due to its association with Yale Law School
and Myres McDougal.
4 McDouga]. and Lasswell, "Systems of Public Order,"
supra, n. 139, p. 6.
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resources. These values include power, enlightenment, wealth,
skill, well-being, affection, respect and rectitude.
Within the global social process, the policy-oriented
school is concerned with the shaping and the sharing of power.
The social situation concerned with this process is labelled
an "arena":
"The identifying characteristic of an arena is a
structure of expectations shared among the members of a
community; that is, choices affecting the community are
made which, if opposed, will in all probability be
enforced against opposition."43
Thus, a process of decision-making in which choices are
made occurs. Within the arena there are various participants
including	 governments,	 international	 organ.isations,
nongovernmental organisations, pressure and interest groups,
' 42 This is a representative and not an exhaustive list.
See, Eisuke Suzuki, "The New Haven School of International
Law: An Invitation to a Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence," Yale
Studies in World Public Order Vol. 1 (1974), p. 23.
Power: making and influencing community decisions;
enlightenment: gathering, processing and disseminating
information and knowledge; wealth: production, distribution
and consumption of goods and services, control of resources;
well-being: safety, health and comfort; affection: intimacy,
friendship, loyalty, positive sentiments; respect: freedom of
choice, equality and recognition; rectitude: participation in
forming and applying norms of responsible conduct. Myres
McDougal and Michael Reisman, "International Law in Policy-
Oriented Perspective," in The Structure and Process of
International Law ed. McDonald and Johnston (1986), p. 118, W.
Michael Reisman, "The View From the New Haven School of
International Law," in American Society of International Law:
Proceedings of the 86th Annual Meeting, by the American
Society of International Law, Washington, DC (1992), p.
122.
" 3McDougal and Lasswell, "Systems of Public Order,"
supra, n. 139, p. 8.
See, also, infra, Chapter 3, for similarity to the
international relations concept of "regime."
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as	 well	 as	 individuals	 acting	 alone	 or	 through
organisations.
The perspectives of these participants may diverge and be
highly individualised. Participants continuously attempt to
achieve their own goals through their "bases of power" or
resources, made effective by various strategies used to affect
outcomes. These strategies utilise indulgences or
deprivations, resulting in isolation or coalitions of the
participants.
For this school of thought, international law is thus not
just a body of rules but a continuous process of decisions
made by authoritative decision-makers, guided by community
perspectives and choosing among policy alternatives:
"...an appropriate conception of law will include not
merely certain allegedly autonomous, technical rules,
inherited from the past, but also a whole contemporaneous
process of decision - a process in which decisions are
taken through orderly procedures by authorized decision-
makers, not by naked force or calculation of momentary
expediencies but by the reasoned relation of alternatives
in choice to fundamental community expectations about how
values should be shaped and shared."14'
Thus, the policy-oriented school takes the perspective of
the decision-maker. While the positivist is concerned with
the identification of sources of law, the policy-oriented
school is concerned with social choices encountered in
decision-making: "the prescription and application of policy
in ways that maintain community order and, simultaneously,
achieve the best possible approximation of the community's
44McDougal and Lasswell, "Systems of Public Order,"
supra, n. 139.
Ibid., pp. 8-9.
46 Myres McDougal and Associates, Studies in World Public
Order (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960), pp. 1006-1007.
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social goals."'	 The decision-making process is further
broken down into the following components: '
(1) Intelligence: Gathering, processing, and disseminating
information essential to decision making;
(2) Promoting: Advocacy of general policies and urging
proposals;
(3) Prescribing: Projecting authoritative community policies
about the shaping and sharing of values;
(4) Invoking: Provisional characterization of a certain action
as consistent or inconsistent with a prescription or law that
has been established;
(5) Applying: Final characterization and execution of
prescription in concrete situations;
(6) Appraising: Evaluating performance in decision process in
terms of community goals;
(7) Terminating: Ending a prescription or arrangement and the
social arrangements based on them.
Decision-making includes the making of the law as well as
its application though courts and other institutions. It
extends across the scope of social organization and the
hierarchy of power. Thus:
For purposes of policy-oriented inquiry, the most
appropriate [i.e., usable conception of international
law] requires emphasis not upon rules alone, but upon
rules and operations, and further, not upon authority
alone or control alone, but upon authority and control
(original emphasis)
' 47 Reisman, "New Haven School," supra, n. 142, p. 120.
' 48 See, Chen, Contemporary International Law, supra, n.
137, pp. 18-19.
' 49Myres McDougal, "The Impact of International Law Upon
National Law: A Policy-Oriented Perspective," in M. McDougal
& Associates, Studies in World Public Order, 2d ed. (New
Haven: New Haven Press, 1987), pp. 169-170. See, also, Harold
D. Lasswell and Myres S. McDougal, Jurisprudence For A Free
Society, Vols. I and II (New Haven: New Haven Press, 1992).
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2.1.3.1 Authority and Control
International law, then, is the entire process of
authoritative decision-making, involving both authority and
control. Thus:
"New Haven reserves the word 'law' for processes of
decision that are both consistent with the expectations
of rightness held by members of the community
(authoritative decisions) and effective (controlling
decisions). While the particular mix of authority and
control may vary widely, a conception of law as
authoritative and controlling decision avoids exercises
in irrelevance, whether because of absence of authority
or absence of control.'"50
Authority refers to expectations regarding the decision-
maker, while control is defined in terms of effectiveness,
thus introducing an element of power and incorporating
political and social processes into law. "...A conception of
law as authoritative and controlling decision avoids exercises
in irrelevance, whether because of absence of authority or
absence of control," 5 ' and prevents legal scholarship from
drifting off into the "fantasy lands of naked power or
semantic law." 52
 The degree of effectiveness depends on the
social and decision processes between transnational and
national communities.
Thus, in the policy-oriented school of international law,
the process of creating legal obligations depends on shared
' 50 Reisman, "New Haven School," supra, n. 142, p. 121.
' 5 'Ibid., p. 121. See, also, Rosalyn Higgins,
"Integrations of Authority and Control: Trends in the
Literature of International Law and International Relations,"
in Toward World Order and Human Dignity, ed. W. Michael
Reisman and Burns H. Weston (NY: The Free Press, 1976).
' 52 Chen, Contemporary International Law, supra, n. 137, p.
17.
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expectations of legitimacy (authority) and effectiveness
(control).	 Oscar Schachter has succinctly outlined the
policy-oriented view of legal obligations. The critical
test for obligation is the response of the target audience to
the express or implied assertion of authority, or, a test of
legitimacy and effectiveness.L54 Accordingly, five processes
are necessary for the establishment of obligatory norms:
(1) the formulation and designation of a requirement as to
behaviour in contingent circumstances;
(2) an indication that designation has been made by persons
recognized as having the competence (authority or legitimate
role) to perform that function and in accordance with
procedures accepted as proper for that purpose;
(3) an indication of the capacity and willingness of those
concerned to make the designated requirement effective in
fact;
(4) the transmittal of the requirement to those to whom it is
addressed (the target audience);
(5) the creation in the target audience of responses-both
psychological and operational-which indicate that the
designated requirement is regarded as authoritative (in the
sense specified in (3) above) and as likely to be complied
' 53 The sources of obligation in international law, as
opposed to Art. 38 sources of law, have been the centre of
debate within the discipline as there is no agreement on what
exactly establishes a source of obligation. This can best be
understood by examining Oscar Schachter's well-known "baker's
dozen" list of the proposed sources of obligation in
international law: l)consent of states, 2) customary
practice, 3) a sense of "rightness"-the juridical conscience,
4)natural law or natural reason, 5)social necessity, 6)the
will of the international community 7)direct (or "stigmatic")
intuition, 8)comnion purposes of the participants, 9)
effectiveness, lO)sanctions, ll)"systematic" goals, 12)shared
expectations as to authority, 13) rules of recognition. Oscar
Schachter, "Towards a Theory of International Obligation,"
Virg inia Journal of International Law, Vol. 8, No. 2 (1968),
p. 301.
54 Ibid., p. 311.
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with in the future in some substantial degree.
The perception as to the legitimacy of the norm is a
psychological as well as a political event. The psychological
factor is not new to international law; it has been addressed
with respect to the traditional concept of customary law and
opinio iuris.' 56
 But Schachter differs from the usual
approaches to characterising the psychological factor (consent
of states, state conduct, and the like)' 57 and instead
focuses on the expectations of the target audience. For him,
(as for the policy-oriented school) "[t]he question with
regard to any given possible norm or practice is whether the
target audience will regard it as authoritative and effective,
not simply whether it has done so in the past" (emphasis in
original).L58 Thus, for legal prescription to result under
the policy-oriented school, there must be present initially
(and continuously for the prescription to endure) a "policy
content," an "authority signal" and a "control intention."59
lssIbjd	 p. 308.
' 56 1an Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law,
4th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990) pp. 7-9.
' 57 Consent or recognition carries the risk that an
established rule of law will be seen as subject to rejection
by an individual state which claims that it no longer agrees
to it or that it had never expressly manifested its agreement.
Perception also does not necessarily involve an act of
consensual acceptance since one can perceive and recognize
authority and control without accepting it in the sense in
which a party accepts an agreement. Behaviour, while an
indicator of opinio juris, does not imply the elimination of
a psychological test. Schachter, "Theory of International
Obligation," supra, n. 153, pp. 312-314.
' 58 Ibid., p. 314.
' 59 W. Michael Reisman, "International Lawmaking: A Process
of Communication," in American Society of International Law:
Proceedings of the 75th Annual Meetin g , by the American
Society of International Law, Washington, DC (1981), pp. 108-
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Explicit content does not necessarily equal prescription,
since there may be absence of prescriptive intent. In less
formal settings, content must often be inferred. The
application of content may differ in future situations,
depending on the context.
The authority signal may also be explicit or implicit, as
well as changeable. It must be something that distinguishes
demands backed up only by credible threats from law. It is
the audience that gives the prescriber or law-maker authority.
Power entails the element of control, that those who are
prescribing intend and can make the prescription controlling.
The power "elite" will vary from circumstance to circumstance,
depending on the relevant parties. Sometimes only a few
states will be critical. The objectives of the parties, the
importance they attach to the norm in question and the
investment they are willing to make to sustain the
prescription are all important. Control does not require
unanimity or even wide consensus: norms are effective because
some elites have enough interest to make them effective.
The "overriding aim [of the policy-oriented school] is to
clarify and aid in the implementation of a universal order of
human dignity." 16° Within the decision-making process, the
policy-oriented school outlines five intellectual tasks
towards achieving that objective to be performed by those
involved in decision-making, including: clarification of
goals, analysis of past trends to examine the degree to which
the goal has been achieved in past decisions, analysis of the
113.	 See,	 also Schachter,	 "Theory of	 International
Obligation," supra, n. 153.
eMcDougal and Lasswell, "Systems of Public Order,"
supra, n. 139, p. 11.
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factors that influenced past decisions, projection of future
trends with regard to different decision options, and the
invention and evaluation of policy alternatives in order to
achieve the preferred goal.t'
2.1.3.2 Criticisms
Notwithstanding the attraction of the policy-oriented
school to those concerned with integrating power and
authority, the school has been the subject of much criticism.
"Common criticisms are that the system's meta-language is
hard to understand; that its approach is open-ended and
susceptible to subjective manipulation; that it generates
more uncertainty about law than it provides general and
stable guidance for conduct; that the entire approach is
too complex, cumbersome, and demanding to apply; and that
it is merely a wordy way of stating the obvious."62
Specifically, a "key issue in the controversy between the
policy-oriented and rule-oriented schools (positivists) [is]
the question whether specific rules and principles of
international law may legitimately be overridden by policies
or major purposes of the States concerned.lb3
Ibid.
' 2 Chen, Contemporary International Law, supra, n. 137, p.
21.
' 63 Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice,
supra, n. 109, p. 22. Recent research attempted to "bridge
the theories" of the positivist and policy-oriented schools in
order to appraise the influence of international law on
decision making in the context of conflict resolution. See
Joaquin Tascan, The Dynamics of International Law in Conflict
Resolution (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992). The
conclusion of that research was that international law
consisted of the application of legal knowledge (formal and
informal sources of law, as well as expectations) to policy-
making. More importantly, the effectiveness of international
law can be evaluated in terms of the voluntary or constrained
changes of the mind and attitude that the disputing parties
experience as a direct result of efforts to apply and clarify
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In reply to the above criticism, it is necessary to
outline the essence or necessity of the New Haven School,
which can be summed up with regard to its role in three
critical areas of law-making: determining legal obligation
when there are competing legal principles at play, when legal
rules have fallen into disuse and when new legal rules have
come into existence.' 64
 In each of these three areas, policy
must be taken into account to determine the existence and
context of legal obligation. This does not mean that the
traditional sources of international law are discarded.
Rather, policy is taken into account during the decision-
making process in order to determine the presence (or not) of
a legal norm "by the use of analogy, by reference to context,
and by analysis of the alternative consequences." 65 Thus,
". . .International law is most usefully conceived, not as
a pre-existing body of rules, but as a comprehensive
process of authoritative decision in which rules are
continuously made and remade; the function of the rules
of international law is to communicate the perspectives
(demands, identifications, and expectations) of the
peoples of the world about this comprehensive process of
decision; and that the rational application of these
rules	 in	 particular	 instances	 requires	 their
interpretation, like that of any other communication, in
terms of who is using them, with respect to whom, for
what purposes (major and minor), and in what
context. ,166
More importantly, the intellectual tasks of the lawyer
legal knowledge. This can not be done by viewing
international law as an "objective, binding and almost
enforceable set of rules," p. 227 (emphasis in original).
' 64Rosalyn Higgins, series of private conversations,
October 1993. Higgins is a disciple of the policy-oriented
school, having studied under McDougal.
' 65Higgins, "International Law," supra, n. lii, p. 34.
' 66Myres McDougal, "A Footnote," American Journal of
International Law Vol. 57, No. 2 (April 1963), p. 383.
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and scholar outlined above cannot be carried out irrespective
of policy considerations. This is particularly true with
regard to situations such as:
(1) the "quasi-legislative" activities of the "General
Assembly and other UN bodies purporting to lay down,
expressly or by implication, requirements of state
conduct or to terminate or modify existing requirements;"
(2) "the recognition of so-called 'rules of the
game, ' based on implicit understandings or
unilateral actions;"
(3) "the social revolutions which have overturned
traditional orders and have challenged the
assumptions on which prior conceptions of authority
were based;"
(4) "the growing interdependence of states-
especially in economic and technological
activities-has vastly increased patterns of
cooperation and reciprocal behaviour which have not
been institutionalised in the traditional modes of
lawmaking;"
(5) "the increased 'permeability' of national
States has resulted in a diminishing barrier
between matters of international concern and those
of domestic jurisdiction, (due mostly to the force
of the UN Charter bringing domestic activities
before collective organs for appraisal on the base
of international criteria);" and
(6) "the expansion of science and technology with
international impact both beneficial and harmful
has given rise to informal means of setting
standards and exercising supervision without
entering into tight and tidy legal instruments."t'1
What was true in 1968 is even more true today,
particularly in light of such occurrences as the breaking up
of the Soviet bloc and Yugoslavia, and the humanitarian
intervention in Somalia. Some of these trends can also be
seen in the area of climate change and ozone layer depletion:
blSchachter	
"A Theory of International Obligation,"
supra, n. 153, pp. 302-303.
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notably, the global impact of environmental problems as well
as the expansion of science; ' economic and technological
interdependence; and the involvement of the United
Nations. =
Thus, reliance on rules alone, or the trend of past
decisions, especially when that trend is not clear, is of
little assistance when attempting to deal with a changing
political world. The emphasis and concern with policy
alternatives for the future, then, is necessary, since a
"jurisprudence which purports to be 'scientific' only is [not]
adequate. "' While
"international law has its own inbuilt methods for change
(treaty revision, progressive development through the
International Law Commission, codification, c.ustom)...
these methods... are slow. Hence, to rely merely on
accumulated past decisions (rules), where their context
has changed and their content is unclear, is to encourage
contempt among international relations scholars."172
Brief mention should be made here of
	 legal
functionalism.' 73
 While not a framework of inquiry such as
lb8See infra, Chapter 4, Section 4.1.1.1, Scientific
Uncertainty.
' 69 See infra, Chapter 4, Sections 4.1.2, Critical Issue of
Economics, and 4.1.3, Critical Issue of Development.
' 70 See discussion of role of the General Assembly-created
International Negotiating Committee in climate change
negotiations, infra, Chapter 6, Section 6.1, International
Action Regarding Climate Change.
1" 'McDougal, "The Impact of International Law," supra, n.
149, p. 140.
' 72 Higgins, "Integrations of Authority and Control,"
supra, n. 151, p. 83.
17 See, for example, Clarence Jenks, Law in the World
Community (London: Longmans, 1967), Wolfgang Friedmann, The
Changing Structure of International Law (NY: Columbia
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the policy-oriented school, 	 it is a "jurisprudential
orientation that generates a certain style of inquiry and
concentrates on certain sorts of legal developments.
Functionalism's aim is to examine those activities not
considered politically significant, concentrating on the "role
of law at the margins of international conflict." Thus,
the functionalists claim that, where the vital interests of
states are concerned, states will not be concerned with rules
of international law. Where non-vital interests are at stake,
however, such as telecommunications, postal services, etc.,
states are willing to support international law and
organisations serving it.
However, regardless of the degree of political interest,
because "the legal process is part of the process of decision
which in turn is part of the social process as a whole,"'76
law and politics cannot be separated, no matter how critical
the issue. Thus, the "halfway house" approach of
functionalism is damaging in that, while it claims to deal
with policy, it does not provide a systematic structure for
University Press, 1964). Legal functionalism builds on the
work of David Mitrany, A Working Peace System: An Ar gument for
the Functional Development of International Organization
(1943)
' 74See, Richard Falk, The Status of Law in International
Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970) p. 463.
' 75Richard Falk, "New Approaches to the Role of
International Law," American Journal of International Law Vol.
61, No. 2 (April 1967), p. 492.
76 Lasswel1 and McDougal, Jurisprudence, supra, n. 149, p.
335. See, also, W. Michael Reisman, "The New Haven School,"
supra, n. 142, pp. 118-125.
The policy-oriented school, however, does not digress
into the realm of critical legal theory, as the school
believes choice is necessary because rules are incomplete or
missing, not because rules are contradictory.
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doing so.
	
The policy-oriented approach does provide that
structure.
This thesis argues that the best choice is the policy-
oriented approach to international law-making. This process
of decision-making does not avoid, like other schools, the
essential relationship between law and policy, but deals with
it openly and systematically, instead of achieving
unconsciously desired policy objectives which are then given
the label of "correct legal rule." 79 Because, moreover, the
policy-oriented approach can accomplish this, which neither
the naturalists nor the positivists attempt to do, it is
conducive to the inclusion and study of international regimes
within the international legal order. This does not mean, as
already stated, that the approach ignores rules; rules play a
vital part in the process of lawmaking. In this school's
view, focusing on the traditional view of the sources of law
is not wrong, but is an incomplete approach to law.
Accordingly, these sources will now be examined.
' 77 1-iiggins, "Integrations of Authority and Control,"
supra, n. 151, p. 90.
' 78 There is also a movement within international law to
reveal the systemic basis of international law. This approach
attempts to investigate the effect of the international system
on the role of international law. Richard Falk and Saul
Mendlovitz have attempted to use systems analysis to analyze
the prospects and obstacles of transition from one
international system to another, in order to provide a set of
universal values for the decision-maker. See, Morton Kaplan
and Nicholas Katzenbach, The Political Foundations of
International Law (1961). However, this does not remove the
problem of choice that the decision-maker faces, which the
systems method advocates through "universal values." See,
Higgins, "Integrations of Authority and Control," supra, n.
151, p. 91.
'Higgins, "International Law," supra, n. 111, pp. 28-29.
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2.2 The Sources of International Law
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) lists what are generally considered to be the
traditional sources of international law: international
conventions, international custom and the general principles
of law recognized by civilised nations. Included as
subsidiary sources are judicial decisions and the writings of
highly qualified publicists.' 80
	Each of these will be
discussed in turn.
2.2.1	 International Conventions or Treaties
International conventions or treaties are agreements
governed by international law, binding only upon the parties
to the particular agreement unless the treaty represents or
comes to represent customary law.' 8' Thus, it is an
"obligation of international law voluntarily undertaken - or,
if it be preferred, the instrument whereby such an obligation
is undertaken. l82
The 1969 Vienna Convention on Treaties sets out
conventional rules for treaties concluded after 1980, when the
' 80See, Ian Brownlie, Basic Documents in Public
International Law, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), p.
397.
' 81Brownlie, Public International Law, supra, n. 156, p.
12.
' 82Clive Parry, The Sources and Evidences of International
Law (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1965), p. 29.
There is a distinction sometimes made between law making
treaties and treaty contracts, with the difference being that
treaty contracts are between relatively few parties and so
only create law as between the parties, while treaties with
many signatories create "legal obligations the observance of
which does not dissolve the treaty obligation." Brownhie,
Public International. Law, supra, n. 156, pp. 11-13.
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Convention came into force. The three basic approaches to
treaty interpretation; literal (centring on the actual text of
the agreement and emphasising the analysis of the words used),
the effective (intentions of the parties), and the
teleological (object and purpose of the treaty), are all taken
account of in the Convention. t84
 To confirm interpretation
of the treaty in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the
words in their context and in the light of the treaty's object
and purpose, recourse may be had to supplementary means of
interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty
and the circumstances of its conclusion.' 85
 This recourse is
also allowed where the interpretation leaves the meaning
ambiguous or obscure or leads to a manifestly absurd
unreasonable result. 186
The Convention also allows for reservations so long as
the reservation is not incompatible with the object and
purposes of the treaty, or unless the treaty prohibits
reservations or permits only specific kinds of
reservations.' 87
 While reservations encourage greater number
' 83 Reprinted in International Legal Materials Vol. 8, No.
4 (1970), pp. 679-735. Provisions of the Convention such as
the rules on interpretation, material breach and fundamental
change of circumstances are considered to be customary law.
Shaw, International Law, supra, n. 118, p. 561. See also,
Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984).
' 84Vienna Convention, supra, n. 183, Art. 31, 32. See
also, Sinclair, Vienna Convention, supra, n. 183, and Shaw,
International Law, supra, n. 118, p. 584.
' 85Vienna Convention, supra, n. 183, Art. 32.
'86Ibid.
' 87 Ibid., Art. 19-23. See, also, Shaw, International Law,
supra, n. 118, pp. 570-576, and Brownlie, Public International
Law, supra, n. 156, pp. 608-610, Reservations to Genocide
Convention Case, ICJ Reports (1951), p. 15.
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of parties, writers point out that reservations tend to
undermine the effectiveness of treaties, "by enabling states
to protect their economic and other interests." This has
affected, for example, the Convention on Trade in Endangered
Species, where objecting Parties are not bound to trade
restrictions	 concerning	 species	 listed	 in	 treaty
appendices. 189
 On the other hand, the impermissibility of
reservations in the Law of the Sea Convention has prevented a
sufficient number of ratifications needed for the treaty to
enter into force. As stated above, however, the issue of
reservations is closely linked to uncertainty regarding
economic and other issues which prevent substantive
agreements, and so might be overcome as uncertainty is
overcome.
The concept of lus cogens is also recognised in the
Vienna Convention, whereby states cannot opt out of the
observance of certain basic norms of international law. Thus,
there are "rules of customary law which cannot be set aside by
treaty or acquiescence but only by the formation of a
subsequent customary rule of contrary effect."' The
Convention describes a peremptory norm as that which is
"accepted and recognised by the international community of
States as a whole... ,192	 The concept is controversial,
however. Erownile points out that "more authority exists for
' 88 Patricia W. Birnie & Alan E. Boyle, International Law
& the Environment (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 14.
'89Ibid.
190 See, infra, Chapter 4.
' 91 Brown].ie, Public International Law, supra, n. 156, p.
513, citing prohibition on the use of force, genocide, racial
non-discrimination, crimes against humanity, and prohibition
against slavery and piracy.
t2jflfl Convention, supra, n. 183, Art. 53.
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the category of jus cogens than exists for its particular
content. 1
Nevertheless, it can be argued that the acceptance of
certain norms as fundamental "would represent an advancement
and refinement in the international legal system, and the
system for this step forward does not depend on itself, but
rather upon its principal participants, states.' 94 Norms of
lus cogens, then, would not retain their peremptory status if
the world community as a whole did not regard them as such.
Thus, "the status of norms that we hold dear is to be
protected by our efforts to invoke and apply them, in turn
ensuring that they do not totally lose the support of the
great majority of States." 15
 As such, advancement is
possible and the observance of how these and other legal norms
develop can only help in the development of such norms.'6
Once treaties have entered into force, they are binding
on the parties under the customary principle of pacta sunt
servanda. Non-parties can become bound to treaty provisions
should they become part of customary law, so long as the
provision is "of a fundamentally norm-creating character such
as could be regarded as forming the basis of a general rule of
law." 1
	Third parties can also become bound by treaties
' 3Brownlie, Public International Law, supra, n. 156, pp.
514-415.
M.M Wallace, International Law, 2d ed. (London:
Sweet & Maxwell, 1992), p. 33.
l5jggjfl5, "International Law," supra, n. 111, pp. 48-49.
LhSee infra, chapters 3, 5, 6.
' 97See, North Sea Continental Shelf Case, ICJ Reports
(1969), p. 41. Baxter argues that the idea of "norm-creating"
is redundant, since if a rule does pass into international
law, it is norm-creating. Recueil des Cours I Vol. 129 (1970),
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providing benefits or obligations for them as long as the
third parties agree, which must be in writing for an
obligation.
While treaties may be successful in achieving binding
rules, they also have drawbacks. Treaties may take a long
time to negotiate, as well as to enter into force. This can
be due both to delays regarding individual state ratification
and political unwillingness to enter into the treaty.
Examples of uncertainty inherent in preventing development of
international law will be examined, infra, in Chapter 4, and
discussed in regard to ozone layer depletion and climate
change in Chapters 5 and 6.
Long delays may not always occur, however, as
"multilateral treaties can provide an efficient means of
urgent global or regional law-making when necessary."20°
Treaties can overcome delay by providing a "framework" of
general obligations and avoiding contentious areas of
substantive obligations until such time when agreement is more
forthcoming. Both the Vienna Convention on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer and the Framework Convention on
p. 62.
'Vienna Convention, supra, n. 183, Art. 34, 35, 36.
Certain treaties creating rights and duties for third states
have been labelled "objective regimes," such as treaties for
international waterways, demilitarization, and those creating
organizations. The International Law Commission, however,
rejected this concept. Brownhie, Public International Law,
supra, n. 156, p. 633.
'"van Hoof, Rethinking the Sources of International Law
supra, n. 116, p. 120.
200Birnie and Boyle, International Law & The Environment
supra, n. 188, p. 12.
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Climate Change follow this approach. 201
 Further protocols
can be added as agreement is reached regarding scientific and
technical issues. This can be seen in the development of the
ozone layer depletion regime, infra, Chapter 5. In addition,
treaties sometimes provide for protocols or annexes to be
amended separately from the basic treaty, thus allowing for
easier revision.
The references made above to delays and possible
solutions are important, since they indicate that there are
factors critical or catalytic to treaty formation and
development within the legal order. The determination and
observance of these factors would seem to be an important
consideration for international legal scholars. 202
 This is
true not only for those involved in the negotiations at hand,
but also for legal scholars seeking to learn lessons from past
treaty negotiations for application to future negotiations.
Regimes can aid in the study of such legal development.103
2.2.2	 Customary Law
Regarding customary law, the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) stated in The Case of Nicaragua v. United States
that:
(T]he Court has to emphasize that, as was observed in
the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, for a new
customary rule to be formed, not only must the acts
concerned 'amount to a settled practice', but they must
201 See, infra, Chapters 5 and 6. Other examples include
the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution,
infra, this chapter, and the UNEP Regional Seas Conventions.
202 See, infra, Chapter 4, for a discussion of the critical
issues and catalysts that may determine this sense of
"urgency" for global environmental change, as well as future
protocols.
203 5ee, infra, Chapter 3.
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be accompanied by the opinio juris sive necessitatis.2'4
Thus, "customary international law results from a general
and consistent practice of states followed by them from a
sense of legal obligation." 205
 Various alternative theories
for the necessity of both opinio juris and practice for the
formation of customary law have been put forth. These include
a focus on the objective element or practice alone, 206
 and
a focus on the subjective element or opinio juris alone.207
Yet the ICJ and PCIJ have always stressed the need that both
elements be present for the formation of customary law.209
In principle, customary international law binds all
states whether or not they have given formal consent, unless,
as is widely accepted, a state persistently objects to the
rule while it is being formed. 209
 Thus, "new norms require
204Case of Nicaragua v. United States (Merits), ICJ
Reports, (1986), p. 14.
205American Law Institute, Restatement (Revised) Foreign
Relations Law of the United States (St. Paul, MN: American
Institute Publishers, 1987), section 102(2), p. 24.
206Proponents of this view include Lazare Kopelmanas,
"Custom as a Means of the Creation of International Law,
British Yearbook of International Law Vol. 28 (1937), pp. 127-
151, and Kelsen, Principles of International Law, supra, n.
128.
207See, Bin Cheng, "United Nations Resolutions on Outer
Space: 'Instant' International Customary Law?" Indian Journal
of International Law Vol. 5 (1965), pp. 23-48.
208Nicaragua, supra, n. 204, North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases (FRG v Denmark, FRG v Netherlands) ICJ Reports 1969, p.
3.
209Brownlie, Public International Law, supra, n. 156, pp.
10-12, Mark E. Villiger, Customary International Law and
Treaties (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985),
stating that objections must be maintained from the early
stages of the rule, through formation and beyond, and must be
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both practice and opinio juris before they can be said to
represent customary international law. And so it is with the
gradual death of existing norms and their replacement by
others." 21 ° The requirements and determination of practice
and opinio juris, however, have given rise to considerable
controversy within international law.
While it is generally agreed that state practice includes
conscious acts or abstentions that have direct or physical
consequences, as well as entry into binding agreements, there
is some divergence in national digests of state practice and
disagreement among scholars as to what other acts, such as
claims and statements, are and should be treated as examples
of state practice.
Brownlie includes the following within state practice:
"diplomatic correspondence, policy statements, press
releases, the opinions of official legal advisers,
official manuals on legal questions, eg manuals of
military law, executive decisions and practices, orders
to naval forces etc., comments by governments on drafts
produced by the International Law Commission, state
legislation, international and national judicial
decision, recitals in treaties and other international
instruments, a pattern of treaties in the same form, the
practice of international organs and resolutions relating
to legal questions in the United Nations General
Assembly. 211
Akehurst includes physical acts, claims, declarations in
maintained consistently, p. 16. But see Jonathan I. Charney,
British Yearbook of International Law Vol. 56 (1985), pp. 1-
24, who claims that while states "in theory or in a court of
law... may invoke the persistent objector rule, the realities
of the societal pressure will require either that they conform
to the new rule or that a new accommodation be reached."
210Higgins, "International Law," supra, n. 111, p. 48.
'Brownlie, Public International Law, supra, n. 156, p.
5.
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abstracto such as General Assembly resolutions, national laws,
national judgments and omissions. 2 Thus, under his view
General Assembly Resolutions can qualify as state practice if
they claim to be declaratory of existing law, with the value
of such resolutions depending on factors such as voting
numbers and reasons for votes.2'
The Restatement includes in state practice "diplomatic
acts and instructions as well as public measures and other
governmental acts and official statements of policy, whether
they are unilateral or undertaken in cooperation with other
states." Inaction may also constitute state practice.214
D'Amato, however, restricts state practice to those acts
having physical consequences, such as nuclear weapon testing,
which provide concrete evidence of state practice. Thus, for
D'Amato, statements and claims, including General Assembly
Resolutions do not qualify as state practice since they are
poor indicators of what states will actually do.215
2 Michael Akehurst, "Custom as a Source of International
Law," British Yearbook of International Law Vol. 47 (1975),
pp. 1-53.
2T3 Ibid., pp. 6-7. The Restatement follows similar
reasoning, examining the"subject of the resolution, whether it
purports to reflect legal principles, how large a majority it
commands and how numerous and important are the dissenting
states, whether it is widely supported (including in
particular the states principally affected), and whether it is
later confirmed by state practice." Restatement, supra, n.
204, Sec. 102, Reporters' note 2, p. 31
214 Restatement, supra, n. 204, Section 102, Comment B, p.
25.
215AA D'Amato, The Concept of Custom in International Law
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971), pp.89-90, 78-79,
although, for D'Amato, resolutions can constitute the "element
of articulation" for a customary rule, see, infra, on opinio
juris.
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Although there is disagreement regarding the content of
state practice, the general view appears to be that "state
practice covers any act or statements by a state from which
views about customary law may be inferred," 2 including
omissions to act and silence. While individuals may play a
role in pressuring state behaviour, usually through non-
governmental organisations, 217 it is state behaviour that
remains the decisive factor. The ICJ has taken notice of
unilateral declarations in the Nuclear Test case, 218 and the
North Sea Continental Shelf case. 218 Omissions were
considered in the Lotus case. 22° In addition, the Court has
accepted General Assembly Resolutions and resolutions of other
international organizations as state practice.22
The extent of practice necessary to qualify as customary
law is not clear.	 The 1C3 has mentioned "general
acceptance" 222 	and	 "extensive"223	 state	 practice.224
216Akehurst, "Custom as a Source," supra, n, 212, p.10.
See, also, Birnie & Boyle, International Law & the
Environment, supra, n. 188, P. 17, stating "most, but not all,
lawyers now agree that we should not take too narrow a view of
what constitutes state practice for the purpose of identifying
customary law."
217See, infra, Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2.1, International
Organisat ions.
218See, infra, Section 2.4.1, Prevention of Environmental
Harm.
219Supra, n. 208, regarding the Truman Proclamation of
1945.
220PC1J, Series A, No. 10 (1927), p. 28. See, also
discussion infra, on opinio juris.
221Nicaragua, supra, n. 204, para 202-205.
222Fisheries Jurisdiction (UK v. Iceland) ICJ Reports
1974, 23-26.
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Regarding duration and consistency, "most jurists accept as a
general rule that duration has an inverse relationship to
consistency: the shorter the duration of a practice, the more
consistent it must have been." The ICJ in the North Sea
Continental Shelf cases stated the necessity of "virtually
uniform" state practice. 2
 In the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries
case, "substantial uniformity" was required, thus allowing for
some inconsistency 227
 while in the Asylum case the ICJ found
state practice too inconsistent to establish customary
law. 228
 Thus, Brownlie states that uniformity and
consistency of practice is "very much a matter of appreciation
and a tribunal will have considerable freedom of determination
in many cases"228
In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ agreed that opinio juris
needed to be confirmed by state practice. But the Court added
that state practice did not have to be universally consistent,
so long as inconsistent conduct is treated as an exception to
the rule, and not an indication of a new rule:
' 23North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra, n. 208, p.
43.
224 Brownlie states that the "International Court does not
emphasise the time element as such in its practice," Public
International Law, supra, n. 156, p. 5.
22 H.C.M. Charlesworth, "Customary International Law and
the Nicaragua Case," Australian Yearbook of International Law
Vol. 11 (1983-87), p. 7.
226North Sea, supra, n. 208, p. 43.
221Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case, ICJ Reports (1951) pp.
131, 138.
2 ' 8Asylum (Columbia v Peru), ICJ Reports (1950), p. 277.
22 Brownlie, Public International Law, supra, n. 156, p.
5-6 where he cites the Asylum case in which the Court could
not find any constant and uniform usage.
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"The conduct of States, should, in general, be consistent
with such rules, and that instances of State conduct
inconsistent with a given rule should generally have been
treated as breaches of that rule, not a indications of
the recognition of a new rule. If a State acts in a way
prima facie incompatible with a recognized rule, but
defends its conduct by appealing to exceptions or
justifications contained within the rule itself, then
whether or not the State's conduct is in fact justifiable
on that basis, the significance of that attitude is to
confirm rather than weaken the rule."23°
Opinio juris, because it is a psychological as opposed to
a material element, is difficult to identify; problems of
proof arise. In the Lotus case, the PCIJ found that customary
law had not been established, as there was no evidence that
states had refrained from criminal prosecution because they
had been conscious of a duty to do so. 23 ' In the North Sea
Continental Shelf cases, the ICJ found no evidence that states
had felt legally obligated to act in a certain way. 212 Thus,
the Court seemed to require "unequivocal evidence of a
consciousness of legal obligation." 233
 How this is to be
revealed is not clear: "occasionally the Court seems to have
identified opinio juris in state practice itself. The Lotus
and North Sea Continental Shelf cases imply, however, that
evidence of opinio juris is to be found mainly in explicit
statements made by states about the reasons for their actions
or abstentions. ,234
230Nicaragua, supra, n. 204 p. 98.
231 Supra, n. 220, p. 28.
232 Supra, n. 208, pp. 44-45.
233 Charlesworth, "Customary International Law," supra, n.
225, p. 10.
233 1bid. See, also, Brownlie, supra, Public International
Law, n. 156, pp. 7-10.
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Attempts have been made to deal with the difficulties of
establishing opinio juris. D'Amato states that opinio juris
is satisfied if "an objective claim of international legality
is articulated in advance of, or concurrently with, the act
[or abstention] which will constitute the quantitative
elements of custom." In so doing, a state will give notice of
legal implications. 2
 Akehurst also accepts statements by
states as more important than actual belief by the state in
the truth of the statement.236
In Nicaragua, the ICJ stated that opinio juris could be
deduced "with all due caution" from the attitudes of the
parties concerned and other states toward certain General
assembly resolutions, particularly the Declaration on Friendly
Relations. 237
 The Court stated that state consent to such
resolutions was "an acceptance of the validity of the rule or
set of rules declared by the resolutions themselves."28
Thus, a customary rule included in a treaty does not
discontinue its status as a customary rule with its ensuing
obligations.
Notwithstanding the Nicaragua case, the legal value of
General Assembly resolutions continues to be debated. Higgins
describes the various views as part of a spectrum, ranging
from those sceptical about the relevance of the resolutions to
235D'Amato, Concept of Custom, supra, n. 215, pp. 74-75.
236Akehurst, "Custom as a Source," supra, n. 212, p. 37,
giving the example of the Truman Declaration.
27Nicaragua, supra, n. 204, pp. 99-100.
238 1bid., p. 100. The ICJ also found additional proof of
opinio juris in the International Law Commission's draft
articles on the Law of Treaties which stated that the
prohibition on the use of force was a "conspicuous example" of
a rule of jus cogens, as well as the prohibition of force as
outlined in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975.
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the middle of the spectrum, where resolutions may be evidence
of developing trends of customary law to the radical end,
where there are those who give "considerably greater legal
significance" to resolutions.'
The Court in the Nicaragua case has come under criticism
for its view of the formation of customary law:
"It [the IC.J] envisages certain actions (such as
participation in treaties or voting for resolutions in
international fora) as constituting both state practice
and opinio juris and thus giving rise readily to an
"instant" customary law... Thus a significant
international obligation can be created by non-objection
to a consensus resolution."240
D'Amato agrees, claiming the "Court.. .completely
misunderstands customary law" with regard to state practice
and opinio juris: "First, a customary rule arises out of state
practice; it is not necessarily to be found in UN resolutions
and other majoritarian political documents. Second, opinio
juris had nothing to do with 'acceptance' of rules in such
documents. Rather, opinio juris is a psychological element
associated with the formation of a customary rule as a
characterization of state practice."24'
In addition to theoretical debates concerning custom,
there are practical concerns as well. Unfortunately for
pressing issues of international importance, customary law
usually takes time to develop, although it is possible for
239 She considers herself part of the middle of the
spectrum, see, "International Law," supra, n. 111, p. 52.
24 Charlesworth, "Customary International Law," supra, n.
225, p. 170.
241 Anthony D'Amato, "Trashing Customary International
Law," American Journal of International Law Vol. 81, No. 1
(January 1989), p. 102
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customary law to develop quickly or even on a regional or
bilateral basis. 142
 However, it is difficult for any
semblance of universal state practice to develop at all, let
alone quickly, when there are an ever increasing number of
states joining international society, particularly where
issue-areas are global in nature, such as climate change and
ozone layer depletion. 243
 Thus, "...customary law provides
limited means of social engineering, and there is a particular
need for the development of new institutions, standards, and
localized regimes to deal with the protection of the
environment. 244
Brownlie, however, is quick to point out that customary
rules should not be undervalued as they provide the basis for
the development of the law. 245
	Indeed, since the time
242 See, Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law,
supra, n. 156, pp. 4-11. and DJ Harris, Cases and Materials on
International Law, 4th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1991),
pp. 25-46.
243 Kirgis offers an interesting description of how
customary law is established. He views the elements of custom
as interchangeable along a sliding scale. Thus, "as the
frequency and consistency of the practice decline in any
series of cases, a stronger showing of opinio luris is
required. At the other end of the scale, a clearly
demonstrated opinio luris establishes a customary rule without
much (or any) affirmative showing that governments are
consistently behaving in accordance with the asserted rule.
Exactly how much state practice will substitute for an
affirmative showing of an opinio juris, and how clear a
showing will substitute for consistent behaviour, depends on
the activity in question and on the reasonableness of the
asserted customary rule." Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., "Custom on
a Sliding Scale," American Journal of International Law Vol.
81, No. 1 (January 1987), p. 149.
244 1an Brownlie, "A Survey of International Customary
Rules of Environmental Protection", Natural Resources Journal
Vol. 13, No. 2 (April 1973), p. 179.
2451bid.
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Brownlie made that statement in the context of the
environment, international environmental law has developed
greatly. Many new concepts such as the precautionary
principle, conuion concern and intergenerational equity,241
introduced in various documents and resolutions, may become
part of customary law eventually.
Customary law has been described as part of a "process of
continuous interaction, of continuous demand and response"
among the decision-makers of different states which "create
expectations that effective power will be restrained and
exercised in certain uniformities of pattern." 248 By
describing custom in this way, an evaluation is made of the
several interdependent features of the process of customary
prescription which might aid in determining the degree to
which participants share expectations about their future
behaviour. Under this policy-oriented view, international
custom, refers to the flow of communication and acts of
collaboration among persons across national state boundaries
which create expectations among them regarding the
requirements of future decision in the shaping and sharing of
all values or preferred events. 249
 As this thesis is
adopting the policy-oriented approach to international law,
then this view of customary law will also be adopted.
246See, infra, Chapters 5 and 6 for the development of
international law in the area of ozone layer depletion and
climate change.
241 See, infra, this Chapter, Section 2.5, New Concepts.
248Myres McDougal, "Editorial Comment," American Journal
of international Law Vol. 49, No. 3 (July 1955), pp. 357-358.
249 K. Venkata Raman, "The Role of the International court
of Justice in the Development of International Customary Law,"
in Proceedings of the American Society of International Law
(1965), Washington, DC, p. 171.
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2.2.3	 General Principles of Law
General principles of law are difficult to define
precisely. Although the drafters apparently had two aims in
mind: 1) they wished to expand the sources of international
law by introducing natural law principles into international
relations and 2) to avoid the possibility of the Court
declaring itself incompetent through lack of applicable rules
(non liquet), 25° as Brownlie has noted: "In the committee of
jurists which prepared the Statute there was no very definite
consensus on the precise significance of the phrase,"25'
Consequently, there is disparity regarding the extent to
which general principles are considered sources of law.52
Jennings points out that "it seems possible to hold either
that the general principles are a distillation from some
essential notions found in municipal laws generally.., or that
it means nothing more or less than the principles of natural
law." 253 While Jennings cautions against the dangers of
general principles, he concludes that on balance the provision
is a "salutary addition to Article 38 if used with caution,"
as it allows apparent gaps in the law to be turned into
opportunities for progressive development.254
The Restatement (Revised) of the Foreign Relations Law of
250Antonio Cassese, International Law in a Divided World
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 170-171.
251 Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law,
supra, n. 156, p. 15.
252 Louis Henkin, Richard Crawford Pugh, Oscar Schachter
and Hans Smit, International Law: Cases and Materials, 2d ed.,
(St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1987), pp. 117-129.
253 R.Y. Jennings, Recueil des Cours II (1967), p. 339.
254 1bid., p. 340.
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the United States categorises general principles as only a
supplementary source of international law. 2
 One academic
notes that:
even Verdross, one of the most authoritative and staunch
advocates of the importance of Art. 38, conceded in 1968
that the role of the principles' had greatly dwindled as
a result of their gradual absorption into treaty and
customary law.25
Alexandre Kiss, however, points out that the underlying
concept of general principles, identifying common principles,
remains valid. 257
 The importance of the principles lies with
their ability to fill in gaps within international law. There
is a problem, however, with the lack of general principles
that are applicable in specific areas, or, being applicable,
they are vague and unhelpful.258
Nevertheless, general principles remain a valid source of
international law, and are useful in non liquet situations.
As international law develops, then more general principles
may become accepted as international law.
2.2.4	 Subsidiary Sources
Judicial decisions and the writings of publicists are
255 Restatement, supra, n. 205, section 102, pp. 24-25.
256Antonio Cassese, International Law In A Divided World,
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 173-174 quoting A.
Verdross, "Les principles generaux du droit dans la systeme
des sources du droit international public," in Hommage
Guggenheim (Geneva, 1968), p. 530.
57A1exandre Kiss and Dinah Shelton, International
Environmental Law (New York: Transnational Publishers, Inc.,
1991), p. 107.
258Birnie and Boyle note that the most prevalent use of
principles concern procedure, evidence and jurisdiction,
International Law & The Environment, supra, n. 188, p. 24.
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included in the ICJ Statute as subsidiary sources of
international law. While they do not qualify as formal
sources under the Statute, they both can contribute to the
development of international law.
Although ICJ decisions are not binding precedent in
theory, they can provide compelling evidence of the law.
Several decisions have been notable for their contributions to
the development of international law, including the Nottebohm
case 6 ° ( genuine link between individual and claimant state),
the Reparation for Inluries case (legal personality of the
UN), 261
 the Genocide case (treaty reservations), 2 ' 2
 the
Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case (persistent objection to
formation and unilateral claims). 263
 Cases dealing with the
environment are discussed infra.
Art. 38 does not limit judicial decisions to the ICJ.
Thus, other international courts and tribunals, as well as the
decisions of municipal courts can be considered under this
category, such as the European Court of Justice and the US
Supreme Court. 2" Domestic courts, then, can have an effect
on the development of law, as can be seen in regime
259 Brownlie, Principles of International Law, supra, n.
156, p. 21.
260 1CJ Reports (1955), p. 4.
2 "Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the
United Nations Case ICJ Reports (1949), pp. 174.
2 2 Reservations to the Genocide Convention Case, ICJ
Reports, (1951), p. 15.
21Supra, n. 227, p. 131.
2t4 Brownlie, Public International Law, supra, n. 156, pp.
21-24.
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development.
Although judicial decisions are a subsidiary source of
international law, there is still high value placed on these
decision. This is because judicial decisions "often produce
a degree of certainty where previously confusion and obscurity
existed" as well as invoke familiar principles with "assurance
and certainty.I2b6 In rapidly evolving areas of law,
however, there may not be any applicable judicial decisions to
provide evidence of the law for the situation at hand.
Writings of prominent publicists are highly looked upon
in the international law community, particularly by those less
familiar with international law, such as arbitral tribunal and
domestic courts. 267 They may be subjective, however,
reflecting national and other prejudices and may not
adequately reflect shared state interests. 268 One writer
states that "since academic sources do have a role, albeit a
minor one, in the creation of rules of international law, it
is crucial to the validity of one's conclusions not to confuse
the snowballing acceptance of a rule by academics with
snowballing acceptance by states." 269 Yet this "should not
lead us to dismiss the value of writers, but rather to assess
265 See,	 infra, Chapter 4, Section 4.2.3, Domestic
Regulations.
266 Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice
supra, n. 109, p. 40.
267 Brownlie, Public International Law, supra, n. 156, p.
25.
268 1bid., pp. 24-25.
2b9van Hoof, Rethinking the Sources, supra, n. 116, p.
178, quoting 3. Watson, "Legal Theory, Efficacy and Validity
in the Development of Human Rights Norms in International
Law," 3 TJILF (1979), p. 637.
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correctly the writer within his particular environment."7'
It is not possible to prove which publicists are "the
most highly qualified," and so opinions as to authority of
writings can differ greatly.27' Nevertheless, the
International Law Commission, Harvard Research drafts and
other similar bodies are considered highly authoritative.272
UN reports and drafts, as well as EC recommendations could
also have some significance.273
2.2.5	 Soft Law
"'Soft' law is a paradoxical term for defining an
ambiguous phenomenon;" "...a new process of normative creation
which jurists feel uncomfortable analysing does exist... ;tt274
"soft law means different things to different people;"2'5
".. .its precise meaning is still debated;' 276 "there is no
270 Shaw, "International Law," supra, n. 118, pp. 92-93.
271 Restatement, supra, n. 205, Section 103, Reporters
Notes 3, p. 38.
272 1bid. See, also, Brownlie, Public International Law,
supra, n. 156, p. 25.
273Birnie & Boyle, International Law & the Environment,
supra, n. 188, p. 26.
274 Pierre Dupuy, "Soft Law and the International Law of
the Environment," Michi gan Journal of International Law Vol.
12, No. 2 (Winter 1991), p. 420.
275 Gunther Handi, "A Hard Look at Soft Law," American
Society of International Law: Proceedings of the 82nd Meeting,
by the American Society of International Law, Washington, DC
(1988), p. 371.
276 Joseph Gold,"Strengthening the Soft International Law
of Exchange Arrangements," American Journal of International
Law Vol. 77, No. 3 (July 1983), p. 483.
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uniform opinion.., regarding the exact definition. .
Statements such as these underline the imprecision of the
term "soft law" and underscore the difficulty in examining the
phenomenon. Nevertheless, an attempt will be made to dissect
this concept, which differs from international regimes,
described in the next chapter. Regimes are institutional
arrangements within the legal order. As such, they provide a
framework of analysis regarding cooperation between states in
which soft law may be taken into account in the analysis.
In keeping with the statements made above regarding soft
law, definitions of soft law vary. They:
"range from treaties, but which include only soft
obligations ('legal soft law'), to non-binding or
voluntary resolutions and codes of conduct formulated and
accepted by international and regional organisations
('non-legal soft law'), to statements prepared by
individuals in a non-governmental capacity, but which
purport to lay down international principles."278
Thus, definitions vary from a narrow to a wide view of
soft law. For the purposes of this thesis, the definition of
soft law will include binding as well as non-binding
obligations. Both types are underdeveloped from the
perspective of substantive international law; the first type,
while binding, is "soft" on substantive obligations, and the
277 Tadeusz	 Gruchalla-Wesierski,	 "A	 Framework	 for
Understanding 'Soft Law,'" Revue De Droit De McGill, vol. 30
(1984), p. 44. See also, generally, Seidl-Hohenveldern,
"International Economic Soft Law," Recueil des Cours (1979),
pp. 173-175 and W. Riphagen, "From Soft Law to lus Cogens and
Back," Victoria University of Wellington Law Review Vol. 17
(1987), pp. 81-99.
778 C.M. Chinkin, "The Challenge of Soft Law: Development
and Change In International Law," International and
Comparative Law Quarterly Vol. 38, Part IV (October 1989), p.
851,
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second type is non-binding. The underlying reasons for
underdevelopment, as well as the prospects for future
development, can be examined in the framework of regimes and
their critical issues.
	 Essentially:
'Soft law' is by its nature the articulation of a 'norm'
in written form, which can include both legal and non-
legal instruments; the necessary abstract norms in issue
which have been agreed by states or in international
organisations are thus recorded in it, and this is its
essential characteristic; (original emphasis). '
While non-legal soft law is, of course, not binding under
international law, the repetition of principles through non-
binding instruments can indicate a new opinio juris emerging
among states.	 Combined with state practice, opinio juris
signals the emergence of customary law. 282
	There is some
debate, however, as to whether soft law instruments alone
establish state practice. 283
	This contributes to the
dissatisfaction with customary law in general:
"Perhaps it is time to face squarely the fact that the
279 See, infra, Chapters 3 and 4.
' 40Birnie and Boyle, International Law & The Environment
supra, n. 188, p. 27.
291 Dupuy, "Soft Law and the International Law of the
Environment," supra, n. 274, p. 432, Chinkin, "The Challenge
of Soft Law," supra, n. 278, pp. 857-858, Gruchalla-Wesierski,
"Soft Law" supra, n. 277, p. 53-54.
282 See, supra, this Chapter, Section 2.2.2, Customary Law.
283 Gruchalla-Wesierski, "Soft Law," supra, n. 277, pp. 53-
54 who states that "as a result of its abstract nature, soft
law cannot be held to provide the state practice that the
wording of the norm describes." See, also, Chinkin, "The
Challenge of Soft Law," supra, n. 278, p. 857, where the
author points out that "state practice is evidenced by what
states do, as well as by what they say."
Soft law is considered to be binding on international
organisations that adopt it, although not necessarily its
members. See, Seidl-Hohenveldern, "International Economic
'Soft Law'," Recueil des Cours (1979), p. 195.
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orthodox tests of custom - practice and opinio juris -
are often not only inadequate but even irrelevant to the
identification of much new law today. And the reason is
not far to seek: much of this new law is not custom at
all, and does not even resemble custom. It is recent, it
is innovatory, it involves topical policy decision, and
it is often the focus of contention. Anything less like
custom in the ordinary meaning of that term it would be
difficult to imagine."283
Claims as to the legal force of non-binding soft law are
an inevitable result of the international law-making process.
These claims are made by arguing either that soft law has
"hardened" or that the sources of international law have
changed. 285 The problem for the international legal order is
that inclusion of non-binding soft law within the category of
sources would force a structural change in traditional
international law. However, such soft law should not be
regarded as having no legal significance simply because it
does not fit into the categories of sources.'
In an attempt to resolve this dilemma, one scholar
advocates a distinct legal category for non-legal soft or
"declaratory" law in order to allow the recognition of such
norms that are in the process of articulation and
effectuation. 287 Under this category, a law is declarative
when a minority considers it binding or a majority considers
it non-binding. Declarative law, then, would lack one of the
284 Robert Y. Jennings, "What is International Law and How
Do We Tell It When We See It?" Annuaire Suisse De Droit
International Vol. Xxxvii (1981), p. 67.
28'Chinkin, "The Challenge of Soft Law," supra, n. 278, p.
856.
286 Hiram E. Chodosh, "Neither Treaty Nor Custom: The
Emergence of Declarative International Law," Texas
International Law Journal Vol. 26, No. 1 (Winter 1991), p. 97.
57Ibid.
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elements of customary law; either the material element or the
psychological element. Such a view, however, would require
the sources of law to be changed, something that could not
easily be achieved without a major re-thinking of legal
theory. Indeed, such a view ignores the premise that, since
soft law by its label differentiates itself from "hard" law,
there must be some advantage to it being so labelled.
The advantage lies in the subjectivity inherent in soft
law: discretion with regard to obligation due either to
vagueness or the exigibility of the obligation because of an
escape clause. 298
 On the other hand, non-legal soft law may
allow states to accept precise, but non-binding,
ObligatjOfls, 289
 which may eventually harden.
Nonetheless, it is argued that the concept of soft law
contributes to a blurring of normativity regarding law and
non-law. 29° Rather than being considered a "normative
sickness," however, soft law is more of a sign of the times
and a product of necessity 29 ' and "is not per se a legal
288 Gruchalla-Wesierski, "Soft Law," supra, n. 277, pp. 49-
50. The author describes two types of escape clauses: 1)
allowing the party to subjectively interpret the norm ie
"consistent with their needs," 2) weak command ie: "should" as
opposed to "must".
289 Birnie & Boyle, International Law & the Environment,
supra, n. 188, p. 27.
2 '°Prosper Weil, "Towards Relative Normativity in
International Law," American Journal of International Law,
Vol. 77, No. 3 (July 1983), pp. 413-442 where the author
claims the international legal order is faced "with a
pathological phenomenon of international normativity."
2 'Dupuy, "Soft Law," supra, n. 274, p. 422.
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pathology." 22
	Indeed, soft law serves important purposes
within the legal order.
Soft law can indicate trends in international law-making,
as well as define standards of acceptable behaviour. As
Pierre Dupuy has pointed out, soft law may result in the
setting of standards of "due diligence" 24
 in international
cooperation as well as serving as a point of reference for
national legislation, and is "both a sign and product of the
permanent state of multilateral cooperation..
Soft law can help create expectations as to state
behaviour, 296
 either that it will be respected or that it is
binding. Precision or the legal form of soft law "induce"
this expectation, although it is argued that expectations
differ depending on whether the norm is legal or non-
legal. 297
 When states do not wish to commit themselves to
rigid obligations, but rather wish to allow themselves
flexibility with regard to compliance, they are apt to choose
non-legal obligations. Flexibility is particularly important
292 W. Michael Reisman, "Remarks," in American Society of
International Law: Proceedings of the 82nd Meeting, by the
American Society of International Law, Washington, DC (1988),
p. 374.
293Dupuy, "Soft Law," supra, n. 274, p. 433.
294 See, infra, this Chapter, Section 2.4.2, Liability for
Environmental Harm.
295Dupuy, "Soft Law," supra, n. 274, pp. 434-435.
296 Chinkin, "Soft Law," supra, n. 278, p. 865. See, also,
"expectations" with regard to the policy-oriented school,
supra, this Chapter, Section 2.1.3, Policy-Oriented School.
297Michael Bothe, "Legal and Non-Legal Norms - A
Meaningful Distinction in International Relations?"
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 11 (1980), pp.
85-86.
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in an increasingly diversified world of newly created states
with discrepancies in economy, which make agreement regarding
obligations harder to reach. 2 ' This often happens under the
stress of international negotiations.2
Soft law can also play a role in overcoming disputes.
Taking due account of this role, Birnie considers the label
"soft settlement" more accurate than "soft law." 30° Soft law
allows states to negotiate and interpret ambiguous terms
"without exciting complaint, ,301 an important consideration
in a decentralised international legal order. In this regard,
institution building in the form of regimes aids in the
dispute-settlement procedure, in which soft law can be
utilised.
Soft law thus appears to play a large role in
implementing international law and cooperation. It has been
pointed out that:
Soft law instruments allow for the incorporation of
conflicting standards and goals and provide States with
the room to manoeuvre in the making of claims and
counterclaims. While this process inevitably causes
29 See, Patricia Birnie, "Legal Techniques of Settling
Disputes: The 'Soft Settlement' Approach," in Perestroika and
International Law, ed. W.E. Butler (Dordrecht: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1990), p. 184.
299R.R. Baxter, tInternational Law in 'Her Infinite
Variety'," International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol.
29, Part 4 (October 1980), p. 557. See, also, Chapters 5 and
6, infra.
300 Birnie, "Soft Settlement," supra, n. 298, p. 183.
301 Patricia Birnie, "International Environmental Law: Its
Adequacy For Present and Future Needs," in The International
Politics of the Environment, ed. Andrew Hurrell and Benedict
Kingsbury, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 53.
2 See,	 infra,	 Chapter 3,
	
Section 3.6.2,
	 Dispute
Settlement Mechanisms.
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normative confusion and uncertainty in terms of the
traditional sources of international law, it is probably
the inevitable consequence of unresolved pressures for
change in international law.
The concept of soft law underscores "that it is
excessively simplistic to divide written norms into those that
are binding and those that are not."° 4
 Treaties may require
little in the way of obligation, while "instruments of lesser
dignity," ie technically not binding, may prove more
influential regarding state's behaviour. 305
 Legal scholars
have correctly advocated for some time the benefits of "soft
law" as a basis for development of "hard law." Thus, soft law
should and does play a role in the international legal order,
including regime building.306
2.3 Policy-Oriented Lawmaking
The above discussion has highlighted some of the
difficulties associated with formal sources of international
law, particularly delays in treaty-making and creating
customary law. But the recognition that customary
international law and treaties can be brought about when the
conditions warrant it, as well as the promise of soft law,
suggest optimism for the development of the international
legal order in the form of regimes, as will be described in
the following chapters. The policy-oriented school of
international law is well suited for the examination of
regimes, as the school advocates the study of expectations
30 'Chinkin, "The Challenge of Soft Law," supra, n. 278, p.
866.
° 4 Baxter, "Her Infinite Variety," supra, n. 299, p. 564.
305 1bid., p. 565.
° 6 See, infra, Chapters 5 and 6.
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about appropriate behaviour in determining lawmaking.
Similarly, regime theory explores why states cooperate.
The critical test for determining the establishment of
obligatory norms is the response of the target audience to the
assertion, whether express or implied, of authoritativeness.
If the rules of the game developed by states are perceived by
themselves and by other parts of the community (ie
organisations) as "state practice" carried out by appropriate
decision-makers for that purpose and by appropriate
procedures,	 then that practice would be considered
authoritative (legitimate). This does not imply that the
practice of two or three states imposes obligations on others;
it means that such practice is viewed as authoritative by
those others. If that practice is also perceived as likely to
be complied with, it would then be appropriately characterised
as "practice accepted as law," or opinio juris." 3
	The test
in	 brief	 is	 authority	 (legitimacy)	 and	 control
(effectiveness). To fully understand the policy-oriented
communications model of lawmaking or prescription (both custom
and treaty) is to speak of it as an on-going process where the
observer can identify: 1) the participants, 2) the
subjectivities, 3) the situations, 4) the resources, 5) the
strategies, and 6) the outcome of the process.309
	
Firstly,	 there are the participants
	 (both the
"prescribers" and the "target audience"), including
international and national officials, elites of multinational
enterprises, many interest and pressure group, and individual
'37 See, infra, Chapter 3.
° 8 Schachter, "Theory of International Obligation," supra,
n. 153, p. 311.
3 Reisman, "International Lawmaking," supra, n. 159, p.
107-108.
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leaders within these groups. The extent to which the
prescribers represent the principal participants among the
target audience is also important: "The fact that divergent
political and ideological viewpoints have been harmonized is
widely treated as persuasive evidence that the draft has an
enhanced authority. ,,3b0
While states possess the maximum authority in the world
arena, the activities of other participants may also be
relevant, 31 ' in particular the United Nations. International
governmental organisations are both distinctive participants
and provide necessary structures of authority for other
participants :312
"While the obsession with the paramount nature of
sovereignty still reigns supreme in power politics, the
law of Specialised Agencies, in so far as it follows in
the wake of scientific and technical progress, has tended
to intensify methods of functional co-operation and
promote a measure of world integration."313
Other non-state actors also participate in the
prescribing of international rules, including nongovernmental
organisations and transnational corporations.314 In
addition, all group participants are associations through
310 Schachter, "Theory of International Obligation," supra,
n. 153, pp. 310-311.
311McDougal et al, Human Ri ghts and World Public Order,
supra, n. 124, 167-179.
312 See, infra, Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2, International
Non-state Actors.
31 Chen, Contemporary International Law, supra, n. 137,
pp. 56-57, quoting C. Alexandrowicz, The Law-Making Function
of the Specialised Agencies of the United Nations (1973), p.
161.
'"See, infra, Chapter 4, and application to ozone layer
depletion and climate change in Chapters 5 and 6.
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which individuals cooperate in order to fulfil their demands;
"in the final analysis, these group forms are highly malleable
instruments created and maintained by people to clarify and
secure their common interest."31
Secondly, there are the sublectivities (identifications,
demands, expectations) or perceptions of the participants
about the content of their communications and its relation to
existing law. This could vary from those identifying with a
global system to those identifying with a more exclusive unit;
demands could vary from those seeking world order to those of
exclusive self-interest, expectations could vary from the most
realistic to the most fantastic.
Thus, the participants may have differing subjectivities.
The concern here is primarily with the shared expectations
regarding future behaviour. Since subjectivities are not open
to direct examination, they can only be distinguished from a
contextual analysis of past behaviour;
Thirdly, there are the situations in which subjectivities
are mediated and expectations about authority and control are
played out, ranging from the most formal and specialised
(international organisations and conferences) to the most
informal and unorganised. Thus, in determining proper
authority, the inquirer can look to the relation between the
prescriber participant and the situation in which he has
acted, ie acting in an official capacity such as diplomatic
correspondence, as a UN representative, etc., as well as the
temporal and geographical extent of interaction;
Fourthly, there are the resources and other bases of
3t5 Chen, Contemporary International Law, supra, n. 137, p.
81.
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effective power and authority which all would-be prescribers
use to give weight to words and deeds; ie knowledge and skill.
The degree to which the prescriber participants are able and
willing to use means to make their policy effective and
controlling, as well as the procedures they utilize in doing
so are taken into account;
Fifthly, there are the strategies or modes of
communication used in generating the flow of words and
behaviour, ranging from those relatively explicit (both verbal
and written) to those which are relatively implicit (eg
judicial opinion) or in other uniformities of behaviour
exhibited over any period of time;
Finally, the outcome of the process, exhibited as a
pattern of communication and response, may or may not be a
prescription, in the sense of expectations shared by
politically relevant groups (the target audience) that certain
policies are authoritative and controlling.
Thus, the above process is important in ascertaining
whose expectations are relevant, how these expectations can be
ascertained in such a diverse international community, and
what will result if only divergent expectations can be found.
The relevant expectations depend on the subject and situation;
the extent to which the issue is of concern to the actors.
There are methods to ascertain shared expectations within the
world community,	 such as diplomatic correspondence,
international agreements,
	 judicial decision,	 scholarly
studies, public statements of leaders and national
legislation. As to the prospect of divergent expectations,
the decision-maker can look to duration frequency, geographic
extent, consistency and continuity. But even if divergencies
cannot be resolved through such techniques, Schachter
emphasises "that the extent and obduracy of such difficulties
99
are subjects for investigation, not for surrender. They
involve questions of fact; they change in time and in relation
to changing environmental factors and to new perceptions of
needs, interests, and values." 16
Rule-oriented approaches to law-making cannot easily take
account of new perceptions or expectations; it is in that
respect that:
"the further one moves away from positivism and rules,
the less important becomes the distinction between lex
lata and lex ferenda. . . If law as rules requires the
application of outdated and inappropriate norms, then law
as process encourages interpretation and choice that is
more compatible with values we seek to promote and
objectives we seek to achieve. But it is only to a rule-
based lawyer that this is to be classified as 'law as it
should be,' standing in contrast to 'law as it is'. To
the law as process, this is in large measure a false
dichotomy.
The policy-oriented approach can best analyze the entire
process of international lawmaking, and will be applied in the
analysis of the ozone layer depletion and climate change
regimes. Before doing so, there is a need to show why these
regimes were needed.
2.4 International Law Applicable to Global Environmental
Change
The following sections will examine the international law
applicable to climate change and ozone layer depletion, prior
to the formation of the respective regimes. This is done to
help explain the shaping of expectations (as the policy-
oriented school uses that term) for more substantive
" 6 Schachter, "Theory of International Obligation," supra,
n. 153, pp. 314-319.
7Higgins, "International Law," supra, n. 111, p. 34.
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regulations for both climate change and ozone layer depletion.
An examination of the relevant "new concepts" that have been
introduced within international law will also be made, which
although controversial within international law, can still
help to shape expectations regarding future lawmaking.
2.4.1	 Prevention of Environmental Harm
The appropriate starting point for the examination of the
duty to prevent environmental harm is what Kiss and Shelton
refer to as the fundamental principle of international law
concerning transfrontier pollution.' 8 This principle is
stated in Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on
the Human Environment:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations and the principles of international law, the
sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant
to their own environmental policies and the
responsibility to ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits
of national jurisdiction.319
Principle 21320 has its historical roots in the Roman
maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. 32 '	 This maxim
'Kiss and Shelton, International Environmental Law,
supra, n. 257, p. 129.
319 Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference
on the Human Environment, International Legal Materials Vol.
11, No. 6 (1972), pp. 1416-1469.
320 See text infra.
'"You should not use your property in such a way so as
to harm others." An expansion of the sic utere principle can
be found in the concept of "good neighbourliness", which was
recognised in the International Commission of the River Oder.
International Commission of the River Oder (1929) PCIJ Ser. A.
No. 23, Judgement 16, pp. 5-46. See also, L.F.E. Goldie
"Special Regimes and Pre-emptive Activities in International
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was later expanded in the well known Trail Smelter
Arbitration, which gave credence to the prevention of harm
principle.
The Trail Smelter Arbitration 22
 was concerned with the
issue of fumes from a Canadian smelter that were adversely
affecting property across the border in the US state of
Washington. The tribunal affirmed that:
Under the principles of international law,.., no state
has the right to use or permit the use of its territory
in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the
territory of another or the properties or persons
therein, when the case is of serious consequence and
injury is established by clear and convincing
evidence.323
Law", International and Comparative Law Quarterly Vol. 11,
Part 3 (July 1962), p. 689, where he refers to good
neighbourliness as a broad standard of recognition and
respect.
The rule against abuse of rights also finds its origins
in sic utere and essentially maintains that ". . .no person may,
under international law, exercise a power for a reason, actual
or inferred, which is contrary to the purpose or purposes for
which international law contemplates the power will be used".
See G.D.S. Taylor, "The Content of the Rule Against Abuse of
Rights in International Law," British Yearbook of
International Law Vol. 46 (1972-73), p. 352.
However, the principle of good neighbourliness is too
general to be applied to concrete situations such as climate
change or ozone layer depletion. As for the concept of abuse
of rights, agreement on the theoretical descriptions is
lacking and there is debate as to whether it is in actuality
a principle of international law. See, for example, A.P.
Lester, "River Pollution in International Law," American
Journal of International Law Vol. 57, No. 4 (October 1963),
pp. 833-834. But see Kiss and Shelton, International
Environmental Law, supra, n. 257, p. 121, where the authors
state that it is generally accepted that the principle forms
part of international law.
322 American Journal of International Law Vol. 33, No. 1
(January 1939) pp. 182-212; Vol. 35, No. 4 (October 1941) pp.
684-736.
323 1bid., p. 716.
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While Trail Smelter aided the development of
international environmental law, it "is actually a rather
modest contribution to the jurisprudence" 324 because of its
limited application. The damage contemplated included only
tangible injury which could be given a monetary figure; the
incident had to be of "serious consequence"; and the injury
had to be "established by clear and convincing evidence".325
In addition, the tribunal dealt only with property damage and
placed "no value on wider environmental interests such as
wildlife,	 aesthetic considerations,	 or the unity of
ecosystems. ,326
Under Trail Smelter, "the victim has to wait for the
harm to be done before he can take action". 327
 However, it
has been pointed out that if Trail Smelter had prescribed
otherwise, not only would the Trail Smelter have been closed,
"but it would have also have brought Detroit, Buffalo and
Niagara Falls to an untimely end". 328
 In addition, the case
is unusual since Canada admitted its responsibility, the two
states having agreed to the use of a tribunal to determine the
324 Brownlie, "Survey of International Customary Rules,"
supra, n. 244, p. 180.
325 Trail Smelter, supra, n. 322, p. 716.
326Birnie and Boyle, International Law & The Environment,
supra, n. 188, p. 100. The authors point out that the tribunal
was required to follow US law on that issue.
327Patricia Birnie, "The Development of International
Environmental Law", British Journal of International Studies,
Vol. 3, No. 2 (July 1977), p. 176.
328 John E. Read, "The Trail Smelter Dispute", The Canadian
Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 1, (1963), pp. 224-225.
This underscores the importance of economics in environmental
issues. Economics as a critical issue in the climate change
and ozone layer depletion regimes will be described, infra,
Chapter 4, Section 4.1.2.
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question of damages and future operation of the smelter.
Notwithstanding its limited scope of application, Trail
Smelter did provide a precedent for international
environmental law through the use of an international tribunal
to deal with harm from transboundary pollution. ° So while
the shortcomings of Trail Smelter can be criticised, the
decision did contribute to the development of international
environmental law. And, as scientific knowledge advances "as
to the nature of 'damage' that pollution wreaks" and as
technology advances to permit greater industrial production
with a lesser amount of pollution, the decision of Trail
Smelter becomes stronger. 3
 Still, such knowledge cannot
resolve the problem of unwillingness to pay for higher
standards of environmental protection; without the acceptance
of such a responsibility by industrialised states, the
developing world will similarly disregard such a duty.
Expanding further on the concept of sic utere tuo and the
prevention of harm principle, in the Corfu Channel Case, the
ICJ held Albania responsible for damage caused to British
ships in its territorial waters, because Albania failed to
warn the ships of the presence of mines. 333
 Specifically,
329 See, for instance, Alfred P. Rubin, "Pollution By
Analogy: The Trail Smelter Arbitration," Ore gon Law Review
Vol. 50, No. 3, Part I (Spring 1971), pp. 259-282.
3 °Lynton Keith Caldwell, International Environmental
Policy, 2d ed., (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990), p. 123.
331 Rubin, "Trail Smelter Arbitration," supra, n. 329, p.
281.
32 Ibid, pp. 281-282. See, infra, Chapter 4, Section 4.1.3
for the critical issue of development in the climate change
and ozone layer depletion regimes.
333 Corfu Channel Case, ICJ Reports (1949), pp. 4-38.
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the Court iterated that it is "every State's obligation not to
allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to
the rights of other States", 313 thus establishing a ". . .prima
facie liability for the harmful effects of conditions created
even by trespassers of which the territorial sovereign has
knowledge or means of knowledge". However, while the
"rights of other States" could be identified in this context
as the right of innocent passage, the specific rights are not
as clear where the harm may be to common resources.336
Further supporting the prevention of harm principles is
the Lac Lanoux Arbitration, 37 which resulted from a Spanish
claim that France was illegally diverting waters from reaching
Spain, without the consent of the Spanish government. The
tribunal held that if France had impaired the waters through
pollution, Spain would have had a valid claim. 338
334 1bid., p. 22.
335Brownlie "Survey of International Customary Rules,"
supra, n. 244, p. 180.
336 Birnie, "Development of International Environmental
Law," supra, n. 327, p. 176, see also Professor Birnie's
article, "The Role of International Law in Solving Certain
Environmental Conflicts", in International Environmental
Diplomacy, ed. John E. Carroll (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1988), p. 112 where she draws a similar
conclusion as to these "rights." See, also, infra, Section
2.4.3.1, Duty to Inform.
337 lnternatjonal Law Reports Vol. 24 (1957), pp. 101-142.
338 "Thus, while it is admitted there is a principle
prohibiting the upper riparian State from altering the waters
of a river in circumstances calculated to do serious injury to
the lower riparian State, such a principle has no application
to the present case, since it was admitted by the Tribunal...
that the French project will not alter the waters of the
Carol." Yearbook of the ILC Vol. II, Part II (1974), p. 197.
The main significance of this case will be discussed below
regarding the duty of cooperation.
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In the Nuclear Tests cases, Australia and New Zealand
brought an action against France in an effort to stop French
nuclear testing in the South Pacific. Interim Orders
restraining the tests were made, but the case was later
declared moot when France agreed to stop its atmospheric
testing, although the ICJ did state that the unilateral
declaration of a state created a binding legal obligation to
conform its behaviour to that stated in the declaration.
At least one scholar believes that the Court "would have
succeeded in identifying a legal principle on which to base a
decision," such as the reliance on equitable principles in the
North Sea Continental Shelf cases.34'
As stated earlier, these cases have led to the
development of the "fundamental principle" concerning
transfrontier pollution, formulated in Principle 21 of the
Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, 342 adopted at
the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment.
Attended by delegates from 113 states, 343 the Conference
3 ' 9 ICJ Reports (Interim Measures) 1973 (Australia v.
France), pp. 99-106, (New Zealand v. France), pp. 135-142. ICJ
Reports (Jurisdiction) 1974 (Australia v. France), pp. 253-
272, (New Zealand v. France), pp. 457-478. The plaintiffs also
sought to prevent interference with territorial sovereignty
(from nuclear fallout) and ensure freedom of the high seas.
340Brownlie cautions that when a unilateral declaration is
not directed to a specific state, but is expressed erga omnes
as here, the facts must be carefully examined when determining
the intention to be bound. Brownlie, Public International Law,
supra, n. 156, pp. 638-639.
4t Birnie, "The Role of International Law in Solving
Certain Environmental Conflicts", supra n. 336, p. 112.
42 See, supra, n. 319.
John McCormick, The Global Environmental Movement:
Reclaiming Paradise, (London: Belhaven Press, 1989), p. 97.
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adopted a fundamental Declaration of Principles (the
"Stockholm Declaration") concerning the human environment, a
resolution on institutional and financial arrangements, and an
Action Plan of 109 recommendations for environmental
assessment. 44
Principle 21 of the Declaration, described earlier,
expands on the restrictive bounds of Trail Smelter by
expanding the
	 responsibility of states to prevent
environmental damage for "activities within their jurisdiction
or control", not just activities within their territory.
Also, the Principle extends the scope of protection to "areas
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction", thus including
common areas. In addition, damage is not qualified by the
term "serious, "' and includes damage caused by persons
under the state's control, wherever they may act.147
However, the Principle also underscores the sovereign
right of states "to exploit their own resources pursuant to
their own environmental policies". Even though the Principle
does not give states unlimited freedom regarding its
44 Louis B. Sohn, "The Stockholm Declaration on the Human
Environment," Harvard International Law Journal Vol. 14, No.
1 (Winter 1973), pp. 423-424, who notes that the success of
the Conference was due to a complex preparatory process where
agreement on most issues was reached prior to the Conference,
leaving few questions to be resolved at the Conference itself
(emphasis added). Regimes incorporate this process.
345 See text, supra.
346 Allen Springer, "United States Environmental Policy and
International Law: Stockholm Principle 21 Revisited" in
International Environmental Diplomacy, ed. John E. Carroll
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 51. See
also, Sohn, "Stockholm Declaration," supra, n. 344, pp. 485-
493.
341 Sohn, "Stockholm Declaration," supra, n. 344, p. 493.
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environment, it has been suggested that more distinct
guidelines referring to the "common good" should have been
articulated. 348
 A stronger principle, however, might have
precluded any agreement at all.
The Principle has also been supported by declarations
adopted by the UN General Assembly, including the Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States, in which Article 30
reiterates the responsibility of states laid down in Principle
In addition, the 1979 Geneva Convention on Long Range
Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP)350, the 1982 UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 35 ' the Vienna Convention
for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (Vienna Ozone
Convention), 352
 the Framework Convention on Climate Change
' 48 Ibid., p. 492. For example, Professor Sohn states that
it was unfortunate that the proposal of the Holy See, calling
for a "just environmental policy" in states' exploitation of
natural resources, was not considered.
349 UN Resolution A/Res/3281, 15 January 1975, reprinted in
International Legal Materials Vol. 14, No. 1 (1975), pp. 251-
265.
450 lnternational Le gal Materials Vol. 19, No. 6 (1979),
pp. 1442-1455, where Principle 21 is expressed verbatim in the
introduction.
35t lnternational Legal Materials Vol. 21, No. 6 (1982),
pp . 1245-1354, where Art. 194(2) states that "States shall
take all measures necessary to ensure that activities under
their jurisdiction or control are so conducted as not to cause
damage by pollution to other states and their environment, and
that pollution arising from incidents or activities under
their jurisdiction or control does not spread beyond the areas
where they exercise sovereign rights in accordance with this
Convention." The Convention is not yet in force.
352 lnternational Le gal Materials, Vol. 26, No. 6 (1987),
pp. 1516-1540, where the Preamble recalls and recites
Principle 21 verbatim.
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33(FCCC)	 and other agreements also reiterate or otherwise
give support to Principle 21.
Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, 355
 however, rephrased Principle 21 to read:
"States have.., the sovereign right to exploit their own
resources pursuant to their own environmental and
developmental	 policies."	 Thus,	 the addition of
"developmental policies" would mean that states'
responsibility in the exploitation of their resources is no
longer subject solely to its environmental polices, but to its
economic development policies as well. 356
 The Declaration
appears, then, to equate environmental with developmental
policies and rights.
While some may bemoan this inclusion of "developmental
policies" in the Declaration as a "skilfully masked step
353 lnternational Legal Materials, Vol. 31, No. 4 (1992),
pp. 849-873, where Principle 21 is repeated in the
Convention's Preamble.
354 See, in addition, the 1980 Memorandum of Intent between
the US and Canada, International Le gal Materials Vol. 20, No.
3 (1981), pp. 690-695; the 1972 Convention on the Prevention
of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Waste and Other Matter
(London Dumping Convention), International Le gal Materials
Vol. 18, No. 2 (1979), pp. 499-529; and the 1982 UN Resolution
on a World Charter for Nature, International Legal Materials
Vol. 22, No. 2 (1983) pp. 455-460.
355 lnternational Legal Materials Vol. 31, No. 4 (1992),
pp. 874-880.
356Marc Pallemaerts, "International Environmental Law From
Stockholm to Rio: Back to the Future?" in Philippe Sands, ed.
Greening International Law (London: Earthscan, 1993), p. 6.
See, also, Willem Kakebeeke, "Transboundary Air Pollution,"
Yearbook of International Environmental Law Vol. 3 (1992), p.
223.
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backwards," its inclusion was insisted upon by the G-77
group of developing states. This was due to the "perception
[of the G-77] that developed country rhetoric was shifting
dangerously in the direction of globalizing certain selected
environmental resources. . . " Such a statement underscores
the importance of development issues in environmental policies
and signals that it should not be taken lightly in lawmaking.
Indeed, the issue of development is critical to both the ozone
layer depletion and climate change regimes. 359
 Thus, even as
non-binding soft law, 3 ° the Declaration helps shape the
expectations of states with regard to future regulations and
the concept of "sustainable development."
First introduced in the 1987 Brundtland Commission Report
Our Common Future, the term "sustainable development" has been
frequently used to describe an ideal model of development that
takes into account the environmental needs of both present and
future generations.3bl How this is to be achieved, however,
is not quite clear. The Declaration attempts to do so in
Principle 8, where it states that:
"To achieve sustainable development and a higher quality
of life for all people, States should reduce and
7 Pa1lemaerts, "From Stockholm to Rio," supra, n. 356, p.
5.
358Ileana Porras, "The Rio Declaration: A New Basis for
International Cooperation," in Philippe Sands, ed. Greening
International Law (London: Earthscan, 1993), p. 31.
359 See, infra, Chapter 4, Section 4.1.3.1, Development
Uncertainty and Chapter 5, Section 5.3.3 and Chapter 6,
Section 6.3.3, Development Uncertainty.
360 See, supra, this Chapter, Section 2.2.5, Soft Law.
3b1Porras, "The Rio Declaration," supra, n. 358, p. 26.
See also, Environmental Protection and Sustainable
Development: Le gal Principles and Recommendations, adopted by
the Experts Group on Environmental Law of the WCED (London:
Graham & Trotman, 1987).
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eliminate unsustainable patterns of production and
consumption and promote appropriate demographic
policies."
Thus, the Principle "achieves one of the most delicate
balancing acts of the entire Rio Declaration," by addressing
itself to both developed and developing countries. The
Declaration, then, contributes to the shaping of future
expectations regarding sustainable development through its
soft law basis. There are other examples of the legally
"soft" Declaration concerned with the duty to cooperate,
infra, which also help shape expectations.
It can be concluded that a general duty of prevention of
harm to the environment exists. Birnie and Boyle point out
that recent conventions, discussed above, "point to
international acceptance... that states are now required to
protect global common areas," in addition to preventing
transboundary harm. 363
	This duty, however, almost always
362 Porras, "The Rio Declaration," supra, n. 358, pp. 26-
27. The Principle addresses developed states when referring to
the need to "reduce and eliminate unsustainable patterns of
production and consumption," and addresses developing states
when it refers to the need to "promote appropriate demographic
policies." Weiss agrees that equity must be achieved between
developed and developing states for environmentally
sustainable development to occur. This is because the "global
environment knows no political boundaries," "developing
countries have control over resources that are important to
the industrialized world," ie reserves of biological
diversity, and that "developing countries are likely to suffer
most from environmental degradation," due to poverty.
"International Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues and the
Emergence of a New World Order," Geor getown Law Journal Vol.
81 (March 1993), pp. 706-707.
t3International Law & The Environment, supra, n. 188, p.
91.
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exists as a "qualified duty of prevention," r4 according to
existing case law and treaties. In addition, it is unclear as
to what standard of liability a state will be held
responsible: due diligence or strict (or absolute) liability.
2.4.2	 Liability for Environmental Harm: Due Diligence or
Strict Liability35
The adoption of a due diligence standard poses certain
standards. Due diligence is the conduct "to be expected from
a good government;" one "mindful of its international
364 Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice,
supra, n. 109, p. 368, since prohibition of environmental risk
cannot be absolute. See, also, Johan G. Lammers, "Balancing
The Equities In International Environmental Law," in The
Future of the International Law of the Environment, ed. Hague
Academy (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985), pp. 153-163.
The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any
Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques
requires its Parties not to "engage in military or any other
hostile use of environmental modification techniques having
widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of
destruction, damage or injury to any other State Party." Art.
1(1). However, Art. III states that the Convention does not
apply to the use of environmental modification techniques for
peaceful purposes. International Legal Materials Vol. 16, No.
1 (1977), pp. 88-94. Theoretically, climate change could be
considered an environmental modification attributed to fossil
fuels.
365Birnie and Boyle point out that strict liability is
sometimes interpreted as a reversal of the burden of proof,
and due diligence remains a relevant consideration. Sometimes
it is interpreted to imply that a failure of due diligence is
not required, but other defences are available. The
distinction between strict and absolute liability is then made
on the basis of strict liability permitting more defences to
liability. Birnie and Boyle, International Law & The
Environment, supra, n. 188, p. 142.
For the purposes of this thesis, strict liability follows
the second interpretation above, and thus no distinction will
be made between it and absolute liability.
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ob1igations." The vagueness of this definition does
little to clarify the requirements of due diligence. Instead,
"ecostandards," or norms laid out in agreements have been
looked to for possible indication of the standards required
for due diligence. It may be difficult to develop a common
standard of due diligence when states are held to different
obligations regarding the same issue-area.
Divergent standards also prevent the evolution of these
rules into customary law since state practice will differ, as
it is difficult to frame a common duty when standards remain
uncommon. In addition, a due diligence standard, precisely
because it is undefined and subjective, illustrates "the
paradox of creating a universalist system from a radically
subjective concept." 361
 Because nations have "cultural,
political, and economic dissimilarities," the definition of
due diligence will vary, as states take into account their
subjective interests. 368
 Indeed, this standard-setting has
evolved in some areas into the principle of "common but
differentiated responsibility", whereby states are held
responsible in direct proportion to their contribution to the
harm. 369
366 Pierre Dupuy, "Due Diligence in the International Law
of Liability," in OECD Legal Aspects of Transfrontier
Pollution, ed. OECD (Paris, 1977), p. 369.
367Harvard Law Review, ed., "Developments In The Law:
International Environmental Law," Harvard Law Review, Vol.
104, No. 7 (May 1991), p. 1509.
38 lbid., p. 1510.
369 For example, the Vienna Ozone Convention and its
amended Protocol attempt to lay out standards regulating
emissions of CFCs and other ozone-depleting gases. Yet, there
are exceptions to these requirements for developing states.
See infra, Chapter 5. There are divergent reporting standards
in the FCCC as well. Infra, Chapter 6.
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While, however, holding a state strictly or absolutely
liable for environmental harm caused by breach of an
obligation without proof of fault may avoid the difficulties
of defining due diligence, this standard of care presents its
own problems. Strict liability restrains international
consensus for both developed and developing states, each of
whose interests are at odds with the principle. Developing
states will often not have adequate technical resources to
foresee harm and high costs of prevention may frustrate
economic development. 370
 Developed states, on the other
hand, mistrust "this automatic right to redress," 37 ' without
consideration of the specific situation at hand. In addition,
the instances to which strict liability will be applied
requires subjectivity in choosing which activities will
trigger the standard.372
Academics generally support due diligence rather than
strict or absolute liability, although there is no consensus
on the matter. 373
	The case law does not provide much
guidance either.
	 In Trail Smelter, Canada had accepted
responsibility for the harm caused by the smelter, thus
370 "Developments in the Law," supra, n. 367, pp. 1510-
1511. See also, infra, Chapter 4, Section 4.1.3, Critical
Issue of Development.
37t Pierre Dupuy, "International Liability for
Transfrontier Pollution," Trends in Environmental Policy and
Law, ed. Michael Bothe (Gland, Switzerland: IUCC, 1980), pp.
373-374.
' 72 "Developments in the Law," supra, n. 367, p. 1511.
' 73Birnie and Boyle, International Law & The Environment,
supra, n. 188, p. 144. See also, Alan Boyle, "Nuclear Energy
and International Law: An Environmental Perspective," British
Yearbook of International Law: An Environmental Perspective
Vol. 60 (1989), pp. 291-292.
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obviating the need to choose a standard 74 and in Corfu
Channel, no definitive ruling on standards of responsibility
was made. Most agreements require due diligence from
parties, although some do provide for strict or absolute
liability. 476
Whatever standard us chosen, the question as to what
degree of harm must occur before states will be held liable is
not clear; nor is the issue of an equitable balancing of
interests expressly addressed under either standard. While
there may not be strong customary support for a balancing of
interests, 77 it is becoming increasingly obvious that
economic and development interests must be taken into account
in the international legal order, where these issues are
becoming critical to the law-making process and more
substantive obligations.378
Problems of proof can also occur, both to the effects and
source. This can be a particular problem in determining the
link of causality concerning pollution. Distance and time may
374 See, supra, n. 322. The Gut Dam Arbitration,
International Legal Materials, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1968), pp. 118-
143, is also not helpful, since it was concerned with
interpretation of a bilateral treaty.
375 See, supra, n. 333.
376 For example, the 1972 Convention on International
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, International
Legal Materials Vol. 18, No. 5 (1971), pp. 965-972.
371 Boyle, "Nuclear Energy," supra, n. 373, pp. 275-276,
where the author points out that Trail Smelter did not utilise
a balancing of interests in determining whether Canada was in
breach of its obligation. However, Canada accepted fault
without a finding as such, thus not requiring the tribunal to
balance activity versus effect regarding that obligation.
378 See infra, Chapter 4, Critical Issues of Economics and
Development.
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make it difficult to identify or trace the source as
well. Problems specific to the global commons also arise
with regard to standing and the fact that remedies tend to
focus on damages that have already taken place, rather than on
prevention.
The difficulties discussed in this section may signal
that the traditional methods of attributing international
liability is not the best technique for tackling global
environmental harm. 38 ' It is suggested, then, that the
debate over the standard of liability is not of much value.
By engaging in such a polemic:
International legal scholars construct their systems from
the sparse material of international tribunal decisions
and charter declarations instead of proceeding from the
basic building blocks of concordant state interests and
Kiss and Shelton, International Environmental Law,
supra, n. 257, pp. 352-353.
There is the additional question of whether local
remedies should be exhausted first. Alan E. Boyle, "State
Responsibility for Breach of Obligations to Protect the Global
Environment," in Control Over Compliance With International
Law, ed. William E. Butler (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 1991), p. 72. Boyle dismisses the issue of
exhausting legal remedies where the global commons is
concerned, since there is usually no obvious plaintiff to
exhaust such remedies.
380Boyle, "State Responsibility," supra, n. 379, pp. 72-
74. Ozone layer depletion and climate change do not per se
violate the rights of any one state. Ibid., p. 73. Attempts to
gain standing by invoking responsibility on behalf of the
international community, on the basis of an international
crime or by virtue of a treaty even though there is no direct
effect of the breach on the party bringing the suit or the
suit is brought by a non-party state, are of uncertain
outcome. Ibid., pp. 73-74.
81 See Birnie, "International Environmental Law," supra,
n. 301, p. 66 where the author states that "there are serious
difficulties with the effective application of state
responsibility in the field of environmental law."
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aspirations.
In determining state interests and aspirations from which
to proceed, the focus should turn elsewhere.
2.4.3 International Cooperation
Along with the principle of prevention of harm to the
environment, the principle of cooperation in the protection of
the environment is also important in the context of global
environmental change. The duties most often mentioned in
regard to this obligation include the duties to inform,
consult, and assess. 384
 The extent to which these duties are
accepted as obligations within international law is not a
controversial matter:
the basic principle that states must co-operate in
avoiding adverse effects on their neighbours through a
system of impact assessment, notification, consultation,
and negotiation appears generally to be endorsed by the
relevant jurisprudence, the declarations of international
bodies, and the work of the ILC. ... [and] some support
in state practice.385
However, the degree to which these duties have gone
beyond generalities to specifics is not as clear.
382 "Developments in the Law," supra, n. 367, p. 1509.
383The suggestion of this thesis is regimes. See, infra,
Chapter 3.
384 5ee, Schachter, International Law In Theory and
Practice, supra, n. 109, p. 373 and Allen Springer, The
International Law of Pollution (Westport: QuorumBooks, 1983),
p . 145.
385 Birnie and Boyle, International Law & The Environment,
supra, n. 188, p. 103.
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2.4.3.1	 Duty to Inform
The duty to inform of the risk of environmental harm
finds its greatest support in emergency situations, and thus
is "probably the least controversial principle of general
international environmental law." 386
 This principle was
given support in the Corfu Channel case, which outlined the
necessity for states not to knowingly allow its territory to
be used for acts contrary to the rights of other states.381
This statement of the Court allows the case to be taken as
authority for the obligation to inform of known environmental
hazards. 388 The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention and the 1989
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of
Hazardous Wastes also have provisions dealing with the duty to
warn of known environmental The 1992 Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development also takes account
of the duty to warn of environmental emergencies, thus
contributing to the shaping of expectations notwithstanding
its soft law status.39°
Regarding non-emergency situations, the tribunal held in
386Schachter, International Law In Theory and Practice,
supra, n. 109, p. 373.
387See, Corfu Channel, supra, n. 333, p. 22.
388Birnie & Boyle, International Law & The Environment,
supra, n. 188, p. 108.
389Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra, n. 351, Art.
198 states that "When a state becomes aware of cases in which
the marine environment is in imminent danger of being damaged
or has been damaged by pollution, it shall immediately notify
other States it deems likely to be affected by such damage, as
well as the competent international organizations". Basel
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of
Hazardous Wastes, Art. 13, International Le gal Materials, Vol.
28, No. 3 (1989), pp. 649-686.
390Principle 18, supra, n. 355.
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the Lac Lanoux arbitration that France was required to inform
Spain of its intent to divert a shared watercourse, but it is
unclear whether this requirement was the result of the treaty
at hand or a customary duty. ' The General Assembly, in
adopting the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States,
reinforced the duty to cooperate "on the basis of a system of
information and prior consultations" in the exploitation of
shared natural resources. 392 This principle of cooperation
regarding the exploitation and conservation of natural
resources was upheld in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases.33
In addition, treaties covering nuclear installations near
borders, continental shelf operations, long-range
transboundary air pollution and marine pollution from land-
based sources or dumping call for some degree of prior
notification (and consultation). 394	The non-binding Rio
Declaration also calls for timely notification.3
Defining the degree of risk which sets this principle in
motion is not clearcut, however. 	 Grave dangers and
catastrophes such as nuclear accidents are not
controversial, 396
 but situations where a sense of imminent
crisis is missing create uncertainty as to when the duty to
3 ' t Lac Lanoux, supra, n. 337, p. 138.
392 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, Art.
3, supra, n. 349.
393 Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases ICJ Rep., (1974), (UK v.
Iceland), pp. 3-35; (FRG v. Iceland), pp. 175-206.
394 Birnie and Boyle, International Law & The Environment,
supra, n. 188, p. 104.
395 Principle 19, supra, n. 355.
396See, Boyle, "Nuclear Energy," supra, n. 373, p. 281,
Kiss and Shelton, International Environmental Law, supra, n.
257, pp. 132-134, and Schachter, International Law In Theory
and Practice, supra, n. 109, p. 373.
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inform of environmental risk actually arises. 	 Thus, as
Springer argues:
One could hardly speak at present of an existing rule in
positive international law which could impose the duty
upon States to inform those who could be concerned, of
activities which can be prejudicial to their sovereignty
or affect environmental quality (emphasis added).
Even if one takes the duty to exist, Springer adds that
its content is ambiguous: when should it be enforced (ie what
is the threshold of harm to be crossed and does it apply to
areas beyond national jurisdiction); how far in advance of the
activity should notice be given; what information should be
supplied; and to whom should the notice be given?3
2.4.3.2	 Duty to Consult
The duty of a potential polluter state to consult with a
potential victim state finds support in the Lac Lanoux
arbitration. 399 Thus:
"There does exist a duty of consultation and of bringing
into harmony the respective actions of the two States
when general interests are involved in matters concerning
waters. 400
Yet:
{B]ecause	 consultation	 can	 involve	 extensive
397 Springer, International Law of Pollution, supra, n.
384, p. 147, quoting Alexandre Kiss, Survey of Current
Developments in International Environmental Law, IUCN
Environmental Policy and Law Paper, No. 10 (Morges,
Switzerland:IUCN, 1976), p. 31.
38 Ibid., pp. 147-148.
3 Birnie & Boyle, International Law & the Environment,
supra, n. 188, p. 103. The authors state that France had
complied with its obligations under a treaty and customary law
to consult and negotiate in good faith.
400 See, Lac Lanoux Arbitration, supra, n. 337, p. 133.
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discussions and further consequences if the discussions
prove unsuccessful in satisfying the concerned state, it
is a duty to which a state may be even less willing to
commit itself than that of simply supplying information.
For this reason, there is even greater doubt [than that
surrounding the duty to inform] about the existence of a
general duty to consult.401
Thus, to ensure that the duty is not questioned,
agreements must specifically provide for consultation.40'
For example, the Geneva Convention on Long-Range Transboundary
Pollution403
 states that consultations shall be held upon
request between the polluting state and the state affected by
pollution or in danger of being so damaged. 404
 Non-binding
agreements such as the UNEP Principles of Conduct Concerning
Natural Resources Shared By Two or More States, adopted by the
General Assembly, 405
 requires in Principle 6 that states
sharing natural resources, in addition to notifying other
states of plans that may significantly affect the environment
of an other state, enter into consultations concerning those
plans when requested by that other state. 406
	The Rio
401 Springer, International Law of Pollution, supra, n.
384, pp. 148-149.
402See, supra, Section 2.4.3.1, Duty to Inform.
4035ee, supra, n. 350.
4041bid.
405Cooperation in the Field of the Environment Concerning
Natural Resources Shared by Two or More States, International
Legal Materials Vol 17, No. 5 (1978), pp. 1091-1098. This
document is noted in UN General Assembly Resolution 34/186.
406 1bid. In addition, Principle 1 states that "[ut is
necessary that consistent with the concept of equitable
utilization of shared natural resources, States co-operate
with a view to controlling, preventing, reducing or
eliminating adverse environmental effects which may result
from the utilization of such resources".
The concept of equitable utilization of shared natural
resources, ". . .according to which the numerous and different
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Declaration also calls for consultation regarding activities
potentially harmful to the environment. 407 In addition,
provisions calling for parties to promote and cooperate in
research, included in many treaties such as the FCCC, also
implicitly	 require	 consultation.408	 Requirements	 of
communication of information also include the duty to
consult. 409
	Communication and promotion are difficult to
achieve without consultations.
state interests in international river basins are to be
coordinated with each other" was given effect in the 1966
Helsinki Rules on the Uses of Waters of International Rivers
and was also addressed in the Lac Lanoux and the River Oder
cases. See also, Convention on Protection of Transboundary
watercourses and International Lakes, Art. 2-6. 9-10. It has
been noted, however, that Art. X of the Helsinki Rules
requires both inequitable utilization and serious
transboundary harm for a prohibition of the act, thus creating
a high threshold for damages. See, Jutta Brunnee, Acid Rain
and Ozone Depletion: International Law and Re gulation, (Dobbs
Ferry, NY: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 1988), p. 102;
Alfred Rest, "Responsibility and Liability for Transboundary
Air Pollution Damage," in Transboundary Air Pollution, ed.
Cees Flinterman, Barbara Kwiatkowska, Johan G. Lammers
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1986), p. 312.
Equitable utilization may, moreover, be of little value
for tackling global environmental change, since the underlying
concept is one of shared resources between two states, not of
a global resource such as the atmosphere. See Alan E. Boyle,
"International Law and the Protection of the Global
Atmosphere: Concepts, Categories and Principles," in
International Law and Global Climate Chan ge, ed. Robin
Churchill and David Freestone, (London: Graham & Trotman,
1991), p. 8.
407 Principle 19, supra, n. 355.
408 FCCC, supra, n. 353, Art. 4(l)g, See, also, Vienna
Ozone Convention, supra, n. 352, Art. 3, and Montreal Protocol
to the Vienna Convention on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer, International Legal Materials Vol. 26, No. 6 (1987),
pp . 1541-1561, Art. 9.
409 FCCC, supra, n. 353, Arts. 4, 12. Montreal Protocol,
supra, n. 408, Art. 7.
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2.4.3.3	 Duty to Assess
The duty of a state to assess environmental harm is a
logical extension of the duty to inform another state of that
harm; a state must assess before it can inform. As a result,
it suffers from the same lack of criteria as does the duty to
inform.
Assessment is best carried out through environmental
impact assessments. UNEP has adopted non-binding "Goals and
Principles of Environmental Impact Assessment". 41° An
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is, according to UNEP,
"an examination, analysis and assessment of planned activities
with a view to ensuring environmentally sound and sustainable
development." 41 ' The EIA guidelines stated that the
"environmental effects of... activities should be fully taken
into account" before such activities are authorised.412
Under these Principles, an EIA should include:
1) A description of the proposed activity;
2) A description of the potentially affected environment;
3) A description of practical alternatives and
4) An assessment of the likely or potential environmental
impacts of the activity and alternatives.413
As with the duties to notify and consult, the safest way
to ensure that states have a duty to carry out assessments is
to include them in the agreement under consideration. The
1991 Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a
Transboundary Context is the most advanced in its application
410UNEP, Environmental Impact Assessment, Environmental
Law Guidelines and Principles, No. 9, (Nairobi: UNEP, 1987),
p. 1.
"'Ibid.
4121bid.
" 3 lbid., p. 2.
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of these assessments, requiring Parties to utilise assessments
in proposed activities, taking into account the views of
states likely to be affected. 114
 The FCCC requires that
Parties, "to the extent feasible," "employ appropriate
methods, for example impact assessments," for taking climate
change considerations into account in their social, economic
and environmental policies and actions. 415
 While the Vienna
Ozone Convention does not specifically refer to impact
assessments, it does require its Parties to cooperate through
observations, research and information exchange "in order to
better understand and assess the effects of human activities
on the ozone layer."416
Articles 204, 205 and 206 of the Law of the Sea
Convention, address monitoring of the risks of effects of
pollution, publication of reports of monitoring, and
assessment of potential effects of [state] activities.417
The non-binding Rio Declaration also calls for environmental
impact assessments.418
414 lnternational Legal Materials Vol. 30, No. 3 (1991),
pp. 800-819. Other activities not listed can be subject to
assessment should the parties agree.
415 FCCC, supra, n. 353, Art. 4(f).
416Vienna Ozone Convention, supra, n. 352, Art. 2(a). The
Montreal Protocol also provides for cooperation of the parties
regarding reporting of data, exchange of information and
technical assistance, Arts. 6, 9 and 10, supra, n. 408.
417 Law of the Sea, supra, n. 351.
418 Principle 17, supra, n. 355. A US Federal Appeals
Court, however, has ruled that under the National
Environmental Policy Act, an EIA is not required for the North
American Free Trade. Public Citizen; Friends of the Earth,
Inc.; Sierra Club, Appellees v. United States Trade
Representative, No. 93-5212, US Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, 1993 US APP. LEXIS 24660. While this is
a US case, the catalytic effect of leader states and domestic
regulations is important to regime formation and development.
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2.5 "New Concepts" in International Law
In addition to the established principles of
international law, new concepts have begun to develop. These
new concepts include (1) the precautionary principle; (2)
intergenerational equity; (3) common heritage and common
concern; and (4) the polluter pays principle. While these
concepts may not have acquired the status of principles of
international law, their legal significance is important in
the shaping of shared expectations, which are critical to
international law-making in the view of this thesis.'9
2.5.1	 Precautionary Principle
The precautionary principle has begun to appear
frequently in various declarations and international
agreements, attracting the interest of legal scholars in the
process. 42 °	 The Second International North Sea Conference
See, infra, Chapter 4, Section 4.2, Catalysts for Climate
Change and Ozone Layer Depletion Regimes.
" 9 See, supra, this Chapter, Section 2.1.3, Policy-
Oriented School and 2.3, Policy-Oriented Lawmaking.
420 See, for example, Lothar Gundling, "The Status in
International Law of the Principle of Precautionary Action,"
in The North Sea; Perspectives on Re gional Environmental
Cooperation ed. D. Freestone and T. Ijlstra, pp. 23-30
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1990), Ellen Hey "The
Precautionary Concept in Environmental Policy and Law:
Institutionalizing 	 Caution,"	 Georgetown	 International
Environmental Law Review Vol. 4, No. 2 (1992), pp. 303-318,
David Freestone, "The Precautionary Principle," in
International Law and Global Climate Chan ge, ed. R. Churchill
and D. Freestone (London: Graham & Trotman, 1991), p. 30,
James Cameron and Juli Abouchar, "The Precautionary Principle:
A Fundamental Principle of Law and Policy for the Protection
of the Global Environment," Boston College International and
Comparative Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Winter, 1991), pp. 2-
27, and Daniel Bodansky, "Scientific Uncertainty and the
Precautionary Principle," Environment Vol. 33 (1991), p.4.
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was the first forum to explicitly enunciate the precautionary
principle:
' T In order to protect the North Sea... a precautionary
approach is necessary which may require action to control
inputs of such substances even before a causal link has
been established by absolutely clear scientific
evidence. ,,421
But, the 1987 Declaration states only that pollution
emissions should be reduced through use of the best available
technology, and did not provide for a total ban on potentially
harmful emissions, so that it is unclear how broadly the
principle can be interpreted in that document.22
Interpretations of the precautionary principle can
involve a spectrum of possible obligations, ranging from the
prevention of harm principle described above, to a complete
reversal of the burden of proof whereby evidence of no harm
must be shown before an activity can be carried out.42
A weak formulation can be found in the 1990 Bergen
421 Robin Churchill, "Hard or Soft Law in International
Environmental Law-Making? Some Reflections on the
International North Sea Conferences," speech delivered at
meeting of the British International Law Association, 22
January 1992. See, also, Freestone, "The Precautionary
Principle," supra, n. 420, p. 23.
422 Birnie, "International Environmental Law," supra, n.
301, p. 80.
423 See, Freestone, "The Precautionary Principle," supra,
n. 420, p. 30, and Edith Brown Weiss, "International
Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues and the Emergence of a
New World Order," Georgetown Law Journal Vol. 81 (March 1993),
p. 690, where the author points out that "there is no
agreement on the content of this principle, or even as to
whether an actual principle has emerged or only an approach to
address a problem."
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Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development, which, in
linking the principle with sustainable development, states
that:
In order to achieve sustainable development, policies
must be based on the precautionary principle.
Environmental measures must anticipate, prevent and
attack the causes of environmental degradation. Where
there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack
of full scientific certainty should not be used as a
reason for postponing measures to prevent environmental
degradation.424
Stronger formulations can be found in the Oslo Commission
Prior Justification Procedure, which allows dumping of
industrial wastes in the North Sea only if it can be shown
that no harm will be caused to the marine environment.425
Thus, the level of risk, the level of precaution and the
economic factors to be considered are not clear, nor does it
resolve	 the	 arduous	 regulatory	 difficulties	 facing
international decisionmakers.426
424Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development in
the ECE Region, United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
Conference on Action for a Common Future, Bergen, Norway, 15
May 1990, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/PClO.
See also, James Cameron and Juli Abouchar, "The
Precautionary Principle: A Fundamental Principle of Law and
Policy for the Protection of the Global Environment," Boston
College International and Comparative Law Review, Vol. XIV,
No. 1 (Winter, 1991), pp. 2-27, where the authors stated that
adoption of the principle "ensures that a substance or
activity posing a threat to the environment is prevented, even
if there is no conclusive scientific proof linking that
particular substance or activity to environmental damage."
425 Remi Parmentier, "Radioactive Waste Dumping At Sea," in
Philippe Sands, ed. Greening International Law (London:
Earthscan, 1993), pp. 150-151.
426See, Daniel Bodansky, "New Developments in
International Law: Remarks by Daniel Bodansky," American
Society of International Law: Proceedin gs of the 85th Annual
Meeting, by the American Society of International Law,
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Precautionary language was used in both the Vienna Ozone
Convention and the FCCC. The Vienna Ozone Convention refers
to the "precautionary measures" already taken for the
protection of the ozone layer, 427
 while the FCCC states that
the parties "should take precautionary measures to anticipate,
prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate
its adverse effects." 428
 While the Vienna Convention does
not address the "principle" as such, the FCCC refers to
"precautionary measures" in Art. 3 entitled "Principles."42'
Although Art. 1 states in a footnote that "titles of articles
are included only to assist the reader," the footnote does not
state that titles are thus without legal significance and so
leaves interpretation of the footnote unclear.430
The potential legal implications of Art. 3 are, however,
reduced. The article states that (1) the principles are to
guide the Parties in their actions to achieve the Convention
and implement its provisions and (2) the Parties are to be
guided "inter alia" by the principles, ie other principles
than those listed may be taken into account in the
implementation of the Convention. In addition, "states" was
replaced by "Parties". 43 ' These wordings were intended to
"forestall arguments that the principles listed in Article 3
Washington, DC (1991), pp. 413-417.
427 Preamble, supra, n. 352.
428Art. 3(3), supra, n. 353.
429 Ibid.
430Daniel Bodansky, "The United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change," Yale Journal of International
Law Vol. 18, No. 2 (Summer 1993), p. 502, fn 308. The author
also notes that the dispute settlement procedure of the FCCC,
Art. 14, does not contain an express limitation that parties
could not be found in violation of Art. 3 under Art. 14.
4311b1d.
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are part of customary international law and bind states
generally. Instead, the principles clearly apply only to the
Parties and only in relations to the Convention, not as
general law."412
Nevertheless, Art. 3 does take account of precautionary
measures, while taking into account also that policies and
measures should be cost-effective so as to ensure global
benefits at the lowest possible cost. 433 The application of
precautionary measures, if not the name "precautionary
principles," is thus accounted for in the FCCC.
In addition, the Second World Climate Conference4
addressed precautionary measures: "where there are threats of
serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific
certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing cos-
effective measures to prevent such environmental
degradation." 435
 This passage is also included in Principle
15 of the Rio Declaration.436
The precautionary principle, however, is not yet an
accepted principle of international law, 437 and is largely
limited to non-binding declarations. This is due in part to
432 1bid., p. 502.
433 FCCC, supra, n. 353, Art. 3(3).
434 See, infra, Chapter 6, Section 6.1, International
Action Regarding Climate Change.
43 Ministerial Declaration, Paragraph 7, Environmental
Policy and Law Vol. 20, p. 220.
436 Rio Declaration, supra, n. 355.
47Birnie and Boyle, International Law & The Environment,
supra, n. 188, p. 98. See, also Weiss, "Environmental Law,"
supra, n. 423.
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lack of a definitive interpretation and due in part to the
fact that it is also at odds with a "no-regrets" policy, which
advocates taking action only when action is also justified on
other grounds.43
Because there is no accepted definition of the
438 1t is so-called because the measures to be taken are
"chosen for broad-based reasons and no one would regret having
taken them even if, as the science became clearer, [the
problem] turned out not to be a serious threat." R. A.
Reinstein, "Climate Negotiations," The Washington Quarterly
Vol. 16, No. 1 (Winter 1993), p. 86. The best-known advocate
of the "no-regrets" policy is the United States. See James A.
Baker III, "Diplomacy for the Environment," speech given to
the National Governors Association, 26 February 1990
(Washington, DC: US Dept of State, Bureau of Public Affairs).
While this policy was advocated under the Bush
Administration, it does not necessarily mean it is not a
principle of the Clinton Administration. Most of the State
Department staff dealing with global environmental change has
remained the same, and publications of these staff members
suggest that they are supporters of the "no-regrets' policy.
See Daniel A. Reifsnyder, "Remarks of Daniel A. Reifsnyder,
(Director, Office of Global Change, US Department of State) at
the '92 Seoul Symposium on UNCED and Prospects for the
Environmental Regime in the 21st Century," Seoul, Korea, 2
September 1992. Indeed, President Clinton's commitment to
reduce US greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by 2000,
"Remarks By the President in Earth Day Speech," 21 April 1993,
is largely symbolic, as environmental groups estimate that the
United States will achieve that target anyway, as a result of
measures already planned. See, Bodansky, "Framework Convention
on Climate Change," supra, n. 430, p. 558.
In addition, a recent US government report concluded that
over the last 15 years, US environmental policy has evolved
largely in reaction to popular panics and not in response to
sound scientific analyses of which environmental hazards
present the greatest risks. See, Keith Schneider, "New View
Calls Environmental Policy Misguided," New York Times, 21
March 1993, p. 1. The article quotes Richard D. Morgenstern,
acting administrator for policy planning and evaluation at the
US EPA as saying: "Our society is very reactive, and when
concerns are raised people want action. The problem in a
democracy is you can't easily sit back and tell people it
would be better to learn more. We're now in the position of
saying in quite a few of our programs, 'Oops, we made a
mistake [and overreacted to the degree of harm expected].'"
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precautionary principle, it is difficult to assess its
significance if it was an accepted principle of international
law. If it was to be so accepted, then it will have changed
the requirements of foreseeability and due diligence,
described above, to one whereby:
"a state which has participated in the endorsement of the
precautionary principle in a particular sector would be
held liable in the future for causing harm (whether to
neighbours or commons) for activities in that sector
which today are strongly suspected (but not proven) to
cause substantial harm."49
2.5.2	 Intergenerational Equity
Another progressive concept in international
environmental law is the idea of intergenerational equity.
The theory of intergenerational equity "assumes that each
generation receives a natural and cultural legacy in trust
from previous generations and holds it in trust for future
generations." 44° The FCCC states that the Parties "should
protect the climate system for the benefit of present and
future generations of humankind. •
While it is difficult to refute a moral obligation for
4 Freestone, "The Precautionary Principle," supra, n.
420, p. 37.
440 See, Edith Brown Weiss, "Intergenerational Equity in
International Law," Proceedings of the American Society of
International Law, by the American Society of International
Law, Washington, DC (1987), p. 127, and Catherine Redgwell,
quoting Weiss, "Intergenerational Equity and Global Warming,"
in Intergenerational Law and Global Climate Change, ed. Robin
Churchill and David Freestone (London: Graham & Trotman,
1991), p. 42.
441 FCCC, supra, n. 353, Art. 3(1). The Preamble of the
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile
Use of Environmental Techniques also makes reference to
"future generations," see, supra, n. 364.
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the present generation to pass on to the next an environment
in good condition, the prospect of a legal obligation to do so
is somewhat distant. 442
 Perhaps more importantly, such a
concept does not aid in "determin[ing] the content of current
regulations," and the appointment of an "Ombudsmen" to care
for these future rights is "surely an impractical
suggestion." 443
 Put another way, concentrating efforts on
the rights of future generations does not necessarily aid in
promulgating regulations for today's citizens. Yet such an
approach could help shape expectations as to future behaviour
of states.
2.5.3	 Common Heritage, Shared Resources and Common Concern
Another concept introduced into international law is the
idea of the common heritage of mankind. This principle
suggests that the resources of an area:
442 See, Boyle, "The Protection of the Global Atmosphere,"
supra, n. 406, p. 16. In addition, the concept of vesting such
rights in future generations appears to be inconsistent with
certain rights accorded to individuals, particularly in the
domestic law of western democracies, such as the greater right
of the living individual over the unborn fetus on the issue of
abortion.
443 See, Birnie, "International Environmental Law," supra,
n. 301, p. 79. Professor Birnie points out that the only model
for such an approach is the Supervisory Authority mechanism of
the 1974 Nordic Convention, a mechanism not activated by any
of the concerned Parties.
Art. 4 of that Convention provides that "Each State shall
appoint a special authority (supervisory authority) to be
entrusted with the task of safeguarding general environmental
interests. . ." Convention on the Protection of the Environment
Between Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, International
Legal Materials, Vol. 13, No. 3 (1974), pp. 591-597.
See, also, Gary P. Supanich, "The Legal Basis of
Intergenerational Responsibility: An Alternative View - The
Sense of Intergenerational Identity," Yearbook of
International Environmental Law Vol. 3 (1992), pp. 94-107,
where the author questions Weiss' theory of intergenerational
equity.
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cannot be appropriated to the exclusive sovereignty of
states but must be conserved and exploited for the
benefit of all, without discrimination.44
This concept has been applied in Part XI of the 1982 Law
of the Sea Treaty and the 1979 Moon Treaty. 4
	However, the
concept was not adopted in either the Vienna Ozone Convention
nor the FCCC, where it was deliberately replaced by the
concept of common concern, discussed below. Thus, other
concepts must be considered for determining the legal status
of the atmosphere.
The legal concept of shared resources is not appropriate
for application to the atmosphere. It is impossible to treat
the atmosphere as a resource that can be "shared" equally, as
it cannot be divided. In addition, the atmosphere and climate
do not have proprietary connotations, not being subject to
appropriation, reducing the relevancy of the concept of shared
resources. The atmosphere also cannot be considered as, or
part of, simple airspace, nor does it fit into the concept of
common property. "
444 Birnie & Boyle, International Law & The Environment,
supra, n. 188, p. 120. See also Arvid Pardo and Carl Q.
Christol, "The Common Interest: Tension Between the Whole and
the Parts," in The Structure and Process of International
Law, ed. R. St. McDonald and Douglas Johnston (Dordrecht:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1983), pp. 643-660.
445 Law of the Sea, supra, n. 351, Art. 136, and the 1979
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies, Art. 11(1) and (5), International
Legal Materials Vol. 18, No. 6 (1979), pp. 1434-1455. Since
the LOS is not yet in force and since the Moon Treaty does not
include any space states among its Parties, the concept of
common heritage is of doubtful legal status. See, Birnie and
Boyle, International Law & The Environment, supra, n. 188, p.
121.
446Boyle states that the atmosphere is not the same as
airspace since the atmosphere is not a spatial dimension
subject to national sovereignty, but is a moving airmass and
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The UN General Assembly in 1988 took a very different
approach, declaring that the global climate was the "common
concern of mankind." 447
 The legal significance of common
concern is not yet clear, however. The Executive Directorate
of the UN Environment Programme sponsored in 1990 The Meeting
of the Group of Legal Experts to Examine the Concept of The
Common Concern of Mankind in Relation to Global Environmental
Issues. 448 While the opinion was expressed there that the
concept was not yet a rule of general international law, it
was agreed that the concept was an evolving rule.
Birnie and Boyle state that the Vienna Ozone Convention
not subject to any national boundaries. He also rejects the
concept of common property, since the atmosphere falls only
partly into areas of common property or areas open for use to
all states, and partly into areas of sovereign airspace. See
Boyle, "Protection of the Global Atmosphere," supra, n. 406,
pp. 7-9. See also, Birnie & Boyle, International Law & The
Environment, supra, n. 188, p. 390.
447UN General Assembly Resolution 43/53, Protection of
Global Climate for Present and Future Generations of Mankind,
UN General Assembly Official Records of the General Assembly,
43rd Session, Supplement No. 49 (A/43/49), p. 133.
That view was also taken in the Noordwijk Declaration on
Atmospheric Pollution and Climate Change, Ministerial
Conference on Atmospheric Pollution and Climatic Change, 5-7
November 1989, Environmental Policy and Law Vol. 19, No. 6
(1989), pp. 229-231, as well as by the UN Environment
Programme Governing Council Decision 15/36, 25 May 1989, UN
General Assembly, Official Records, 44th Session, Supplement
No. 25 (A/44/25), p. 164.
The 1989 Ottawa Meeting of Legal and Policy Experts for
the Protection of the Atmosphere also stated that the
atmosphere "constituted a common resource of vital interest to
mankind." Statement reprinted in "Selected Materials,"
American University Journal of International Law and Policy,
Vol. 5, No. 2 (Winter 1991), pp. 529-542.
448David J. Attard, ed., The Meeting of the Group of Legal
Experts to Examine the Concept of The Common Concern of
Mankind in Relation to Global Environmental Issues (Nairobi:
UNEP, 1991). The Group of Experts have met once since that
time. David J. Attard, facsimile correspondence, 17 May 1993.
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confers the status of common concern or interest on the ozone
layer, since the definition given to "ozone layer" by the
Convention regards the ozone layer as a "global unity, without
reference to legal concepts of sovereignty, shared resources,
or common property." 449
 As such, all Parties maintain a
common legal interest in protecting the ozone layer, whether
directly injured or not, and in enforcing rules for protection
of the ozone layer. 45° The FCCC states that "change in the
Earth's Climate and its adverse effects are a common concern
of humankind." 45 ' Thus, it may not be too problematical to
draw the conclusion that the FCCC treats climate change, if
not he climate per Se, as a common concern of mankind, and
thereby bestowing the same legal interest on the Parties to
protect against climate change and to enforce rules for doing
so.
Whether the concept of common concern has been legally
conferred on the atmosphere as a whole is still unsure,
however. In addition, its consequences is still unclear. One
possible interpretation is the implication that states'
obligations towards that "concern" would be erga omnes.452
Any state, then, would have legal standing to bring a claim
against another in that area, without having to show that it
449Birnie and Boyle, International Law & The Environment,
supra, n. 188, p. 391.
4501bid.
451 Preamble, supra, n. 353.
452 See Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., "Standing To Challenge
Human Endeavors That Could Change The Climate," American
Journal of International Law Vol. 84, No. 2 (April 1990), p.
527.
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was uniquely harmed.
2.5.4	 Polluter Pays Principle
The polluter pays principle places responsibility on the
entity causing or likely to cause damage to the environment to
pay compensation for restoration. 54
 In so doing, "the cost
of these measures should be reflected in the costs of goods
and services which cause pollution in production or in
consumption." 455
 The consequence of a full application of
this principle is that liability is in effect unlimited.
The OECD has promoted the use of the polluter pays
principle. 456
 The EEC also endorsed the principles in a
programme of action adopted in 1973, and the Single European
Act of l986	 provided a legal basis. 458
 In addition, this
453 1bid., pp. 527-529. Boyle suggests two other meanings.
One is that it creates rights for future generations. A
second interpretation is that it contributes to already
existing obligations of customary international law, and that
the atmosphere is already protected by international law.
Boyle, "Protection of the Global Atmosphere," supra, n. 406,
pp . 11-13.
See, also, Christopher Stone, "Defending the Global
Commons," in Greening International Law, ed. Philippe Sands
(London: earthscan, 1993), pp. 35-49, where the author
addresses the issue of guardians for the global commons.
454 Kiss and Shelton, International Environmental Law,
supra, n. 257, p. 67.
455Birnie & Boyle, International Law & the Environment,
supra, n. 188, p. 109, citing OECD definition.
4560ECD Council Recommendation on the Implementation of
the Polluter Pays Principle, OECD and the Environment (Paris:
OECD, 1986), OECD Council Recommendation on Application of the
Polluter-Pays Principle to Accidental Pollution, International
Legal Materials Vol. 28, No. 5 (1989), pp. 1320-1325.
41Art. 130R(2), International Le gal Materials Vol. 25,
No. 3 (1986), pp. 506-518.
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principle can be found in various documents, including the
1990 Convention on Oil Preparedness, Response and Co-
operation, 4" the Meeting on the Protection of the
Environment of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE), 46° Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration, 46 ' and
a UNEP Governing Council Decision.462
The polluter pays principle, as stated above, would
require compensation in full; unlimited liability in effect.
This approach has been largely incorporated in the 1990 US Oil
Pollution Act (OPA) enacted in reply to the 1989 Exxon Valdez
grounding in Alaska which caused extensive environmental
damage. 463 Under OPA, liability is unlimited in
circumstances including gross negligence, wilful misconduct
and violations of federal regulations. 464	As a result of
458Birnie and Boyle, International Law & the Environment,
supra, n. 188, p. 110.
459 lnternational Legal Materials Vol. 30 (1991), p. 735.
4"See Birnie and Boyle, International Law & The
Environment, supra, n. 188, pp. 110-111.
461 Principle 16, supra, n. 355.
462 SS.II/4/B, 3 August 1990. It can also be found in
sectoral pollution control regimes, such as the 1992
Oslo/Paris Convention, Art. 2(2b), the 1992 Helsinki
Convention, Art. 3(4), and the 1992 ECE Convention on
International waterways, Art. 2(5b).
463See, Peter Wetterstein, Environmental Impairment
Liability in Admiralty (Finland: Abo Akademi University Press,
1992) for a good account of liability under OPA.
464 Birnie & Boyle, International Law & the Environment,
supra, n. 188, p. 296. The OPA permit two types of defences:
complete defences whereby the responsible party must show by
a preponderance of the evidence that the discharge (or
substantial threat of discharge) of oil was caused solely by
an act of God, an act of war or of an act of omission by a
third party (other than an employee or agent of the
responsible party or a third party acting under a contractual
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such an approach, OPA could increase the cost of tanker
transportation of crude oil to the United States by
approximately US$450 million per year, based on current
shipping volumes and patterns. 4 " 5 The estimated cost passed
on to the American consumer is a $2.00 per year increase in
gasoline and utility bills. 4 " 6 Thus, the consumer will pay
some of the costs involved in the good and services which
cause pollution.
The OPA can be contrasted with the approach taken under
the 1969 Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage, where the owner is entitled in most cases to limit his
liability under a formula related to tonnage and to an overall
total 461
The polluter pays approach has been subject to criticism,
however.	 One scholar states that the approach is not
relationship with the responsible party); and defences as to
particular claimants; ie to the extent that the incident is
caused by the gross negligence or wilful misconduct of the
claimant. Wetterstein, Impairment Liability, supra, n. 463,
pp. 80-81, 85.
465 This is due to increasing vessel operating costs due to
OPA pressure on manning and maintenance expenditures,
increasing insurance costs, increasing construction costs, and
increasing overhead costs for intensified safety training and
response plans. See, John M. Ellis, "Impact of Environmental
Taxation on Consuming Countries and the Economic of Shipping,"
paper presented at the Oil & Money Conference, London, 26
October 1993.
466 1bid. The $450 million implementation cost does not
include any impact OPA may have on transportation costs to
other countries, however, and as ships trade globally and OPA
standards become more common worldwide, costs will increase.
461Birnie and Boyle, International Law & the Environment,
supra, n. 188, pp. 293-295. A Protocol not yet in force would
require shipowners to bear full costs up to the limit of their
own liability.
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appropriate as a principle of liability between states:
"Liability in international law has been traditionally
concerned with compensating for damage, although it is
nearly impossible to compensate states fully for
environmental damage. Moreover, if the goal of those who
argue for a polluter-pays liability principle is to
discourage polluting behaviour, the amount needed to
deter such behaviour is unlikely to be the same as that
needed to compensate for damage. Moreover, the polluter-
pays principle as an economic approach suggests that a
party could be liable only for negligent behaviour, not
strictly liable, in international law. Finally, the
emphasis on liability is questionable. There is virtually
no instance in public international law when states have
admitted liability for environmental damage to another
country in the absence of treaty provisions. Indeed, the
trend has been directly opposite - some countries have
paid for the installation of proper pollution control in
polluting countries because the costs of doing so were
less than the costs of continuing to suffer pollution
damage."4
Such an argument places the polluter pays approach in a
dubious position, then, particularly in light of the argument
that there should be burden-sharing on the part of consumers
of the goods involved as well, and not have the burden of
pollution placed solely on the polluters. Developing states
also are not convinced of the merits of the principle,
insisting that developed states help defray the cost of
pollution. This approach is followed by the Montreal Protocol
to the Vienna Ozone Convention, infra, Chapter 5, whereby
financial aid is offered to developing states for
environmental protection.
Accordingly, as one scholar points out, the principle
remains at the international level a political and economic
principle, 469 but which will, however, influence the future
468Weiss, "Environmental Law," supra, n. 423, p. 705, fn
180.
469Birnie, "International Environmental Law," supra, n.
301, p. 80. The author points out that there are ad hoc
examples of application of the principle, including the US
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application of the legal principle in the shaping of
expectations regarding future behaviour of states.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter has outlined the main approaches to
international law, and in particular, the policy-oriented
approach, which will be utilised with respect to regime
theory, infra. The policy-oriented approach illustrates the
process of decision-making as more than just application of
rules, although it does not require a rejection of sources of
international law. Therefore, the policy-oriented school is
most conducive to the development of thought necessary to
understand and respond to the particularly serious
environmental challenges in question here, and is also able to
incorporate the study of regimes and the regime process.
From the above discussion, it is evident that the duty
not to cause harm as well as the duty to cooperate are general
principles that are long on hope and short on specifics.
Standing on their own, they do not provide much guidance for
either ozone layer depletion or climate change. The "new"
concepts introduced into international law, while progressive
components of legal theory, are of little benefit to
international law at the present time as "they affect the
timing of development rather than its content." 47° They can,
Superfund and the IMO's International Oil Pollution
Compensation Fund.
See also, Birnie & Boyle, International Law & The
Environment, supra, n. 188, p. 110.
470Birnie, "International Environmental Law," supra, n.
301, p. 83. In addition to these concepts, there is a movement
toward bringing environmental protection under the rubric of
international human rights law. See, for example, Dinah
Shelton, "What Happened in Rio to Human Rights?" Yearbook of
International Environmental Law Vol. 3 (1992), pp. 75-93, and
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however, help shape expectations as to the future behaviour of
states and thus contribute to international law-making.
Faced with such a lack of applicable law, the response of
states has been to form regimes of cooperation within the
international legal order. Examining such modes of
cooperation within the international legal order might prove
beneficial to the overall development of the legal order.
In order to understand how and when this might occur, a
new approach should be undertaken, one that focuses on the
common interests of states in creating and maintaining legal
rules, rather than attempting to force conformity to abstract
international legal principles such as the duty to prevent
harm or duty to cooperate. The development of progressive
concepts of law within the international legal order as
described above also favours such an approach, since "this
step forward does not depend upon itself, but rather upon its
principal participants.47L It is to a discussion of the
concept of international regimes that we now turn.
Symposium, Earth Rights and Responsibilities: Human Rights and
Environmental Protection, Yale Journal of International Law
Vol. 18, No. 1 (Winter 1993), pp. 212-413. This may not be the
best route at present, however, in view of the Asian and
Chinese animosity toward the imposition of what they perceive
as western human rights on their cultures displayed at the
recent International Conference on Human Rights, Vienna, June
1993. See, Thomas Hammarberg, "Vienna Will Be Remembered for
What Wasn't Said," International Herald Tribune, 29 June 1993,
p. 4. The writer is a former secretary-general of Amnesty
International and is currently with the UN Committee on the
Rights of the Child.
471 Wallace, International Law, supra, n. 194, p. 33.
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CHAPTER 3
"Once established, that expectation becomes a culture."4'2
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES
3.1 Introduction to International Regimes
The concept of international regimes 473 is proposed to
provide a middle ground between the two extremes of anarchy
and world government 474 through the creation of legal
obligations in specific issue-areas. Regimes remain, of
course, part of the larger legal order and thus subject to its
rules, and it is important "not to lose sight of the
interconnections and coherence of the larger whole" [legal
order]. 475 Regimes, then, serve to fill gaps in the
international legal order with regard to a specific issue-
area.476
But what exactly is a regime? Although regimes were
addressed initially by international law as a means of
472 Paul Tsongas, "Convince These Americans That Bush Is
Their President Too," International Herald Tribune, 18 May
1992, p. 4.
473 See supra, Chapter 1, n. 1.
474See, Richard Williamson, "Building The International
Environmental Regime: A Status Report," Inter-American Law
Review Vol. 21, No. 2 (1990) p. 740. See also, Lynne M.
Jurgielewicz, "Long Lines At Disney World Reduced By
Sunstroke! Or Can International Law Control Climate Change?"
Revue Generale de Droit Vol. 22, No. 2 (1991), pp. 468-470.
415Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and
Practice (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1991), p. 1.
476 See supra, Chapter 2, for the gaps in applicable
international law for climate change and ozone layer depletion
prior to the FCCC and the Vienna Ozone Convention.
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describing the prospect of legal regulation in unregulated
areas, 477
 the theory has gained prominence primarily within
the discipline of international relations. Within that
discipline, four different theoretical approaches have
evolved, but which, however, are not mutually exclusive.
These have been labelled structural,
	 game-theoretic,
functional, and cognitive.4
The structural approach attempts to connect the existence
of regimes with the existence of a dominant power. Thus, this
theory, in its simplest form, maintains that the presence of
a dominant power or coalition is necessary for regime
477 See, L.F.E. Goldie, "Special Regimes and Pre-Emptive
Activities in International Law," International and
Comparative Law Quarterly Vol. 11, (July 1962), pp. 670-700.
Goldie thus introduced the concept of regimes into
international law over a decade before it was introduced into
the international relations literature by Ernst Haas, "On
Systems and International Regimes, World Politics Vol. 27, No.
2 (January 1975), pp. 147-174. The international relations
literature, however, has made little more than a passing
reference to international legal research on regimes thus far.
478 See, Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, "Theories of
International Regimes," International Organization Vol. 41,
No. 3 (Summer 1987), pp. 491-517. This thesis' concept of
regimes falls predominately, but not exclusively, within the
cognitive approach.
See also, Helen Mimer, "International Theories of
Cooperation Among Nations," World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 3
(April 1992), pp. 466-96, Stephen Krasner, International
Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), Oran Young,
International Cooperation: Building Regimes For Natural
Resources and the Environment (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1989), Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and
Discord in the World Political Economy (1984), and Oran Young
and Gail Osherenko, Polar Politics: Creatin g International
Environmental Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1993).
A recent "Regimes Summit" workshop was held at Dartmouth
College, USA, to attempt to inventory the work of those
engaged in formulating and testing ideas about international
regimes. See "Workshop Report: Regimes Summit," Minary Center,
Dartmouth College, 22-24 November 1991.
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formation and for the regime to remain stable. 	 Hegemonic
stability theory has been criticised, however, for several
reasons. These include the presence of enough empirical
evidence to argue that the existence of a hegemon may be
neither sufficient or necessary for regime formation; that the
mere existence of a hegemon is probably not enough to
facilitate regime formation and maintenance (ie there must be
the will to take on the leadership role); and that there is
confusion as to what a hegemon is and what type of hegemonic
structure is advantageous under what circumstances for what
type of regime.479
The game-theoretic or strategic approach attempts to
determine, from a given set of rules, the most likely strategy
to be used by each player, in effect, this approach studies
the logic of interdependent decision-making. It is difficult,
however, to specify the preferences of the players, and
domestic processes are frequently ignored. Applying formal
game theory to a large number of actors can become
unmanageable, and reducing the number of choices to two
(cooperation or defection) could become an oversimplification.
Game theory also is not helpful in predicting whether regimes
will come into existence, as well as what norms and rules the
regime will consist of.48°
479 Thomas Bernauer, The Chemistry of Regime Formation
(Geneva: UNIDIR, 1993), p. 321, Another broad criticism used
against this approach is that it tends to look only at the
distribution of power within the international capitalist
system.Simmons and Haggard, "International Regimes," supra, n.
478, p. 503. See also, Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural Causes
and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables," in
International Regimes, ed. StephenD. Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1983), p. 1. and Keohane, After Hegemony,
supra, n. 478.
480Haggard and Simmons, "International Regimes," supra, n.
478, pp. 504-506, Bernauer, The Chemistry of Regime Formation,
supra, n. 479, pp. 208-209, and Milner, "International
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The functional approach attempts to explain behaviour in
terms of benefits or rewards which motivate behaviour.
However, knowing the function of a regime does not help
explain why regimes exist in some issue-areas, but not in
others. This is important since regimes may not always be
convergent, but may be divergent and institutionalize
inequalities.
Finally, the cognitive theory's "core cognitive insight
is that cooperation cannot be completely explained without
reference to ideology, the values of actors, the beliefs they
hold about the interdependence of issues, and the knowledge
available to them about how they can realize specific
goals." 482
 Thus, regimes are conditioned by ideology and
consensual knowledge, and evolve as the actors learn.
The above theories reveal the different strands within
regime theory. While there is no coherent set of propositions
to be gleaned from the above, this does not mean that
international legal scholars cannot proceed in the area of
regime theory. This also does not mean that the divisions
Theories of Cooperation Among Nations," supra, n. 478, where
the author outlines the weaknesses of the game theoretic
approach to regimes.
481 Haggard and Simmons, "International Regimes," supra, n.
478, pp. 506-508. The functional approach is somewhat similar
to that of legal functionalism, described earlier, supra,
Chapter 2, n. 173.
482 Haggard and Simmons, "International Regimes," supra, n.
478, pp. 509-513. Cognitive approaches cannot, however,
predict at what point consensual values or knowledge will
bring about cooperation. This thesis' concept of regimes falls
predominately, but not exclusively, within the cognitive
approach. See, also, Bernauer, The Chemistry of Regime
Formation, supra, n. 479, pp. 348-373, "Cognitive Factors,"
where the author argues that cognitive approaches can
contribute to closing the explanatory gap.
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within regime theory are underplayed, but that there is an
awareness of them. Methodological difficulties, while not to
be ignored in the "two-culture problem" between international
law and international relations, does not mean that there are
no intellectual opportunities for collaboration. Oran Young,
a leading international relations regime specialist has stated
that:
there are good grounds for concluding that the
development of a more effective working relationship
between the legal community and the social science
community is a necessary condition for the articulation
of a comprehensive and fully satisfactory account of the
nature and roles of regime in international society.483
It is only recently that regime theory has again become
the focus of legal scholars' search for methods to induce
greater international cooperation. 484
 Writing with regard to
4830ran Young, "Understanding International Regimes:
Contributions from Law and the Social Sciences," paper
presented at the annual meeting of the American Society of
International Law, Washington, DC, 1-3 April 1992, p. 39. The
paper was part of a panel examining methods to "build bridges"
between international law and international relations. In his
comments, Young suggested that there might be opportunities
for collaboration, notwithstanding the "two-cultures problem."
"Remarks," in American Society of International Law:
Proceedings of the 86th Meeting, by the American Society of
International Law, Washington, DC (1992), p. 175.
484 See for instance, Douglas M. Johnston, "Systemic
Environmental Damage: The Challenge To International Law and
Organization," Syracuse Journal of International Law and
Commerce Vol. 12, No. 2 (Winter 1985), pp. 255-282, Kenneth W.
Abbott, "Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus
for International Lawyers," Yale Journal of International Law
Vol. 14, No. 2 (Summer 1989), pp. 335-411, Williamson,
"International Environmental Regimes," supra, n. 474 and
Thomas Gehring, "International Environmental Regimes: Dynamic
Sectoral Legal Systems," Yearbook of International
Environmental Law Vol. 1 (1990), pp. 35-56.
These legal scholars are not just examining regimes to
describe legal institutional arrangements and practices, as
Goldie did, but have begun a preliminary look at the
conceptual and theoretical issues underlying regime theory.
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environmental problems, one scholar noted that regimes bring
to light the:
strong dependence on economic and political
factors, ... on the relative strength and
bargaining power of competing... lobbies,... on
scientific evidence (certainty versus uncertainty),
and on public opinion.485
This thesis expands upon the preliminary research done by
these legal scholars and seeks to answer their calls for
further investigation of regimes. 	 This requires the
integration of the work of international relations specialists
in this area. Until recently, the relations between these two
disciplines has been one of "mutual neglect." As noted by
Hurrell and Kingsbury:
There had been some collaboration between legal scholars
and political scientists previous to this, for example, Seyom
Brown, Nina A. Cornell, Larry L. Fabian and Edith Brown Weiss,
Regimes for the Ocean, Outer Space, and Weather (Washington,
DC: The Brookings Institution, 1977), and R. Michael M'Gonigle
and Mark W. Zacher, Pollution, Politics and International Law:
Tankers at Sea (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1979).
Mention should also be made of The Effective Management
of Resources, edited by C.M. Mason (London: Frances Pinter
Ltd, 1979) which looked at the use of regimes in resource
management and included legal scholars in its collaboration.
In particular, the chapter entitled "Regulation of North Sea
Marine Pollution," by Peter Fotheringham and P.W. Birnie,
pointed out that "the factors which have given rise to the
complex structure of the legal regimes for pollution control
can be considered under four headings: scientific, economic,
political and international legal," p. 172. The definition
given in the volume for "regime" was "a set of rules together
with the administrative arrangements for their implementation
and enforcement," C.M. Mason, "Resource Management and
International Politics,", p. 6. This thesis expands on that
concept, outlining the entire regime process, including that
prior to formal rules, and its role in the international legal
order.
485Winfried Lang, "The International Waste Regime," in
Environmental Protection and International Law, ed. Winfried
Lang, Hanspeter Neuhold and Karl Zemanek (London: Graham &
Trotman, 1991), p. 148.
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Regime theorists have tended to neglect the
particular status of legal rules, to downplay the
links between specific sets of rules and the
broader structure of the international legal
system, and to underrate the complexity and variety
of legal rules, processes, and procedures. On the
other hand, theoretical accounts of
international.., law have often paid rather little
explicit attention to the political bargaining
processes that underpin the emergence of new norms
of international.., law, to the role of power and
interest in inter-state negotiations, and to the
range of political factors that explain whether
states will or will not comply with rules.486
This pushes regime research in the direction of an inter-
disciplinary approach.487
486Andrew Hurrell and Benedict Kingsbury, "The
International Politics of the Environment: An Introduction,"
in The International Politics of the Environment, ed. Andrew
Hurrell and Benedict Kingsbury (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1992), p. 12.
487 Besides Hurrell and Kingsbury, others have advocated
interdisciplinary work in this general area. See, Anne-Marie
Slaughter Burley, "International Law and International
Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda," American Journal of
International Law Vol. 87, No. 2 (1993), pp. 205-239. See
also, Michael G. Schechter, "The New Haven School of
International Law, Regime Theorists, Their Critics and
Beyond," paper presented at the annual meeting of the
International Studies Association, Acapulco, Mexico, March
1993, and Lynne M. Jurgielewicz, "International Regimes and
Environmental Policy: An Evaluation of the Role of
International Law," in International Organizations and
Environmental Policy, ed. Robert Bartlett (Westport: Greenwood
Press, forthcoming 1993).
Also, Abram Chayes and Antonia Chayes note in the
abstract of their article that "a new dialogue is beginning
between students of international law and international
relations scholars concerning compliance with international
agreements," "On Compliance," International Organization, Vol.
47, No. 2 (Spring 1993), pp. 175-205. In that regard, Mark
Hoffman and Michael Banks of the LSE International Relations
Department participated as occasional lecturers in the 1992-93
University of London LLM course on alternative dispute
resolution.
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3.2 Definition of Regimes4
There is no complete agreement on what exactly comprises
a regime. 4
	Goldie, in his earliest work on regimes
identified them as
(1) the acceptance, amongst a group of States, of a
community of laws and of legal ideas; (2) the
mutual respect and recognition accorded by certain
States to the unilateral policies of others acting
in substantial conformity with their own, enmeshing
all the States concerned in a regime with respect
to those policies; (3) a common loyalty, among a
group of States, to the principle of abstention
regarding a common resource.49°
Goldie added:
when this is mutually and equitably administered in
the light of scientific knowledge, the
participation of these States within a regime of
this kind most clearly illustrates the possibility
488 The definitions below were chosen to reflect the broad
spectrum of the existing literature and are not inclusive.
489 See, for instance, Haggard and Simmons, "International
Regimes," supra, n. 478. See also, Michael McGinnis and Elinor
Ostrom, "Institutional Analysis and Global Climate Change:
Design Principles For Robust International Regimes," where the
authors concede lack of consensus on the meaning. Paper
presented at the conference "Global Change," sponsored by the
Midwest Consortium for International Security Studies and
Argonne National Laboratory, Chicago, Illinois (February,
1992), pp. 6-9, and Eckart Klein, "International Regimes," in
R. Bernhard, ed., Encyclopedia of Public International Law
Vol. 9, (Netherlands: Elsevier Science Publishers B.V., 1986),
p . 202 where the author states that there is no generally
accepted meaning of regimes.
Regimes as defined in this thesis are distinct from the
legal concept of "objective regimes," defined as treaties
which create rights and duties for third states, such as
treaty regimes for international waterways or
demilitarization. While regimes as advocated in this thesis
may eventually create third party duties or lead to formal
treaties, they may not necessarily do so. Ian Brownlie,
Principles of Public International Law, 4th ed. (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1990), p. 633.
4 °Goldie, "Special Regimes," supra, n. 477, p. 698.
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of restraining pre-emptive acts which might
otherwise be permitted under international law.49'
So for Goldie, regimes provide an intermediate stage of
formulation for rules which may eventually become part of the
general system of international law as acceptance widens to
include more states within the regime.492
Over a decade after Goldie's writing on international
regimes, international relations scholars began to further
explore the concept. Within that discipline, the most
frequently cited definition of regimes is that of Stephen
Krasner. He states that international regimes are
"principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures
around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-
area.
Although it is difficult for an international legal
scholar not to notice the influence of international law
within Krasner's definition, Krasner does not explicitly take
account of international law. His definition differs
substantially from Goldie's, where the development of a legal
conscience by the regime members leading to rules of law is
regarded to be critical. 494
 While the language of Krasner's
structural approach to regimes was probably used so as to
avoid the confines of traditional treaty-based law as well as
4911bid.
492 1bid., pp. 698-699. Goldie contrasted "special regimes"
with regional arrangements by reason of the latter's
geographical reference and because regional arrangements do
not necessarily form a system reciprocating unilateral acts
which lead to regimes, p. 676.
493 Krasner, "Structural Causes," supra, n. 479, p. 1.
" 4 Goldie, "Special Regimes," supra, n. 477, p. 698.
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to avoid equating regimes with formal treaties or
international organizations, his use of norms, rules and
decision-making procedures brings his definition of regimes
precariously close to, if not within, the process-oriented
account of the international legal order.
Within Krasner's framework, principles are defined as
"beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude," norms are
"standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and
obligations," rules are "specific prescriptions or
proscriptions for action," while decision-making procedures
are "prevailing practices for making and implementing
collective A comparison to the work of leading
international legal scholars following the policy-oriented
approach reveals a similarity in meanings of these terms,
particularly to those theorists adopting a "cognitive theory"
approach to regimes, notwithstanding the different labels.
Oscar Schachter, while applying different labels to these
terms, offers similar definitions for their application within
international law. He describes three types of legally
relevant "norms": rules, principles and objectives. These are
analogous to Krasner's rules, norms and principles. For
Schachter, "rules" dictate a specific result, such as the rule
that nine votes are required to adopt a Security Council
resolution. 496
	This equates with Krasner's definition of
"rules" (specific prescriptions). His description of
"principles" is similar to Krasner's use of "norms" (standards
of behaviour) in that interpretations of these "principles"
will vary with respect to the circumstances as with non-use of
45Krasner, "Structural Causes," supra, n. 479, p. 2.
International Law in Theory and Practice, supra, n.
475, p. 20.
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force versus self-defence.' Finally, Schachter describes
"objectives," which do not give rise to claims of entitlement
but become relevant when making choices between opposing
"rules" or "principles" (as he defines those terms).4
Schachter's use of "objective" is loosely analogous to
Krasner's use of "principles. "
Rosalyn Higgins' description of the meaning of rules and
norms within international law also does not differ
dramatically from Krasner's (or Schachter's, except perhaps in
labelling, where Higgins' use of "norm" is analogous to
Schachter's use of "principle"):
A 'rule' is an obligation of law which in its terms
cannot be gainsaid: For example, the requirement that the
Security Council be composed of 15 members; or that an
important vote in the General Assembly requires a two-
thirds vote. A norm, by contrast, is an authoritative
provision of law that continues to command significant
community expectations as to its contemporary validity
and which may be appropriately invoked and applied in the
particular factual context. But our appreciation of that
very context can give rise to debate as to whether that
norm, or another different (indeed, competing) norm,
should be applied. The prohibition against the use of
force is thus a norm. Recent events.., have illustrated
graphically the diverse views that may be advanced as to
whether that norm is applicable to the fact situation; or
rather the norm permits the use of force in self-
reliance; or perhaps permits reprisals.500
4911bid.
498 1bid., p. 21.
For example, Krasner lists reciprocity as an example of
a principle. Krasner, "Structural Causes," supra, n. 479, p.
3. This seems similar to Schachter's definition of objective
or policy. Decision-making procedures appear to mean the same.
500Rosalyn Higgins, "The Role of Resolutions of
International Organizations in the Process of Creating Norms
in the International System," in International Law and the
International System, ed. William E. Butler (Dordrecht:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), p. 21.
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While there is disagreement among regime analysts
regarding the precise meanings of these terms, the degree
of similarity between Krasner's terms and international legal
concepts is striking, notwithstanding the different labels
used.	 Rules are basically obligations that cannot be put
aside, while norms are behaviour standards. This suggests
more of a presence of a legal order encompassing regimes than
international relations scholars have implied, as well as more
of a role for the concept of regimes within international law
than legal specialists have acknowledged.502
While Krasner's definition may not appear to have
explicitly addressed the presence of international law
surrounding regimes (although as pointed out earlier it
appears to implicitly address law) this is not surprising as
Krasner was defining regimes in the political context of
international relations. Eckart Klein's definition, on the
other hand, can be seen to have gone to the opposite extreme.
501 5ee, Haggard and Simmons, "Theories of International
Regimes," supra, n. 478, p. 494. Dissatisfaction with the
meanings, however, can only lead to more research producing
better understanding of regime theory.
502This thesis is concerned with international law and
thus the views of international legal scholars. For other
general jurisprudential views see, Ronald Dworkin, Taking
Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth and Co., 1977), who states
that the law consists not just of rules, but of principles as
well, which may conflict and must be weighed against each
other. Principles cannot be identified simply by consulting
sources, but only through a moral or political discussion of
which principles should be used to lustify black-letter law.
For another view, see H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), who claims that law consists
of a body of rules which emanate from certain sources, and
that any lack of clarity results from the "open texture" of
language. See, also, supra, Chapter 2, Section 2.1.2,
Positivists.
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More in line with traditional legal thinking, Klein states
that regimes "refer to treaty-based settlements which are
intended, by defining the status of a certain area, to form
part of the international order," and the purpose of which is
to stabilize a contentious situation or to regulate common use
of an area.° 4 Under this view, an international regime
consists of: 1) a treaty between states, or between states and
international organizations regulating an issue-area; 2) a
general interest underlying the regulation; and 3) the
intention of the parties to serve the general interest by
endowing the area with a general status erga omnes. 50 This
definition, however, is too narrow in that it requires a
treaty, thus incorporating one of the difficulties some
regimes attempt to evade (at least in their early existence):
legal formalism. As will be argued below, regimes may come
into existence long before a treaty is negotiated, and could
arguably exist without a formal treaty.
Thomas Gehring offers a more integrated work in this area
by more closely linking international law and regimes. He
explains regimes as the regulations, developed within the
503Not surprisingly, as Klein's definition appears in the
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, supra, n. 489.
504 Klein, "International Regimes," supra, n. 489, p. 203.
Lang similarly holds that regimes are established through
framework conventions or protocols, Winfried Lang, "Diplomacy
and International Environmental Law-Making: Some
Observations," Yearbook of International Environmental Law
Vol. 3 (1992), p. 120.
505 Still another definition states that although a regime
"does not have any legal consequences per Se," it is evidence
of a "coherent subset of rules, subordinated to the universal
system" forming "a framework bracket susceptible to recurring
future application." Ingrid Detter De Lupis, The Concept of
International Law (Stockholm: Norstedts, 1987), p. 40. This
definition is at odds with the view of this thesis that
regimes do have legal consequences.
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context of a Diplomatic Conference of Parties (which addresses
both political and technical issues) to a convention,
governing a specific area of international relations.
However, some regulation occurs outside of the body of formal
law, such as through recommendations of working groups.506
Gehring asserts that regimes so defined maintain a tight
relationship between "their normative substance and their
decision-making procedures to implement, administer and
develop prescriptions to meet the demand for quick legal
action." 507
 This definition expands upon Klein's, but still
provides for the presence of international law which Krasner
neglects, albeit in the confines of a Conference of Parties.
Within Gehring's framework of the Conference of Parties,
law-making is the search for consensus among the states
involved on the need for international action and the basis
for doing so. As Gehring correctly points out, the lack of a
centralised authority for the international legal system
requires consensus for the creation of new rules of
international law. 508
	Regimes organise the process for
shaping consensus.	 Thus, agreement on the priorities and
strategies for international action is reached through
consensus-building. A body of technical knowledge,
accumulated from expert opinions, gives rise to what Gehring
calls "cognitive expectations," or expectations based on
knowledge.	 Prescriptions for behaviour or "normative
expectations" evolve, based on the cognitive expectations of
506 Gehring, "International Environmental Regimes," supra,
n. 484, p. 37.
5071b1d.
508 Ibid., p. 38.
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the actors involved. Normative expectations can also
induce changes in cognitive or knowledge expectations, for
example, through requiring ongoing research. Thus, regimes
provide the building block for norms and rules, eventually
commanding a much larger commitment as the norms and rules
evolve.
Gehring also maintains that norms and rules may be only
partially articulated in formal legal instruments.
	 Thus,
differing degrees of formal law are utilised in regimes.
Indeed, there may be reasons why the parties to a regime might
desire an informal agreement instead of a more formal
undertaking, such as when states are uncertain about the
future benefits and wish then to remain easily and quickly
open to adjustment. 51 ' Informal agreements may also be
necessary to give effect to controversial concepts such as
"sustainable development" or "differentiated responsibility,"
which have imprecise meanings.
509 See, supra, Chapter 2, Section 2.1.3, Policy-Oriented
School and Section 2.3, Policy-Oriented Lawmaking, where
shared expectations give rise to legal obligations in the
prescriptive process of lawmaking.
°Gehring, "International Environmental Regimes," supra,
n. 484, pp. 47-50.
51 'Charles Lipson, "Why Are Some International Agreements
Informal?", International Organization, Vol. 45, No. 4 (Autumn
1991), pp. 495-538. Lipson states that the choice between
treaties and informal agreements is not based on whether it is
"legally binding", which, for Lipson, is a misleading term
since states must act for themselves to enforce their
bargains. Rather, states choose treaties over informal
arrangements when they wish to raise "the credibility of
promises by staking national reputation on adherence." Ibid.,
p. 511. Although I agree with Lipson that states must decide
for themselves whether to comply with their agreements, I do
not agree that only formal treaties can raise the credibility
of promises, since informal regimes can also create a source
of legal obligation. See, infra, Section 3.5, The Legal Status
of Regimes.
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Dispute settlement functions are also internalised within
Gehring's concept of regimes. Since states rarely use third-
party dispute settlement procedures to resolve critical issues
of policy, internalising such procedures is a practical
reflection of the present state of international affairs. Yet
there is an additional benefit in that such internal dispute
settlement procedures can utilise not only international law
to guide decisions, but also incorporate the normative
expectations developed within the regime. This method of
dispute settlement ensures optimal cooperation and is of great
importance since the "legal relations would be based on more
highly articulated rules and standards... than those generally
obtaining [within international law]".512
One international lawyer undertaking a preliminary
examination of regimes states that "grasping the concept of a
regime can be a bit of a challenge." 513
 Goldie, however, has
set out the relevant parameters in that regimes encompass the
acceptance of legal ideas in the regulation of an issue-area;
a minimal set of limitations (which may evolve) on a state's
policies to ensure conformity with certain standards.514
512Goldie, "Special Regimes," supra, n. 477, p. 699. See,
also, supra, Chapter 2, where the very general rules of
international environmental law applicable to global
environmental change are outlined.
513williamson, "International Environmental Regime,"
supra, n. 474, p. 739. He states that for the purposes of his
paper, "it should be sufficient to note that nearly all
regimes involve some use of international treaties and
organizations (and thus international law), but have other
critical elements which are not legal." Abbott did not pursue
the "proper definition" of regime, alleging its relation to
international law seemed likely to be sterile. Abbott,
"International Relations Theory," supra, n. 484, p. 339.
514 Although Goldie saw regimes as more of an intermediate
stage of formulation of rules while this thesis takes the view
that norms and rules can evolve within the regime itself, his
statement is still relevant here. See, "Special Regimes,"
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Most of the other definitions described above either ignore
the presence of law or require it in traditional, formal
methods. However, some sort of legal obligation, not
necessarily formal, is needed within a regime. '' Indeed, to
qualify as legally binding, it must satisfy the sources
test. In addition, a legal obligation supplies a minimum
standard for distinguishing regimes from ordinary political or
administrative arrangements, provides a gauge for judging the
effectiveness of a regime, and allows for comparison of the
rules at different moments in time.7
Gehring's view of regimes appears to be the most fluid,
allowing for the presence of law in informal as well as formal
methods. Nevertheless, Gehring's regime requires as a
starting point a Conference of Parties to a convention.
Regimes, however, may be formed prior to a diplomatic
conference.
The definition used in this thesis is that a regime
constitutes the development of legal regulations ("normative
supra, n. 477, pp. 80-81.
IsSee infra, Section 3.5, The Legal Status of Regimes.
supra, Chapter 2, Section 2.2, Sources of
International Law.
517Gareth Porter and Janet Welsh Brown, Global
Environmental Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), p.
21. This argument is augmented by the ozone layer depletion
regime, where the Vienna Convention and the adjustments and
amendments to the Montreal Protocol allow for comparison of
the norms at different points in the development of the
regime, see, infra, Chapter 5. See also, Martin List and
Volker Rittberger, "Regime Theory and International
Environmental Management," in International Politics of the
Environment, ed. Andrew Hurrell and Benedict Kingsbury
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 89, where the authors
state that regime identification "requires the observation of
norm and rule guided behaviour."
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expectations") by both state and non-state actors through
collective decision-making ("cognitive expectations"),
governing a specific issue-area and creating a legal
obligation among the actors. Since regimes may eventually
deal with more than one issue-area, however, the "simple"
regime described above can evolve into a "complex regime,"
This can occur as the "international community, or major
portions of it, adopts a series of interlocking measures...
toward a common... goal, bolstered by shared values, norms, or
fears. ,,518
Notwithstanding the fact that international law and
international relations have been working in relative
isolation in general and in the area of regimes specifically,
the two disciplines may be drawing closer together in their
"mutual concerns." Hurrell illustrates this point by drawing
comparisons between an international relations regime theorist
and an international lawyer. 519
 The former defines regimes
as "institutions with explicit rules, agreed upon by
governments, that pertain to particular sets of issues in
international relations." 52° The latter describes the
purpose of international agreements as providing a framework
518Williamson, "International Environmental Regime, supra,
n. 474, p. 741. The author cites as an example the nuclear
nonproliferation regime which includes two major treaties, an
international organization, and other measures dealing with
closely related issues such as export control, intelligence
sharing and diplomacy.
519Andrew Hurrell, "International Society and the Study of
Regimes: A Reflective Approach," in Regime Theory and
International Relations, ed. Volker Rittberger (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 54. See, also, List and Rittberger,
"Regime Theory," supra, n. 517, pp. 89-90, and Porter and
Brown, Global Environmental Politics, supra, n. 517, pp. 20-
21.
52 Robert 0. Keohane, International Institutions and State
Power (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), p. 4.
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for the facilitation of on-going negotiations for the
development of rules of law. 52 ' The international relations
viewpoint appears to be moving towards a greater rule-oriented
view of order, while the international legal view is moving
away from its traditional view of rule-making. Although these
are just two viewpoints, they reflect a gradual movement of
the two disciplines towards each other regarding state
behaviour. 522
 This development can only be encouraged; it is
my view that, just as it is important for the international
521 Patricia Birnie, "International Environmental Law: Its
Adequacy For Present and Future Needs," in International
Politics of the Environment, ed. Andrew Hurrell and Benedict
Kingsbury (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 57.
522An examination of the recent texts dealing with the
environment and cooperation may leave one feeling' somewhat
pessimistic, however. This is reflected in the scope of four
of the most recently published international relations books
on the environment and cooperation: (l)Ian Rowlands and Malory
Greene, ed., Global Environmental Change and International
Relations (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991); (2)Porter and Brown,
Global Environmental Politics, supra, n. 517; (3)Caroline
Thomas, The Environment in International Relations (London:
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1992); and (4)Andrew
Hurrell and Benedict Kingsbury, ed., The International
Politics of the Environment (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1992).
Only Hurrell and Kingsbury give adequate space to the
important linkage between international relations and
international law in environmental cooperation, although
Porter and Brown make a point of defining regimes in terms of
legal instruments. Rowlands and Greene allot space only to a
traditional analysis of the formal legal institutions involved
in environmental cooperation, and Thomas does not allude to
the role of law at all, except to formal legal instruments
already in place. In addition, a recent University of London
PhD thesis states that, within the scope of that thesis, the
term 'regime' is used "in the way it is used by international
relations specialists. This usage is distinct from that
employed by other scholars and practitioners-for example,
international lawyers..." Ian Rowlands, "International Regime
Formation: The Politics of Ozone Depletion and Global
Warming," unpublished thesis, University of London, 1992, p.
17.
International legal scholars, of course, are in no
position to cast the first stone, as their work has not often
taken account of the work of international relations scholars.
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relations specialist to take account of international law when
studying regimes, so also is it important for international
lawyers to take account of extralegal aspects of law-making in
the formation and development of regimes, and not just the
final result.523
3.3 Formation of Regimes
Just as there is a dispute concerning the definition of
regimes, there is also a dispute concerning when regimes come
into existence. 524
 Within international relations, a widely
used taxonomy regarding regimes identifies three different
models: structural or realist, modified structural or modified
realist, and Grotian. 525 The realist model argues that
regimes are created when cooperation is desired among self-
interested actors and are merely "arenas for acting out power
relationships." 526
 The modified realist model argues that
states enter into regimes to coordinate state behaviour in
order to achieve desired outcomes in certain issue-areas.527
523This requires a policy-oriented approach to
international law, see, supra, Chapter 2, Section 2.1.3,
Policy-Oriented School and Section 2.3, Policy-Oriented
Lawmaking.
524See, Haggard and Simmons, "International Regimes,"
supra, n. 478.
525Krasner, "Structural Causes," supra, n. 479, pp. 5-10.
See also, Tony Evans and Peter Wilson, "Regime Theory and the
English School of International Relations: A Comparison,"
Millennium: Journal of International Relations Vol. 21, No. 3
(Winter 1992), pp. 329-351.
526Evans and Wilson, "Regime Theory," supra, n. 525, p.
330. See also, Susan Strange, "Cave! Hic Dragones: A Critique
of Regime Analysis," in International Regimes, ed. Stephen U.
Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 337-354.
527Krasner, "Structural Causes," supra, n. 479, p. 7. See
also, Robert 0. Keohane, "The Demand For International
Regimes," in International Regimes, ed. Stephen D. Krasner
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Finally, the Grotian model argues that regimes exist in all
areas of international relations and that states are
"constrained by principles, norms, and rules that prescribe
and proscribe varieties of behaviour." Grotians consider
regimes subjective, existing "primarily as participants'
understandings, expectations or convictions about legitimate,
appropriate or moral behaviour." This model takes account
of domestic and transnational actors as well, although
agreeing that the state is the main actor. 51° For Grotians,
these regimes range from "an empty facade that rationalises
the rule of the powerful" to "codified international law or
morality.
Research within international law is more convergent
regarding regime formation. Goldie maintains regimes are
dependent on the existence of shared values (independent of
the legal order). 532
 Gehring attributes the formation of a
regime to consensus among a conference of parties to a
convention on the necessity of international action, thus
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983) pp. 141-171.
5 Krasner, "Structural Causes," supra, n. 479, p. 8. See
also, Donald J. Puchala and Raymond F. Hopkins, "International
Regimes: Lessons From Inductive Analysis," in International
Regimes, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1983) pp. 61-91.
529 Puchala and Hopkins, "International Regimes," supra, n.
528, p. 62. This closely parallels what Haggard and Simmons
have characterised as the cognitive approach, supra, n. 478.
530Evans and Wilson, "Regime Theory," supra, n. 525, p.
331.
5 Puchala and Hopkins, "International Regimes," supra, n.
528, p. 86.
532 "Pollution From Nuclear Accidents," in International
Law and Pollution, ed. Daniel Magraw (Philadelphia: University
of Pennsylvania Press, 1991), p. 204. See also, Goldie,
"Special Regimes," supra, n. 477, p. 698.
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arguably depending on the shared values or interests of states
regarding a certain issue-area. Williamson states that
regimes arise as states adopt a series of measures toward a
common goal, "bolstered by shared values, norms, or fears.
He stresses that while the perception of the problem and goal
may be widespread, it is not universal. Instead, it is the
work of common efforts by states which make the goal more
universally accepted, transforming practical arrangements into
normative constraints on behaviour.535
In these analyses, shared values provide normative
structures for the formation of these regimes, which do not
arise solely from self-interest. In the language of the
policy-oriented school of international law, these shared
values are called shared expectations.536
This type of analysis is anathema to a realist model of
533 "International Environmental Regimes," supra, n. 484,
p. 37.
534 "Building the International Environmental Regime,"
supra, n. 474, p. 741.
35 Ibid., p. 743. Although the author was referring to
"complex regimes," see supra, p. 158, his analysis applies to
simple regimes as well.
536 See, supra, Chapter 2, Section 2.1.3, Policy-Oriented
School.
Emphasis on shared expectations does not mean that
international legal specialists naively ignore the concept of
power among states. Indeed, Schachter points out that
"[nJearly all... regimes are seriously affected by the
differentiation in power among their members," International
Law in Theory and Practice, supra, n. 475, p. 80. Indeed,
power or control is necessary under the policy-oriented
school, along with an authority signal, if shared expectations
are to be sustained. See, supra, Chapter 2, Section 2.3,
Policy-Oriented Lawmaking.
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regimes within international relations. 537
 But, as Hurrell
points out, "this rigour has been bought at a significant
cost," including a downplaying of the sense of community and
the necessity of ethics. 538
 But realist self-interest and
moral idealism can be mutually supporting in the sense that a
minimal sense of equity must enter into the formation of
regimes, no matter how great the self-interest that lies
behind the regime formation: "[a] collaboration that is
perceived by a participant as blatantly unfair cannot be a
durable arrangement in international society." 539
 In another
sense, this is also a realisation that a "responsible" view of
sovereignty, whereby absolute sovereignty is limited, is
necessary within the international system.54°
The policy-oriented international law perspective of
regime formation mirrors closely the Grotian model discussed
above. Indeed, their view of regimes as value-biased is very
similar to the policy-oriented view that law-making reflects
choices and thus is not neutral:
"All regimes are biased. They establish hierarchies of
values, emphasising some and discounting others. They
also distribute rewards to the advantage of some and the
disadvantage of others, and in so doing they buttress,
legitimize, and sometimes institutionalize patterns of
537Put more bluntly, it is necessary to stress national
[self] interest, "because [there's] not a lot of morality
around." Professor Stuart Harris, "The Environment and
International Relations," speech given at the Royal Institute
of International Affairs, London, May 1992.
538Hurrell, "International Society and the Study of
Regimes," supra, n. 519.
539Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice,
supra, n. 475, p. 61. See, also, Oscar Schachter, Sharing the
World's Resources (NY: Columbia University Press, 1977) pp.
142-143.
540Birnie, "International Environmental Law," supra, n.
521, p. 84.
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dominance,	 subordination,	 accumulation,	 and
exploitation. "s"
However, the Grotian model appears to limit the presence
of international law somewhat, since the Grotians consider
regimes to be particularly prevalent in the broad range
"between the limits of major-power hegemony and legal or moral
order," 542
 whereas this thesis advocates regimes as being
part of the international legal order notwithstanding their
(sometimes) lack of legal formalism.
For the formation of a regime to take place, there must
be present shared expectations of future behaviour regarding
the regulation of an issue-area. 543 Formation of a regime is
an important aspect since it may indicate that the legal order
is present before a rule-oriented approach to international
law would acknowledge. It is difficult to pinpoint the exact
moment when formation occurs, but the attempt is critical if
anything is to be learned about when and why states will
cooperate in the regulation of a previously unregulated area.
In the words of the policy-oriented school, the identifying
characteristic of a regime or what the school labels an
"arena" is:
"a structure of expectations shared among the members of
a community. The identifying characteristic of an arena
541 Puchala and Hopkins, "International Regimes," supra, n.
528, p. 66.
542 1bid., p. 87. See also, Evans and Wilson, "Regime
Theory," supra, n. 525, p. 331, where the authors point out
the Grotian claim "that a purely formal understanding of
regimes-one that concentrates on bargaining and negotiating
procedures, legal rules and concrete international
organizations-does not take proper account of the prevailing
social environment..." such as non-state actors.
543 See, supra, Chapter 2, Section 2.3, Policy-Oriented
Lawmaking for a description of the prescriptive process for
identifying shared expectations.
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is a structure of expectations shared among the members
of a community; that is, choices affecting the community
are made which, if opposed, will in all probability be
enforced against opposition."'44
3.4 Maintenance or Development of Regimes
From the perspective of answering the sceptic's question,
"do regimes matter?", formation pales in significance with
comparison to the maintenance or development of a regime.
Maintenance or development depends upon the extent to which
critical issues have been resolved and cognitive expectations
shaped. 546
	Thus, the stronger the regime through critical
issue agreement, the stronger the cognitive expectations, and
the stronger the rules and norms or normative expectations
flowing from that regime. 547
 Thus, the shared or normative
expectations are shaped just as in the formation of the
regime, supra.
	 In addition, there are catalysts that, if
present, can aid the formation and development of a legal
" 44Myres S. McDougal and Harold D. Lasswell, "The
Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public
Order," American Journal of International Law, Vol. 53, No. 1
(January 1959), p. 8.
545There is a hierarchy, then, among the aspects of a
regime from the standpoint of utility. Most important is the
maintenance or development of a regime (including compliance),
the 2nd most important is the formation, and the 3rd is the
definition. From the standpoint of legal theory, however,
formation cannot be overlooked since the formation of a regime
creates legal obligations. See, supra, this Chapter, Section
3.3, Formation of Regimes.
See, infra, Chapter 4, for the discussion of the
development of regimes with regard to critical issues and
catalysts, and Chapters 5 and 6 for analyses of this
development.
46 See, supra, n. 509 for cognitive expectations.
47 Ibid.
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regime, although their presence is not critical to either.548
Regarding regime development, it is argued that because
of the internalizing of the making and application of law, and
by virtue of "dispute settlement procedures consistent with
the consensus-building process of communication, regimes can
develop into "comparatively autonomous sectoral legal
systems." 549
 Schachter agrees that a regime may eventually
achieve a significant degree of autonomy. Indeed, he believes
that international law is shifting away from its focus on
state sovereignty, and that regimes will form "new centres of
authority," due to the inability of states to deal
unilaterally with such complex problems as global
environmental change. 55° Birnie supports this view of
states' shift towards "responsible" sovereignty, at least
within the area of environmental regulation, as a necessity
for self-preservation. 55 ' Others, however, see regimes as
something short of formal law or a legal order, but somewhat
more structured than an arrangement based solely on power
politics. 552
548 See, infra, Chapter 4, Section 4.2, Catalysts.
549 Gehring, "International Environmental Regimes," supra,
n. 484, p. 37.
550 lnternational Law in Theory and Practice, supra, n.
475, p. 81. Schachter is referring to an advanced stage of
development for regimes, after a treaty has evolved.
55t Birnie, "International Environmental Law," supra, n.
521, p. 84.
552 Williamson, "Building the International Environmental
Regime," supra, n. 474, p. 740 and Puchala and Hopkins,
"International Regimes," supra, n. 528, p. 87, advocating the
Grotian model.
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3.5 The Legal Status of Regimes
Theorists disagree as to how valuable the concept is
within the international order. Within international law,
a critical question must be to what extent can a regime be
considered part of the legal order.
A great deal would depend, of course, on the definition
of what exactly comprises international law, or indeed, as
some realist sceptics would question, whether international
law exists at all. This thesis incorporates the policy-
oriented approach to international law, which was described
above. 554
	This school views international law-making as a
continuous process.
	 In this process, shared expectations
creating legal obligations are sustained or changed by the
continuation or abatement of streams of communications
regarding the authority and credible control intentions of
those whose support is needed for the norms' efficacy.555
A similar view states that the difference between legal
and non-legal norms and rules can be attributed to the
interpretation or construction of norms and rules, "a skill
transmitted through a socialization process which people
553 See Strange, "Cave! Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime
Analysis," supra, n. 526, p. 337, who claims that regimes have
little impact on outcomes and behaviour and subsequently
should be dismissed as a passing academic fad.
554 See, supra, Chapter 2, Section 2.1.3, Policy-Oriented
School and Section 2.3, Policy-Oriented Lawmaking.
555 W. Michael Reisman, "International Lawmaking: A Process
of Communication," Proceedings of the American Society of
International Law (1981), p. 113.
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undergo when they become 'rule handlers.'" 56 These rule
handlers rely on the expectations perceived as legitimate and
expected to be complied with.
Critics counter this reliance on "shared expectations" by
arguing that legal obligation may be dissolved by having it
depend on expectations, perceptions and compliance, and thus
risk turning law into politics. Support for the relevance of
"expectation," however, comes (for international law!) from
strange places. International relations specialists argue
that cooperation is facilitated by law and regimes "because of
the functional benefits which they provide in the form of an
order based not on coercion, but on the co-ordination of
interests and of patterned expectations."557
Schachter adds that when deciding whether or not an
obligation exists, the decision will need to be made on the
basis of the relevant variables (perceptions, expectations,
and compliance): "[t]o impose hard-and-fast categories [of
sources of law] on a world filled with indeterminacies and
circularities can only result in a pseudo-realism which does
justice neither to our experience nor to our higher
556Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 205. In
regimes, of course, the rule handlers are usually the regime
members. Similarly, Gehring states that non-formalised regime
norms and rules share the same "legally significant
expectations" as formalised rules, as both types are based on
consensus, "International Environmental Regimes," supra, n.
484, p. 55.
557 Hurrell and Kingsbury, "Introduction," supra, n. 486,
p . 25. Although the authors were speaking about environmental
law and environmental regimes, the point can be extrapolated
to international law and international regimes.
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purposes."
Regimes establish legal obligations, where those
obligations are made by those having authority to prescribe
them and the target audience will perceive (ie have shared
expectations) that those norms and rules have are
authoritative (legitimate) and effective (control intention).
Normative or shared expectations evolve as cognitive
expectations or knowledge develop, which grows as the
uncertainty surrounding critical issues is overcome. These
shared expectations, then, are a source of obligation.
Admittedly, the obligation may at times be weak, but as the
knowledge grows, so will the strength of the shared
expectations and thus the obligations. This process can be
shown through analyses of existing regimes.559
During this process of "obligating," regimes succeed in
the area Oscar Schachter calls "international legal
craftsmanship." 56° For Schachter, a legal mechanism should
be created to meet environmental or other objectives, other
than through the techniques of commands and prohibitions,
which will advocate positive acts and provide incentives for
having them. 56 '	 The process of regime building, which
558Oscar Schachter, "Towards a Theory of International
Obligation," Virginia Journal of International Law Vol. 8, No.
2 (1968) p. 322.
559 See, infra, Chapters 5 and 6 for analyses of the ozone
layer depletion and climate change regimes.
60 lnternational Law In Theory and Practice, supra, n.
475, p. 372.
56'Ibid.
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assimilates policy, law, and management, b2 can accomplish
this. Regimes, through consensus-building, can succeed in
inducing states to behave in ways they may not at first
prefer. In an international legal system which lacks a
supranational law-making body, this process of consensus-
building "in a specific and often narrowly defined area of
international relations is the most important function of an
international regime.
3.6 Effectiveness of Regimes: Prospects for Compliance
The degree to which a regime can ensure compliance with
its regulations is, on a practical basis, the most important
factor to consider in the evaluation of legal regimes.5
Within international law, compliance has been addressed in
some detail,5b6 although not within the area of regimes.
562 See, Johnston, "Systemic Environmental Damage: The
Challenge to International Law and Organization," supra, n.
484, p. 270.
5b3WilliamSOn "Building the International Environmental
Regime," supra, n. 474, p. 740.
5"Gehring, "International Environmental Regimes," supra,
n. 484, p. 38. Ian Brownlie notes that international law
depends to a great extent on 'voluntarist' devices to induce
cooperation. Public International Law, supra, n. 489, p. 258.
5 For international relations specialists looking at
compliance and effectiveness within regimes, see, for example,
Peter M. Haas, Robert 0. Keohane and Marc A. Levy, ed.,
Institutions For The Earth (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993). See
also, Philipp M. Hildebrand, "Towards a Theory of Compliance
in International Environmental Politics." paper presented at
the annual conference of the International Studies
Association, Atlanta, Georgia (April, 1992).
6 See, for example, Roger Fisher, Improving Compliance
with International Law (Charlottesville, VA: University of
Virginia Press, 1981) and William E. Butler, ed., Control Over
Compliance With International Law (Dordrecht: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1991).
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Identifying sources of law may not be all that helpful,
however, in answering the question "Do regimes matter?",
since "the force of a rule's compliance pull cannot be gauged
solely or primarily by examining its source." 7
 Thus, it
will be argued below that a regime will be able to provide an
effective level of compliance through the evolution of norms
and rules, dispute-settlement mechanisms, accountability and
transparency, as well as conditional cooperation and
exclusion.568
3.6.1	 Evolution of Norms and Rules
The evolution of normative or shared expectations within
regimes is an important process, as these norms and rules
567 Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 206. For Franck,
a rule is considered legitimate and therefore has a stronger
compliance pull if it has been created in the correct
"process," ie there is adherence between the rule and the
standards by which it is made, interpreted and applied, and
the rule is determinate, has undergone symbolic validation and
is coherent.
In this respect, he uses a similar approach to the
policy-oriented approach to lawmaking, which requires for
legal obligation that the target audience view share
expectations that have ben created in an authoritative manner
and are likely to be complied with. While Franck is concerned
with compliance and the policy-oriented school with legal
obligation, their reasoning is similar in their different
pursuits.
568An effective level of compliance "will reflect the
perspectives and interests of participants in the ongoing
political process rather than some external scientific or
market-validated standard," Abram Chayes and Antonia Chayes,
"On Compliance," International Or ganization Vol. 47, No. 2
(Spring 1993), p. 202. Thus, an acceptable level of compliance
rises as the regime strengthens, demanding more of its
members. These compliance methods will be further examined in
an analysis of the climate change and ozone layer depletion
regimes, infra, Chapters 5 and 6.
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create legal obligations.	 Thus, Oscar Schachter refers to
regimes as "clearly part of the process by which international
law develops," since regimes create "rules binding on
large groups of States, 57 rules which evolve from the
normative expectations agreed upon within the regime. Or, as
Goldie has suggested, regimes provide a
development of a legal consciousness and moral
awareness and sensitivity concerning the self-
seeking and exclusionary qualities of pre-emptive
activities and following from that consciousness
and that sensitivity, the making of legal rules
limiting and channelling its drives, in brief, the
'detailed shaping of legal consciousness into
manageable rules of law' .
This evolution of normative expectations can be examined
in two parts: the first being the actual physical process of
evolution, and the second being the legal status of the norms
themselves. While the two may appear to be separate strands
of thought, it is through the evolution process that the norms
and rules acquire legal status. The first strand has been
explored more within international relations, while the second
strand has been a concern of international law, although not
within the concept of regimes.
The legal status of the shared or normative expectations
created within regimes was discussed above. 572 Regarding the
evolution of norms and rules, as cognitive expectations or
569 See supra, n. 508-509.
570 lnternational Law in Theory and Practice supra, n. 475,
p. 75. Although Schachter was referring to regimes that
include a treaty, his comment still applies to regimes as
defined in this thesis, see, infra, Chapters 5 and 6.
571 "Special Regimes," supra, n. 477, p. 698.
572 See supra, Chapter 2, Section 2.3, Policy-Oriented
Lawmaking.
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knowledge are shaped by member States of the regime, normative
expectations will develop. The ozone layer depletion
regime discussed below is particularly good evidence of
this. 5'4
	However, normative or shared expectations within
the regime may change even without new technical knowledge as
a result of discussion and negotiation among regime
members. 75
 Prescriptions are not final and are not
permanent. Shared expectations may change as the elements of
authority and control may cease to be communicated, perhaps
because of changes in global authority structures or
reassessment by the relevant participants as to the degree or
intensity	 of	 their	 interest	 in	 supporting	 the
•576
Within the regime, the common effort to solve a problem
results in the underlying goal or purpose of the regime being
"more universally accepted, gradually transforming pragmatic
arrangements into normative constraints on behaviour."577
In achieving this common effort through the shaping of
shared expectations, "the passing of 'binding decisions' under
traditional law-creating methods is not the only way in which
law development occurs. Legal consequences also can flow from
acts which are not, in the traditional sense, 'binding'."578
573 See, supra, n. 508-509.
574 Chapter 5, infra.
575 Gehring, "International Environmental Regimes," supra,
n. 484, p. 55.
576 Reisman, "International Lawmaking," supra, n. 555, p.
109.
577williamson, "Building the International Environmental
Regime," supra, n. 474, p. 743.
578Higgins, "Role of Resolutions," supra, n. 500, p. 23.
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Thus, regimes can aid in norm development as critical issues
are resolved. 579
 More importantly, because these norms and
rules evolve within the regime through collective decision-
making, 58° the prospect for compliance is higher. Schachter
affirms the probability of achieving high compliance within a
regime, attributable in part to a representative decision-
making body, which "tend to limit the sphere of
autointerpretation by the states of their obligations."581
3.6.2 Dispute Settlement Mechanisms
Traditional dispute settlement mechanisms, such as
arbitration or resort to the ICJ, seem out of place when
dealing with global problems. These disputes will involve
more than the traditional complainant and respondent, since
all states are affected by adverse actions. In addition,
traditional settlement procedures do not usually take place
until there is a formal legal dispute, with the parties
assuming an adversarial relationship.
From the standpoint of... effectiveness, it may not
matter whether state A or state B has the better legal
argument; what is needed is a process that identifies the
impediments to full implementation and seeks to overcome
them.582
This process can be achieved within a regime, where
579 See, infra, Chapter 4.
580 See, supra, n. 508.
581 lnternational Law in Theory and Practice, supra, n.
475, p. 75.
582 Joan E. Donoghue, "Legal Dimensions of Compliance and
Dispute Resolution in a Global Climate Regime," paper given at
the annual conference of the International Studies
Association, Atlanta, Georgia (April 1992), pp. 9-11. The
author is writing from her experiences as a legal adviser for
the US State Department.
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disputes are normally resolved among the states themselves.
This internal judicial system, which allows for settlement
without the constrictions of formal international law, can
either "confirm or modify authoritatively, . . . the normative
structure of the regime," thereby "shaping consensus on the
interpretation of norms in light of the factual
circumstances", and "reinforc[ing] the stability of the
sectoral legal system as a whole." 583
 This method of
oversight, however, has been criticised as "a political body,"
since the dispute settlement mechanism is composed of party-
states, rather than independent experts. 584
 This may be so,
but dispute settlement is better accommodated within the
regime, than not accommodated at all, as the relative non-use
of the ICJ reveals, 585
 although use of the Court is on the
increase.
3.6.3	 Accountability and Transparency586
The absence of a world government means that regime
members will need to find a "substitute for coercion" that a
domestic system can usually provide. In most regimes, this
is accomplished through "the exploitation of accountability of
states by rendering their performance transparent to scrutiny
583 Gehring, "International Environmental Regimes," supra,
n. 484, p. 54.
5843111 Barrett, "The Negotiation and Drafting of the
Climate Change Convention," in International Law and Global
Climate Change, ed. Robin Churchill and David Freestone
(London: Graham & Trotman, 1991), p. 200.
585 See, Lynne M. Jurgielewicz, "The Role of International
Law in Non-Judicial Methods of Dispute Settlement,"
unpublished LLM thesis, London School of Economics and
Political Science, 1989.
86Whi1e dispute settlement mechanisms could technically
be considered a method of accountability, I prefer to treat
them separately.
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by the international community." ' In other words, despite
state sovereignty, states are accountable for their actions:
to their own populations, to other states, and the
international public. States are held accountable through the
information available about their actions, generated by the
regime itself.
Various means have been noted for accountability and
transparency within a regime. They include reporting and
monitoring, target setting and surveillance. 588
 "Pledge and
review" systems whereby states undertake unilateral pledges,
whether legally binding or not, for action to be reviewed by
a body of experts, are also a means of accountability.589
587Abram Chayes and Antonia H. Chayes, "Adjustment and
Compliance Processes in International Regulatory Regimes," in
Preserving The Global Environment, ed. Jessica Tuchman Mathews
(New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1991), p. 290.
588 See, Ronald B. Mitchell, "Eliciting Reporting Under
Environmental Treaties," paper presented at the annual meeting
of the Northeast International Studies Association,
Providence, Rhode Island, 12-14 November 1992, where the
author concludes that successful reporting and monitoring
systems create circumstances which incorporate incentives to
report; that the capacity to report is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for reporting; non-reporting does not
necessarily mean non-compliance; shaming or black-listing
remain largely unused incentives for reporting; and that
reporting systems must get states to report high quality,
useful information.
589 See Glen Plant, "'Pledge and Review': A Survey of
Precedents," in Michael Grubb and Nicola Steen, Pledge and
Review Processes: Possible Components of a Climate Convention
(London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1991), pp.
V-XIV, where the author examines the pledge and review
precedents of the IMO and IMF, among others.
There is some lack of clarity as to what "pledge and
review" encompasses. In its broadest sense it "encompasses all
possible components of the statements and reports lodged by
countries as part of the convention process." See, Michael
Grubb and Nicola Steen, Pledge and Review Processes: Possible
Components of a Climate Convention (London: Royal Institute of
International Affairs, 1991), p. 5.
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Accountability between international regimes and state
practice is essential. Although some legal scholars advocate
an international supervisory mechanism to integrate the two
and ensure comp1iance, it would still seem that the most
effective type of accountability would take place, at least in
the beginning, within a regime where the states provided their
own supervisory functions. This can eventually develop into
involving the authority of an international organisation. But
while normative expectations are still being resolved and
obligations are still weak, there is no need for the
involvement of an international supervisory mechanism.
It is important to distinguish between the two concepts
of	 regimes	 and	 organizations,	 particularly	 within
international law.' In viewing the legal order, regimes
are a conceptual part of the legal order, while organizations
form a tangible contribution. Regimes are a necessary part of
°See, for instance, Geoffrey Palmer, "New Ways To Make
International Environmental Law, American Journal of
International Law Vol. 86, No. 2 (April 1992), pp. 278-282;
Glen Plant, "Institutional and Legal Responses to Global
Warming," in International Law and Global Climate Change, ed.
Robin Churchill and David Freestone, pp. 175-181, (London:
Graham & Trotman, 1991); Elizabeth P. Barratt-Brown, "Building
a Monitoring and Compliance Regime Under the Montreal
Protocol," Yale Journal of International Law Vol. 16, No. 2
(Summer 1991), p. 569; and more generally, Fisher, Improving
Compliance With International Law, supra, n. 566, esp. Chapter
10.
5' Haas, Keohane and Levy distinguish between regimes and
bureaucratic organizations, with regimes being "rule-
structures that do not necessarily have organizations
attached." See, Peter M. Haas, Robert 0. Keohane and Marc A.
Levy, "The Effectiveness of International Environmental
Institutions," in Institutions For The Earth, ed. Peter M.
Haas, Robert 0. Keohane and Marc A. Levy (Cambridge: MIT
Press, 1993), p. 5.
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the legal order.	 Organizations can strengthen regimes,
but only once the regime has taken hold. At that point,
organizations may be useful to avoid a proliferation of
independent, isolated regimes.
3.6.4	 Conditional Cooperation and Exclusion
States may hinge their cooperation within a regime on the
conditional cooperation or reciprocity of other members of the
regime. Violations are thus likely to be limited by self-
interest, as many "regimes involve concrete benefits and
reciprocal restraints." 593
 Goldie describes this aspect of
compliance as:
the mutual respect and recognition accorded by certain
States to the unilateral policies of others acting in
substantial conformity with their own, enmeshing all the
States concerned in a regime with respect to those
policies.594
This phenomena of respect and recognition is linked to
"reputation", whereby "the focus of public concern is less on
what an actor has done in the past (as in a formal legal
system) than on what he is likely to do in the future."5
Thus, states may adhere to the rules of a regime for the sake
of reputation.
States may also find it in their best interests to adhere
to regime regulations for fear of exclusion. Exclusion from
592 See, infra, chapter 4, for a discussion of
international organisations as catalysts for regime formation
and formation.
593 Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice,
supra, n. 475, p. 75.
594 "Special Regimes," supra, n. 477, p. 698.
55Keohane, After Hegemony, supra, n. 478, p. 106.
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the regime could mean a loss of benefits to the state
concerned. 56
 This could occur, for example, through trade
restrictions levied upon non-Parties to a regime.
In the area of the environment, however, such trade
restrictions have recently been called into doubt. A GATT
Panel 591
 recently ruled that Contracting Parties to GATT
could not enact trade measures for the purpose of
environmental protection outside their individual
jurisdictions or to restrict imports or exports based on the
method of production of a traded product (as opposed to the
end product), as both procedures interfered with free trade,
a cornerstone of the world trading system which GATT seeks to
protect. 598
 The Panel ruling resulted from Mexican
objections to US trade sanctions placed on Mexican tuna to
protect dolphins being killed when caught up in tuna nets.5
56Keohane lists three examples: 1) only members of the
International Energy Agency can receive oil under its
emergency sharing program 2) only members of the International
Monetary Fund are entitled to borrow funds from the IMF, and
3) GATT can exclude uncooperative members from its benefits,
such as most favoured nation status. Ibid., pp. 77-78.
591 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 61 Statute A3,
55 United Nations Treaty Series 187. The US argued that Art.
XX(b), which allows trade restrictions "necessary to protect
human, animal or plant life or health" and Art. XX(g) which
allows restrictions "relating to the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made
effective in conjunction with restriction or domestic
production or consumption" permitted the trade restrictions
placed on Mexican tuna.
598 Decision reprinted in International Legal Materials,
Vol. 30, No. 6 (1991), pp. 1598-1623. See, GATT, "Trade and
the Environment," International Trade 90-91, Vol. 1 (Geneva:
GATT, 1992), p. 25.
599 The Panel suggested that if parties wanted to allow
environmental trade restrictions, they would need to agree on
limits to prevent abuse. Since GATT does not provide such
limits, the Panel suggested that Parties amend or supplement
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Although limited to examination of the matter in light of
existing GATT regulations, if upheld by the GATT Council, the
ruling could affect environmental treaties such as the
Montreal Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer, 60° which imposes trade bans on non-
party states who refuse to phase out ozone depleting
substances.°' Environmentalists fear such a ruling will be
a setback to the prospects for sustainable development.
Developing states on the other hand, fear that strong
environmental provisions in trade agreements could "facilitate
or provide easy justification to countries to apply
environmental measures for political and other coercive
the provisions of GATT or provide a waiver. GATT, "Trade and
the Environment," supra, n. 598, p. 27.
boolnternational Le gal Materials, Vol. 26, No. 6 (1987),
pp. 1541-1561.
601 The Panel ruling may undermine the trade embargo
provision of the Protocol, which discourages free-riders.
Although the Panel had excluded from its opinion multilateral
agreements where parties have agreed to waive their GATT
rights, the trade embargo affects non-parties who have not
waived any rights since they are not Parties to the Protocol.
The panel decision also affects the Protocol's potential ban
on products produced with ozone-depleting chemicals, since it
would require states to distinguish between products on the
basis of production. See, Eric Christensen and Samantha
Geff in, "GATT Sets Its Net On Environmental Regulation: The
GATT Panel Ruling on Mexican Yellowf in Tuna Imports and the
Need for Reform of the International Trading System,
University of Miami Inter-American Law Review Vol. 23, No. 2
(Winter 1991-92), p. 598.
However, there was (unusually) no request for adoption
through Council confirmation, apparently for political
reasons. Mexico, undergoing negotiations with the United
States for the North American Free Trade Agreement, did not
wish to hamper those negotiations. Mexico was also under
pressure from environmentalists to remedy its own
environmental laws, which it has since done, and thus now
conforms with the US regulations for tuna-fishing. Peter
Morrisette, GATT, telephone conversation, 1 March 1993.
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measures." 6
	GATT fears protectionist devices from such a
precedent, resulting in obstruction of free trade.603
During the negotiations for the Montreal Protocol, 604
 it
was determined that, since the trade sanctions could only be
applied against those violating the Protocol's trade
provisions, and since the sanctions were neither arbitrary nor
unjustifiable, the trade sanctions would not violate GATT.6°
However, when trade sanctions are applied against non-Parties
who are Parties to GATT, then GATT obligations are violated,
making the sanctions potentially illegal. 606 The attempt to
reconcile trade issues with environmental protection will not
be easy.607
602 "EFTA Members Press Convening of Working Party," Focus:
GATT Newsletter No. 82 (July 1991), P. 2. See also, Charles
Arden-Clarke, "South-North Terms of Trade-Environmental
Protection and Sustainable Development," International
Environmental Affairs Vol. 4, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 122-
138.
603 GATT, "Trade and the Environment,", supra, n. 598, p.
21. See also, J. Owen Saunders, "Trade and Environment: The
Fine Line Between Environmental Protection and Environmental
Protectionism," International Journal Vol. XLVII, No. 4
(Autumn 1992), pp. 723-750.
604 5ee, supra, n. 600.
605 Patricia Birnie and Alan Boyle, International Law & The
Environment (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 408. The
provision were deemed necessary to protect health. See, supra,
n. 597. It should be pointed out that any decision regarding
GATT trade provisions is for the GATT Contracting Parties.
606 The Vienna Convention on Treaties states that when two
treaties conflict between a party to both treaties and a party
to only one, then mutual rights and obligations are determined
by the treaty to which both are parties. Art. 30,
International Legal Materials Vol. 8, No. 4 (1969), pp. 679-
735.
607 See, for instance, the Agora exchange between Thomas J.
Schoenbaum, "Free International Trade and Protection of the
Environment: Irreconcilable Conflict?" American Journal of
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3.7 Conclusion
Edith Brown Weiss, a leading international lawyer,
recently stated that:
• . . [lit is not clear to me that we will have been able to
sustain the really extraordinary level of negotiating new
international agreements that we have seen in the past
decade. Governments are stressed today just trying to
keep up with international negotiations and making sure
that they have delegates who are fully informed attending
these negotiations. The need places a big strain on
industrialised countries, and more strain, on
nonindustrialised countries. That suggests that legal
instruments other than formal conventions may also
increasingly become an important component of how we
manage the international arena.608
While Professor Weiss did not provide any examples as to
what kind of "legal instruments" she was referring to, it is
suggested here that regimes may be able to provide some degree
of "management" until conventions can evolve. As outlined
above, the formation of regimes entails a legal obligation.
This legal obligation is met when there exists a shared
expectation sustained by authority and a control intention.
As such, a regime is not "soft law" (although it may contain
some soft law) but is legally binding. Formed from shared
expectations, regimes develop normative or shared expectations
and obligations as cognitive expectations or knowledge evolve.
International Law Vol. 86, No. 4 (October 1992), pp. 700-727
and Edith Brown Weiss, "Environment and Trade as Partners in
Sustainable Development: A Commentary," American 3ournal of
International Law Vol. 86, No. 4 (October 1992), pp. 728-735.
Similar problems face the ratification of the North
American Free Trade Agreement, International Legal Materials,
Vol. 32, No. 2 (1993), pp. 289-456.
608 Comments of Edith Brown Weiss, "Issues Relating to the
1992 Brazil Conference on the Environment," in American
Society of International Law: Proceedin gs of the 86th Annual
Meeting, by the American Society of International Law,
Washington, DC, 1992, p. 422.
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The shaping of cognitive expectations depends on the degree of
certainty regarding the critical issues within a particular
regime.
This is an exciting prospect for a discipline long
beleaguered by claims of ineffectiveness. 63 In the
following chapter, an analysis of the issues critical to the
maintenance or development of the climate change and ozone
regimes will be examined.
609 1t could also be considered a time of reckoning for
international law in that if the discipline remains tied to
its traditional positivist past, then prospects for progress
are dimmed, since the concept of regimes demands a non-
traditional view of international law.
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CHAPTER 4
"The real longer-term challenge is not external to ourselves
but is our own understanding and how we relate to one
another. "c"
CRITICAL ISSUES AND CATALYSTS FOR EFFECTIVE CLIMATE CHANGE
AND OZONE LAYER DEPLETION REGIMES IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
ORDER
For regimes to "matter" in the international legal order,
they need to be effective. This is measured in part by the
strength of the regime's normative or shared expectations
(norms and rules) adopted by the regime members.' 1 These in
turn are dependent on the degree to which cognitive
expectations (knowledge) have been accepted regarding critical
issues particular to the regime. These normative
expectations, in order to maintain or develop the regime, must
move beyond the basic expectations necessary to form the
regime. 612
 The degree of clarity regarding uncertainty is
not as important as the degree of unity regarding the critical
issues. In addition, there are catalysts that can help create
and further develop the regime.
4.1 Critical Issues
In the climate change and ozone layer depletion regimes,
610 R.A. Reinstein, "Climate Negotiations," The Washington
Quarterly Vol. 16, No. 1 (Winter 1993), p. 95. Mr. Reinstein
was chief US negotiator for the UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change.
611 Compliance with the regime norms and rules is another
measure of effectiveness. See, supra, Chapter 3, Section 3.6
Effectiveness of Regimes.
6t2 See, supra, Chapter 3, Section 3.3, Formation of
Regimes.
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the critical issues are science, economics and development.
Climate change and ozone layer depletion are both scientific
based problems with economic ramifications and which need the
full cooperation of all states, including developing states.
Without substantial agreement on these issues, the climate
change regime will flounder and the ozone layer depletion
regime would have floundered. 3
 The uncertainty beyond each
of these issues will be examined, followed by an examination
of how regimes can overcome this uncertainty. Finally, the
secondary issues that may act as catalysts in the creation
and/or maintenance or development of these regimes will be
examined: leadership; international non-state actors; crisis;
and domestic regulations. 614
 These critical and catalytic
issues will be applied to the climate change and ozone layer
depletion regimes in the following chapters.
4.1.1	 The Critical Issue of Science
Both climate change and ozone layer depletion were
brought to the attention of the world by scientists. The
certainty of the science, then, is a critical issue for both
problems.
4.1.1.1 Scientific Uncertainty
In Chapter 1, the general scientific background
concerning climate change resulting from global warming was
explained. While much progress has been made concerning the
causes of climate change, there still remains a significant
amount of scientific uncertainty regarding potential effects,
6t3Analyses of both regimes will be undertaken in Chapters
5 and 6, infra.
6 "See infra, Section 4.2, Catalysts.
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particularly to the extent and rate of change. 6 ' Because of
this uncertainty, the debate continues as to whether abatement
or adjustment through adaptation and mitigation techniques
("no regrets") 616
 is the best approach to climate change.'7
Similarly, while scientific certainty is presently greater for
ozone layer depletion than for climate change, that was not
always the case.618
Because the prospect of damage on a global level arises
from climate change and ozone layer depletion, the possibility
of this "non-discrimination" among states can influence to a
great extent the development of regimes. However, the
greatest chance at influence may be not when there is greater
scientific certainty, but when there is less. 619
 At that
point in time, when it is unclear as to where the damage will
occur, more states would be willing to insure against a
possible risk than if the risk were known to occur outside the
6t See the discussion regarding the limitations of
modelling in predicting the rate of climate change, Chapter 1,
Section 1.2.1, Climate Change.
616 See, supra, Chapter 2, n. 438, for an explanation of
the "no regrets" policy. Adaptation and mitigation are
considered together under this policy.
617A third possibility of doing nothing or a "wait and
see" is discarded since the formation of the climate change
regime effectively nullifies that possibility; ie with the
formation of the regime, "something" has already been done.
618 See, supra, Chapter 1, Section 1.2.2, Ozone Layer
Depletion, where the Ozone Trends Panel confirmed that
chlorine monoxide was linked to ozone layer depletion.
619Oran Young refers to this as the "window of
opportunity,"	 see,	 "Global Environmental	 Change and
International	 Governance,"	 Millennium:	 3ournal	 of
International Studies Vol. 19, No. 2 (Winter 1990), p. 342.
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individual state's jurisdiction. This may not be a fair
or equitable decision on the part of the non-affected state,
but it will probably be the case that unaffected countries
would be less willing to contribute to legal attempts to
control global environmental change. When evidence surfaces
that the global nature of the problem may in fact be more
regional, then there is less likelihood that abatement will be
stressed.	 Instead, an adaptative approach may be taken
instead.62'
But even if there was 100% scientific certainty as to
effects, "{sjcience alone cannot save the environment.
Political choice is required to translate the findings of the
environmental sciences into viable policies." 622
 It is
important that the international legal order take into account
this "politicization" 623
 of scientific uncertainty, since it
is necessary for cooperation between states.
620 States' choice of action would be constrained by what
Rawls refers to as a "veil of ignorance." This veil excludes
knowledge that would distinguish one state from another, thus
achieving impartiality when making choices. See, John Rawls,
A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972).
621 See, for instance, the National Academy of Sciences
Report recommending adaptation to and mitigation of climate
change in lieu of prevention for the US and other similarly
situated industrialised states, Policy Implications of
Greenhouse Warming (Washington, DC: National Academy Press,
1991), p. 37.
622 Lynton Keith Caidwell, Between Two Worlds: Science, The
Environmental Movement and Policy Choice (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1990), p. 19. See also, William K. Stevens,
"Biologists Fear Sustainable Yield Is Unsustainable Idea," New
York Times, 20 April 1993, p. C4, where the author quotes Dr.
Donald Ludwig of the University of British Columbia as saying
that policy makers must abandon the "pretence of scientific
certainty."
623 See, supra, Chapter 1, n. 11.
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Notwithstanding the need for political action, science is
still called upon to provide evidence from which law and
policy can be derived. One way to deal with scientific
uncertainty is to utilise an economic cost-analysis
calculation whereby states estimate the extent of damage that
would occur from an environmental problem, and then multiply
that amount by the probability that the damage will occur. A
comparison is then made to the costs entailed in abatement or
adaptation to the problem and an attempt is made to resolve
the problem at minimal cost and with minimal damages.'24
This approach is often criticised, however, for failure to
take adequately into account losses not traditionally viewed
as economic, such as aesthetic value. 625
 Nevertheless,
regardless of how economically-oriented adaptation or
abatement programmes may be, the burden of scientific
certainty ultimately returns to science and the production of
sufficient evidence to create a need for policy action.
The degree of certainty that science is required to
achieve before policy action is taken is in itself
uncertain. 626
 A former Administrator of the US Environmental
624Harvard Law Review, ed., "Developments in the Law:
International Environmental Law," Harvard Law Review Vol. 104,
No. 7 (May 1987), p. 1530. See, also, infra, Section
4.1.2.1.2, Abatement vs. No Regrets.
625Developments in the Law, supra, n. 624, p. 1531. The
reliability of the cost-analysis must also be taken into
consideration.
626While absolute certainty can never be reached on any
scientific issue, scientists nevertheless attempt to achieve
certainty in their search to solve the set of scientific
problems referred to as "grand challenges," which includes
modelling global climate changes. The amount of computer power
necessary to solve these "grand challenges" is referred to as
a "teraf lop," the computer speed commensurate to the ability
to compute a trillion mathematical operations a second. The
announcement of a new US supercomputer has, in effect, "fired
the first shot in the international race to a teraf lop." See
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Protection Agency has put the issue in quite clear
perspective:
The difficulty of converting scientific findings into
political action is a function of the uncertainty of the
science and the pain generated by the action.621
One researcher has attempted to develop a list of
characteristics outlining when science is likely to have an
impact on law and policy; in effect, when science has achieved
a sufficient degree of certainty. 628
 According to this
finding, this is likely to occur when there is evidence of:
'Definite' or at least consensual conclusion
Feasible 'cure' available
Effects close in time and (social) space
Problem affecting 'social centre' of society
Problem developing rapidly and surprisingly
Effects experienced by or at least visible to the public
Political conflict:low
Issue linkage: none, or on substantive merits only
Institutionalised setting, iterative decision-making
Conversely, science is deemed to be too uncertain to have
an impact when there is evidence of:
Tentative or contested hypothesis
'Cure' unclear or not feasible
Effects remote
Problem affecting 'periphery' only
Problem developing slowly and according to expectations
Effects not (yet) experienced by or visible to the public
Political conflict: high
Tactical issue linkage; issue 'contamination'
Not institutionalised, ad hoc decision-making
3ohn Markoff,	 "US Makers Ready Fastest Computers,"
International Herald Tribune, 30 October 1991, p. 13.
627William D. Ruckeishaus, "Toward A Sustainable World,"
Scientific American Vol. 261, No. 3 (September 1989), p. 166.
628Arild Underdal,	 "The	 Politics of
	 Science	 in
International Resource Management: A Summary," in
International Resource Management: The Role of Science and
Politics, ed. Steinar Andresen and Willy Ostreng (London,
Beihaven Press, 1989), p. 259.
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While lists such as the one above can be good indicators
of determining a sufficient level of certainty for
international action, interpretations will differ. An
acceptable level of certainty of science, however, cannot be
determined solely on its own merits, ie by the science itself.
The uncertainty will yield not to greater certainty, but to
unity or the shaping of cognitive expectations regarding an
acceptable amount of uncertainty. Achieving unity is due to
some influence beyond pure scientific interpretation.
4.1.1.2 Overcoming Scientific Uncertainty
Scientific uncertainty may be overcome by the influence
that the scientific community maintains with respect to
policy-making. 630
 For example:
Science was not the driving force in the making of the
Brundtland Report. Although some premises were delivered
by scientists, generally they were not attributed much
weight. Nor were the main conclusions scientifically
founded. . . .The report is a political document, not a
6290n a domestic level, the US Supreme Court is now
wrestling with the problem of how judges should decide when a
scientific theory or process is sound enough to be admitted as
evidence. The present (Frye) test requiring that the theory be
"generally accepted as a reliable technique among the
scientific community" is being challenged on the grounds that
the US Federal Rules of Evidence allow expert witnesses to
present opinions that do not necessarily attain the level of
"general acceptability." The Supreme Court in Daubert V.
Merrell Dow, US Supreme Court Docket No. 92-102, held that the
Federal Rules, not Frye, provide the standard for admitting
scientific testimony in a federal trial.
630 See, Bruce L.R. Smith, The Advisers: Scientists in the
Policy Process (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution,
1992). The attempt to link scientific knowledge of advisers
with the power of government creates a paradox for the
adviser: "he or she must become a true insider to accomplish
anything; but in doing so the adviser may lose the fresh view,
detachment, and outsider qualities that are urgently
required," p. 193.
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scientific one.'
One of the studies examining the influence of the
scientific community in environmental policy-making,' 2
undertaken by Peter Haas, attributes the influence of
scientists to their role as an "epistemic community," defined
as "transnational networks of knowledge-based communities that
are both politically empowered through their claims to
exercise authoritative knowledge and motivated by shared
causal and principled be1iefs." 3
 Members of an epistemic
community share common values, a common body of facts, and
interpret those facts or observations in the same manner.634
Even though the members may belong to different scientific
disciplines, they all share a common world view and concern
about the same subject matter, and would offer similar advice
if consulted.635
In order to create an international influence, a national
631 Lloyd Timberlake, "The Role of Scientific Knowledge in
Drawing Up the Brundtland Report," in International Resource
Management: The Role of Science and Politics, ed. Steinar
Andresen and Willy Ostreng (London: Belhaven Press, 1989),
p.122, referring to the WCED Report on Sustainable Development
(emphasis in the original).
632 Caldwell lists six possible sources of scientists
contributing to policy: scientists employed l)by government,
2)as government consultants, 3)as members of national
academies, 4)as members of national commissions, 5)as part of
legislative inquiry, and 6)particular to the United States, as
participants in White House Conferences. Between Two Worlds,
supra, n. 622, pp. 24-25.
633 Peter M. Haas, "Obtaining International Environmental
Protection Through Epistemic Consensus," Millennium: Journal
of International Studies Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1990) p. 349.
See also, Peter M. Haas, Savin g the Mediterranean: The
Politics of International Environmental Cooperation (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1990), pp. 55-56.
634 Haas, Saving The Mediterranean, supra, n. 633, p. 55.
6351bid.
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epistemic community must eventually expand into an
international epistemic community. This will enable the
community to "infiltrate" government agencies of more than one
state. The influence of these communities will be more
pronounced if they are successful in the states that play a
major role in regimes concerning the issues involved. The
communities do not have to be large - what matters is that
they are respected within their discipline and are able to
extend their influence to those involved in decision-
making.636
Haas maintains, however, that the influence of an
epistemic community cannot always be generalised to all
environmental problems. Nevertheless, Oran Young argues that
science can play a role in placing certain issues on the
international scene that might otherwise have never come to
light without scientific research. 631
 "Agenda setting,"
according to Young is most effective when scientists are able
to reach consensus among themselves and "overcome [their]
natural tendency... to exhibit extreme caution in the
interests of avoiding any appearance of overstating the
inferences to be drawn from the available evidence." 38
636 See, Emanuel Adler and Peter M. Haas, "Conclusion:
Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a
Reflective Research Program," International Organization Vol.
46, No. 1 (Winter 1992), pp. 378-381.
6370ran Young, "Science and Social Institutions: Lessons
For International Resource Regimes," International Resource
Management: The Role of Science and Politics, ed. Steinar
Andresen and Willy Ostreng (London: Beihaven Press, 1989), pp.
8-11.
638 1b1d., p. 10. Young warns about the possible abuse of
science in the area of social choice, however, such as
allocation of scarce resources and human use of natural
resources, in that interest groups may use scientific research
in order to disguise their own value preferences, pp. 15-17.
Nonetheless, Young foresees a credible role for science in
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Scientists must have had some success in this regard; climate
change and ozone layer depletion have surely reached a point
of some priority on the international agenda of
governments .
But under what circumstances will scientists influence
policy-making?	 It would seem that the most influential
position of scientists would be inside government. 640
 The
Brookings Institution has undertaken a study of the
effectiveness of scientific advisers within government
agencies and has attributed successful integration to the
following factors: 1) a clear charter or mandate; 2) an
identifiable client or point of access to the government
agency; 3) an active chairman; 4) a well-chosen and fairly
balanced committee; and 5) adequate supporting resources from
the agency and commitment of time from the members.64'
Without these factors present, an advisory committee can end
up languishing within government bureaucracy instead of having
their concerns heard.
The extent of influence may also depend on the
familiarity of the government with the issue. If the
government is unfamiliar with the issue, the advisers may be
more influential in contributing to the choice of policy-
policy-making.
639 This can be seen from the gathering of world leaders at
the UN Conference on Environment and Development. See, William
K. Stevens, "Rio Raises Environment Issue To Lasting World-
Class Status," International Herald Tribune, 15 June 1992, p.
2.
640This is not to suggest that scientists do not have
influence while working outside the government, but that
advisory committees allow for more direct input into
government decision-making.
6"Smith, The Advisers, supra, n. 630, pp. 189-191.
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making. If government is familiar with the issue, then the
advisers may be involved in defending and promoting government
policies rather than choosing them.642
Some scholars argue that putting the ultimate advisory
burden on science has:
allowed the decision-makers to divest themselves of the
responsibility for the decisions which should be theirs,
and theirs alone, to take and has pushed that
responsibility onto the scientific method... [T]he
scientific method cannot sustain such a
responsibility.643
Nor should it - the responsibility of implementing legal
regulations rests with governments, not scientists. Yet there
probably is little choice regarding some degree of
responsibility for scientists: the media will not wait for
scientific certainty. All the scientist can do is to attempt
to put the environmental risks in proper perspective for the
public and the decision-makers, helping to shape cognitive
expectations along the way. This is not easy, however, as one
prominent scientist has pointed out:
On the one hand, we are ethically bound to the scientific
method. . .which means that we must include all the doubts,
caveats, ifs and buts. On the other hand, we are not just
scientists, but human beings as well. And like most
people we'd like to see the world a better place... To do
that we have to get some broad-based support, to capture
the public's imagination. That, of course, entails
getting loads of media coverage. So we have to offer up
scary scenarios, make simplified, dramatic statements,
and make little mention of any doubts we might have. This
'double ethical bind' that we frequently find ourselves
in cannot be solved by any formula. Each of us has to
642 See Adler and Haas, "Epistemic Communities," supra, n.
636, p. 381.
643 "Developments in the Law," supra, n. 624, p. 1531, fn
52, quoting Heap, "The Role of Scientific Advice for the
Decision-Making Process in the Antarctic Treaty System," in
Antarctic Challenge III, at 21, 23 (R. Wolfrum ed. 1988).
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decide that the right balance is between being effective
and being honest. I hope that means being both.'44
4.1.2	 The Critical Issue of Economics4s
Economic concerns are always important in any
international issue and climate change and ozone layer
depletion are no exceptions. However, economic concerns can
be overcome or alleviated through financial mechanisms.
4.1.2.1	 Economic Uncertainty
Uncertainty regarding climate change resulting from
global warming and ozone layer depletion does not lie
exclusively within the realm of science; economic uncertainty
will also have an effect on the successful implementation of
these regimes, particularly climate change, as economists
cannot be sure of the financial impact on global
economies.646
4.1.2.1.1 Climate Change Economics
The most intensive studies of overall damage costs
regarding climate change have been undertaken for the United
States; studies for other countries are fragmentary, and
644 Stephen Schneider, quoted by Patrick J. Michaels,
"Benign Greenhouse," Research and Exploration Vol. 9, No. 2
(Spring 1993), p. 232.
6451 am grateful for the helpful comments of Tim Swanson,
Cambridge University, in this section of my thesis.
646 See, David Pearce, "The Global Commons," in David
Pearce et al, Blueprint 2, (London: Earthscan Publications,
1991). p. 13.
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general conclusions cannot be drawn from them yet. Yet
even the two major US studies differ in their projections of
total damage costs to the United States. The dine study
estimates the cumulative costs to the United States of a
doubling of CO2 equivalent concentrations of all greenhouse
gases from preindustrial concentrations to be approximately
five times greater than the estimate in the Nordhaus study.
Cline estimated the damages to be approximately 1981 US$30
billion as opposed to approximately 1981 US$6 billion
estimated by Nordhaus.648
Cline assumes greater risk from climate change in his
calculation than does Nordhaus. For Cline, the "greenhouse
effect poses major risks, especially over the very long term
of two to three centuries, by which time temperature could
647 See, William D. Nordhaus, "Economic Approaches to
Global Warming," in Global Warming: Economic Policy Responses,
ed. Rudiger Dornbusch and James M. Poterba (Cambridge, Mass:
MIT Press, 1991), p. 44. Thus, the emphasis in this chapter on
US-based economic studies is not intentional. On the other
hand, the importance of the United States as a major
contributor of greenhouse gases may make a focus on the
economic analysis of costs to the United States legitimate,
since those costs will no doubt influence the US degree of
commitment to resolving the problem.
For an overview of potential costs to OECD countries,
see, OECD, Responding to Climate Chan ge (Paris: OECD, 1991).
For an examination of the possible effects in the United
Kingdom. see, Department of the Environment, The Potential
Effects of Climate Change in the United Kingdom (London: HMSO,
1991). While not specifically a cost analysis, the report does
make some reference to loss of possible revenue.
648 Nordhaus, "Economic Approaches," supra, n. 647, p. 42.
For Cline's estimate, see William Cline, The Economics of
Global Warming (Washington, DC: Institute for International
Economics, 1992), p. 131. Although Cline's estimate was in
1990 US$61 billion while Nordhaus was in 1981 US$6, Cline's
can be converted using the following equation: (1990 US damage
cost)/(l990 US national income)X(198l US national income).
See, R.A. Howarth and P.A. Monahan, Economics, Ethics and
Climate Policy, Energy and Environment Division, Lawrence
Berkeley Laboratory, November 1992, p. 24.
197
rise by as much as 10-18 C." ' 	 Nordhaus, on the other hand,
is decidedly more optimistic about potential damage costs.'
These evaluations are specific to the United States and
damages for other states may be larger or smaller. Cline
estimates that developed countries at the mid-latitudes might
expect to experience comparable damage, while states at higher
latitudes might have less damage. For developing states, he
estimates damage to be more costly since those states rely
more heavily upon agricultural income, thought to be the
economic sector likely to be most severely affected. 65 ' In
addition, developing states are more limited in their capacity
to absorb climate change damage from a financial
perspective. 652
It also must be remembered that these estimates, while
consistent with the known facts of climate change, are at best
two possible scenarios:
This is not science; it is metaphysics: value judgements
and political goals will enter into the determination of
649 Cline, The Economics of Global Warming, supra, n. 648
pp. 376-377.
650 See,	 infra, Section 4.1.2.1.2, Abatement vs. No
Regrets.
651 See, for example, Cynthia Rosenzweig and Daniel Hillel,
"Agriculture in a Greenhouse World," Research and Exploration
Vol. 9, No. 2 (Spring 1993), pp. 208-221, and Harry M. Kaiser
and Thomas E. Drennan, ed., Agricultural Dimensions of Global
Climate Change (Delray Beach, Florida: St. Lucie Press,
forthcoming 1993).
652William Cline, Global Warming: The Economic Stakes,
(Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1992),
p. 50. Cline adds, however, that developing states tend to be
clustered towards lower latitudes, where warming should be
less than the global mean.
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whether [damage cost] exists.
Economic uncertainty, 	 then,	 is also subject to
'politicization.
4.1.2.1.2	 Abatement vs. "No Regrets"
In addition to cost related to damage, there is the cost
of either abatement or a "no regrets" approach to climate
change. Economics-based arguments for and against taking
significant action to slow global warming abound. Climate
stabilisation or the abatement approach advocates cautionary
safeguards against the risk of possibly severe future costs.
Thus, climate stabilisation at a tolerable level of
temperature change arguably provides insurance against unknown
risks.
The opposing argument of "no regrets" suggest that states
adapt to and mitigate climate changes, rather than to attempt
to prevent these changes outright. In this area, the work of
William Nordhaus is prominent in the relevant literature. He
advocates adaptation to and mitigation of global warming as he
653Howarth and Monahan, Economics, Ethics and Climate
Policy, supra, n. 648, p. 27 quoting Carl J. Dahiman, "The
Problem of Externality," Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 22
(April 1979), p. 156. This may be partly the reason why
Cline's and Nordhaus' estimates vary.
654 See, supra, Chapter 1, n. 11.
6 5 See, supra, Chapter 2, n. 438.
6 6 See, Charles Perrings, "Reserved Rationality and the
Precautionary Principle: Technological Change, Time and
Uncertainty In Environmental Decision Making," Ecological
Economics: The Science and Management of Sustainability, ed.
Robert Costanza (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991),
pp. 153-166. See, also, Howarth and Monahan, Economics, Ethics
and Climate Policy, supra, n. 648, p. 28.
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estimates the economic benefits to be gained by abatement are
not that great, at least for the industrialised states.
The most recent report of the National Academy of Sciences
also advocates a policy of adaptation and mitigation rather
than abatement of climate change, at least for the United
States.	 This is because only 3% of US gross domestic
product is produced through agriculture and forest products,
so the US economy would not be badly affected by a shift in
agricultural zones caused by climate change.659
Nordhaus warns that reducing greenhouse gas emissions
inefficiently or too quickly through strict emission caps will
result in unnecessarily higher economic costs and lower
economic growth than policies which are more efficient, such
as taxes placed on carbon content of emissions, 660 and which
57 See, for example, "Hot Stuff," The Economist, 15
September 1990, p. 113.
See also, Wilfred Beckerman, "Global Warming and
International Action: An Economic Perspective," in The
International Politics of the Environment, ed. Andrew Hurrell
and Benedict Kingsbury (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), where
the author states that "once one looks at such estimates [of
costs] as have been made, ... one sees that the economic
impacts hardly justify the alarm and the calls for dramatic
action that characterize much public discussion of this
issue," p. 260.
National Academy of Sciences, Policy Implications of
Greenhouse Warming , supra, n. 621.
659 See, for example, William Nordhaus, "Greenhouse
Economics," Economist, 7 July 1990, p. 20. See also, William
Booth, "Warming : An Adaptationist Case For Staying Cool,"
International Herald Tribune, 25 September 1991, p. 4. The
National Academy of Sciences report, supra, n. 621, states
that while farming is sensitive to climate change, adaptation
is possible, p. 43.
690 Different fossil fuels have different carbon content,
making it important to tax the actual carbon content. Carbon
taxes have been introduced in Finland, Norway, Sweden and the
Netherlands. See, International Unit on Climate Change (IUCC),
Fact Sheet 230, "Why Carbon Taxes Are A Cost-Effective Way To
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are introduced gradual1y.'
Nordhaus points out that since the climate does not have
a large economic impact upon the industrialised states,
affecting under 1% of total national income, then adaptation
would prove economically more beneficial than abatement for
those states. 662
 However, less developed and poorer
countries, that are heavily dependent upon agriculture which
is particularly sensitive to climate change, will be harder
hit economically by global warming. 663
 Although he
recognises this possibility, Nordhaus nevertheless advocates
international cooperation, including aid to developing states,
more research and development of new technologies, taxes on
emissions of greenhouse gases, and a "no regrets" policy
whereby mitigation measures that are otherwise economically
beneficial are implemented. 664 These actions presumably
would not have a detrimental impact on economic growth, thus
allowing for a greater possibility of third-world aid as well
as allowing for growth in less-developed states. This concern
for the developing states is shared by others, including the
UK economist Wilfred Beckerman, who argues that the third
world cannot afford to make economic sacrifices now in order
Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions" Climate Change Dossier
(Geneva: IUCC, March 1992).
661 Nordhaus, "Economic Approaches," supra, n. 647, pp. 50-
51. See also, Nordhaus, "Greenhouse Economics," supra, n. 659,
pp. 19-20, 22.
662 Nordhaus, "Greenhouse Economics," supra, n. 659, p. 20.
663 1b1d. See, also, Nordhaus, "Economic Approaches,"
supra, n. 647, pp. 45-46.
" 4Nordhaus, "Economic Approaches," supra, n. 647, pp. 60-
63. See, also Nordhaus, "Greenhouse Economics," supra, n. 659,
p. 22.
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to improve the future global environment.5
As in the case of scientific uncertainty,6 6 there is
criticism of the above cost-benefit analysis of climate
change, as opposed to a purely preventive or abatement
approach, in that it fails to take certain factors into
account. These include loss of species, global catastrophe or
the fact that reducing fossil fuel consumption will aid in
fighting other environmental problems such as acid rain and
urban smog. 661
	In addition, fears of a rapidly increasing
global population contributing greater amounts of greenhouse
gas emissions have added to the debate. A 1993 study
estimates that global population will reach 8.5 billion by
2025, with most growth coming in the developed world.668
While concerns over rapid population growth leading to
increased greenhouse gas emissions include all of the
developing world, there is a special concern regarding Asia,
where more than half of the world's 5.4 billion population
live.	 Asia's rise in population in addition to rapid
665 See Wilfred Beckerman, Pricing For Pollution, 2d ed.,
(London: The Institute of Economic Affairs, 1990), P. 13. The
author made similar comments in his presentation "Global
Warming and Developing World Priorities," Conference on Law
and Politics of Global Climate Change sponsored by South-North
Centre for Environmental Policy and British Branch of the
International Law Association, London, 6 December 1991.
666 See, supra, Section 4.1.1.1.
667 "Hot Stuff," supra, n. 657.
668The study, conducted by the Population Reference Bureau
(Washington, DC), stated that UN and World Bank projections of
an "ultimate" population growth of about 12 billion will only
occur if birth rates fall as quickly as anticipated.
Otherwise, population could rise to the 20-30 billion range.
See, "PRE Population Survey," Inter Press Service (IPS)
Newswire, Compuserve,14 May 1993. See, also, UN Population
Fund, Population and the Environment (NY: UN Population Fund,
1991).
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economic growth is expected to cause a "massive increase in
combustion of fossil fuels in the region over the next decade,
dangerously raising levels of gases in the atmosphere that
cause global warming." This will raise the economic cost
associated with climate change.
A compromise approach to the cost-benefit analysis is
suggested by Professor David Pearce, a leading UK
environmental economist. Pearce advocates pursuing the cost-
analysis approach in general terms, because it is well-
formulated for pursuing the optimal mix of adaptation to, and
abatement of, global warming. He cautions, however, that the
results will need to be examined very carefully since, inter
alia, estimates for damage may be too low.' 7° As an
alternative to strict cost-benefit analysis, Pearce argues
that a zone of unknown risk or warming threshold should be
detected. Once that is detected, targets should be set to
avoid moving beyond that threshold and incurring catastrophic
impacts. 67' While these targets may be achieved through
emission permits, Pearce follows Nordhaus in advocating carbon
taxes for reaching targets.672
4.1.2.1.3.	 Methods to Control Greenhouse Gas Emissions:
Carbon Taxes or a Quota System?
Carbon taxes face difficult implementation problems.
These include choosing which gases to tax, as well as the
ob9IScientists Warn of Asia's Swelling Population," Inter
Press Service Newswire, 14 May 1993.
°David Pearce, "Economics and the Global Environmental
Challenge," Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol.
19, No. 3 (Winter 1990), p. 372.
67 Pearce, "Global Commons," supra, n. 646, p. 16.
' 72 Ibid., p. 22.
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amount of tax, which could place a burden on developing
states." 73 One solution might be to tax various greenhouse
gases at their differential rate of estimated contribution to
global warming, or "global warming potential."' 74 These
estimated configurations must be used cautiously, however, in
view of changing scientific knowledge regarding their global
warming potential ."
Additionally, there are concerns over control and
allocation of the accrued funds such as how they are to be
levied and by whom. 676
 Cline maintains that the tax should
at first be levied and collected nationally, since revenues
from carbon taxes sufficient to cause major emissions
reductions would be so large as to make states unwilling to
submit to an international tax authority. Eventually, the
system might be harmonised on an international level.677
Also, carbon taxes cannot guarantee the amount of
reduction of carbon emissions; that depends on the response of
" 73 Distribution of the revenue to developing states might
rectify this. See, Scott Barrett, "Global Warming: The
Economics of a Carbon Tax," in David Pearce, et al, Blueprint
2 (London: Earthscan Publications Ltd, 1991), pp. 15-36. In
addition, see, Christopher Flavin, Slowing Global Warming: A
Worldwide Strategy (Washington, DC: World Resources Institute,
1989), pp. 53-54.
674 See, supra, Chapter 1, Section 1.2.1, Climate Change.
6751bid.
" 76See, Michael Grubb, The Greenhouse Effect: Negotiating
Targets (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs,
1989), pp. 31-32. See also, William A. Nitze, The Greenhouse
Effect: Formulating A Convention (London: Royal Institute of
International Affairs, 1990), pp. 51-52.
" 77 Cline, Global Warming: The Economic Stakes, supra, n.
652, pp. 85-86.
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energy users and suppliers. 78
	Nevertheless,	 Pearce
maintains that economists advocate carbon taxes as the most
economically efficient way to reduce
A quota system is an alternative to a carbon tax. Cline
maintains that the main reason for considering a quota system
is income distribution equity. Thus, developing states may be
more financially able to support a quota system than an
outright tax. The difficulty is in setting the correct quotas
of "carbon rights."680
Emission permits and subsequent trading of the permits
may be able to make a quota system more economically
efficient, if permits are set at the same price as a carbon
tax generating an identical cut in emissions. These; however,
present their own problems: the arrangements for allocation
678 lndividuals and firms faced with a carbon tax of $100
per ton of carbon would seek to avoid this tax by spending up
to, but not more than, $100 to abate a ton of carbon, thus
assuring the cost does not rise over the set rate. See, IUCC,
"Carbon Taxes," supra, n. 660. Grubb maintains that while
carbon taxes can play a large role in limiting emissions, they
fail to address broader issues of energy supply and demand.
See, Michael Grubb, Energy Policies and the Greenhouse Effect
(Dartmouth: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1990).
619 David Pearce, "The Role of Carbon Taxes in Adjusting to
Global Warming," The Economic Journal Vol. 101, No. 407 (July
1991), pp. 938-948. See also, Neil A. Leary and Joel D.
Scheraga, "The Costs of Different Energy Taxes For Stabilizing
US Carbon Dioxide Emissions," paper presented at the 4th
Global Warming International Conference, Chicago, Illinois,
April 1993.
680 Cline offers as an initial formula the following: 1/3
weight each on a state's base-year share in world emission
total, current share in world GDP, and base-year share in
world population. Eventually, there would be a phaseout of
weights associated with past emissions and GDP ("realist"
criteria) and an increase in weight on base-year population
("equity" criterion). Cline, Global Warming: The Economic
Stakes, supra, n. 652, p. 86.
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as well as trading will be difficult to create and
maintain." 8 ' In addition, permit trading might lead to
industries abandoning investment in compliance mechanisms or
research and development, if purchasing permits proved cheaper
than compliance. 2
 Nevertheless, advocates of permits
stress the practicality of such a system since states retain
sovereign control over transfers and most of the transfers
will take place bilaterally rather than multilaterally,
minimising the need for international bureaucracy."8'
Permits also ensure that emissions do not exceed a certain
level, although they cannot guarantee the costs as well as a
carbon tax can and so are subject to energy price fluctuations.684
" 81 See, for example, Anil Markandya, "Global Warming: The
Economics of Tradeable Permits," in David Pearce et al,
Blueprint 2 (London: Earthscan Publications Ltd., 1991), pp.
53-62. See also, Grubb, Negotiating Targets, supra, n. 676,
pp. 32-41.
" 82 The US EPA recently held its first auction of permits
or pollution allowances for sulphur dioxide, the chemical
which causes acid rain. The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments set
emission targets for sulphur dioxide, to take place in 1995,
with stricter targets for 2000. One utility that bid in the
auction, Illinois Power Company, has stopped construction on
a $350 million scrubber to reduce sulphur dioxide emissions
and has begun to stockpile permits for use between 1995 and
2000. See, Barnaby 3. Feder, "Sold: $21 Million of Air
Pollution," New York Times, 30 March 1992, pp. Dl, D22.
683 Grubb, Negotiating Targets, supra, n. 676, p. 41. See,
also Joshua M. Epstein and Raj Gupta, Controllin g the
Greenhouse Effect (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution,
1990), where the authors argue that only a market in carbon
emission permits meets the criteria of effectiveness and
efficiency, pp. 32-33.
684 5ee, IUCC, Fact Sheet 231, "Cutting Back Greenhouse
Gases With Tradeable Permits," Climate Chan ge Dossier (Geneva:
IUCC, March 1992).
See, also, R.F. Kosobud, D.W. South, K.G. Quinn and T.A.
Daly, "Setting the Global Thermostat With An Exhaustible
Tradeable Permit System," paper presented at the 4th Global
Warming International Conference, Chicago, Illinois, April
1993. The authors advocate an "evaporative" permit system
206
4.1.2.1.4 Ozone Layer Depletion Economics
The economic uncertainty behind ozone layer depletion is
of a different nature than that for climate change described
above. The rise in greenhouse gas emissions exacerbating the
problem of climate change results mostly from fossil fuel
combustion in connection with industrial production, needed
for the maintenance of society. 685
 While the total amount of
these emissions can be scaled back, the sources of global
warming cannot realistically be replaced, with the exception
of CFCs and HCFCs.
Ozone depleting substances on the other hand, such as
CFCs and HCFCs, can more realistically be substituted for, as
their use is primarily confined to those sectors of industry
that provide a higher standard of living, such as electronics,
refrigeration, pesticides and computers. 686
 While arguments
could be made that these uses are necessary for society and
that phasing out ozone depleting substances could lower a
standard of living or prevent development, these substances
are not as critical to society as fossil fuels. The focus of
ozone layer depletion economics was, and remains, on the
uncertain cost of substitutes and alternative processes.
whereby a focus is made on a long term atmospheric CO2
concentration (temperature) goal. A fixed quantity of undated
emission permits consistent with the defined goal is then
issued. The total number of permits decreases (evaporates)
once they are used and therefore each permit becomes more
valuable over time. Emitters will thus compare the present
value of their marginal cost of compliance with the present
value of the permit, thereby factoring the timing of
reductions into their CO 2 emission/permit usage decisions.
685 See, supra, Chapter 1, n. 23-27.
686 Even aerosols and fire-fighting equipment can be
included in this category.
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The major obstacle to replacement is industries which
make or utilise these substances, and who fear large economic
costs for replacement as well as the costs for research and
development of the replacements.' An additional concern is
that replacements might be considered ozone depleting
themselves, making them subject to replacement as well and
further driving up costs. For ozone layer depletion, then,
economic uncertainty revolves around replacement costs. This
will be examined in greater detail in an analysis of the ozone
layer depletion regime.689
4.1.2.2 Overcoming Economic Uncertainty
As with scientists and scientific uncertainty, the
economists are also divided as to the correct policy approach
to resolving these problems. 69° Yet, if climate change and
ozone layer depletion regimes are to be strengthened, economic
uncertainties must be resolved.691
' 87Most accounts of the ozone depletion issue allude to
the reluctance of industry to develop replacements for ozone
depleting substances. See, Richard Elliot Benedick, Ozone
Diplomacy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991) and
Sharon Roan, Ozone Crisis (NY: John Wiley & Sons, 1989).
688 For example, HCFCs, a replacement for CFC5, is now
being phased out itself. See infra, Chapter 5, Section 5.1,
International Action Regarding Ozone Layer Depletion.
689 5ee,	 infra, Chapter 5, Section 5.3.2, Economic
Uncertainty.
690 Economists do not form a legitimate epistemic community
with regard to global warming, however, as they do not share
a common purpose to abate or adapt to climate change or ozone
layer depletion. Rather, they are concerned with economic
aspects of the issue, not the issue itself. See, supra, n.
633.
691 5ee, for example, Robert Repetto and Roger C. Dower,
"Reconciling Economic and Environmental Goals," Issues in
Science and Technology (Winter 1992-93), pp. 28-32.
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In order to help alleviate the economic concerns of
climate change, William Cline has suggested a two stage
approach whereby a first stage would include a "best-efforts",
but not legally binding, international commitment to limit
carbon emissions by 2000 to 1990 levels. 692
 A second stage,
if warranted by greater scientific certainty by the year 2000,
would include stricter regulations, such as carbon taxes or
tradeable permits. 693
 Cline argues that this approach would
be both economically attractive as well as risk-averse.
While Cline's approach to climate change may be
economically efficient, the underlying concerns of economic
uncertainty with respect to climate change still need to be
addressed and developed. This includes the development of
affordable technologies to help reduce the emissions of
greenhouse gases. In addition, industries need to be
convinced that using energy more efficiently can in fact be
economically beneficial. 694
 These issues, as well as the
unknown costs concerning potential costs of damage, make
economics a critical issue that must be addressed in the
climate change regime.
Overcoming these economic concerns also needed to be
addressed regarding ozone layer depletion. While at first,
there had been warnings of severe economic consequences, by
692Cline, Global Warming: The Economic Stakes, supra, n.
652, pp. 90-95. For a similar approach see, Nitze, The
Greenhouse Effect, supra, n. 676, pp. 29-34.
693 Cline, Global Warming: The Economic Stakes, supra, n.
652, pp. 90-95.
694 See, for instance, Andrew Warren, "But Anti-Warming Can
Be Big Business," International Herald Tribune, 25 Sept. 1991,
p . 4. See, also, infra, Section 4.2.2.3, for a discussion of
the catalytic role of transnational corporations.
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1986 there was a more optimistic assessment. 65 At the
present time, replacement availability looks particularly
promising.696
4.1.3	 The Critical Issue of Development
Traditionally, developing states have had little
influence in matters of international concern, mostly due to
lack of economic power. But in the area of the environment,
the developing world has become "empowered" by its potential
capacity for emitting greenhouse gases and contributing to
climate change as well as ozone layer depletion. The
development issue, then, has also become subject to
politicization. 697
 Their views must now be taken into
account and their uncertain contribution to environmental
problems addressed for a viable regime to evolve.
4.1.3.1 Development Uncertainty
"Intentional violations are not the norm in international
law. Far more common are cases in which a country simply
lacks the financial or technical capabilities needed to
comply." 698
 The extent to which developing countries will
actually prosper economically and further their greenhouse gas
emissions is unknown, and the exact degree to which such
developing states will require technology and financing to
695 See,	 infra, Chapter 5, Section 5.3.2, Economic
Uncertainty.
6961bid.
697 See, supra, Chapter 1, n. 11.
698 Lee A. Kimball, Forging International Agreement:
Strengthening Intergovernmental Institutions For Environment
and Development, (Washington, DC: World Resources Institute,
1992), p. 43.
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implement international regulations regarding global warming
is also unknown.t Such "development uncertainty" has
played and will continue to play a large role in the
negotiations of a climate change treaty, revealing the need
for a flexible, responsive legal order.7'°
The majority of greenhouse gas emissions are at the
present time attributed to the industrialised world. However,
the less-developed states are poised to take the lead in
overall emissions upon attaining a certain level of
development and population. By 2100, it is projected that
developing countries will account for 57% of world CO2
emissions, compared with 29% today.70'
Similarly, the longer term potential of developing states
to use ozone layer depleting substances can not be ignored.
A 1987 Rand Corporation report listed the 13 developing
countries that would most likely have the highest demand for
699An additional concern are those states with "economies
in transition" from a state controlled market to a free
market, ie the former Soviet bloc.
700 See, the Kuala Lumpur and Tokyo Declarations addressing
the financial arrangements for developing states, The Earth
Summit: The United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development (UNCED), introduction by Stanley P. Johnson
(London: Graham & Trotman, 1993), pp. 31-39.
70 'Cline, Global Warming: The Economic Stakes, supra, n.
652, p. 82. In addition, the Tata Conference, one of several
international meetings to discuss development concerns,
announced that developing states could be responsible for 50%
of carbon dioxide emissions by the middle of the next century.
Tata Conference Statement, American Journal Of International
Law and Policy Vol. 5, No. 2 (Winter 1990), p. 554.
See, also, T.F. Homer, J.H. Butwel and G.W. Rathjens,
"Environmental Change and Violent Conflict," Scientific
American Vol. 268, No. 2 (February 1993), pp. 16-23, where the
authors argue that conflicts between growing world population
and increasing environmental degradation have contributed to
conflicts in many parts of the developing world.
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CFCs by the year 2000.' 2 The concerns of these states need
to be addressed, due to the size of their potential domestic
markets.
4.1.3.2 Overcoming Development Uncertainty
In order to address the uncertainty associated with the
unknown contribution of developing states to climate change,
the underlying issue of economic development has to be
addressed in tandem.703
International agreements can entice developing country
membership through provisions for funding and transfer of
technology. In addition, other efforts to alleviate the
concerns of developing states when dealing with environmental
problems have been made, for example, debt-for-nature
swaps. 704
 These swaps usually provide for loan forgiveness
702 China, India, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, South Korea,
Indonesia, Nigeria, Mexico, Turkey, Argentina, Venezuela,
Algeria and Iran. See, Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, supra, n.,
687, p. 151.
703 This is true not only so that developing states will be
able to afford environmental protection, but also because to
argue otherwise may be to suggest that imposing developed
countries' environmental standards on the developing world is
more important than eradicating poverty. See, "Pollution and
the Poor," Economist, 15 February 1992, pp. 14-15.
104The first swap, completed in 1987, entailed
Conservation International paying $100,000 to Citicorp Bank in
return for an outstanding debt of $650,000 owed by Bolivia to
Citicorp. The remaining Bolivian debt was entirely forgiven
by Conservation International on condition that Bolivia
protect 4 million acres of tropical forest. See, George E.
Brown, Jr. & Daniel R. Sarewitz, "Fiscal Alchemy: Transforming
Debt Into Research," Issues in Science and Technology (Fall
1991), pp. 72-73.
See also, Michael Occhiolini, Debt-For-Nature Swaps,
Working Paper, International Economics Department, World Bank
(March 1990).
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in return for environmental protection projects, such as the
protection of rain forests. Since these forests serve as a
natural sink for greenhouse gas emissions, there is some
potential for offsetting climate change. Between 1987 and
1990, 15 major swaps were carried out, involving 8 developing
countries. 706
 These "first generation" swaps 707
 were carried
out by private non-governmental organisations, 78
 suggesting
a role for non-state actors in regimes.709
The debt-for-nature swaps have been criticised, however,
for failure to address the core causes of environmental
degradation,	 including the	 lack of
	 scientific and
technological innovation within these debtor states. To
address this problem, debt could conceivably be purchased in
return for a pledge by the debtor state to further research
and development. There is currently an attempt to establish
such a debt-for-science swap between the United States and
105 Forests, however, only absorb carbon during the
lifetime of the trees. After the forest matures, it provides
no further contribution for absorbing carbon dioxide. See,
National Academy of Sciences, Policy Implications of
Greenhouse Warming, supra, n. 621, p. 76.
706 Brown and Sarewitz, "Fiscal Alchemy," supra, n. 704,
p. 73. See also, "Developments in the Law," supra, n. 624, p.
1570.
707 See, Michael S. Sher, "Can Lawyers Save the Rain
Forest? Enforcing the Second Generation of Debt-For-Nature
Swaps," Harvard Environmental Law Review Vol. 17, No. 1
(1993), p. 151.
708The three major groups involved in these swaps are
Conservation International, the World Wildlife Fund and the
Nature Conservancy. See, Janeen N. Klinger, "Debt-For-Nature
Swaps: A Paradigm For International Cooperation?" Paper
presented at the annual meeting of the Northeastern Political
Science Association, Providence, Rhode Island, 12-14 November
1992.
707 See, infra, Section 4.2.2, International Non-state
Actors.
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Mexico.
These swaps, however, may involve an imposition of the
environmental values of developed states on the developing
world. While not necessarily a bad thing, reaching consensus
on shared values is a better, albeit more difficult, approach.
A "policy of inclusion" of developing states is necessary for
the regime to develop. 11 ' This would ensure that the
concerns of developing countries are heard, not just for
egalitarian purposes but in order to assure that normative
expectations will be adhered to by all. The odds of universal
adherence would be significantly increased if developing
states felt that they had a say in the outcome of the negotiations.
710 Brown and Sarewitz, "Fiscal Alchemy," supra, n. 704, p.
75. This proposal is an example of a "second generation" or
public swap. It differs from the "first generation" or
private swap in that governments are playing the central role
and that greater amounts of debt are being reduced. Sher,
"Second Generation of Debt-For-Nature Swaps," supra, n. 707,
p. 151. One prominent example of a second generation swap is
the proposal for a public swap between the Polish government
and the Paris Club, an ad hoc group of creditor nations. The
proposal calls for providing US$3.3 billion in debt
forgiveness to clean up the Polish environment, one of the
most polluted states in Europe. Since some pollutants are
precursors of greenhouse gases, supra, Chapter 1, Section
1.2.1, Climate Change, this is important for climate change.
The Paris Group includes Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the
United Kingdom and the United States.
In April 1992, Poland announced the first multilateral
debt for nature scheme, in which its debt would be converted
into an ecological fund, to be used for projects to reduce
transboundary pollution flows, reduce pollution in the Baltic
Sea, reduce greenhouse gas emissions and enhance nature
conservation. See, American Society of International Law,
"Debt-For-Nature," International Environmental Law Interest
Group Newsletter Vol. 3, No. 4 (September 1992), p. 3.
"Lynne M. Jurgielewicz, "Development Issues and Global
Environmental Change," International Economic Law Society
Bulletin Vol. 4, No. 2 (Spring-Summer 1991), p. 30.
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In addition, the developing world has long regarded the
traditional legal order with suspicion, as it was largely
brought into existence by the wealthier industrialised states.
A legal system which recognises and accommodates the need for
increased interdependence among nations may persuade more
developing countries to lower their suspicions that the legal
order is biased in favour of the developed world. The
traditional legal order is largely based on law that many of
the newly created developing states had no or little say in,
and therefore view with distrust.712
The uncertainty of the impact of development, then, is a
critical issue in the climate change and ozone layer depletion
regimes. Developing states wield great influence in this
regard, since their involvement is critical to the
implementation of substantive obligations and, therefore, the
success of the regimes.113
4.1.4	 Critical Issues Summary
Science, economics and development are, therefore,
critical issues in the maintenance or development of the
climate change regime, as they are in the ozone layer
depletion regime. All of these issues maintain a degree of
uncertainty that must be overcome if substantive normative
expectations and obligations are to evolve and be maintained
within the regimes. While these issues can never attain 100%
712 See, generally, Francis Snyder and Peter Slinn, ed.
International Law and Development (Abingdon: Professional
Books Ltd., 1987) and Mohammed Bedjaoui, Toward A New
International Economic Order, in the series "New Challenges to
International Law" (London: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1979).
713 See, Shridath Ramphal, "In a North-South Gap, Seeds of
Environmental Discord," International Herald Tribune, 24
January 1992. Mr. Ramphal is President of the World
Conservation Union.
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certainty, there is still the possibility of achieving unity
or shared expectations on these issues. As uncertainty is
overcome, obligations become stronger.
4.2 Catalysts for Climate Change and Ozone Layer Depletion
Regimes
In addition to the critical issues, secondary issues can
act as catalysts in both the creation and maintenance or
development of a regime, and thus are important to a legal
analysis of global environmental change. They include:
leadership, international non-state actors; crisis; and
domestic regulations.
The selection of these catalysts is based on their
importance as catalysts identified in the ozone layer
depletion regime, a comparable environmental problem. 114
 The
selection of those catalysts relevant to climate change may
not be the same, however, and other catalysts may surface in
future research. An application of these catalysts to the
respective regimes will be made in Chapters 5 and 6.
4.2.1 Leadership
Although ultimately the decision to enter into a regime
remains with individual states, leadership by any one state is
sure to aid the evolution of such an arrangement. Failure of
a leader state to emerge can result in inaction regarding the
regime. In addition, within states, individual negotiators
7t4 See infra, Chapter 5, Section 5.4, Catalysts in the
Ozone Layer Depletion Regime. These catalysts may play a part
in lifting the level of acceptable compliance, supra, Chapter
3, Section 3.6, Effectiveness of Regimes. See, also, Abram
Chayes and Antonia Chayes, On Compliance, International
Organization Vol. 47, No. 2 (Spring 1993), pp. 202-204.
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may play a pivotal role in a state's leadership.Fv
State leadership has been defined as falling into one of
three possible categories: leadership evolved from power,
leadership evolved from skilful negotiation, and leadership
evolved from intellectual contributions. 716
 Since the
concept of regimes in this thesis relies on shared values or
interests, leadership evolved from power is not as important
in this discussion as the other types.
4.2.2 International Non-state Actors
Although the sovereignty of states does not remain in
doubt within the global system, states are certainly not the
sole actors within the system. International organisations,
non-governmental organisations, and transnational corporations
are all actively involved in policy-making areas, including
the environment and can contribute to regime formation and
maintenance.
4.2.2.1	 International/Intergovernmental Organisations
The involvement of international organisations within
world politics is not new. Their influence within
environmental affairs has increased as of late, as the
environment in general has increasingly become a matter of
international concern.
	 International organisations can
115 lnternational organisations and corporations may also
play a role within the policy of a state and will be
considered as a separate secondary factor, infra, Section
4.2.2, International Non-state Actors.
7160ran R. Young, "Political Leadership and Regime
Formation: On the Development of Institutions in International
Society," International Organization Vol. 45, No. 3 (Summer
1991), pp. 281-308.
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contribute to the creation and maintenance of regimes through
having issues placed on their agendas and thus developing
policies for action.
Of the many international organisations and specialised
agencies dealing with environmental issues, the one
predominately associated with such work is the United
Nations. 111
 Among its bodies and specialised agencies, the
UN Environmental Programme (UNEP) is most closely involved in
environmental affairs.718
UNEP's role as guardian of the global environment is
often described as "catalytic" and its primary function that
of a coordinating body vis-a-vis other UN agencies, as well as
7170ut of the three principal UN Councils, the Security
Council, the Trusteeship Council and Economic and Social
Affairs (ECOSOC), ECOSOC is the only council (at this time)
primarily involved with environmental affairs, although both
of the other councils have had some dealings concerning the
environment. Lynton Keith Caidwell, International
Environmental Policy: Emergence and Dimensions, 2d ed.
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1990), p. 101.
718 Some of the other UN bodies and agencies also concerned
with environmental issues include the Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAa), the International Labour Organization
(ILO), the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the UN
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO),
the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Meteorological
Organization (WMO), the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (IBRD), the UN Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) and the UN Development Programme (UNDP).
Caldwell, International Environmental Policy, supra, n. 717,
pp. 104-106.
For an overview of UNEP's role in international
environmental law, see Carol Annette Petsonk, "The Role of the
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in the Development
of International Environmental Law," The American University
Journal of International Law and Policy Vol. 5, No. 2 (Winter
1990), pp. 351-391.
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non-UN organisations concerned with the environment.
While UNEP admittedly has not received a formal mandate to
develop international law,'° the driving force of the legal
activity of UNEP is drawn from the decisions of its Governing
Council and documents such as the Report of the Ad Hoc Meeting
of Experts held in Montevideo, 1981.121
Since it is not a specialised agency of the UN, tJNEP's
General Council reports to the General Assembly through the UN
Economic and Social Council, 722 thus creating a "vertical
chain of accountability". 723 This chain, however, may itself
be so long that it prevents progress from being made quickly,
thus creating more of a problem than it solves. In addition,
719 Caldwell, International Environmental Policy, supra, n.
717, p. 75. For example, UNEP's coordinates and disseminates
information through its Earthwatch Programme, which includes
the Global Environmental Monitoring System (GEMS) for air and
water quality, the International Registry of Potentially Toxic
Chemicals (IRPTC), and an information referral system
(INFOTERRA) which refers environmental questions to the
correct forums.
720 See UNGA Res. 2997, International Legal Materials Vol.
12, No. 2 (1973), pp. 433-438 where UNEP was not explicitly
given the directive to develop international law. But see,
T.C. Bacon, "The Role of the United Nations Environment
Programme in the Development of International Environmental
Law," Canadian Yearbook of International Law Vol. 12 (1974),
p. 255 where the author pointed out that "it was not intended
that the Stockholm Conference [which established UNEP], should
consider legal questions," and "it was merely a technical,
scientific meeting."
721UNEP, Environmental Law in the United Nations
Environment Programme, (Nairobi: UNEP, 1990), p. 2.
122 Caldwell, International Environmental Policy, supra, n.
717, p. 102.
723Glen Plant, "Institutional and Legal Responses to
Global Climate Change," in International Law and Global
Climate Change, ed. Robin Churchill and David Freestone
(London: Graham & Trotman, 1991), p. 167.
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this "chain" may be too far away from the immediacy of the
problem in terms of decision-making.
Another international organisation is the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)' 24 , which
together with the International Development Association and
the International Finance Corporation, make up the component
parts of the World Bank. 125
 In 1970, the World Bank
established the post of Environmental Advisor and in 1973, the
Office of Environmental Affairs, today called the Office of
Environmental and Scientific Affairs. 126
 Environmental
Assessment Guidelines are utilized to ensure that both
developing countries and the Bank "systematically take
environmental interests into account at the earliest stage of
designing development projects." 121 In its 1992 Annual World
Development Report, the Bank outlined its strategy for
reconciling its goal of economic growth with the need to
conserve environmental resources: "The key is not to produce
less, but to produce differently."128
' 24 Established in 1945, the World Bank resulted from the
1944 Bretton Woods Conference to finance development
activities. D.W. Bowett, The Law of International
Institutions, 4th ed. (London: Stevens & Sons, 1982), pp.109-
110.
725Pau1 Muldoon, "The International Law of
Ecodevelopment," Texas International Law Journal Vol. 22, No.
3 (1987), p. 9.
126 1bid., p. 33.
127 Barber B. Conable, "Development and the Environment: A
Global Balance," American Journal of International Law and
Policy Vol. 2, No. 2, (Winter 1990), p. 246.
128World Development Report 1992: Development and the
Environment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). See,
also, Tom Redburn, "World Bank Strives for a Green Approach to
Development," International Herald Tribune, 18 May 1992, p. 9.
The Bank's President, Lewis T. Preston, highlighted the
differences between the market-oriented approach of the Bank
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The World Bank, in conjunction with UNEP and the United
Nations Development Programme, established the Global
Environmental Facility (GEF) which will aid projects that help
to reduce ozone depletion, global warming, marine pollution
and loss of biodiversity. 72
 The Bank also plays a role in
the funding mechanism for the Montreal Protocol.'7°
While the Bank attempts to take environmental concerns
into consideration in its policy-making, there is still
pessimism reserved for an institution whose primary concern is
economic development. 73 ' In particular, the GEF has come
under criticism from developing states as lacking transparency
and for promoting the interests of the developed countries
over the economic needs of developing states. Developed
states as well have been critical, particularly the United
States, which criticise the GEF's secrecy and bureaucratic
slowness. In addition, disputes over the GEF voting mechanism
and opposing environmentalist arguments that the world cannot
support significant new industrialisation: "{s]ome would
prefer a more absolute approach to protection, but for
policymakers with scarce resources seeking to raise the well-
being of their citizens in an environmentally responsible
manner, it is essential that tradeoffs be clarified in a
rational manner and cost-effective policies designed." Ibid.,
p. 11.
129 "Green Aid," Our Planet: The Magazine of the UNEP Vol.
2, No. 4, (1990), p. 9. See, also, infra, Chapter 5, Section
5.4.2 and Chapter 6, Section 6.4.2, International Non-state
Actors.
730See, infra, Chapter 5, Section 5.4.2, International
Non-state Actors.
131 The Bank itself appears to be cautious about its role
in the "global commons." Listing "degradation of the global
commons" as one of five problem areas requiring special
attention from the Bank and its members, the Bank disclaims
any recognition of international legal obligations regarding
"commons" areas in the absence of treaty provisions. See,
World Bank, The World Bank and the Environment: Annual Report-
Fiscal 1990 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1990), p. 1. fn 1.
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continue, with the developing states demanding one vote per
participant, while the industrialised states prefer a system
weighted according to financial contribution.132
Another intergovernmental organisation, the Organisation
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), is widely
regarded as a forum for economic development and international
trade. 113
 In 1970, the OECD established an Environment
Committee for the analysis of environmental problems and the
assessment of actions undertaken and contemplated by member
states, with a special emphasis on the economic and trade
ramifications, and to suggest solutions bearing in mind the
cost benefits. 114 Perhaps the most interesting charge to the
Committee was that the results of such work were to be
effective within the broader spectrum of OECD work on economic
policy and social development. 135 The linkage of these issue
712 See, Mark Lawson, "Deep Divisions Complicate Global
Environment Meeting," Nature Vol. 363 (20 May 1993), p. 199.
These concerns, as well as the question of funding, were
considered at a meeting of the GEF in Beijing in late May
1993, but no substantive decisions were made. While an
estimated target of raising US$2.8 billion to $4.2 billion
over a three to four year period starting in July 1994 was
set, and broad consensus emerged for universal membership of
the GEF governed by a Participants' Assembly, final decisions
were put off until after meetings in September (Washington,
DC) and December (Geneva) 1993. It was agreed that consensus
would be the prime instrument for decision making with voting
to be used only as a last resort. GEF, Press Release, World
Bank, Washington, DC, 27 May 1993. Also, telephone
conservation with Maria Subiza, Office of GEF Administrator,
15 June 1993.
733The OECD was the result of the reconstitution of the
Organisation for European Economic Administration, which was
formed to administer Marshall Aid. Bowett, The Law of
International Institutions, supra, n. 724, p. 189.
734 Caldwell, International Environmental Policy, supra, n.
717, p. 98.
7351bid.
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areas with the environment is important for the implementation
of international law.'6
4.2.2.2	 Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs)
The role of NGOs within regimes as international actors
cannot be overlooked. 731
 These organisations help bring
environmental issues to the attention of the public.'"
Caidwell distinguishes between three types of NGOs:
professional organisations with restricted membership such as
the International Council of Scientific Unions, institutes
such as the World Resources Institute, and advocacy groups
like Friends of the Earth International.739
The International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU),
composed of 20 member unions, 140 has taken an active role in
the scientific aspects of the environment and climate change.
The ICSU occasionally sets up various committees. Notable is
the ICSU's Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment
(SCOPE), which concerns itself with furthering the awareness
of the "influence of humans on their environment" and to
function "as a non-governmental, interdisciplinary and
international council of scientists", aiding governments,
736 See, supra, Sections 4.1.2, Critical Issue of Economics
and 4.1.3, Critical Issue of Development.
137NGOs are too many in number to be listed here; perhaps
a mark of their growing proliferation, if not influence.
738 See, John McCormick, The Global Environmental Movement
(London: Belhaven Press, 1989), pp. 143-148.
For a description of the environmental groups wielding
the largest clout in Britain, see "Green Groupies," The
Economist, 6 June 1992, p. 31.
139 Caldwell, International Environmental Policy, supra, n.
717, pp. 111-112.
740 1bid, p. 114.
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intergovernmental	 and	 non-governmental	 bodies	 with
environmental concerns.' 4 The ICSU, with the collaboration
of UNEP, UNESCO and the WMO, established in 1986 the
International Geosphere-Biosphere Program (IGBP). The IGBP
embodies an integrated scientific approach to global
environmental change, through the study of planetary processes
and the effects of human activities on those processes.741
NGOs play a large role in raising public opinion.
Although the origins of western environmentalism reach far
back into the 17th century, 743 public opinion was effectively
woken to the concerns of the environment with the publication
of Rachel Carson's Silent Spring in 1962, first as a series of
articles in the New Yorker, and then as a book in its own
right. 744 By 1989, the extent to which the public believed
environmental issues to be important was confirmed in a 14-
country Harris Poll, reported in Our Planet , the magazine of
UNEP
US Vice President Al Gore, Jr. alludes to the
"environmentalism of the spirit" as a method of achieving
environmental awareness within the general public.' 46 While
7411bid.
742 Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, supra, n. 687, p. 201.
143 See, Richard H. Grove, "Origins of Western
Environmentalism," Scientific American Vol. 267, No. 1 (July
1992), pp. 22-27.
'"Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (New York: Houghton
Mifflin, 1962).
745 0ur Planet Vol. 1, No. 2/3 (1989), pp. 14-15.
746 A1 Gore, Jr., Earth in the Balance (London: Earthscan,
1992), pp. 238-265.
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the union of science and religion may make some
uncomfortable, 147
 it is hard to separate the union of man and
nature:
Modern society will find no solution to the
ecological problem unless it takes a serious look
at its lifestyle. In many parts of the world,
society is given to instant gratification and
consumerism while remaining indifferent to the
damage which these cause. As I have already stated,
147 For example, recently, Dr. George F. Smoot of the
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory (US) detected density
fluctuations in the afterglow of radiation from the Big Bang,
which scientists theorize was the beginning of time and
space.. Reflecting on his discovery, Smoot said: "[iJf you're
religious, it's like looking at God." "It really is like
finding the driving mechanism for the universe, and isn't that
what God is?" Later, true to the vein of separation of science
and religion, Smoot said "[wjhat matters is the science. I
want to leave the religious implications to theologians and to
each person, and let them see how the findings fit into their
idea of the universe." John Nobel Wilford, "In the Glow of a
Cosmic Discovery, A Physicist Ponders God and Fame," New York
Times, 5 May 1992, pp. Cl and C9. See also, John Horgan,
"Profile: George F. Smoot," Scientific American, Vol. 267, No.
1 (July 1992), pp. 20-21.
Not all scientists strive to remove all vestiges of
religion from their analyses. Al Gore relates a personal
conversation with the Nobel Prize winning scientist, Arno
Penzias, who shared the prize for his discovery of the
measurable echo of the Big Bang. Penzias was asked on a radio
show what he thought existed before the Big Bang. He answered
that he didn't know, but that the answer most consistent with
the mathematical evidence was "nothing." When the next caller
accused him of being an atheist, Penzias replied, "Ma'am, I
don't think you listened carefully to the implications of what
I said." Gore, Earth in the Balance, supra, n. 746, p. 254.
Finally, Tom Hayden, California Democratic Assemblyman
and environmental activist, teaches a university course at
Santa Monica College, California, which combines
environmentalism and religion, International Herald Tribune,
6 August 1991, p. 16.
Caution, however, in reinforcing the perception of
science as a type of religion is urged by one commentator who
points out that science is about description while religion or
philosophy is about explanation, and no explanation of life
can be found in a set of equations. Science, then, "need not
abandon its speculations, but it should watch its language."
Bryan Appleyard, "In Science We Trust," New York Times, 8
April 1993, p. All, from his book Understanding the Present:
Science and the Soul of Modern Man.
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the seriousness of the ecological issue lays bare
the depth of man's moral crisis."
Whether or not one is inclined to see God in nature, it
is difficult to dispute that "{tJhe fate of mankind...,
depends upon the emergence of a new faith in the future."749
The raising of public opinion by NGOs, then, can be a
motivating factor in the formation and maintenance of legal
regimes.
4.2 .2.3	 Transnational Corporations
Business has become an important factor in the
environmental equation. With the realisation that 500
companies control 70% of world trade, 75 ° it becomes fairly
obvious that their influence on environment and development is
considerable. 75 ' Transnational corporations (TNC5) have some
very important assets: they only have to avert international
action instead of trying to reach consensus on it; they have
access to bureaucratic sectors in some governments; and
sometimes may be able to propose technical alternatives that
suit their interests. 752
 All of these characteristics create
748 Gore, Earth In The Balance, supra, n. 746, pp. 262-263,
quoting Pope John Paul II, "The Ecological Crisis A Common
Responsibility," message of His Holiness for the Celebration
of the World Day of Peace, 1 January 1990.
149 1bid., p. 263, quoting Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The
Phenomenon of Man (London: Collins, 1959).
750 John Vidal, "A World Shackled By Economic Chains,"
Guardian (London), 8 May 1992.
751 For a good account of the opportunities for a working
relationship between industry and the environment, see, Bruce
Piasecki and Peter Asmus, In Search Of Environmental
Excellence (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990).
752Gareth Porter and Janet Welsh Brown,	 Global
Environmental Politics (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), p. 65.
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a powerful role for business in the environment.
While the environment may not be the primary concern of
industry, the responsibility lies with each sector to consider
the other's perspective. 753
 That being stated, it is also of
some	 economic	 benefit	 for	 corporations	 to	 adopt
"environmentally	 friendly"	 production	 and management
techniques.	 Although criticised as a public relations
gimmick, businesses are realising the economic value of
"confronting environmental issues before the regulators
do . ,,
7530ne promising movement is Prolect 88: Harnessin g Market
Forces to Protect Our Environment, a report co-sponsored by
the late John Heinz, then-Republican Senator of Pennsylvania,
along with former Democratic Senator Tim Wirth of Colorado.
The purpose of the report, to outline goals Congress should
keep in mind when voting, is summed up in a quote from the
report: "If Theodore Roosevelt's conservation ethic at the
beginning of this century represented the first important era
of environmental concern in the US, then the decade of
important new laws and regulation following Earth Day was the
second era. Our challenge now is to move aggressively into a
third era-a period when practical and economically sensible
policies will provide more effective and efficient management
of natural resources and protection of the environment."
Piasecki and Asmus, In Search of Environmental Excellence,
supra, n. 751, pp. 137-138.
754 See, Charles T. Rubin, "Greens and Greenbacks: Nature
and the Environmental/Big Business Convergence," paper
presented at the annual meeting of the Northeastern Political
Science Association, Providence, Rhode Island, 12-14 November
1992.
The movement of businesses toward portraying themselves
as environmentally conscious is reflected in such career books
as Susan Cohn, Green At Work: Finding a Business Career That
Works for the Environment (Washington, DC: Island Press,
1992), which chronicles those US corporations that champion
environmental concerns. See, also, Marlise Simons, "The
European Community's Green Seals of Approval: 12 Countries,
340 Million Shoppers, One Planet," New York Times, 11 April
1993, p. ES.
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4.2.3 Domestic Regulations
Domestic implementation of international agreements is
obviously important for the successful implementation of a
regime. What is not as obvious is the role of domestic
regulations that precede the international agreement. These
regulations can catalyse the formation of a regime, as well as
the maintenance of similar regulations within a regime.
4.2.4 Crisis
The perception of an imminent crisis has always acted as
a catalyst for international action; not least for
international legal action on the environment. A crisis has
the effect of propelling action before it is "too late." Such
a crisis could help catalyse the formation and maintenance of
a regime.
4.3 Conclusion
This chapter has outlined the issues critical to the
development of the climate change and ozone layer depletion
regimes. While these regimes can be formed on the basis of
shared expectations; science, economics and development
uncertainty must all be overcome for the regime to develop.
As this process of overcoming uncertainty proceeds and
cognitive expectations evolve, then the regime's normative
expectations or obligations become stronger. 155
 The
catalysts discussed above can also play a role in the
formation and development of regimes.
Even before the advent of such a complex problem as
' 55 See, supra, Chapter 3, Sections 3.3, Formation of
Regimes, and 3.4, Maintenance or Development of Regimes.
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climate change, it was recognised that:
No problem in international law, however, can be viewed
realistically without its context of underlying
political, economic, sociological, scientific, technical,
and other factors, and no viable solution to an
international law problem can be achieved which does not
accommodate these contextual realities.
Thus,	 "[tjhe challenge for global environmental
management rests in identifying these interests and
constructing a system based on them."157
756 Jan Schneider, World Public Order of the Environment:
Towards an International Ecological Law and Organization
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), p. 110.
757 "Developments in the Law," supra, n. 624, p. 1494.
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CHAPTER 5
"The atmospheric conditions have been very unfavourable
lately," said Owl. "However, the prospects are rapidly
becoming more favourable. At any moment-"758
ANALYSIS OF THE OZONE LAYER DEPLETION REGIME
In order to illustrate the role of regimes within the
international legal order, this chapter will analyze the
formation, maintenance and compliance mechanisms of the ozone
layer depletion regime. The ozone layer depletion regime is
a particularly good example of the role of regimes within the
international legal order and how they can solidify general
obligations into more substantive international law.
5.1 International Action Regarding Ozone Layer Depletion
International action to regulate the use and production
of CFCs and other ozone depleting chemicals 7" resulted in
the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone
Layer (Vienna Ozone Convention). This was followed by the
1987 Montreal Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Substances
that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal Protocol) that was
subsequently adjusted and amended in 1990 and 1992. 760
758 From A.A. Milne, Piglet Is Entirely Surrounded By
Water.
759 lncluding halons, HCFCs, carbon tetrachloride, methyl
chloroform, methyl bromide, and HBFCs. See, supra, Chapter 1,
n. 27, 79 for a description of their uses in industry.
760The Vienna Ozone Convention was adopted in March 1985
and the Protocol in September 1987, International Legal
Materials Vol. 26, No. 6 (1987), pp. 1516-1540 and pp. 1541-
1561 respectively. The 1990 London Revisions (amendment and
adjustments) to the Protocol are reprinted in International
Legal Materials Vol. 30, No. 2 (1991), pp. 537-554. The 1992
Copenhagen Revisions (amendment and adjustments) can be found
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In September 1975, following the publication of research
in 1974 linking CFCs with ozone layer depletion, 76 ' UNEP
funded a World Meteorological Organisation conference on the
implications of US research on the ozone layer depletion.72
A number of international conferences followed, including the
first significant international initiative, a 1977 UNEP
sponsored meeting in Washington, DC. At that conference, a
"World Plan of Action on the Ozone Layer" was drafted and a
Coordinating Committee on the Ozone Layer (CCOL) was
created.7b3 The Plan called for international cooperation in
research concerning ozone layer depletion, with the CCOL to
report on that research.
By October 1978, the manufacturing of nonessential uses
of CFC5 as aerosol propellants was banned in the United
States, followed closely by similar action in Canada, Norway
and Sweden. The European Community settled on a 30% reduction
•	 •	 764in CFC aerosol use from 1976, to take effect in 1981.
A UNEP Ad Hoc Working Group of Legal and Technical
Experts for the Preparation of a Global Framework Convention
in the Report of the Fourth Meeting of the Parties to the
Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer,
UNEP/Oz.L.Pro.4/15, 25 November 1992.
761 See supra, Chapter 1, n. 79.
162Richard Elliot Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy: New
Directions in Safeguarding the Planet (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1991), p. 40.
763 See Edward A. Parson, "Protecting the Ozone Layer,"
Institutions For The Earth (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993), p. 35
and Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, supra, n. 762, p. 40.
764 5ee Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, supra, n. 762, p. 24,
Parson, "Protecting the Ozone Layer," supra, n. 763, pp. 36-
38, and Sharon Roan, Ozone Crisis (NY: John Wiley & Sons, mc,
1989) p. 84.
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for the Protection of the Ozone Layer was established in 1981,
meeting seven times over the next three years to negotiate an
international convention. From that process evolved the
"Toronto Group," a group of states calling for a protocol
reducing CFC emissions. 7 The Toronto Group's call for a ban
on nonessential uses of CFCs in spray cans faced stiff
opposition from the EC, which favoured a production capacity
cap protocol. hi,	 Differences could not be overcome, and
neither of the proposed protocols was signed.
	
Only the
Convention was opened for signature.
The Vienna Ozone Convention was the first formal
international agreement concerning the ozone layer. The
Convention listed general obligations of the Parties to
protect human health and the environment from activities
modifying the ozone layer, defined as the "layer of
atmospheric ozone above the planetary boundary layer,"
including the adoption of legal measures to control ozone
depletion. Cooperation in research and exchange of legal,
scientific and technical information was required, and a
' 5 See, Parson, "Protecting The Ozone Layer," supra, n.
763, pp. 37-38. The Toronto Group consisted of Canada,
Finland, Norway, Sweden and the United States, with supporters
including Australia, Austria, Denmark and Switzerland. See
also, Roan, Ozone Crisis, supra, n. 764, pp. 114-117.
766 Benedick quotes Patrick Szell, a British official
involved in the negotiations as stating: "not all countries...
were prepared to be so sweeping or quick [as the Toronto
Group] to condemn such useful chemical substances," concluding
that "their hesitance was vindicated" when newer estimates
showed reduced predictions of future ozone depletion and noted
that if the Toronto Group had insisted on their protocol, "a
sizeable proportion of the world's CFC-producing countries
would simply have refused to have anything to do with it."
Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, supra, n. 762, p. 44.
167 The Convention entered into force on September 22,
1988. As of November 1993, 131 states have ratified. Source:
Treaty Section, UN Legal Office, New York.
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Conference of the Parties was established for the review of
scientific information and the promotion of appropriate
policies. The Convention marks the first time states
endeavoured to solve an environmental problem before the
effects were felt or scientifically proved and set the stage
for substantive obligations.169
In 1987, building upon the framework laid down by the
Vienna Convention and reacting to publication and satellite
confirmation of research documenting the "ozone hole,"17°
substantive agreement was reached for reduction of CFCs and
halons, resulting in the Montreal Protocol. Under the
Protocol, CFC production and consumption was to be frozen at
1986 levels by 1989 (when the Protocol came into force), cut
by 20% by 1994, and 50% by 1999. For halons, production and
consumption was to be frozen at 1986 levels by 1992 (37 months
after the Protocol came into force). 17 ' Developing ("Art.
5") countries were given a 10 year extension for compliance
with these timetables, as well as an additional 10 to 15%
allowance for complying with the production deadlines. 772 In
768Vienna Ozone Convention, Arts. 4 & 6, supra, n. 760.
See also, Dale S. Bryk, "The Montreal Protocol and Recent
Developments To Protect The Ozone Layer," Harvard
Environmental Law Review Vol. 15, No. 1 (1991), p. 280.
769 See, UNEP, Action On Ozone (Nairobi: UNEP, 1989), p. 8.
170 See, supra, Chapter 1, n. 83.
77 'Montreal Protocol, supra, n. 760, Art. 2. CFCs 11, 12,
113, 114 and 115 were regulated, along with halons 1301, 1211
and 2402. CFC-l1 and CFC-12, used in refrigeration, air-
conditioning and aerosols, have the greatest ozone depletion
potential.
772 1bid., Arts. 2 and 5. For the purpose of the Protocol,
the developing countries are identified in "Decision of the
First Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer," Art. 12E,
UNEP/Ozl.Pro.1/5, reprinted in UNEP, Handbook for the Montreal
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addition, the Protocol provided for the calculation of control
levels, 173
 control of trade with non-parties, assessment
of the control measures every 4 years,' 7 " and reporting of
data and exchange of information regarding technology. '
Non-compliance procedures were as yet not provided for, but
left for future development. 177	The Protocol entered into
force on January 1, l989.
The First Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal
Protocol 779 took place at Helsinki in 1989, after scientific
Protocol On Substances That Deplete The Ozone Layer, (Nairobi:
UNEP Ozone Secretariat, May 1991), pp. 57-58. In order to
qualify for the 10 year extension, developing countries must
have an annual calculated level of consumption of the
controlled substances of less than 0.3 kilograms per capita.
See, infra, n. 783 for extensions relating to new substances
controlled by the London Revisions.
As of September 1993, there are 73 Parties operating
under Article 5. Source: UNEP Ozone Secretariat, Nairobi.
773Montreal Protocol, supra, n. 760, Art. 3, where
formulas were laid out for determining production, imports and
exports, and consumption.
774 1bid., Art. 4, outlining the restrictions regulating
the import and export of controlled substances with non-
parties, as well as the technologies for producing controlled
substances.
775 1bid., Art. 6, to be done on the basis of available
scientific, environmental, technical and economic information.
See, also, infra, n. 833.
776 1bid., Art. 7, mandating annual reports on production,
imports, and exports.
777 1bid., Art. 8. See, infra, n. 806 for this development.
779As of November 1993, there are 128 ratifications under
the Protocol, Source: Treaty Office, UN Legal Office, NY.
779 The purpose of the meetings of the Parties is outlined
in the Protocol and include taking any action necessary to
achieve the purposes of the Protocol. Montreal Protocol,
supra, n. 760, Art. 11(4).
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research revealed that the original phase-out called for by
the Montreal Protocol was not adequate to halt the depletion
of the ozone layer. This research included the Airborne
Antarctic Ozone Experiment in October 1987 proving that
chlorine monoxide was the primary source of ozone depletion;
NASA's Ozone Trends Panel announcing in March 1988 that the
ozone layer had depleted at a rate of 1.7 to 3% over the
Northern Hemisphere; and new EPA evidence revealing that
ozone layer depletion could cause serious harm to
humans. 780
In Helsinki, the Parties agreed that CFCs should be
phased out by 2000, that halons should be phased out as soon
as possible, and that other ozone depleting substances should
be controlled. Agreement was also reached to develop a
funding mechanism to facilitate the transfer of technology to
developing countries. 18 ' The resulting Helsinki Declaration
on the Ozone Layer could not legally revise the Montreal
Protocol, however, since it requires that any proposed
amendments and adjustments of the Protocol be communicated to
the Secretariat at least 6 months before a meeting of the
Parties at which they are proposed to be adopted.'8
780 See supra, Chapter 1, n. 84, 94.
781 Helsinki Declaration on the Protection of the Ozone
Layer, International Legal Materials Vol. 28, No. 5 (1989) pp.
1335-1336.
782 Amendments to the Protocol require a 2/3 majority vote
(if consensus fails). They enter into force after at least 2/3
of the Protocol Parties have ratified it( unless the Protocol
provides otherwise), and are binding only on those Parties
that ratified, Vienna Convention, Art. 9(4),(5) supra, n. 760.
Adjustments, changes in stringency and timing of already
controlled substances, required a 2/3 majority vote (if
consensus fails) of Parties present and voting representing at
least 50% of the total consumption of the controlled
substances of the Parties, and is binding on all Parties,
Montreal Protocol, Art. 2(9), supra, n. 760. This requirement
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The following year, the Second Meeting of the Parties to
the Montreal Protocol took place in London. Adjustments were
made stating that CFCs would be phased out by 2000, with a 50%
reduction required by 1995 and an 85% cut by 1997, with again
additional time for compliance allowed for developing
countries. 783
 Halons are to be phased out by 2000, with
rates frozen at 1986 levels by 1992, and a 50% cut by
1995.784 There is a possibility of higher allowances for
"essential uses" and if no adequate alternative exists. No
definition was given of essential uses. 785 A new Amendment
also stated that production and consumption of methyl
chloroform was to be phased out by 2005 and carbon
tetrachloride by 2000, and additional CFCs were added to the
list of controlled substances to be phased out by 2000.786
No restrictions were imposed on HCFCs, but a resolution was
issued outside the Protocol recommending guidelines for their
for adjustments was amended in London to require separate
majorities of Art. 5 countries present and voting, as well as
non-Art. 5 states present and voting. London Revisions, supra,
n. 760, Art. 2(9)C. This represents a major shift of power
towards developing countries, Winfried Lang, "Ozone Layer,"
Yearbook of International Environmental Law Vol. 3 (1992), p.
225.
783 London Revisions, supra, n. 760, Arts. 2A & 5. For
Parties operating under Article 5, in addition to not
exceeding an annual calculated level of consumption of 0.3
kilograms per capita of substances already controlled under
the Montreal Protocol, supra, n. 760, these Parties must not
exceed an annual calculated level of consumption of 0.2
kilograms per capita of new substances added in London. Art.
5(2).
See also, United Nations, Report of the 2d Meetin g for
the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer, UNEP/Oz.L.Pro.2/3, 29 June 1990.
784 London Revisions, supra, n. 760, Art. 2B.
785 1bid. But see infra, n. 798.
786 1bid., Art. 2E, D & C respectively.
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787use.
Restrictions tightening the prohibition of the trade of ozone
depleting substances with non-parties were also included.788
An Interim Multilateral Fund was established at the
Second Meeting of the Parties for the purposes of providing
financial and technical aid, including the transfer of
technology, to developing states. 789
 The fund was
established at US$240 million, although studies revealed that
the needs of developing states may reach $500 million over the
coming three An Executive Committee will monitor
the implementation of operational policies, including the
disbursement of funds, and will consist of 14 members
appointed by the Parties, evenly divided between the
developing and industrialised countries. 791
 Other issues
raised at the meeting included data reporting required under
the Protocol, non-compliance procedures, recycling and
destruction technologies and assessment panels to review the
787 1bid., Annex VII. See also, Bryk, "Montreal Protocol,"
supra, n. 768, p. 286.
788 London Revisions, supra, n. 760, Art. 4. In addition,
Parties may be allowed to import and export controlled
substances to a non-parties deemed to be in conformity with
the Protocol. Art. 4(8).
789 Ibid., Art. 10.
790American Society of International Law, "Ozone,"
International Environmental Law Interest Group Newsletter Vol.
3, No. 1 (September 1992), p. 6. See also, "Green Aid," Our
Planet: Ma gazine of the UNEP, Vol. 2, No. 4 (1990), p. 9.
791 London Revisions, Art. 10 & Annex IV, Appendix IV,
supra, n. 760. See also, Daniel Goldberg, The Montreal
Protocol Multilateral Fund: A Model for the Framework
Convention on Climate Change, (Washington, DC: Centre for
International Environmental Law, 1992), and Bryk, "Montreal
Protocol," supra, n. 768, p. 287.
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control mechanisms. 2
At the Third Meeting of the Parties, held in June 1991,
no new adjustments or amendments were adopted. A request was
made, however, to the Ad-Hoc Working Group of Legal Experts on
the Non-Compliance procedure, to identify possible instances
of non-compliance as well as possible measures to be taken
against non-compliance.3
The adjustments for CFCs and halons came into effect on
7 March 1991, needing no further ratification. 74
 The London
Amendment to the Protocol, including the requirements
regarding methyl chloroform and carbon tetrachloride, the
addition of new substances to the list of controlled
chemicals, and the creation of the (interim) Multilateral Fund
came into effect on 10 August l992.
The Fourth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal
Protocol convened in Copenhagen in November 1992. Just prior
to that meeting, evidence of even greater ozone layer
depletion was announced. 796
 Once again, the Parties adjusted
72Bryk, Montreal Protocol, supra, n. 768, pp. 288-290.
See also, Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, supra, n. 762, esp.
Chapter 13.
793 "Montreal Protocol: Third Meeting of the Parties,"
Environmental Policy and Law, Vol. 21, No. 5/6 (1991), pp.
251-252. See also, American Society of International Law,
"Ozone Depletion," International Environmental Law Interest
Group Newsletter Vol. 2, No. 2 (November 1991), p. 6.
74American Society International Law, "Montreal
Protocol," International Environmental Law Interest Group
Newsletter (May 1991), pp. 5-6. See, also, supra, n. 782.
5American Society of International Law, "Ozone," supra,
n. 790, p. 6. As of November 1993, there are 70 ratifications.
Source: Treaty Section, UN Legal Office, NY.
supra, Chapter 1, n. 85.
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and amended the Protocol with further restrictions on ozone
depleting substances. Adjustments include a 75% reduction
of consumption and production of CFCs by 1994, with a total
phaseout by 1996. Halons are to be phased out by 1994, and
carbon tetrachloride and methyl chloroform by l996.18
Developing states are again given leeway to exceed the limits
0	 99from l0-l5.
The Amendment also dealt with previously unregulated
ozone depleting substances and CFC substitutes. The principal
CFC substitute at this time, HCFC, is also ozone depleting.
Therefore, the Amendment states that consumption of HCFCs is
to be capped at 1989 levels in 1996, with a total phase-out by
2030.B00	 HBFCs are to be phased out by 1996 (except for
791 See, Fourth Meeting of the Parties, supra, n. 760.
798 1bid., Annex I, p. 32. The phase-out will not apply if
the Parties agree to permit the level of production or
consumption that is necessary for "essential" uses. The
Parties adopted a procedure for the approval of "essential"
uses, defined as necessary for health or safety, or critical
to the functioning of society, and there are no available
alternatives or existing stocks of banked or recycled
material. Ibid., Decision IV/25, pp. 24-26.
19 Ibid. The 10 year deferral still applies as well, Art.
5, see, supra, n. 772. The Parties decided that individual
cases should be considered for the classification of
"developing countries," and that no formal definition be
given. Decision IV/7, pp. 14-15.
800 See, Ian Rowlands, "Copenhagen Meeting on the Montreal
Protocol on the Ozone Layer," LSE Centre for the Study of
Global Governance Newsletter Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 1993), pp.
2-3, where the author states that the 2030 phase-out date, as
opposed to an earlier date, was partially attributable to the
United States, which would be hindered by a more rapid phase-
out. The HCFCs are used in office air conditioners. The United
States makes the largest use of these conditioners, which have
a lifetime of 40 years. Hence, the author argues the United
States needs to ensure that their conditioners will remain
operational during this time. Earlier reports of preparatory
meetings, however, note that US proposals for a phase-out of
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essential uses), and methyl bromide is to be frozen by 1995 at
1991 levels. This and future amendments to the Protocol
are to apply to Art. 5 developing states after a review in
1995.	 The Amendment is to come into force 1 January 1994,
provided 20 Parties have ratified, accepted or approved.
The Multilateral Fund, or financial arm of the Protocol,
was permanently established in Montreal to facilitate
HCFCs by 2010-2030 were viewed as too complicated and too
restricted, with the only additional support for specific
phase-out dates coming from the Nordic countries, who wanted
a phase-out date of 2000. See, Alliance for Responsible CFC
Policy, "CFC Phaseout Moved to 1996, Protocol Advisers Develop
HCFC Proposal," CFC Alliance Bulletin (September/October
1992), pp. 1-2.
In addition, the US 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act,
mandated a phase-out of HCFCs by 2030, prior to any
international regulation of HCFCs. Also, the US EPA has issued
rules, effective July 1993, designed to halt the emission of
HCFCs during the servicing and disposal of air-conditioners
and refrigeration equipment, thus keeping them from entering
the atmosphere. See, The Chemistry of Air Conditioning &
Refrigeration Is Changing (Washington, DC: Air-Conditioning
and Refrigeration Institute, 1991), and "Away From Politics,"
International Herald Tribune, 26 April 1993, p. 3.
801 Report of the Fourth Meeting, supra, n. 760, Annex III,
pp. 36-42. Developing states were given leave to exceed the
freeze on methyl bromide by 10%. The United States, facing a
phase-out of methyl bromide by 2000 under its Clean Air Act,
had introduced an amendment to the Protocol calling for a
phase-out by 2000 for all Parties, but was met by opposition
from developing states, where the use of the substance as a
soil and crop fumigant is increasing. A resolution was adopted
stating that the methyl bromide should become subject to
controls for developed states. Annex Xv.
See also, Friends of the Earth, Methyl Bromide: Ozone
Destroyer (London: Friends of the Earth, 1992).
° 2 Report of the Fourth Meeting , supra, n. 760, Decision
IV/4, p. 29. Art. 5. Lang, "Ozone Layer," supra, n. 782, p.
226.
Report of the Fourth Meeting, supra, n. 760, Annex III,
Art. 3, p. 45. As of November 1993, 8 Parties have ratified
the Amendment. Source: Treaty Section, UN Legal Office, NY.
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compliance. US$ 113.34 million was committed for 1993, at
least as much for 1994, and a range of $340-500 million for
l994-96.° Terms of reference were adopted for the Fund and
its Executive Committee, with the United States to chair the
Executive Committee in 1993.805
Pursuant to Article 8 of the Montreal Protocol, a non-
compliance procedure was formulated. An Implementation
Committee is to consider and report on submissions made to the
Secretariat regarding possible non-compliance, "with a view to
securing an amicable solution of the matter on the basis of
respect for the provisions of the Protocol." 806
 The
Implementation Committee is then to report to the Meeting of
the Parties with its recommendations. An indicative list of
measures that might be taken for non-compliance by the Parties
was also adopted. Included in the list was "appropriate
assistance" (such as assistance for data collection and
reporting, technology transfer, and financial assistance), the
issuing of cautions, and suspension of specific rights and
privileges under the Protocol. 807
 Possible examples of non-
compliance were not adopted as had been hoped for.808
804 1bid., Decision IV/18, pp. 19-21.
805 1b1d., Annexes IX-XIV, pp. 53-70, Decision IV, p. 21.
806 1bid., Annex IV, pp. 46-47.
807 1bid., Annex V. p. 48.
808 See, "Third Meeting of the Parties," supra, n. 793, p.
251, Decision 111/2. This was due mostly to the US view that
non-payment of contributions to the Multilateral Fund did not
qualify as non-compliance, since those contributions were non-
compulsory. Thus, consensus on examples of non-compliance was
absent. See, Winfried Lang, "Ozone Layer," Yearbook of
International Environmental Law Vol. 2 (1991), p. 109. See,
also, American Society of International Law, "Ozone
Depletion," International Environmental Law Interest Group
Newsletter Vol. 2, No. 2 (November 1991), p. 6.
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5.2 Formation of the Ozone Layer Depletion Regime
Formation of a regime requires the existence of shared
expectations regarding future behaviour among the relevant
states involved. °' In the case of ozone layer depletion,
existence of the regime can be traced to the establishment of
the UNEP AD Hoc Working Group of Legal and Technical Experts
for the Preparation of a Global Framework Convention for the
Protection of the Ozone Layer established in 198l.3b0 At
that time, there was evidence of expectations concerning
protection of the ozone layer through future regulation of the
issue-area, if not agreement on what degree of regulation.
While unilateral action by some states to regulate CFC use on
their own preceded the establishment of the Working Group,
there was not yet evidence at that time of the existence of
shared values or expectations to regulate the issue-area as a
collective body. While the unilateral action acted as a
catalyst 81 ' in that it "pushed" international action, there
was no evidence of an understanding that international action
was as yet required. Similarly, the World Plan for Action and
the CCOL, while evidence of the need to coordinate research in
the issue-area, did not reflect the shared value of the
necessity of international action. The legal status of the
regime at formation will be discussed below.
5.3 Maintenance of the Ozone Layer Depletion Regime
As discussed earlier, the maintenance or development of
a regime depends on the extent to which critical issues have
808 See, supra, Chapter 3, Section 3.3, Regime Formation.
supra, n. 765.
811 See, infra, this Chapter, Section 5.4.3, Domestic
Regulations.
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been resolved and cognitive expectations have been shaped.
The stronger this agreement on cognitive expectations, the
stronger the regime obligations or normative (shared)
expectations regarding future behaviour. 1
	In examining the
ozone layer depletion regime, the critical issues include the
scientific, economic and development aspects of the regime.
Without substantial unity on the uncertainty surrounding these
issues, the regime would not have evolved substantive
regulations.
5.3.1	 Scientific Uncertainty
The publication of the Rowland-Molina Hypothesis in
1974 linking CFCs with ozone layer depletion was the beginning
of the search for scientific certainty regarding the causes of
ozone layer depletion. Additional research followed,
including four major reports of the US National Academy of
Sciences released between 1976 and 1984. The estimates of
depletion varied widely, suggesting uncertainty over the
theory linking chlorine monoxide with ozone layer
R15
Thus, it was not surprising that the 1985 Vienna Ozone
Convention did not contain provisions for the international
regulation of CFCs when the scientific community was still
vacillating on the extent of severity of the depletion.
812See, supra, Chapter 3, Section 3.4, Maintenance or
Development of a Regime.
"3Ibid.
14 See, supra, Chapter 1, n. 79.
' 5 In 1976, the estimate was for 2-20% depletion; in 1979,
16.5%; in 1982, 5-9% depletion; and in 1984, 2-4%. See Roan,
Ozone Crisis, supra, n. 764, p. 112.
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The discovery of the "ozone hole" in late 1984
contributed to scientific certainty, yet even that did not
provide proof that chlorine monoxide was the culprit. This
did not occur until late 1987, when an Antarctic scientific
expedition and the report of the Ozone Trends Panel in early
1988, confirmed the chlorine monoxide theory. Yet the
Montreal Protocol was opened for signature a month before the
expedition was completed and six months before the Ozone
Trends Panel Report. There was international action, then,
notwithstanding the scientific uncertainty.
Haas argues that epistemic corrununities7 were
influential in overcoming scientific uncertainty in the
negotiation of the Montreal Protocol. 818
 He states that the
epistemic community of atmospheric scientists led the way
toward an agreement on ozone by disseminating information
suggesting the need for regulation of CFCs, and also was able
to pinpoint the objectives of the key country, the United
States, which provided the largest market for CFCs and could
thus curtail access to other producers. 8
	According to Haas,
the members of this transnational epistemic community of
ThSee supra, Chapter 1, n. 84.
811 5ee, supra, Chapter 4, Section 4.1.1.2, Overcoming
Scientific Uncertainty.
818 Peter M.
	 Haas,	 "Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic
Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control,"
International Organization, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Summer 1989), pp.
402-403. Haas states that epistemic communities were
influential as well in the Mediterranean Action Plans and the
European acid rain policies. See also Haas, Saving the
Mediterranean: The Politics of International Environmental
Cooperation (NY: Columbia University Press, 1990) and Haas,
"Obtaining International Environmental Protection Through
Epistemic Consensus," Millennium: Journal of International
Studies, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 347-363.
Haas, "Epistemic Consensus," supra, n. 818, p. 354.
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atmospheric scientists:
accepted the Rowland-Molina hypothesis [on ozone
depletion], developed models to elaborate it and began
monitoring for actual ozone depletion, while also
publicly supporting policies that would ban CFCs.
they advocated anticipatory action. . . this group had
members throughout the world.... in frequent contact with
one another.. P820
The formation within the United States of an epistemic
scientific community as opposed to other states may be
partially attributed to the lack of an equivalent (at the
time) in Europe to the NASA research and satellite-monitoring
initiatives concerning the ozone layer, which helped to unify
US scientific opinion. In May 1988, 20 leading European
scientists addressed a statement to the EC Community noting
that the gap between the United States and Europe in
stratospheric sciences was widening. 82 ' In countries other
than the United States, then, the influence of the epistemic
community came later, after the Montreal Protocol.822
Regardless of how long the international epistemic
community took to develop, however, it was important for
creating stronger obligations within the regime. This can be
seen from the twice-amended Protocol, which expanded greatly
on the obligations required of parties. This could not have
been accomplished if only the United States were justifying
820 1bid., p. 356.
821 Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, supra, n. 762, p. 29.
822 For example, Benedick states that in the UK, support
did not develop until September 1988 , when then-Prime
Minister Thatcher spoke to the Royal Society calling for
immediate action regarding ozone depletion. Ibid., p. 114.
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the measures.	 Further evidence that the ozone layer was
depleting rapid1y
	 no doubt helped make the task of the
epistemic community easier in Copenhagen. Cognitive
expectations or knowledge concerning scientific uncertainty
concerning ozone layer depletion has coalesced, leading to the
creation of shared or normative expectations.
5.3.2	 Economic Uncertainty
The uncertainty associated with the economic cost of CFC
replacement is another critical issue in the ozone layer
depletion regime. If replacements or alternative
technologies had proved too costly or even impossible, the
agreement at Copenhagen would never have occurred.
The Toronto GroupR2s noted that American industry had
demonstrated that alternatives to CFC propellants were
technically and economically feasible. 826
 By 1986, an
official of the largest US CFC producer, DuPont, stated that
CFC substitutes could be available by 1991.827 Prior to that
time, there had been little motivation for industry to
maintain this position, 928
 and most CFC producers had argued
that scientific evidence was too inconclusive to warrant
923 See, infra, this Chapter, Section 5.3.3, Development
Uncertainty, for the role of developing states at the London
Meeting.
824 See, supra, Chapter 1, n. 85.
82 'See, supra, n. 765.
826 5ee Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, supra, n. 762, p. 42.
82 See Parson, "Protecting the Ozone Layer," supra, n.
763, p. 41.
In 1986, DuPont had stated that it had ceased research
into alternatives for nonaerosol CFC uses 5 years earlier.
See, Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, supra, n. 762, p. 33.
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regu1ation.	 But, in 1987, the Montreal Protocol provided
the necessary incentive for industry to develop alternatives
to ozone depleting substances. 8 '	 With CFCs now being
phased-out, replacement technology was necessary.
The outlook for replacements changed dramatically in 1988
when DuPont, the largest producer of CFCs, announced that it
would begin to phase out its production. 83' The 1990 London
Revisions 632
 requiring CFCs, halons and carbon tetrachloride
to be phased out by 2000 and methylchloroform by 2005 brought
on a new sense of urgency for replacements.
In 1991, the Technology and Assessment Panel established
under the Montreal Protocol 833
 stated that it was technically
feasible to phaseout CFCs and halons by 1995-1997 and that
"innovation to replace CFCs has been rapid, effective and
economical," and that the "most important barriers to the
successful transfer of ... replacing technologies are more
likely to be informational, organisational and financial
rather than political, technical or economic."814
829See, Arjun Makihijani, Amanda Bickel and Annie
Makihijani, "Still Working on the Ozone Hole: Beyond the
Montreal Protocol," Technology Review Vol. 93, No. 4 (May-June
1990), pp. 52-59.
830See, Peter Morrisette, "The Evolution of Policy
Responses to Stratospheric Ozone Depletion," Natural Resources
Journal Vol. 29, No. 3 (Winter 1989), p. 818.
83tMakihijani et al, "Ozone Hole," supra, n. 829, p. 55.
832See, supra, n. 760.
833Art. 6, supra, n. 760.
8'Montreal Protocol 1991 Assessment: Report of the
Technology and Economic Assessment Panel, 1991 Assessment
(Nairobi: UNEP, December 1991), pp. 12(1), ES-4.
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The Fourth Meeting of the Parties 83
 reported that
elimination costs had become much lower than had been
predicted in 1989 and it was technically and economically
feasible to phase out CFCs, methyl chloroform and carbon
tetrachloride between 1995 and 1997, and halons by l995.
More importantly, industry has demonstrated that it can
substitute replacements or alternative technologies for ozone
depleting substances. Recently, Hewlett-Packard, an
international manufacturer of measurement and computation
products and systems used in industry, science, medicine and
education, announced that it had eliminated use of CFCs in its
manufacturing processes worldwide.' It also announced it
had eliminated all uses of methyl chloroform. Compaq Computer
Corporation, a world leader in the manufacture of personal
computers, also announced that it had eliminated CFCs from its
manufacturing processes. 838
 In addition, the German Company
DKK recently announced that it had developed a refrigerator
using propane and butane, instead of ozone depleting CFCs and
835 See, supra, p. 760.
6 Fourth Meetin g of the Parties, supra, n. 760, Synthesis
Report of the Assessment Panel, p. 6. The report also
predicted that methyl bromide emissions could be significantly
reduced through substitution, improved management practices an
containment and recovery. See also, Department of Trade and
Industry, CFCs and Halons: Alternatives and the Scope for
Recovery for Recycling and Destruction (London: HMSO, 1990).
837 See, "Hewlett-Packard Eliminates CFCs," Business Wire,
20 May 1993, Compuserve 1455. The alternatives include water-
based cleaners and a "no-clean" process using non-corrosive
materials that do not have to be cleaned off. Hewlett-Packard
spent four years and over $60 million developing its ozone-
friendly substitutes.
838 See, "Compaq Computer Eliminates CFCs," Business Wire,
18 May 1993, 1231 Compuserve. Compaq is using "no clean"
alternatives as well.
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HCFCs.
Thus, cognitive expectations or knowledge concerning
economic uncertainty regarding CFC replacement costs have
coalesced and contributed to the acceleration of the phase-out
of ozone depleting substances. 84° The progression from
Vienna to Montreal to London to Copenhagen has resulted in the
phase-out of CFC5 from a general intention to undertake a
phase-out, to an actual phase-out by 1996.84!	 In addition,
other substances have been added to the controlled list,'342
including HCFCs, the principle substitute for CFCs.'34
 As
more replacements become available and economically feasible,
more substances will also be phased out.844
'3 '3 See, Greenpeace Press Release, "Ozone-Friendly Fridge
Breakthrough As Antarctic Ozone Hole Worsens," Compuserve, 30
September 1992.
440 1n addition, the amended Protocol allows for the
transfer of production allowances to another party, in effect,
allowing for tradeable permits, providing for greater economic
efficiency. London Revisions, supra, n. 760, Art. 2(5).
84t See, supra, this Chapter, Section 5.1, International
Action Regarding Ozone Layer Depletion.
'3421b1d.
'343 See, Friends of the Earth, Funding Change: Developing
Countries and the Montreal Protocol (London: FOE, 1990). See,
also, Greenpeace International, "HCFCs: An Unacceptable
Solution," Compuserve, December 1992.
844 Particularly when industry sees economic benefits in
doing so. As evidence of this, market investment in a US
chemical manufacturing firm has risen since the company,
American Pacific Corp., acquired the option to buy the global
rights to "Halotran," a fire-extinguishing chemical designed
to replace the ozone-depleting halons. See, Diana B.
Henriques, "They Hope To Cash In By Fixing the Ozone Hole,"
International Herald Tribune, 15 June 1992, p. 11.
The list of alternatives and possible alternatives for
all ozone depleting substances is too long to be described
here. For a general overview, see, K.M. Sarma, "Protection of
the Ozone Layer: Technology Development and Transfer,"
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5.3.3	 Development Uncertainty
Developing states, concerned that a ban on ozone
depleting substances would threaten their economic
development, have become a force to be reckoned with in the
ozone layer depletion regime. During the negotiations for
strengthening the Montreal Protocol, "most observers were...
unprepared for the intensity of concerns subsequently
expressed by many developing countries despite [the earlier]
concession [of the 10 year transitional period for CFC use
accorded under the Protocol]." 845
 The industrialised
countries' push for a total phase-out of CFCs convinced the
developing states that they would have to acquire new
technology as soon as possible and to ensure that the
industrialised world would help them in doing so.
Although delegates from industrialised states alluded to
"environmental blackmail," 847
 a stalemate was avoided with
the agreement that parties will "take every practicable step"
(Nairobi: UNEP Ozone Secretariat, May 1993), where the latest
status of alternative chemicals and processes is indicated.
CFC alternatives for aerosols are for the most part available,
as are alternatives for CFCs used in foams and where CFCs and
methyl chloroform are used as solvent cleaning agents. There
are at present no direct substitutes for halons used for fire-
fighting. See, Malcolm W. Browne, "As Halon Ban Nears
Researchers Seek a New Miracle Firefighter," New York Times,
15 December 1992, p. C4. Possible HCFC replacements in
refrigerants and cooling were described above, supra, n. 939.
See, also, Greenpeace, Climbing Out of the Ozone Hole: A
Preliminary Survey of Alternatives to Ozone Depleting
Substances (October 1992) and Making the Ri ght Choice For the
Ozone Layer (September 1992), as well as the Report of the
Technology and Economic Assessment Panel, supra, n. 834.
845Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, supra, n. 762, p. 148.
8461bid.
841 1bid., p. 189.
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to transfer technology to developing states "under fair and
most favourable conditions. "" In addition, concessions
were made to give developing states more time to switch from
CFC use to substitutes and a fund was set up to make the
transition less economically painful." 9
	These incentives
were seen as necessary to entice countries such as China and
India to accede to the Protoco1. Without ratification and
implementation by developing states, the Montreal Protocol
will be of little value and its provisions rendered relatively
useless. Thus, recognition that the Multilateral Fund was
vital for the elimination of controlled substances in
developing states was stressed again at the Fourth Meeting of
the Parties in Copenhagen. 52
	It should be pointed out,
48 London Revisions, Article 1OA, supra, n. 760.
849 1bid., Art. 5 and see, supra, this Chapter, Section
5.1, International Action Regarding Ozone Layer Depletion.
50 See, Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, supra, n. 762,
especially Chapter 12, "The South Claims A Role."
851 Thus, at the Copenhagen meeting, Lang notes that the
extension of control had to be balanced by new concessions in
favour of developing states. "Ozone Layer," supra, n. 782, p.
226.
Both China and India are now Parties to the Protocol as
well as the London Amendment. In addition, Mexico has stated
that it would phase out CFCs by 2000, ahead of the schedule
required for developing countries, utilising the Multilateral
Fund for its transition. American Society of International
Law, "CFCs," International Environmental Law Interest Group
Newsletter, Vol. 2, No. 1 (August 1991), p. 3. It was agreed
at the time of the implementation of the Multilateral Fund
that the dollar amount would be increased by $40 million when
China ratified and $40 million when India did so.
652 Fourth Meeting of the Parties, supra, n. 760, Report of
the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Interim
Multilateral Fund, p. 6. There was also concern expressed by
parties not operating under article 5 status as developing
states, that they were encountering serious, but hopefully
transitory economic difficulties due to their economies being
in transition. These particular states regretted that the
Parties "appeared unwilling to recognise the existence of a
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however, that the size of monetary transfer under the Protocol
is relatively small and that controls do not place an undue
burden on any of the industrialised states. Nevertheless,
cognitive expectations regarding development have evolved
within the ozone layer depletion regime, leading to normative
or shared expectations facilitating the inclusion of
developing states.
5.4 Catalysts in the Ozone Layer Depletion Regime
The catalysts of leadership, international non-state
actors, crisis and domestic regulations all contributed to the
formation and/or the maintenance of the ozone layer
regime.854
5.4.1	 Leadership
The United States played a leadership role in the
formation and maintenance of the ozone layer depletion regime.
While Europe debated the wisdom of regulating ozone depleting
third group of countries-those with economies in transition-as
well as the two established groups of developed and developing
countries." Statements, p. 11. The regime will need to take
account of these states for successful implementation.
See, also, Report of the Technology and Economic
Assessment Panel, supra, n. 834, Chapter 6.
853Anil Markandya, "Economics and the Ozone Layer," in
David Pearce, et al, Blueprint 2 (London: Earthscan
Publications Ltd, 1991), pp. 72-23. In addition, eventual non-
compliance is an "economic proposition only in a country with
a large internal or external non-Party market for CFC
consumption." See, Alice Enders and Amelia Forges, "Successful
Conventions and Conventional Success: Saving The Ozone Layer,"
in The Greening of World Trade Issues, ed. Kym Anderson and
Richard Blackhurst (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), p.
140.
84 See supra, Chapter 4, for a general discussion of the
regime catalysts.
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CFCs, it is generally undisputed that the United States was a
leader on the issue. This was due in part to the domestic
regulations that the United States was required to enact under
the US Clean Air Act,6 6 but the United States was
nonetheless taking the lead for international regulations.
One observer notes, however, that even the United States'
leadership "was highly uneven," since US support was
threatened at various stages of the regime development. This
included "the last-minute attempt by State Department
officials to reject the 1985 Convention; the counterattack
through the (US) Domestic Policy Council in spring 1987 (to
attempt to reconsider the US negotiating position calling for
international regulation of CFCs); and the Spring 1990
attempt, originating in the office of White House Chief of
Staff John Sununu, to scuttle the delicate negotiations on a
financial	 agreement	 (the	 Multilateral	 Fund)."85
Nevertheless, the overall US commitment has contributed to the
formation and the development of the regime. The recent
change to the perceived "environmentally friendly" US Clinton
Administration may help perpetuate this leadership.
Eventually the developing states, particularly China and
India, created their own leadership role regarding funding and
technology transfer in the negotiations for adjustments and
855 See, Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, esp. Chapter 3, supra,
n. 762, and Roan, Ozone Crisis, supra, esp. Chapter 7, n. 764.
856 US Clean Air Act, 42 USC 7457(b). See Benedick, Ozone
Diplomacy, supra, n. 762, pp. 23-24. See. also, infra, this
Chapter, Section 5.4.3, Domestic Regulations. This type of
leadership, then, evolved more from what Young refers to as
"skilful negotiation" than from the type based on
"intellectual contributions." See, supra, Chapter 4, Section
4.2.1, Leadership.
Parson, "Protecting the Ozone Layer," supra, n. 763, p.
70.
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amendments to the Protocol. At Copenhagen, developing
states, heavily dependent on the use methyl bromide, kept the
substance from being phased-out.9
5.4.2	 International Non-state Actors
The role of UNEP as a catalyst in the formation and
maintenance of the ozone layer depletion regime is
significant. UNEP's Governing Council selected ozone layer
depletion as one of five priority areas in 1976, and in 1977
adopted the World Plan of Action on the Ozone Layer 8 '°
 The
chief US diplomat to the treaty negotiations stated that:
"UNEP was indispensable in mobilising data and informing world
public opinion. . . the strong personality of its executive
director, Mostafa Tolba. . .was a driving force in achieving the
eventual consensus (for international regulation)."86'
The World Bank is also a catalyst for further development
of the ozone layer depletion regime. Although the policies of
858 See Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, supra, n. 762, pp. 188-
189, 196, in particular, quoting India's environment minister
at the London meetings to revise the Protocol, Maneka Gandhi,
as demanding of the developed world: "Either you [sell us] the
technology or you change your laws or you change your patent
rights... Start working on it." Ibid., p. 189. See also,
Nicholas Schoon, "Ozone Destruction Conference Faces Division
Over Aid," Independent, 28 June 1990 and Nicholas Schoon,
"Deal To Save Ozone Layer Agreed," Independent, 30 June 1990,
p. 1.
859 See, Rowlands, "Copenhagen Meeting," supra, n. 800, pp.
2-3. A resolution calling for its eventual phaseout was
adopted, although a phaseout is not expected of Art. 5
Parties. See, supra, n. 801.
86 Gareth Porter and Janet Welsh Brown, Global
Environmental Politics (Boulder, CD: Westview Press, 1991), p.
48, and supra, p. 169.
86t Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, supra, n. 762, p. 6.
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the Bank are often criticised, 4
 it still plays a major role
in environmental lending. In the fiscal year 1991, the annual
volume of World Bank lending for environmental projects had
increased to $1.6 billion, or approximately 7% of total Bank
funding. In addition, the Bank is one of the primary
operators of the Montreal Protocol Multilateral Fund,' 4
 as
well	 as	 the	 Global	 Environmental	 Facility	 (GEF).'
Notwithstanding developing states' opposition, the status of
the Bank as a financially healthy and stable lending
institution, in addition to its tangible role in the
Multilateral Fund and the GEF, makes it a catalyst in the
development of the ozone layer depletion regime.
Non-governmental organisations have also played a role in
the formation and maintenance of the ozone layer depletion
regime. One such organisation, the Natural Resources Defense
Council, lobbied successfully in the United States for the
banning of CFCs from aerosols in 1978, and later brought legal
action against the US EPA that forced the EPA to implement CFC
regulations under provisions of the Clean Air Act.4b6
Following the Montreal Protocol, Friends of the Earth
82 See,	 supra,	 Chapter	 4,	 Section	 4.2.2.1,
International/Intergovernmental Organisations.
3 Kenneth Piddington, "The Role of the World Bank," in
The International Politics of the Environment, ed. Andrew
Hurrell and Benedict Kingsbury (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1992), p. 225.
864 See, supra, this Chapter, Section 5.1, International
Action Regarding Ozone Layer Depletion.
36sSee supra, Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2.1,
International/Intergovernmental Organisations and infra,
Chapter 6, Section 6.1, International Action Regarding Climate
Change.
Porter and Brown, Global Environmental Politics, supra,
n. 860, p. 60. See also, Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, supra, n.
762, p. 28, and Roan, Ozone Crisis, supra, n. 764, p. 113.
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International (FOEI) made ozone layer depletion its number one
priority, and their national affiliates played a large role in
lobbying governments and industries to support the banning of
CFCs and thus strengthened the regime.1
Transnational organisations can also act as catalysts.
The announcements of Hewlett-Packard and Compaq discussed
above played such a role in the development of the ozone
layer depletion regime. The creation of global business
organizations such as the Industry Cooperative for Ozone Layer
Protection, which provides information for the facilitation of
CFC alternatives by electronic firms, is another example of
industry enhancing the development of the regime.9
5.4.3	 Domestic Regulations
In 1986, the CFC industry in the United States began to
lobby for an international agreement, as it expected the
forthcoming Protocol to the Vienna Convention to be weaker
7 Porter and Brown, supra, n. 860, pp. 60-61. During the
second meeting of the parties to the Protocol in 1990, FOE,
along with Greenpeace, advised Australia and Norway, who were
pressing for a 1997 phase-out date of CFCs, pp. 61-62.
68 See, supra, this Chapter, Section 5.3.2, Economic
Uncertainty.
869'rhe ICOLP was formed by two commercial rivals, AT&T and
Northern Telecom (Canada), and a government agency, the US
EPA, which is often in an adversarial position with private
business. The organisation's membership includes the Japan
Electrical Manufacturers Association, the State Institute of
Applied Industry (from the former USSR) and the US Air Force.
Braden Allenby, "Achieving Sustainable Development Through
Industrial Ecology," International Environmental Affairs Vol.
4, No. 1 (Winter 1992), p. 68, fn 23.
The Alliance for Responsible CFC Policy and the Alliance
for Sound Atmospheric Policy are two other industry alliances.
Both located in Arlington, Virginia, they are coalitions of
companies designed to develop responsible environmental
policies for business and government.
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than the expected US rules brought under the Clean Air
Act. On the other hand, a too-weak international
agreement might have forced the EPA to regulate unilaterally,
again mandated by the Clean Air Act. American industry
feared US unilateral controls would undercut their
competitiveness, 72
 although it would be fair to say
unilateral regulations were a concern of all industry. The
result was an international Protocol that prevented the US
from having to act unilaterally under the Clean Air Act. In
addition, many states have adopted regulations that are more
stringent than the Montreal Protocol.A73	 Thus, these
domestic regulations are catalysing the regime development.
5.4.4	 Crisis
The threat to human health arising from ozone depletion
was a definite catalyst for the formation and the maintenance
of the ozone layer depletion regime. 814
 Rowland and Molina's
1974 paper linking CFCs with ozone layer depletion brought the
problem to light, pointing out the link between increased TJV
light and possible skin cancer. 75
 Less than 10 years later,
870 Porter and Brown, Global Environmental Politics, supra,
n. 860, p. 66. The Clean Air Act authorized the EPA
administrator to regulate "any substance... which in his
judgment may reasonably be anticipated to affect the
stratosphere, especially ozone in the stratosphere, if such
effect may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health
or welfare."
871 Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, supra, n. 762, p. 66.
872 1bid., p. 64.
873 See, Report of the Technical and Economic Assessment
Panel, supra, n. 834, Annex D.
874 See, for instance, Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, supra, n.
762, esp. Chapter 9, and Roan, Ozone Crisis, supra, n. 764.
67 See, supra, Chapter 1, n. 79.
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the Vienna Convention was signed. The "ozone hole" presented
tangible evidence of a crisis and was followed two years later
by the Montreal Protocol.' The Antarctic Expedition and
the Ozone Trends Panel confirming the link between chlorine
monoxide and ozone layer depletion preceded the amending of
the Protocol in 1990.817 By April 1991, the ozone depletion
over the US was found to have amounted to 4.5 to 5% in the
last decade, prompting the US EPA chief William Reilly to
state: "[i]t is unexpected, it is disturbing and it possesses
implications we have not yet had time to fully explore."'
The headlines ran "Bad News From Above," and "A Bigger Hole
In The Ozone: EPA Predicts 200,000 More Skin-Cancer
Deaths." 879
 A year later, NASA detected levels of chlorine
monoxide (endproducts of CFC5 which destroy ozone) over the
Arctic 50% higher than that previously seen in Antarctica,
creating a radiation risk for populated areas of the Northern
Hemisphere. 8 "°
	The Protocol was again amended shortly
after. 88 ' Evidence in early 1993 of an even greater amount
816See, supra, this Chapter, Section 5.1, International
Action Regarding Ozone Layer Depletion and supra, Chapter 1,
n. 83.
871 5ee, supra, this Chapter, Section 5.1, International
Action Regarding Ozone Layer Depletion, and supra, Chapter 1,
n. 84.
878William K. Stevens, "Ozone Loss Over US Is Found To Be
Twice As Bad As Predicted," New York Times, 5 April 1991, pp.
Al and Dl8.
879 See, Tom Wicker, "Bad News From Above," New York Times,
10 April 1991, p. A25, and "A Bigger Hole In the Ozone: EPA
Predicts 200,000 More Skin-Cancer Deaths," Newsweek, 15 April
1991, p. 64.
880 5ee, supra, Chapter 1, n. 88, and supra, this Chapter,
Sec. 5.1, International Action Regarding Ozone Layer
Depletion.
88 'See, supra, this Chapter, Section 5.1, International
Action Regarding Ozone Layer Depletion.
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of ozone layer depletion points towards even further adjusting
and amending of the Protocol. The sense of crisis, then, has
preceded the formation as well as each stage of further
development of the regime.
5.5 Compliance in the Ozone Layer Depletion Regime
The ozone regime is a good example of how compliance can
be brought about through regimes, through the process of norm
and rule evolution, dispute settlement procedure,
accountability and transparency, and conditional cooperation
and exclusion.
The evolution of norms and rules is demonstrated by the
latest commitment to eliminating CFCs, the Copenhagen
Revisions. 2
 Tracing the development of the regime from the
Ad Hoc Meeting of Experts attempting to bring about a
framework convention, to the Convention, to the addition of
the Protocol and its subsequent amendments, illustrates the
process of rule evolution, or the shaping of cognitive
expectations leading to shared or normative expectations
regarding future behaviour.883
In addition to dispute settlement procedures included in
the Vienna Ozone Convention, non-compliance procedures are
provided for within the Montreal Protocol through an
Implementation Committee to resolve disputes.' 4 The
Implementation Committee had tested the draft non-compliance
procedure over a period of two years and found it to be "both
2Ibid.
8 See, supra, Chapter 3, Section 3.4, Maintenance or
Development of Regimes.
4 See, supra, this Chapter, Section 5.1, International
Action Regarding Ozone Layer Depletion.
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efficient and appropriate for supporting its work."
Accountability and transparency is maintained within the
ozone regime by reporting requirements and set targets.6
While some developing states still appear to have serious
problems in fulfilling data-reporting requirements, the Ad Hoc
Group of Experts on the Reporting of Data had identified
several technical and administrative problems and possible
solutions. 887
 In addition, the parties noted in a decision
that all the states that did report data either met or
exceeded their obligations for control measures.888
The regime also excludes non-parties through trade
bans, 889
 although non-parties complying with the relevant
provisions of the Protocol are exempt from trade bans on an
interim basis, with a final decision to be made at the Fifth
Meeting of the Parties. 89° The adjusted Protocol sets trade
barriers for controlled substances, products containing
controlled substances and products made with controlled
885 See Fourth Meetin g of the Parties, supra, n. 760,
Report of the Implementation Committee, p. 7. See, also,
Martti Koskenniemi, "Breach of Treaty or Non-Compliance?
Reflections on the Enforcement of the Montreal Protocol,"
Yearbook of International Environmental Law Vol. 3 (1992), pp.
123-162.
886Montreal Protocol, supra, n. 760, Arts. 2, 7.
887 Fourth Meeting of the Parties, supra, n. 760, p. 8.
888 1bid., Decision IV/9, p. 15. But see Lang, "Ozone
Layer," supra, n. 782, who states that "among developing
countries, CFC use presents a rather mixed picture."
889Montreal Protocol, Art. 4, supra, n. 760.
See, Fourth Meeting of the Parties, supra, n. 760,
Decision IV/17 C, p. 19.
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substances. Imports and exports of controlled substances
and imports of products containing controlled substances will
all eventually be banned, but products produced with, but not
containing, controlled substances, will only be subject to an
import ban should the Parties consider it "feasible."
5.6 The Legal Status of the Ozone Layer Depletion Regime
The present legal status of the ozone layer depletion
regime is not in dispute. The Vienna Convention and amended
Montreal Protocol, as international treaties, qualify as
binding international law.
Formation of the regime and creation of a legal
obligation, however, can be traced to an earlier stage in the
regime, where shared expectations are perceived as
authoritative and effective, thus creating a legal obligation
so far as the policy-oriented school of international law is
concerned. 93
 In the ozone layer depletion regime, these
shared expectations can be said to have existed from the time
of the negotiations for international regulations, or, more
precisely, at the creation of the Ad Hoc Meeting of Experts
for the preparation of a convention, from which evolved the
Vienna Ozone Convention.
	 At that point in time, shared
expectations existed regarding states' obligation to protect
B9hlbid. The Protocol provides for trade bans, not
sanctions, since they are not "penalties or restrictions on
products other than ozone-depleting chemicals or products
containing CFCs." See, Enders and Porges, "Successful
Conventions," supra, n. 853, p. 140. See also, supra, Chapter
3, Section 3.6.4, Conditional Cooperation and Exclusion.
R9lFourth Meeting of the Parties, supra, n. 760, Article
4(4). Lang, "Ozone Layer," supra, n. 782, p. 226.
See, supra, Chapter 3, Section 3.3, Formation of
Regimes.
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the ozone layer, with the expectation also of future
regulatory measures of an undetermined degree.
The legal obligation attested to above can be illustrated
through the policy-oriented approach to lawmaking; or the
prescribing of policy as a process of communication. This was
described earlier as requiring an examination of the:
participants, subjectivities and objectives, situations or
arenas, resources, strategies, and outcome in terms of shared
expectations .
5.6.1 Participants
The participants in the formation of the ozone layer
depletion regime included the major CFC producers and users,
as well as international organisations (UNEP), NGOs
(Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth). 8 ' 5
 These participants,
acting in their official capacity, were all involved in the
prescriptive process, described above.89
The extent to which the state participants represented
the target audience is also important in adding to the
participants' authority, as it is the expectations of the
target audience that are crucial in 1awmaking. 1
 As
outlined above regarding international action on ozone layer
depletion, the target audience of the leading CFC producers
and consumers, namely the United States and the European
4 See, supra, Chapter 2, Section 2.3, Policy-Oriented
Lawmaking.
See, supra, this chapter, Sec. 5.1, International
Action Regarding Ozone Layer Depletion.
96 See, supra, Chapter 2, Section 2.3, Policy-Oriented
Lawmaking,
7Ibid.
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Community, were participants in the process of prescription.
This can be traced at least as far back as the first
significant international initiative on ozone layer depletion,
the 1977 UNEP Meeting of Experts in Washington DC, where the
World Plan of Action on the Ozone Layer was drafted.
Unilateral action to ban CFC use in aerosol propellants was
taken by the United States, the EC and others, between 1978
and 198l. These states also partook in the Ad Hoc Working
Group for the Protection of the Ozone Layer.°°
In addition to states, UNEP also played a large role in
the formation of the regime and the prescriptive process. The
Meeting of Experts, as well as the Ad Hoc Working Group, were
both coordinated by UNEP.°' NGO's such as Friends of the
Earth and the Natural Resources Defense Council also
contributed as participants.902
Since the creation of shared expectations regarding the
obligation to protect the ozone layer, developing states have
begun to play a large role as participants in the regime.°3
In addition, other organisations have begun to take on the
role of participants, particularly the World Bank and
898 See, supra, this Chapter, Section 5.1, International
Action Regarding Ozone Layer Depletion.
8991bid.
9001bid.
901 1bid., see also, supra, this Chapter, Section 5.4.2,
International Non-state Actors.
° 2See, supra, this Chapter, Section 5.4.2, International
Non-state Actors.
° 3 See, supra, this Chapter, Section 5.3.3, Development
Uncertainty.
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transnational corporations.1
5.6.2 Subjectivities
As discussed above, ' the subjectivities or perceptions
of participants regarding the content of their communications,
cannot be directly examined but only analyzed on the basis of
past behaviour. With regard to the state participants, the
most important observations can be made with regard to their
domestic activities. Thus, the fact that the United States
banned CFC use in non-essential aerosol propellants by 1978,
followed by Canada, Norway and Sweden, is a telling sign of
these states subjectivities towards protection of the ozone
layer.° 6 The EC, while not establishing an outright ban,
did implement a 30% reduction in CFC aerosol use which took
effect in 1981.107
The actions outlined above take on even greater
significance, since CFC production is concentrated in a few
states. In the 1970s, the United States accounted for about
half of the world total, with most of the remaining production
taking place in the EC. 908 These states also took part in
the Ad Hoc Working Group for the Preparation of a Global
9041bid.
905 See, supra, Chapter 2, Sec. 2.3, Policy-Oriented
Lawmaking.
° 6 See, supra, this Chapter, Section 5.1, International
Action Regarding Ozone Layer Depletion.
°7Ibid.
908 Parson, "Protecting the Ozone Layer," supra, n. 763, p.
29.
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Framework Convention for the Protection of the Ozone
Layer, implying perceptions or expectations that the ozone
layer be protected, and the expectations of an unknown degree
of regulation of ozone depleting substances.
It is not difficult to ascertain the subjectivities of
t.JNEP. Their sponsorship of the 1977 Experts Meeting, which
drafted the World Plan of Action on the Ozone Layer,
illustrates UNEP's perception or expectation that the ozone
layer should be protected and further destruction be
prevented. Their sponsorship of the Ad Hoc Working Group to
prepare a convention underscores this expectation.
From the above, the subjectivities of the participants
clearly point to expectations that the ozone layer be
protected and that there be future regulation of ozone layer
depleting substances. Varied demands as to the extent of
future regulation does not detract from the general
expectation that the ozone layer be protected.
5.6.3 Situations
The situations where the above subjectivities were played
out were formal, institutionalised and organised international
conferences. Thus, the UNEP Experts Meeting, the CCOL and the
Ad Hoc Working Group were all organised (under the rubric of
UNEP) situations or participants to play out their attitudes
or subjectivities. Thus, the situation was not limited to a
geographical region, but was held in a global forum. Neither
was the situation a one-off gathering, but was of extended and
frequent duration.
' ° 9 Supra, this Chapter, Section 5.1, International Action
Regarding Ozone Layer Depletion.
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5.6.4 Resources or Bases of Power
The most important resources used by participants in the
ozone layer depletion prescriptive process included scientific
knowledge and skill. Thus, the Rowland-Molina hypothesis, as
well as other major scientific findings contributed to
scientific knowledge used by the participants. 91
 UNEP
attempted to utilise scientific skill through the workings of
the CCOL, which coordinated scientific research on the ozone
layer undertaken by national and international agencies. The
chemical industry also contributed their resources, through
sponsoring ozone research worth several million US dollars per
Eventually, economic and development knowledge would play
a larger role in the prescriptive process, as more substantive
regulation was advocated by participants. Thus, this
knowledge later contributed to the lawmaking process by
raising the level of shared expectations and therefore, the
level of regulation. 912
 At the beginning of the prescription
process, however, the scientific resources available were more
influential as bases of power.
5.6.5 Strategies
The strategies used to generate the flow of words and
behaviour by the main participants concerning ozone layer
9105ee, supra, Chapter 1, Section 1.2.2, Ozone Layer
Depletion, and this Chapter, Section 5.3.1, Scientific
Uncertainty.
911 Parsons, "Protecting the Ozone Layer," supra, n. 763,
pp. 35-36.
9t2 See, supra, this Chapter, Section 5.3, Maintenance of
the Ozone Layer Depletion Regime.
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depletion were explicit: domestic regulations and
international declarations. Thus, diplomatic strategies on
the international level were used in pursuit of the
participants	 objectives	 to	 shape	 expectations	 for
prescriptions.
In this respect, the flow of communication between
participants was formally incorporated in such documents as
the World Plan of Action on the Ozone Layer and draft control
articles such as those put forth by the Toronto Group and the
EC. All of these exhibited attitudes towards regulation.
The World Plan in particular reveals this attitude, as the
measures adopted in the Vienna Ozone Convention were all
contained in the Plan.914
As with, resources, economic strategies in terms of
replacement technology were used later in the prescriptive
process, once the basic obligation was in place. From that
point, economic strategies were utilised to further more
substantive regulations.915
5.6.6 Outcome
The outcome of the above ongoing process of interaction
is a prescription entailing a legal obligation (under the
policy-oriented approach) to protect the ozone layer, with
additional expectations of future regulations of an unknown
' See, supra, this Chapter, Section 5.1, International
Action Regarding Ozone Layer Depletion.
414 Except for the dispute resolution process, and the
voting status and competency of the EC. See, Parsons,
"Protecting the Ozone Layer," supra, n. 763, p. 39.
11 See, supra, this Chapter, Section 5.3.2, Economic
UnCertainty.
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degree. While admittedly, the obligation identified is vague,
it must be remembered that many rules and principles of
international law are vague, such as the general principle to
prevent harm to the environment described earlier. The
important point to remember is that these vague rules may
develop into more substantive regulations, depending on the
intensity of shared expectations regarding future behaviour.
Until the Vienna Ozone Convention came into force, the
prescription could not be said to qualify as a treaty. Thus,
the prescription must have qualified as a customary rule of
international law. This entails determining what shared
expectations of future behaviour have been created through an
ongoing process of interaction involving policy, authority and
control.
The critical test regarding legal obligation under the
policy-oriented approach is the existence and content of the
shared expectations of politically relevant groups, that are
maintained by the continuation of communication regarding the
authority and control intentions of those whose support is
essential for the norms' efficacy. If the target audience
will perceive behaviour as authoritative state practice and
likely to be complied with, then it can be characterized as
practice accepted as law. 916 The test in brief is one of
shared expectations regarding authority (legitimacy) and
control (effectiveness) as perceived by the relevant target
audience, which in this case as stated above, are the state
participants.
From the prescriptive process above, a policy to protect
the ozone layer can be identified. 	 This is clear from both
9t6 See, supra, Chapter 2, Section 2.3, Policy-Oriented
Lawmaking.
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individual states' efforts to regulate CFC use, as well as the
group participant effort to agree to negotiate a Convention.
While the degree of intensity of the policy was not yet clear
at the formation of the regime, it is difficult to dispute
that the actions taken did not reflect a policy to protect the
ozone layer.
The expectation that the ozone layer was to be protected
needed to be (and continues to need to be) sustained through
an ongoing authority signal and control intention.
The prescriber participants qualify as legitimate in the
sense that they are authoritative. It is difficult to dispute
the authority present in the formation of the ozone layer
depletion regime. The individuals involved acted in an
official capacity for the states they represented, as did the
individuals associated with international and non-governmental
organisations. Of course, states play the most authoritative
role and so their actions are the most important. Indeed, it
is states who played the largest role, imposing domestic
regulations regarding CFC production and agreeing to negotiate
a Convention to protect the ozone layer. The fact that these
states represent the principal participants among the target
audience is important, since it is the expectations of the
target audience that are critical to policy-oriented
lawmaking.
Finally, a control or effectiveness intention can be
ascertained from the willingness of the prescriber
participants to make the prescription effective. Control does
not require unanimity or even wide consensus, but does require
enough interest and willingness on the part of some
participants to make it effective. Clearly, in the case of
ozone layer depletion there was interest on the part of the
major CFC producing states to make a regulatory policy
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effective. This can be seen through the intent of the Ad Hoc
Committee, composed of those states, to negotiate a convention
to protect the ozone layer.
Thus, the behaviour or practice of the participants was
perceived by the participants as both authoritative
(legitimate) and as controlling (effective) or likely to be
complied with. While admittedly the authority signal and
control intention were both weak at formation, they were
present at a degree sufficient for the policy content
entailing a general obligation to protect the ozone layer.
The legal obligation to protect the ozone layer can be
characterized as practice accepted as law, thus fulfilling the
requirements of the formation of customary law, 917
 at least
from the policy-oriented perspective of lawmaking.
It is important to remember that while "it is often
difficult to determine whether or not a new custom has
crystallized into international 1aw,t9lB it is equally
important to try. If one views law as a policy process based
on shared expectations, then the point at which these shared
expectations can be identified is critical. While the
approach here may not be accepted by those not aligned with
the policy-oriented school, it is difficult to ignore that the
shared expectations to protect the ozone layer necessarily had
to be in place for the Vienna Ozone Convention and the ensuing
Montreal Protocol to evolve. Combined with authority and
control, the existence of this policy equates with lawmaking
under the policy-oriented approach.
While admittedly it is easier to make the argument that
°' 7 See, supra, Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2, Customary Law.
8 Patricia W. Birnie & Alan E. Boyle, International Law
& the Environment (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 15.
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the formation of the regime coincided with the creation of the
Vienna Ozone Convention, making the more difficult argument
that the regime was formed prior to that Convention allows for
a broader understanding of the legal order. Such an argument
does not ignore the legitimate process of lawmaking, but it
does necessitate taking the perspective of the policy-oriented
approach. Without this perspective, regime theory is still
useful to the legal scholar, but unnecessarily restricts the
study of law by excluding part of the lawmaking process.
5.7 An Evaluation of the Ozone Layer Depletion Regime
A positive evaluation of the ozone layer depletion regime
is not difficult to make. The policy content, authority
signal and control intention at the time the ozone layer
depletion regime came into existence was admittedly weak. All
of these aspects have strengthened, however, since the
formation of the regime, making the law more substantive.
Thus, the general obligation to protect the ozone layer
created by the negotiating process was "firmed up" with the
signing of the Vienna Convention, and more substantive
obligations followed with the Montreal Protocol.
The development of this regime has been strengthened by
the evolution of cognitive expectations on certain critical
issues, which allowed for the evolution of normative or shared
expectations regarding future behaviour. In addition,
catalysts have aided this formation and development. Thus,
shared expectations have risen regarding regulation, and
authority and control have continued to be present. The
compliance mechanisms are also in place. While the legal
status of the regime is not in dispute, the regime created
legal obligations before a formal Convention had evolved.
The regime is, therefore, a good example of the role of
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regimes within the international legal order, as well as proof
of the evolutionary aspects of regimes. The lawmaking process
continues as the regime evolves. As a result, the regime can
include at any one time, regulations that are not binding
under international law as shared expectations may not yet be
present. It is important to remember that "states have the
will to protect the environment on their own terms and by the
methods preferred by them, under which they have some control
over the pace of regime change." 919
 For example, the London
revisions included HCFCs as "transitional substances," with a
resolution recommending restrictions on the use of HCFCs.
While this resolution did not harden into binding law until
the Copenhagen revisions, the obligation was placed on Parties
to use them with discretion and that they would be subject to
future control 920
Thus, while the present legal status of the ozone layer
depletion regime has evolved to a stage of treaty law, its
legal status in the early stages of the regime should not be
overlooked or denied. Indeed, it is that stage of the regime
that presents evidence of the important role of regimes within
the international legal order, revealing the presence of the
legal order long before it is usually recognised as existing
with regard to a specific issue-area. An analysis of the
climate change regime will now be undertaken for comparison.
9t9 Patricia Birnje, "International Environmental Law: Its
Adequacy For Present and Future Needs," in The International
Politics of the Environment, ed. Andrew Hurrell and Benedict
Kingsbury (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 84.
920 London Revisions to the Montreal Protocol, Annex VII,
supra, n. 760. Similarly, the methyl bromide resolution in the
Copenhagen adjustments is not "binding," but is proceeding
towards a phaseout of that substance, supra, n. 801.
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CHAPTER 6
ANALYSIS OF THE CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME
"One way or another we all fight for the things we believe
in. Doesn't that give us some common ground?"2'
In analysing the climate change regime, parallels between
it and the ozone layer depletion regime will become apparent,
but so also will differences, because of the greater degree of
scientific, economic and development uncertainty in the
climate change regime. This has prevented the development of
more substantive obligations. In that respect, however, the
role of regimes in the international legal order will be
underscored, since the present status of the present climate
change regime highlights the value of regimes often overlooked
in a more traditional view of international law.
6.1 International Action Regarding Climate Change
The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) was
opened for signature at the UN Conference on Environment and
Development in Rio de Janeiro, June 1992•g22 155 states
signed the FCCC, which is due to come into force 90 days after
the 50th instrument of ratification is deposited with the
UN.923
This Convention was negotiated in a relatively short
921 From Tom Clancy, The Cardinal of the Kremlin.
922 lnternational Legal Materials Vol.31, No. 4 (1992), pp.
849-873.
Art. 23. As of November 1993, 38 states had
deposited instruments of ratification. Sources: Treaty
Section, UN Legal Office, NY; Information Unit on Climate
Change, Geneva.
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period of time; it took less than two years from the date the
UN General Assembly Resolution 45/212 of December l99O24
established the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC)
to produce a framework convention on climate change, until the
Convention was opened for signature in June 1992.
The Convention followed on from the findings of key
scientific and policy-oriented conferences, the first
occurring in 1985. At that time, the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP), together with the World
Meteorological Organisation (WMO), and the International
Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU), a non-governmental
organisation, sponsored an international scientific conference
in Villach, Austria to examine climate change. 925 The
conference recommended that task forces be formed to examine
policy options concerning climate change, as some warming
appeared inevitable, the rate of which "could be profoundly
affected by government policies on energy conservation, on the
use of fossil fuels, and emission of some greenhouse
gases." 926
 This conference was followed-up by two workshops
in 1987, a science-oriented gathering held in Villach and the
other focusing on policy, held in Bellagio, Italy. 927	The
joint report recommended the development of a "costing
924 UN General Assembly Resolution 45/212, Resolutions and
Decisions adopted by the General Assembly durin g the First
Part of its 45th Session, UN Press Release GA/8165, p. 263.
925 See World Climate Programme Impact Studies, Developing
Policies for Responding to Climate Change (WMP/TD-No. 225),
April 1988.
9 ' 6 Environmental Law Institute, "Introduction by the
Environmental Law Institute", in Addressin g Global Climate
Change: the Emergence of a New World Order?, principal
authors, Alexandre Timoshenko and Nicholas Robinson
(Washington, DC: Environmental Law Institute, 1989), pp. 3-4.
927 See, Developing Policies for Responding to Climate
Change, supra, n. 925, , p. 1.
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framework" for comparison of the costs of differing policy
strategies and also suggested the setting of a maximum
temperature increase from global warming per decade.
The following year, more than 300 scientists and
policymakers from 46 countries, UN and other international
bodies, and non-governmental organisations gathered in Toronto
in June 1988, at the World Conference on the Changing
Atmosphere, sponsored by the government of Canada. 929
 The
Conference Statement warned that "[h]umanity is conducting an
unintended, uncontrolled, globally pervasive experiment whose
ultimate consequences could be second only to a global nuclear
war." 93° An "Action Plan for the Protection of the
Atmosphere", was called for, as well as a World Atmosphere
Fund to provide the financial resources to implement the
Action Plan. 93 '	 More specifically, the Action Plan called
for an international framework convention, national
legislation to protect the atmosphere as well as national
action plans to address climate change problems "at their
roots." 932
 Reference was also made to differentiated
responsibility, whereby developed states, being the main
source of greenhouse gas emissions, accordingly bear the main
92BEnvironmental Law Institute, "Introduction," supra, n.
926, p. 4. The suggested target rate of temperature increase
was 0.1 degree Celsius.
929 See, "Conference Statement" in Conference Proceedings,
The Chang ing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security,
(WMO/OMN-No. 710), p. 292.
9301bid.
93t Ibid. The Conference Statement also called for a 20%
reduction of 1988 level of carbon dioxide emissions by 2005.
Ibid., pp. 296-297.
932 1bid., pp. 296-299.
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responsibility for addressing climate change.433
The Legal Working Group of the Toronto Conference
recognised that, while there was an existing body of
international environmental law, it was relatively fragmented
and incomplete, thus possibly requiring the creation of "new
principles, rules and institutional frameworks."'4
Concerns over recognition of the atmosphere as a global
commons were raised by the Geopolitical Working Group, which
stressed that "sovereignty is not 'ceded', but 'pooled'"
within a commons; there are "rights of use", not property
rights; all have an equal responsibility to care for the
commons; and that "individual use is subject in principle to
common consent and decisions are by consensus."35
Following the Toronto Conference, in February 1989,
Canada again convened a Legal and Policy Experts Meeting in
Ottawa on the atmosphere, focusing on the legal and
institutional framework concerning the atmosphere and climate
change. 936
 The statement outlined elements for both a broad
9331bid.
934 "working Group Reports", Conference Proceedings, supra,
n. 929, p. 346. The Working Group advocated a framework
convention with additional protocols creating standards for
the protection of the atmosphere.
935 1bid., p. 334.
936 Protection of the Atmosphere: Statement of the Meeting
of Legal and Policy Experts, Ottawa, Canada, February 22,
1989, reprinted in "Selected Legal Materials," American
University Journal of International Law and Policy Vol. 5, No.
2 (Winter 1990), pp. 529-542. The stated purpose of the
Meeting was to develop the legal and institutional framework
for dealing with atmospheric problems and to agree on
principles that might form the basis of framework conventions
on the atmosphere and climate change, to identify areas where
consensus may not be possible and to suggest ways to overcome
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treaty on the atmosphere and a narrower convention on climate
change, with accompanying protocols as appropriate.
Concerning the elements for inclusion in a convention on
protection of the atmosphere, the experts concluded that the
atmosphere "constitutes a common resource of vital interest to
mankind," 937
 and that all states had an obligation to co-
operate to protect the atmosphere.9
A month after the Ottawa Meeting, the government of the
Netherlands hosted, in March 1989, a ministerial meeting at
the Hague to discuss the obligation of states regarding
atmospheric changes. Proposing an alternative approach to the
convention outlined in Toronto, the participants agreed to
encourage the development of a new institutional authority
within the UN to cope with global warming, whether it be via
an enhancement of existing institutions or through the
such hurdles, and to develop recommendations for future
action, including the forwarding of the recommendations to
international meetings and forums for consideration.
417 1bid., p. 531. The meeting decided that the atmosphere
represented a "common resource" as opposed to a "shared
resource". Sylvia Maureen Williams, "The Protection of the
Ozone Layer in Contemporary International Law," International
Relations Vol. X, No. 2 (1990), p. 175. Two definitions were
proposed for the atmosphere: the first stated that "Atmosphere
means the resource constituted by global mass of air
surrounding the earth"; the second defined the atmosphere as
"all or part of the collection of gases which lie within the
limits of the troposphere and stratosphere as defined by the
WMO..." Supra, n. 936, p. 530. The meeting also attempted to
define atmospheric interference, noting that the definition
should include "both the elements of appreciable danger and
appreciable harm.., depending on the degree of tolerance to
harm [threshold] that may be adopted." International
atmospheric interference was defined as instances "of which
not both the origin and the effects are wholly located within
the area under the national lurisdiction of one State." Ibid.,
pp . 530-531.
93 Ibid., p. 533.
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creation of a new organisation. The Declaration envisaged
the International Court of Justice implementing these
standards, a shift from their traditional role of determining
liability. 94
 It should be pointed out that the conference
participants did not include the United States, which had not
been issued an invitation, nor the United Kingdom, which had
declined to attend. Thus, it cannot be assumed that complete
consensus exists as this time regarding the use of an
international mechanism to enforce international environmental
obligations. 941
Another Ministerial Meeting was convened in Noordwijk,
the Netherlands, in November 1989. This time, 67 countries
participated, as well as the EC Commission and 11
international organisations. 942 While limits on emission
levels of greenhouse gases were not set, agreement that a
climate change convention be drafted as soon as possible
signalled that the prospect of international cooperation for
action existed in this area. 943	The Declaration also
999 Hague Declaration on the Environment, International
Legal Materials Vol. 28, No. 5 (1989), pp. 1308-1310.
940 1bid. See also, Glen Plant, "Institutional and Legal
Responses to Global Warming," in International Law and Global
Climate Change, ed. Robin Churchill and David Freestone
(London: Graham & Trotman, 1991), p. 166.
° 41 See Plant, "Institutional and Legal Responses," supra,
n. 940.
942 Noordwijk Declaration on Climate Change, Environmental
Policy and Law Vol. 19, No. 6 (1989), pp. 229-231. See also,
IUCC, Fact Sheet 218, "The Noordwijk Ministerial Declaration
on Climate Change," Climate Change Dossier (Geneva: IUCC,
1992).
141 The Declaration recognised that "global environmental
problems have to be approached through international co-
operation," notwithstanding "the principle of the sovereign
right of States to manage their natural resources
independently." Noordwijk Declaration, supra, n. 942.
278
reaffirmed that climate change is a common concern of mankind,
while stressing the differentiated responsibility of
states.
In May 1990, at the Bergen Conference on Sustainable
Development states agreed that the industrialised world was
primarily responsible for greenhouse gas emissions and
therefore assumed the greater responsibility for dealing with
the problem. The Bergen Declaration advocated this principle
of common but differentiated responsibility, along with the
precautionary principle, whereby potentially harmful
activities should be restricted or prohibited before serious
damage results.945
Meanwhile, UNEP and the WMO had again joined forces
concerning climate change through the establishment of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in November
1988, subsequently endorsed by the General Assembly." 6 The
General Assembly requested UNEP and WMO, through the
implementation of the IPCC, to take action and make
recommendations about climate change regarding the state of
scientific knowledge, the socio-economic impact and the
formulation of possible response strategies." 7
 Accordingly,
three IPCC Working Groups were created, operating in
944 1bid., reaffirming GA Res. 43/53, infra, n. 946, and
supra, Chapter 2, Section 2.5.4, Common Heritage, Shared
Resources and Common Concern.
945 Bergen Conference on Sustainable Development, UN Doc.
A/CONF.l5l/PC/lO, and supra, Chapter 2, Section 2.5.1,
Precautionary Principle.
44"UN Resolution on the Protection of the Global Climate,
GA Res. 43/53, A/RES/43/53 (6 December 1988), UN General
Assembly Official Records of the General Assembly, 43rd
Session, Supplement No. 49 (A/43/49), p. 133.
"'Ibid.
279
coordination under the IPCC: scientific analysis (Working
Group	 impacts (Working Group II)'	 and response
strategies (Working Group III)°. The co-ordinators'
report on prospective legal measures regarding climate change
suggested that a convention on climate change should resemble
in format the Vienna Ozone Convention. 95 ' That is to say,
the convention should provide for general principles and
obligations, while providing for separate protocols to
delineate specific obligations. However, the report was
careful to point out that "[v]iews differ substantially on the
role and powers of the institutions to be created by the
Convention, particularly in exercising supervision and control
over the obligations undertaken."952
948 The stated purpose of Working Group I was to "provide
a scientific assessment of: the factors which may affect
climate change..., the responses of the atmosphere-ocean-land-
ice system, current capabilities of modelling. . . climate
changes and their predictability, [and] the past climate
record and.. .anomalies."IPCC Policymakers Summary of the
Scientific Assessment of Climate Chan ge, Report Prepared for
IPCC by Working Group I, June 1990, p. 3 (NY: WMO and UNEP,
1990).
949 "The responsibility of Working Group II is to describe
the environmental and socio-economic changes over the next
decades caused by increasing concentrations of greenhouse
gases." IPCC Policymakers Summary of the Potential Impacts of
Climate Change, report from Working Group II to IPCC, June
1990, p. 1 (NY: WMO and UNEP, 1990).
950Working Group III's primary task "was, in the broad
sense, technical, not political [and] to lay out as fully and
fairly as possible a set of response policy options and the
factual basis for those options." IPCC Policymakers Summary of
the Formulation of Response Strategies, Report Prepared for
IPCC by Working Group III, June 1990, p. 1 (NY: WMO and UNEP,
1990).
951 1PCC Response Strategies Working Group, Le gal Measures:
Report of Topic Coordinators (Canada, Malta and the United
Kingdom) (NY: WMO and UNEP, 1990), p. 1.
Executive Summary, p. iii.
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The final report of the IPCC, based on the findings of
its three Working Groups, was drawn up in August 1990, at
Sundsvall, Sweden. Significantly, agreement was reached that
scientific evidence concerning global warming signalled a real
threat to the Earth. As scientific uncertainty poses
one of the greatest challenges to the development of a regime
for climate change, the agreement at Sundsvall was laudatory.
The agreement came at an opportune time, as the Second World
Climate Conference in Geneva was due to take place, where the
IPCC report was to be formally presented.
Eleven years after the first gathering was held, the WMO,
UNEP and the ICSU jointly sponsored the Second World Climate
Conference in November l990. The Conference was
visualised as the "official unveiling" of the IPCC report on
climate change. 956
 The UNEP Executive Director opened the
conference by declaring that climate change has created "a
threat potentially more catastrophic than any other threat in
human history" and that "[n]othing less than a complete change
953 "Talks Next Month on Global Warming Pact," Times
(London), 31 August 1990, p. 8.
954 5ee, supra, Chapter 4, Section 4.1.1, Critical Issue of
Science.
955 The WMO had earlier hosted the first World Climate
Conference in 1979 at Geneva. That Conference Report warned of
climate trends that could result in "disastrous effects on the
biosphere and on humanity." Environmental Law Institute,
"Introduction," supra, n. 926, P. 3. In addition, the World
Climate Programme (WCP) was created to research anthropogenic
climate change. Ibid. UN Res. 43/83 calls for high priority to
be given to the WCP. The WCP is composed of the World Climate
Data Programme, the World Climate Applications Programme, the
World Climate Research Programme and the World Climate Impact
Programme. Joint responsibility for these programmes by the
WMO, UNEP and the ICSU provide for funding, organisational
structure and scientific expertise. Ibid., p. 9.
56 Ibid., p. 7. An evaluation of the World Climate
Programme was also to be undertaken.
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in attitudes and lifestyles will succeed" in stopping the
warming," while recognising that there was differentiated
responsibility for climate change. The declaration of the
Conference called for states to develop programmes to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions, but no targets were set.3
The following month, the UN General Assembly created by
resolution the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee, whose
task was to prepare a framework convention on climate
change.
The first negotiating session for a climate treaty was
held in Washington, D.C., in February 1991.°	 Hopes that
7 "Global Warming Conference Begins," International
Herald Tribune, 30 October 1990, p. 2. The 10-day conference
was attended by 500 international scientists and ended in 2-
day meeting of 80 ministers, including then Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher of Britain. Mrs. Thatcher stated that a
"clear case for precautionary action" concerning climate
change existed at the present time, although she cautioned
that more scientific research was needed. "Thatcher Exhorts
Action on Climate,", International Herald Tribune, 7 November
1990, p. 2.
958 "US Resists Greenhouse Gas Accord," International
Herald Tribune, 8 November 1991, P. 2. The head of the US
delegation stated that the US would implement initiatives
concerning energy efficiency, but no commitments to percentage
reductions would be made, as ". . .we do not know how to
guarantee [them]". This contrasted with the position taken by
the environmental ministers of 18 European nations, including
the 12 EC states and the 6 members of the European Free Trade
Association (EFTA), to freeze emission levels of carbon
dioxide by the year 2000. "Europeans Will Freeze Emissions of
Gases Triggering Global Warming," International Herald
Tribune, 6 November 1990, p. 2.
959 UN Resolution 45/212, supra, n. 924.
°This conformed with GA Res. 45/212, ibid., declaring
that the negotiating sessions should be held at Washington,
D.C., February 1991, and subsequently at Geneva and Nairobi,
in May/June 1991, September and November/December 1991, and as
appropriate between January and June 1992.
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the Chantilly Conference 4	might result in a "Bretton
Woods", in that rules of a new order might evolve,	 were
not fulfilled. Nevertheless, an agreement was reached
establishing the guidelines for negotiating a final treaty on
climate change. 3 The guidelines set up two working groups:
Working Group I to examine "appropriate commitments" for
the reduction of greenhouse gases, the protection of forests,
and compensation and technical assistance for developing
countries, and Working Group II to draft the treaty.
The second session of the INC took place in Geneva, June
1991, where co-chairs were selected for the two working groups
established at Chantilly; Working Group I was to be chaired by
Mexico and Japan, while Canada and Vanuatu were selected to
head Working Group II.9b6	 Discussions centred on whether
9 The conference was held outside of Washington, D.C., in
Chantilly, Virginia.
962 3essica Mathews, "Brave New World Order,", Guardian
(London), 15 February 1991, p. 27.
963 5ee, American Society of International Law, "Climate
Change," International Environmental Law Interest Group
Newsletter Vol. 1 (May 1991), p. 3, and "US To Negotiate Steps
on Warming," The New York Times, 15 February 1991, p.
964 "Talks on Warming: A Slight US Shift," International
Herald Tribune, 16-17 February 1991, p. 2. Critics of US
policy stated that the use of the term "appropriate",
reportedly inserted by White House insistence, was too broad
and would prevent absolute requirements of emission
reductions. Ibid.
965American Society of International Law,	 "Climate
Change," supra, n. 963, See also, "INC Climate Change
Convention: First Discussions, Environmental Policy and Law
Vol. 21, No. 2 (1991), pp. 50-52. Jean Ripert of France was
elected Chair of the INC.
9b6Sebastian Oberthur, "Climate Negotiations: Progress
Slow," Environmental Policy and Law Vol. 21, No. 5/6 (1991),
pp. 193-195. See also, American Society of International Law,
"Climate Change," International Environmental Law Interest
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specific commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions should
be included in the convention, with the United States and the
then-USSR opposing such binding commitments and the European
Community seeking specific commitments to reduce CO 7 . A
compromise "pledge and review" concept was put forward by
which states would pledge specific action to slow emissions,
and would also be subject to a review of the action taken.1
Disagreements also arose concerning a financial
mechanism. Most industrialised states supported the use of
existing mechanisms like the Global Environmental Facility
(GEF), while many developing countries pushed for a new fund
outright .
Nairobi was the site of the third session of the INC.
held in September 1991. Disagreements still remained over the
use of specific targets and timetables in a convention,
particularly for the United States, which regarded such
targets as premature. The United States also argued for a
comprehensive approach, rather than focusing on CO2 alone.
The pledge and review concept did not receive great support,
Group Newsletter Vol. 2 No. 1 (August 1991, p. 3).
967 5ee, Michael Grubb and Nicola Steen, Pledge and Review
Processes: Possible Components of a Climate Convention, Report
of a Workshop (London: Royal Institute of International
Affairs, 1991). where recommendations as to the meaning and
strengthening of the concept were put forth, as well as a
survey of precedents. See, Glen Plant, "'Pledge and Review':
A Survey of Precedents," Pledge and Review Processes: Possible
Components of a Climate Convention (London: Royal Institute of
International Affairs, 1991), pp. V-XIV. See also, supra,
Chapter 3, n. 589.
968 See, American Society of International Law, "Climate
Change," supra, n. 966, Oberthur, "Climate Negotiations,"
supra, n. 966 and infra, this Chapter, Section 6.3.3,
Development Uncertainty.
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as some states still held out hope for specific
commitments.
The fourth and fifth sessions of the INC. held in Geneva,
December 1991, and New York, February 1992 respectively, did
not produce much progress. Disagreements still remained as to
specific commitments for slowing greenhouse gas emissions, as
well as the issue of financial aid to developing states and
the financial mechanism to implement the aid. Legal
requirements, such as entry into force and dispute settlement
techniques, also remained unresolved, as did the issue of a
comprehensive approach versus focusing solely on
The final session of the INC prior to the UN Conference
on Environment and Development was held in New York in early
May 1992. Despite the previous disagreement at prior
negotiating sessions, agreement was finally achieved at the
final INC session and the UN FCCC was adopted. However, the
FCCC did not include any specific caps on timetable and
emissions of greenhouse gases.97'
Americafl Society of International Law, "Climate
Change," International Environmental Law Interest Group
Newsletter Vol. 2, No. 2 (November 1991), p. 3. See also, Dan
Bodansky, "INC 3 & 4: Draft Convention on Climate Change,"
Environmental Policy and Law Vol. 22 No. 1 (1992), pp. 5-15.
970American Society of International Law, "Climate
Change," International Environmental Law Interest Group
Newsletter Vol. 2, No. 3 (March 1992), p. 2. See also, "INC:
Fifth Session," Environmental Policy and Law Vol. 22, No. 2
(1992), p. 80.
971 This was largely attributed to "the sense that in order
to satisfy US objections the obligations in the Convention had
been unreasonably diluted." See, The Earth Summit: The United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development,
introduction and commentary by Stanley P. Johnson (London:
Graham & Trotman, 1993), p. 78.
The United States claimed that energy-efficient actions
to which it had already committed would bring it close to
limiting emissions in 2000 to 1990 levels, but that strict
adherence to timetables might harm its economy. See, William
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The FCCC was signed in Rio de 3aneiro in 3une 1992.
Substantively, the Convention adopts a comprehensive approach
to the problem of climate change by including all known
sources and sinks of greenhouse gases (other than those
controlled under the Montreal Protocol).
Specifically, the Convention requires all parties to
"develop, periodically update, publish and make available...
national inventories" of the sources and sinks of its
greenhouse gases, as well as to formulate and implement
national measures to mitigate climate change.972
For developed states, this information, along with
information on their policies to mitigate climate change and
the projected effect of such policies, must be provided within
six months after the Convention enters into force, and will be
reviewed periodically by the Conference of the Parties.473
These policies are to be created "with the aim of returning
individually or jointly to their 1990 levels" of greenhouse
gas emissions.°74
For developing states, their required reports of
inventories and national measures must be submitted within
three years after the Convention enters into force or after
K. Stevens, "143 Lands Adopt Treaty To Cut Emission of Gases,"
New York Times, 10 May 1992, Section 1, p. 14, "Global Warming
Pact Without Targets Gets US Approval," International Herald
Tribune, 11 May 1992, p. 2.
Disagreement concerning critical issues, then, remained.
See, infra, this Chapter, Section 6.3, Maintenance of the
Climate Change Regime.
972 FCCC, supra, n. 922, Art. 4(l)a, b.
Ibid., Art. 4(2)b, Art. 12(5).
74 Ibid., Art. 4(2)b, no timetable for doing so was given.
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receiving financial assistance.' 79
	Least developed states
may make the reports at their discretion.''
The Convention also requires developed states to provide
the financial resources for the developing states to comply
with their obligations, 977
 and to "promote, facilitate and
finance. . . the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound
technologies and know-how."978
In addition to the less stringent reporting requirements
for developing states, the Convention also allows "a certain
amount of flexibility" regarding commitments for states moving
towards market economies, as well as for those states who have
special needs such as low-lying countries, or those states
highly dependent on the income generated from the production
and/or consumption of fossil fuels.979
In order to implement the Convention, a Conference of the
Parties is established to review the Convention and to assess
the measures taken by the Parties, as well as to facilitate
the exchange of information between the Parties. 98° In
addition, the Subsidiary Body for Science and Technological
Advice was established under the Convention to provide advice
on science and technology issues to the Conference of the
° 75 Ibid., Art. 12(5).
976 1bid. Requirements of future communications for all
Parties shall be determined by the Conference of the Parties.
977 1bid., Art. 4(3).
978 1bid., Art. 4(5).
979 1bid., Art. 4(6),	 (8). Annex I highlights those
countries that qualify.
80 Ibid., Art. 7.
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Parties.
A financial mechanism is also provided by the
Convention, 2 and has been entrusted on an interim basis to
the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), established under the
control of the World Bank, UNEP and the UN Development
Programme (UNDP). 83
 The GEF was established as a US$1
billion fund to aid projects designed to reduce ozone
depletion, global warming, marine pollution and loss of
biodiversity. 984	A restructuring of the GEF is underway,
following agreement on this in April 1992. At the April
meeting of the GEF Participants, it was agreed, among other
things, that the GEF would continue to finance the same focal
areas and that a Participants' Assembly would be formed for
decision-making. 5 Decisions are normally to be made by
consensus, except that when that is not possible, a voting
system would be substituted to "guarantee both a balanced and
equitable representation of the interests of developing
countries, as well as give due weight to the funding efforts
of donor countries." 986 The exact details of such a system
remain to be worked out, along with other crucial issues such
as the amount of total funding for the implementation of the
climate change agreement.	 A further meeting was held in
December 1992 to attempt to further the process of
981 1bid., Art. 9.
° 82 Ibid., Art. 11.
983 1bid., Art. 21(3).
994 "Green Aid," Our Planet: The Ma gazine of the UNEP, Vol.
2, No. 4 (1990), p. 9.
9 See, GEF Administrator, Global Environment Facility:
The Pilot Phase and Beyond, Working Paper Series Number 1
(Washington, DC: May 1992).
6 tbid., p. 7.
288
restructuring the GEF, concentrating on the legal framework
and the decision-making aspects of the GEF. 47
 In May 1993,
Beijing was the site for the next meeting of the Participants.
Although it was confirmed that consensus would be the primary
instrument for decision-making, with voting used only as a
last resort, decisions regarding funding and governance were
put off until further meetings in December l993.
A Subsidiary Body for Implementation has also been
established under the Convention, to assist the Conference of
the Parties in assessing and reviewing implementation of the
Convention. When disputes arise, the Convention provides
that the parties "shall seek a settlement of the dispute
through negotiation or any other peaceful means... "° While
parties may agree to submit a dispute to the International
Court of Justice or to arbitration, if the disputing parties
are unable to agree on a dispute settlement mechanism, the
matter shall be submitted to conciliation. A conciliation
commission, composed of members appointed by each party
concerned and a jointly appointed chairman will deliver a
"recommendatory award, which the parties shall consider in
good fajth."	 The Convention requires additional
7 See, Chairman's Summary, Global Environment Facility,
Participant's Meeting, Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire, 3-5 December
1992 (Washington, DC: GEF Administrator, 1992). Also,
interview with Charles DiLeva, Counsel, Environmental Affairs,
Legal Dept., World Bank, 11 September 1992.
8See, supra, Chapter 4, n. 732, regarding the general
agreement to provide US$2.8 billion to $4.2 billion over a
three to four year period starting in July 1994, as well as
agreement for universal membership of the GEF governed by a
Participants' Assembly.
)R9FCCC supra, n. 922, Art. 10.
°Ibid., Art. 14(1).
Ibid., Art. 14(5), (6).
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conciliation procedures to be adopted as soon as practicable,
perhaps following along the lines of the non-compliance
procedure of the Montreal Protocol.
Ibid., Art. 15(7). Also adopted at the UN Conference on
Environment and Development were the Rio Declaration and
Agenda 21, an action plan for the environment and development.
The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development encompasses
27 principles reflecting a compromise between developed and
developing states, and between environment and development
goals. While not specifically related to climate change, both
the Declaration and Agenda 21 are of importance to the issue
of climate change. International Legal Materials Vol. 31, No.
4 (1992), pp. 874-880. See also, American Society of
International Law, "UNCED," International Environmental Law
Interest Group Newsletter Vol. 3, No. 1 (September 1992), pp.
6-7.
Included among the Declaration Principles are a
restatement of Principle 21 of the Stockholm Conference on the
Human Environment, the rights of future generations, the
special needs of developing states, avoidance of unilateral
trade actions dealing with environmental challenges outside
their jurisdiction, application of the precautionary approach,
environmental impact assessments, and the polluter pays
principle.
Agenda 21, a guideline for future national and
international action in the field of the environment and
development, is not directly concerned with climate change.
Indirectly, however, Chapter 9 on the atmosphere addresses
scientific uncertainty, sustainable development, ozone
depletion and transboundary atmospheric pollution, outlining
objectives and activities for better understanding of each.
Chapter 39, dealing with international legal instruments and
mechanisms, proposes to assess the effectiveness of existing
international agreements, as well as procedures to promote and
review implementation. Chapter 33 on financial resources
proved to be contentious, with developed states agreeing to
"re-affirm" the UN target of 0.7% of GNP for development
assistance. See, The Earth Summit, supra, n. 971. The US
stated that never having accepted the target previously, it
was not held to the wording "re-affirm." pp. 444-445, 448.
The UN General Assembly has adopted a resolution creating
the Sustainable Development Commission to monitor
implementation of Agenda 21. UNGA Res. 47/91, International
Legal Materials Vol. 32, No. 1 (1993), Draft Resolution IV,
Institutional Arrangements to Follow Up the UNCED, pp. 254-
262.
While they may eventually become part of formal
international law through custom or treaty, the documents
stand their best chance of early inclusion into the legal
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In order to ensure that the Convention undergoes a smooth
transition into force after ratification, the International
Negotiating Committee met in December 1992 to prepare for the
first meeting of the Conference of the Parties. At that
meeting, the INC defined the tasks to be undertaken by the
Conference of the Parties and for which the INC should
prepare. They include the formulation of methods to calculate
emissions and removals of greenhouse gases, communication of
national plans, 991 implementation of the financial mechanisms
and other matters relating to the implementation of the
Convention.
The INC met again for its seventh session in New York,
March 1993, calling for a report on the functioning of
operational linkages between the Conference of the Parties and
the financial mechanism. The INC also proposed to explore the
feasibility of a joint project with UNEP to establish and
order through a regime, just as the FCCC has evolved. Indeed,
a regime encompassing environment and development may be
evolving. A "complex regime," see supra, Chapter 3, Section
3.2, Definition of Regimes, might include both the climate
change issue and the broader issues encompassed by Agenda 21.
° 9 Alliance for Sound Atmospheric Policy Newsletter,
Arlington, Virginia, Newsletter of 14 December 1992. See also,
American Society of International Law, "Climate Change,"
International Environmental Law Interest Group Newsletter Vol.
3, No. 1 (September 1992), p. 3.
991 The US presented at the meeting its National Action
Plan for Global Climate Change, pursuant to Articles 4 and 12
of the Convention which calls for parties to publish national
inventories of greenhouse gas emissions by sources, removals
by sinks, mitigation measures, and policies to implement the
Convention. In June 1992, US President George Bush proposed
that parties to the Convention present and review their
national action plans. See, National Action Plan for Global
Climate Change, US Department of State Publication, December
1992.
95 See, FCCC, Art. 7, supra, n. 922, for the full list of
duties of the Conference of the Parties.
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operate an information exchange system to support the
reporting requirements and response measures of developing
states called for in the Further meetings of
the INC are to continue through at least l995.
6.2 Formation of the Climate Change Regime
The existence of shared expectations regarding future
state behaviour in the area of climate change, 9
 can be said
to have formed by the time the UN General Assembly resolved in
1990 to create the International Negotiating Committee to
prepare a Framework Convention on Climate Change. 9	' lt
point, shared expectations regarding the need to combat
climate change existed. Therefore, the establishment of the
INC can be said to represent the formation of the climate
change regime.
The creation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) in 1989 can not be said to have been the point
of formation of the climate change regime, since its purpose
was to investigate the impacts and possible responses to
potential climate change. At that point there was not yet
evidence of expectations of a need to regulate climate change.
Similarly, the findings of the IPCC in 1990, before the INC
came into existence, is also not the point of formation of the
996 Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee
for a Framework Convention on Climate Change, seventh session,
NY, 15-20 March 1993, A/AC.237/3l, 27 April 1993. In
accordance with FCCC Art. 12(7).
1Ibid.
"See, supra, Chapter 3, Section 3.3, Formation of
Regimes.
See, supra, this Chapter, Section 6.1, International
Action Regarding Climate Change.
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climate change regime but rather, an expression of the opinion
of that panel. Although those findings gave a sense of
urgency to the need for action, they did not reveal shared
expectations among states to regulate climate change. This was
shown, however, by the establishment of the INC with the
purpose of negotiating the FCCC. The legal status of the
regime at formation will be discussed below.
6.3 Maintenance of the Climate Change Regime
As with ozone layer depletion, the critical issues to the
climate change regime include science, economics and
development. The maintenance or development of the regime
depends on the extent to which the uncertainty surrounding
these critical issues has been resolved and cognitive
expectations have been shaped leading to normative or shared
expectations regarding future behaviour.'001
6.3.1	 Scientific Uncertainty
While man has rapidly acquired new scientific knowledge
concerning the phenomena of global warming leading to climate
change, there is still uncertainty as to the potential
effects.'°° 2
 This has had an obvious effect on the climate
'°°°Working Group III, concerned with laying out a set of
possible response policy actions, stressed that it was not its
purpose to "recommend political actions, much less to carry
out a negotiation on the many difficult policy questions...".
IPCC Policymakers Summary of the Formulation of Response
Strategies, supra, n. 950, p. 1.
'See, supra, Chapter 3, Section 3.4, Maintenance or
Development of Regimes.
°° 2 See, supra, Chapter 1, Section 1.2.1, Climate Change,
and Chapter 4, Section 4.1.1, Critical Issue of Science.
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change regime, which lacks detailed regulations.
The fact remains, then, that there is still debate as to
the potential impact. For example, in the United States the
Marshall Institute has produced studies which question the
impact of climate change, and recent evidence reveals that the
impact to date has been relatively benign. 004 Similar views
have been voiced in the United Kingdom.'°° 5
 Views such as
these have prevented a coherent epistemic community forming
for the climate change regime
At the time of this writing, it must be concluded that
the scientific uncertainty surrounding climate change has
contributed to the lack of substantive legal obligations
within the regime. The basis of the normative behaviour
expected of states has been laid out within the regime,
however, and the regime can be expected to evolve from that
point. This was the case with ozone layer depletion - as the
science became more certain and as the danger became more
LooSee supra, this Chapter, Section 6.1, International
Action Regarding Climate Change.
1004 See, supra, Chapter 1, Section 1.2.1, Climate Change.
See also, F. Seitz, K. Bendetsen, R. Jastrow and WA
Nierenberg, Scientific Perspectives on the Greenhouse Problem
(George C. Marshall Institute: Washington, DC, 1989). Other
sceptics include R. Lindzen, "Some Coolness Concerning Global
Warming," Bulletin American Meteorolo gical Society, Vol. 71
(1990), pp. 288-299, HW Elisaesser, "A Different View of the
Climatic Effect of Carbon Dioxide-Updated," Atmosphera, Vol.
3 (1990), pp. 3-29, and WE Reifsnyder, "A Tale of Ten
Fallacies: The Sceptical Enquirer's View of the Carbon Dioxide
Climate Controversy," Agriculture and Forest Meteorology, Vol.
47 (1989), pp. 349-371.
1005 See, for instance, Wilfred Beckerman, "Global Warming
and International Action: An Economic Perspective," in The
International Politics of the Environment, ed. Andrew Hurrell
and Benedict Kingsbury (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp.
253-289.
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evident, the regime evolved into the Montreal Protocol, which
itself	 has	 evolved	 twice	 trough	 adjustments	 and
amendments.
6.3.2	 Economic Uncertainty
Since the scientific effects of global warming are still
uncertain, the economic ramifications are also difficult to
determine."° 7 Indeed, there are two opposing economic
responses to global warming: prevention at any cost in order
to avoid possible catastrophic damage or a "no regrets"
approach.'°°' Until the effects, and therefore the economic
costs, are better known, then both economic viewpoints will
have validity, and will prevent strong international agreement
on economic grounds.
Compared to ozone depletion, overcoming economic
uncertainty for climate change is much more difficult. The
economic costs will undoubtedly prove much higher, as ozone
depletion is limited to the replacement of CFCs and other
ozone-depleting substances, while climate change involves many
greenhouse gases. Because of the near-impossibility of
greenhouse gas replacement, at least in the foreseeable
future, an economic system to regulate greenhouse gases will
need to be implemented. As already indicated in Chapter 4,
the difficulties of implementing, let alone choosing between,
'°° 6 The end of the Cold War may inadvertently propel more
scientists towards the environment as they search for areas in
which to concentrate their research. This may help advance
scientific certainty. See, William K. Stevens, "With Cold war
Over, Scientists Are Turning To 'Greener' Pastures," New York
Times, 27 October 1992, p. C4.
1007See, supra, Chapter 4, Section 4.1.2, Critical Issue
of Economics.
'°°8lbid.
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an emission permit or tax on greenhouse gases are great. Even
before that point, agreement has to be reached on what level
of greenhouse gases, national and international, is acceptable
in order that a permit or tax system could be
implemented.'°° 9
 Thus, economic incentives must be relied
upon to legitimise any substantive prohibitions in the climate
change regime. In other words, states must be convinced of
the economic viability of any long-range undertakings. To
accomplish this, business concerns must be met, since the
initial burden to reduce pollution will fall on
corporations.'°'° Industry has begun to play a role in the
climate change issue, partly as some firms have realised a
profit-motive in the venture, partly as a public-relations
venture.' 0 " Profit-motive schemes can be helped along
through such devices as environmental tax breaks or similar
incentives, so long as the incentives are perceived as fair
and not draconian.'°'2
'°°There is the additional problem of verification of
targets. In this regard, it is uncertain whether individual
greenhouse gases or sectors (energy, forestry, agriculture)
contributing to emissions will be targeted. See, Julian E.
Salt and Owen Greene, "Climate Convention-Verification or
Not?" Peace Studies Briefings, Dept. of Peace Studies,
University of Bradford, released 10 June 1992, Rio de Janeiro.
'°'°See, Jessica Mathews, "When Environmentalism Jibes With
Economics," International Herald Tribune, 11 November 1992, p.
5.
Annual costs of environmental compliance with US domestic
laws alone is estimated to reach $198 billion by 2000, from
$125 billion in 1992. See, Diedre Carmody, "'Greening' of the
Business Magazine," New York Times, 16 November 1992, p. D6.
'°"See, Matthew L. Wald, "How A Big Oil Company Took the
Green Pledge," International Herald Tribune, 13-14 February
1993, p. 9. See, also, infra, this Chapter, Section 6.4.2,
International Non-state Actors.
'°' 2 1n this vein, a new magazine, Eco, has been launched
in the United States. It is aimed at government officials,
chief executives and top financial officers at large and
midsize corporations. Its purpose is to fill the gap between
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But convincing firms, let alone states, of long term
economic gains in the face of short term losses is not an easy
task. The importance of this was reflected by the
establishment of the Business Council For Sustainable
Development, headed by Stephan Schmidheiny who served as
principal adviser for business and industry to the Secretary-
General of UNCED. The Council endeavoured to analyze how the
international business community can adapt and contribute to
the achievement of the goal of sustainable development.'
In addition, while including environmental costs in
pricing has long been called for by environmentalists,
industry leaders now appear to be warming to that view. The
chairman of Dow Chemical has called for full-cost pricing to
reflect the environmental and social costs of goods and
services.'° 4
 By so doing, firms would realise the differing
environmental costs of their products, with a corresponding
environmental advocacy magazines and business trade books.
ECO's advisory board includes US Vice-President Gore and
Russell E. Train, chairman of the National Commission on the
Environment and a former administrator of the EPA. See, Diedre
Carmody, "'Greening' of the Business Magazine," New York
Times, 16 November 1992, p. D6.
'°' 3Stephan Schmidheiny with the Business Council For
Sustainable Development, Chan ging Course: A Global Business
Perspective On Development and the Environment (Cambridge,
Mass, MIT Press, 1992). See, also, Donella H. Meadows, Dennis
L. Meadows, and Jorgen Randers, Beyond The Limits (London:
Earthscan Publications Ltd., 1992), the sequel to The Limits
To Growth, published by the Club of Rome 20 years earlier.
See, also, "Business Charter for Sustainable Development
Principles for Environmental Management," adopted at the
Second World Industry Conference on Environmental Management,
reprinted in Issues in Science and Technology Vol. 8, No. 2
(Spring 1992), pp. 30-31.
'°' 4Jessica Mathews, quoting Frank Popoff, "When
Environmentalism Jibes With Economics," International Herald
Tribune, 11 November 1992, p. 5.
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effect on technology choice and product design. ' However,
this view has not yet been internalised by industry as a
whole.
Economic uncertainty has prevented strict emission
targets from being implemented in the climate change regime to
date, aside from a general "aim" (for developed states) to
return to 1990 levels of greenhouse gas emissions.''
Nevertheless, with that provision, the regime has set the base
behaviour from which more restrictive rules can evolve. The
ozone layer depletion regime evolved in that manner. However,
the phase-out in that regime is being introduced gradually, in
order to avoid economic hardships and to allow time for
substitutes to be introduced.' 0 ' 7 	This legitimised the
phase-out from an economic point of view. A similar
arrangement will no doubt need to be made in the climate
change regime.
6.3.3	 Development Uncertainty
The unknown extent to which developing states will
contribute to climate change as they attempt to attain a
greater standard of living and the unknown amount of financial
support these states will require in combatting climate change
is a critical issue within the climate change regime.°
This uncertainty is closely tied to the economics of global
warming; uncertainty in that area necessarily affects
'°' 5See, Peter F. Drucker, The New Realities (NY: Harper
& Row Publishers, 1989), pp. 135-136.
'°' 6FCCC, supra, n. 922, Art.4(2)b.
supra, Chapter 5, Section 5.1, International
Action Regrading Ozone Layer Depletion.
supra, Chapter 4, Section 4.1.3, Critical Issue
of Development.
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development issues. So long as the overall cost remains
uncertain, then so does the cost of subsidising developing
states in terms of financial aid and technology transfer.
The majority of greenhouse gas emissions are at the
present time attributed to the industrialised world. However,
the less-developed states are poised to take the lead in
overall emissions upon attaining a certain level of
development. Once again, the uncertainty of this issue is
greater for climate change than it was for ozone depletion.
To accommodate the financial needs of developing states,
the ozone layer depletion regime provides for financial and
technical assistance under the Multilateral Fund.'°' 9
 A
similar mechanism is planned for in the Climate Change
Convention, but the Conference of the Parties must still
decide as to the structure.'° 2° Although the GEF has been
adopted on an interim basis as the operational facility for
the FCCC financial mechanism, it has not yet been adopted as
a permanent fixture.102'
In order to accommodate the technological needs of
developing states, the FCCC states that exchange of technology
should be promoted,L022 but only requires the adoption of
national policies to limit emissions of greenhouse gases
(aiming to return to 1990 levels) from developed states and
supra, Chapter 5, Section 5.3.3, Development
Uncertainty.
1020 See, supra, FCCC, n. 922, Art. 11(3).
'° 2t See, GEF Administrator, Global Environmental Facility:
The Pilot Phase and Beyond, supra, n. 985.
22 FCCC, supra, n. 922, Art. 4(1)h.
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those states with economies in transition.' 23 The
developing world is only required to publish national
inventories of emissions as well as programmes outlining
measures to mitigate climate change. While the purpose
of the provision on adoption of national policies by developed
states was to demonstrate the difference in economic and
equitable starting points between themselves and the less-
developed world, and to illustrate that developed states were
"taking the lead in modifying... emissions," 325
 it can only
be hoped that the provision will be extended to the developing
world as soon as possible. Without policies to facilitate a
cut in future emissions from that sector of the global
population, the convention will be of little use.
The developing states are in a position to wield a great
deal of influence in the financial arrangements as well. If
these states do not feel that the ensuing financial
arrangements are legitimate, then their degree of involvement
is likely to be low. Similarly, the developed states must
also be satisfied with the ultimate financial arrangement,
since they will be providing the necessary financial aid.
Thus, the uncertainty surrounding this issue remains
significant in the climate change regime.
Nevertheless, while difficulties still remain as to the
actual transfer of financial and technology aid, the inclusion
of developing states and their special interests has been made
'° 23 Ibid., 4(2)a, b and c. Those states with economies in
transition to free market economies are allowed some
flexibility in the implementation of national plans to
mitigate and adapt to climate change. Such states are
identified in Annex 1 of the Convention.
° 24 Ibid., Art. 4(l)a.
'° 25 Ibid., Art 4(2)a.
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in the climate change regime.
6.4 Catalysts in the Climate Change Regime
The catalysts to be examined here include leadership,
international	 non-state	 actors,	 crisis	 and domestic
regulations. Each of these factors played a role in
catalysing the ozone layer depletion regimeO2b and thus
could be expected to play a large part in the regime of a
similar global environmental problem, climate change.'°27
6.4.1	 Leadership
To date, no state has assumed a major leadership role in
the climate change regime. The United States hosted the first
meeting of the INC February 19911028, but despite this, was
not supportive of the EC position advocating binding
regulations for the reduction of CO2.'° 29 This stance, kept
up throughout the next three meetings of the INC. was largely
attributed to the influence of John Sununu, the Chief of Staff
to President Bush. 103° His resignation led some to believe
supra, Chapter 5, Section 5.4, Catalysts in the
Ozone Layer Depletion Regime.
'° 27 1n their role in the formation and maintenance of the
regime, these catalysts may contribute to raising the
acceptable level of compliance, see, infra, Section 6.5,
Compliance in the Climate Change Regime.
1028 See, supra, n. 960.
1029 "INC Climate Change Convention: First Discussions,"
supra, n. 965, p. 52.
1030 "Where Sununu Stands," New York Times, 10 September
1991, p. C9. See also, Al Gore, Jr., Earth In The Balance
(London: Earthscan, 1992), pp. 174-175, where Gore derides the
influence John Sununu maintained over White House policy on
global warming. It should be pointed out that Al Gore, as a
Democrat, is a political opponent of Sununu, a member of the
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that the United States would be more amenable to targets for
Co emissions. 0 I The United States, however, was steadfast
in its refusal to submit to CO2 targets, declaring a
'comprehensive approach" of all greenhouse sources and sinks
was mandated, and was supported on that front by other
states.iO3? Nevertheless, the decision of President Bush to
attend was given great attention by the press, perhaps
underlying the need for a leader state in the climate change
regime.
Once at UNCED, however, the leadership on climate change
became more-or-less up for grabs. The EC attempted to acquire
the role, drafting a document calling for firmer commitments
on the reduction of greenhouse gases than those present in the
climate change convention.' 034 Japan pledged to increase
foreign environmental aid.'° 35 The United States called on
Republican Party.
' ° 31 William K. Stevens, "Washington Odd Man Out, May Shift
On Climate, New York Times, 18 February 1992, p. Cl.
' ° 32 Notably, Norway. See, Bodansky, "INC 3 & 4: Draft
Convention on Climate Change," supra, n. 969, p. 10.
' ° 33 Bush's decision was "announced" in the British press
5 days before President Bush released a statement in
Washington, DC to that effect, perhaps revealing more of an
international concern than a (US) domestic concern regarding
his presence in Rio. See, Martin Walker, "Bush To Attend Rio
On Global Warming," Guardian (London), 8 May 1992, and Keith
Schneider, "Bush Plans To Join Other Leaders At Earth Summit
in Brazil in June," New York Times, 13 May 1992, p. A8.
' ° 34 "US Lashes Back at Summit," International Herald
Tribune, 10 June 1992, p. 1. The EC also pledged to increase
aid for environmental projects by $4 billion, but offered no
timetable. See, "Bush Takes The Offensive at Rio Summit,"
International Herald Tribune, 13-14 June 1992, p. 1.
'°' 5 Japan pledged to increase its foreign environmental aid
by an average of $1.45 billion per year, as well as try to
reduce its carbon dioxide emissions to 1990 levels by 2000.
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other states to come up with specific plans for combatting
greenhouse gases by 1 January 1993. ' Germany pledged to
increase development aid to 0.7% of its gross national
product, although did not offer a timetable for doing so,
pointing to the financial burden of reunification. No
one state, then, could be said to have emerged as a leader at
UNCED.
Regarding future leadership, the European Community might
be expected to assume such a role; The European Commission
See, Paul Lewis, "Negotiators In Rio Agree To Increase Aid to
Third World," New York Times, 14 June 1992, Section 1, pp. 1
and 10, and "Japan Pledges $7 Billion Toward Earth Summit
Goals," Asbury Park Press (NJ), 14 June 1992, p. A7.
The Japanese government has also begun an inquiry into
the environmental policies of Japanese firms abroad. See,
"Japan Investigates "Pollution Exports'," International Herald
Tribune 14 July 1992, p. 15.
However, the Japanese Prime Minster did not attend UNCED,
because of internal disputes relating to how much Japan could
afford to spend to finance environmental protection abroad, as
well as a split within the Japanese business community between
those seeking regulations and those wishing to avoid
restrictions. There was also a parliamentary distraction
relating to the deployment of troops abroad. See T.R. Reid,
"Japan Hasn't Found Act It Needs To Star In Rio,"
International Herald Tribune, 3 June 1992, p. 2.
'° 36 "Bush Takes The Offensive At Rio Summit," International
Herald Tribune, 13-14 June 1992, P. 1. The US pledged an
additional $150 million, for a total of $270 million annually,
for other nations' forestry programs. See, Michael Wines,
"Bush Offers Plan To Save Forests," New York Times, 2 June
1992, p. Al. But see also, Earth Summit, supra, n. 71, p.
448, pointing out that the United States argued that since it
had never agreed to the overall UN Official Development
Assistance target of 0.7% GNP, then it could not re-affirm a
commitment it had never made.
'° 37 Paul Lewis, "Negotiators In Rio Agree To Increase Aid
To Third World," New York Times, 14 June 1992, section 1, pp.
1 and 10. The UK and Japan also agreed to move towards the
target, but also did not commit to a timetable. The US did not
accept the commitment. See supra, n. 971.
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has proposed to introduce carbon taxes.' 1' 3 Unfortunately,
as of early 1993 the Community was still preoccupied with
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty as well as the Balkan
crisis.	 Japan, while pledging international aid, has not
taken much more initiative, and Germany has been
preoccupied with the economic aspects of reunification. In
addition, the recent US National Academy of Sciences report
which states that adaptation to global warming is possible for
the United States and similarly situated industrialised
states, t04° does not exactly propel states into adopting a
leadership role.
While no state can as yet claim a clear leadership role
in the climate change regime comparable to that of the United
States in the ozone negotiations, t041 it does not necessarily
mean that one state will not emerge eventually.' 042	The
'° 38 See, Draft Directive, Official Journal 1992 No. C
196/1, submitted 2 June 1992. But, see also, infra, n. 1068.
'° 39 See, Andrew Pollack, "Ecological Savior Abroad, Japan
Lags at Home," International Herald Tribune, 1-2 August 1992,
pp. 1-2, where the author quotes Naomi Kamei, Japanese
coordinator for Friends of the Earth, as stating: "[w]e don't
quote our membership, it's so low."
to4oSee Cline, Global Warming : The Economic Stakes
(Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1992),
pp. 49-50, and National Academy of Sciences, Policy
Implications of Greenhouse Warming (Washington, DC: National
Academy Press), p. 68.
'° 4t See, supra, Chapter 5, Section 5.4.1, Leadership.
'° 42 State leadership is different from the initiatives of
an international organisation, discussed, infra. They are
separate catalysts in a regime.
While individuals may also assume a leadership role, he
or she ultimately needs the backing of either a state or an
international organisation in order to bring legitimacy to the
issue-area. For example, Mostapha Tolba, head of the UN
Environment Programme, was credited with an instrumental role
in the ozone negotiations. Richard Elliot Benedick, Ozone
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issue is so much more complex in terms of economics, science
and development, that it is difficult for a state to take a
lead when so much remains uncertain. ' Indeed, the
environment is only one of several important policy areas
where the world's leaders are unable to reach accord. '
Although any state can strive for a leadership position,
as the then Senator Al Gore pointed out:
It is safe to say that if. . . [the US] do[es] not
lead the world on this issue [of global warming],
the chances of accomplishing the massive changes
necessary to save the global environment will be
negligible. If the United States does choose to
lead, however, the possibility of success becomes
Diplomacy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), p. 6.
Some individuals at the Rio Summit emerged as
international powerbrokers, India's Minster of Environment,
Kamal Nath; Singapore Ambassador-at-Large Tommy Koh; and the
Malaysian chief negotiator, Wen Lian Ting, nicknamed the
"Dragon Lady" for her notorious negotiating skills. See, James
Brooke, "Delegates From 4 Nations Warm to a High-Profile Role:
Global Powerbroker," New York Times, 12 June 1992, p. AlO.
In addition, the Administrator of the US Environmental
Protection Agency, William Kane Reilly, was highly regarded as
having represented environmental interests within a perceived
anti-environmental Bush Administration. See, Keith Schneider,
"US Chief at Summit Walks a Tightrope," International Herald
Tribune, 3 June 1992, p. 2.
t04]Interestingly environmental leadership might evolve
from national security concerns. See, for example, former US
President Jimmy Carter, "Redefining Security For The 90's,"
International Herald Tribune, 9 July 1991, p. 6, Michael
Oppenheimer, "Don't Miss the Green Bandwagon," International
Herald Tribune, 30 March 1990, and Philip Shabecoff, quoting
US Senator Sam Nunn calling environmental destruction "a
growing national security threat," in "Security Shift To
Ecology Seen," International Herald Tribune, 30 June-i July,
1990, p. 4.
'° 44 See, Tom Redburn, "Unpopular G-7 Leaders Keep Bickering
on Issues," International Herald Tribune , 6 July 1992, pp. 1
and 9, where the author points out some of the issues where
the G-7 states are at odds: world trade, aid to former Soviet
republics, global economy, national security and relations
with other states, and the environment.
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much greater.
While this may be a result of fact that the United States
is presently the largest contributor of greenhouse gas
emissions rather than possessing any unique leadership
attributes, US leadership would surely act as a catalyst for
further negotiations.'° 47 The United States was the first
state to have produced the action plan required under the
Climate Change Convention,' 048 meeting the US proposal for
' 45 Gore, Earth In The Balance, supra, n. 1030, pp. 176-
177.
° 4t'National Academy of Sciences, Policy Implications of
Global Warming , supra, n. 1040, p. 7. On a per capita
emissions basis, however, the US falls to 9th overall, behind
Canada and Brazil, among others. See, Robin Churchill,
"Controlling Emissions of Greenhouse Gases," in International
Law and Climate Change, ed. Robin Churchill and David
Freestone (London: Graham & Trotman, 1991), p. 150.
° 47 The perceived need for an active US role in climate
change negotiations is further evidenced by action taken by UN
officials during the UNCED conference, fearing demonstrations
against President Bush, to close the Rio conference centre to
representatives of private environmental groups and to sharply
reduce the number of accredited delegations. An EC spokesman
cautioned: "We don't want a slugging match of everybody
against the US." See, James Brooke, "To Protect Bush, UN Will
Limit Access To Talks," New York Times, 8 June 1992, p. A5.
See, also, Earth Summit, supra, n. 971, p. 79, where the
commentator, alluding to the undermining of the environmental
credibility of the United States at UNCED, noted that while
"dumping on the US always makes good copy," "the isolation of
the US was one of the least satisfactory aspects of the Rio
Conference and one where the world as a whole may pay the
price for a long time to come."
° 48 US Department of State, National Action Plan for Global
Climate Change (Washington, DC: Dept. of State, 1992),
presented at the 6th session of the INC. Geneva, December
1992. See also, Andrew Warren, "Lesson From America," Guardian
(London), 19 June 1992, p. 27, which notes that the US has
already adopted the world's most stringent clean air
legislation and has set out a range of federal energy saving
programmes, projected to save between 125 and 200 million tons
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states to do so before 1 January 1993. 	 It could very
well be that the US may eventually emerge as a leader on this
issue, particularly as the US Vice President has
championed the environment as part of his political
career.
of greenhouse gas emissions by the year 2000. In addition,
many US states are introducing global warming amelioration
programmes.
'° 4' See, Statement of President Bush, "International
Cooperation on Environment and Development," address to UNCED,
Rio de Janeiro, 12 June 1992 proposing the completion of
national action plans by 1 January 1993. See, also, "Bush
Takes The Offensive At Rio Summit," International Herald
Tribune, 13-14 June 1992, p. 1. The US also pledged an
additional $150 million, for a total of $270 million annually,
for other nations' forestry programs. See, Michael Wines,
"Bush Offers Plan To Save Forests," New York Times, 2 June
1992, p. Al.
t050 See, ABC News This Week with David Brinkley, Transcript
#553, 31 May 1992, statement of William Reilly, US EPA
Administrator, where Mr. Reilly stated that "there's no
question that we have made a commitment in the climate
convention.., to move toward stabilization of greenhouse
gases.... We are now going to undertake the efforts. We've
already begun them." See, also, William K. Reilly, "Aiming
Before We Shoot: The Quiet Revolution in Environmental
Policy," speech delivered at the National Press Club,
Washington, DC, 26 September 1990.
1051 See, Gore, Earth In The Balance, supra, n. 1030. As a
self-proclaimed environmentalist, Vice-President Gore may be
in a strong position to broaden the influence of science, thus
strengthening that critical issue within the climate change
regime. Yet it is important to remember that he is not a
scientist and thus not a member of that epistemic community as
such. Rather, he is a politician whose ambitions differ from
those of the scientific epistemic community. See, supra,
Chapter 4, Section 4.1.1.2, Overcoming Scientific Uncertainty.
President Clinton has also committed the United States to
reducing US greenhouse gas emissions to their 1990 levels by
the year 2000. See, "Remarks By the President in Earth Day
Speech," US Botanical Gardens, Washington, DC, 21 April 1992,
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary. To that end,
the President has called for US $1.9 billion in government
spending to help meet that committment, see "Curbing
Greenhouse Gas," International Herald Tribune, 9 November
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6.4.2	 International Non-state Actors
International non-state actors have taken a great
interest in the climate change issue, both governmental and
nongovernmental, as well as transnational corporations. These
organisations can often prod individual states into action,
when initiative within state governments is lacking.
UNEP acted as a catalyst in the formation of the climate
change regime by co-sponsoring the Villach and Bellagio
workshops on global warming, as well as the IPCC, which
undertook scientific and policy studies in preparation for a
climate change convention. However, primary responsibility
for the negotiating of a climate change convention was
effectively stripped from UNEP, and given to the ad-hoc UN
body, the International Negotiating Committee, which reported
directly to the UN General Assembly.'° 52 This move, along
with the name given to the Rio Conference as the UN Conference
on Environment and Development, was intended to afford greater
influence to the developing world.' 051 Nevertheless, UNEP
helped place environment near the top of the world agenda,
with the help of the media.'° 54
 Thus it appears that the
role of the UNEP has been a catalysing factor, and will
continue to be, in the climate change area.
The World Bank's role as administrator of the GEF, which
1993, p. 4.
'° 52 See, supra, n. 959.
'° 53 See, Gareth Porter and 3anet Welsh Brown, Global
Environmental Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991),
pp. 50-51.
' 4 See, William K. Stevens, "Rio Raises Environment Issue
To Lasting World-Class Status," International Herald Tribune,
15 3une 1992, p. 2.
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is serving as the interim operator of the financial mechanism
of the FCCC, was discussed above. '' Its role as a catalyst
in the development of the regime should remain, barring some
unexpected development regarding the GEF. Commenting several
weeks after the conclusion of UNCED, the International
Institute for Economics stated: "Of the international
organizations, the World Bank emerged as a clear winner...
Despite objections from the G77 about the Bank's lack of
democratic accountability, there is essentially no other
financial mechanism available that inspires the confidence of
donors. "°
NGOs have also played a catalytic role in both the
creation and the development of the climate change
regime.'° 57
 One commentator described their role at UNCED as
more active and more influential within intergovernmental
negotiations than ever before.'° 58
	ICSU played a catalytic
105 See, supra, Section 6.1, International Action Regarding
Climate Change, and Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2, International
Non-state Actors.
lo5bPerspectives No. 9 (1992), quoted in The Earth Summit,
supra, n. 971, P. 487.
'° 57 See, for instance, David Tolbert, "Climate Change and
the Role of International Non-Governmental Organisations," in
International Law and Global Climate Change, ed. Robin
Churchill and David Freestone (London: Graham & Trotman,
1991), pp. 95-108.
'See, Richard E. Benedick, "Behind the Diplomatic
Curtain: Inner Workings of the New Global Negotiations,"
Columbia Journal of World Business Vol. 27, No. 3,4
(Fall/Winter 1992), pp. 52-61.
Two NGOs, Kyote Forum and EcoFund '92, published on a
daily basis Earth Summit Times, the official newspaper of
UNCED.
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role in its sponsorship of the Villach Conference.
Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth are positioning to
continue their role as advocates of a safer climate,
particularly in influencing public opinion.
	 At UNCED,
although "some governments could be heard to grumble about the
'privileges' granted to the NGOs," their inclusion was
guaranteed by the Conference Secretary General,° 61
 thus
ensuring the voice of NGOs in the process and contributing to
public opinion.
Public opinion, as every politician realises, can be an
important motivational tool. Should the public decide that
climate change is a concern that they would prefer their
respective governments to take a more active role in, then it
is highly probable that governments will sit up and take
notice.
Business is also not immune to public opinion: "the
'°"See, supra, this Chapter, Section 6.1, International
Action Regarding Climate Change, supra, Chapter 4, Section
4.2.2.2, Non-governmental Organisations.
'° 60 See, supra, Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2.2, Non-
governmental Organisations. One commentator warns, however,
that consumer pressure is a fragile force, see Frances
Cairncross, "UNCED, Environmentalism and Beyond," Columbia
Journal of World Business Vol. 27, No. 3,4 (Fall/Winter 1992),
pp. 12-17. Nevertheless, in response to public pressure, the
US EPA has created an Office of Environmental Equity an
Environmental Justice Bill has been introduced in the US
Congress in response to growing awareness of environmental
risks. Source, The District of Columbia (US) Bar, Environment,
Energy and Natural Resources Section.
Interestingly, a study released in October 1992 by the
Environmental Research Associates, Princeton, NJ, revealed the
role of children in influencing their parents' attitude
towards the environment. See, Ruth M. Bono, "In the Ozone, A
Child Shall Lead Them, New York Times, 10 January 1993,
section 4A, p. 7.
'°"The Earth Summit, supra, n. 971, pp. 9-10.
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pressures to perform environmentally are not just to meet the
law but to meet public expectations, which goes beyond what is
required by law.1,a62 The potential catalytic role of
transnational corporations and industry in the role of the
regime was acknowledged when the Secretary-General of UNCED
requested an adviser for business and industry. 1 The
central message of this adviser was that "what was good for
the environment was (probably) good for the business as
well. 1064
More and more, corporations are realising the importance
of reconciling business goals with environmental goals,'°65
'° 62 See, Diedre Carmody, quoting Don Verrico, manager of
environmental communications at the DuPont Company,
"'Greening' of the Business Magazine," New York Times, 16
November 1992, p. D6.
'° 63 See, Schmidheiny, Changing Course, supra, n. 1013.
1064 Earth Summit, supra, n. 971, p. 10.
106 See, for example, the special issue of Columbia Journal
of World Business Vol. 47, No. 3/4 (Fall/Winter 1992)
concentrating on "corporate environmentalism," particularly
Richard Poduska et al, "The Challenge of Sustainable
Development: Kodak's Response," pp. 286-291.
See, also, AT&T, An Investment In Our Future, An AT&T
Environment & Safety Report, November 1991, outlining its
pollution prevention program utilising benchmarking processes.
Lenchinarking in research and development, whereby goals and
improvement opportunities are outlined, is becoming an
increasingly important management tool and can be adapted to
environmental concerns as AT&T has shown. See, Thomas J. Bean
and Jacques G. Gros, "R&D Benchmarking at AT&T," Research-
Technology Management Vol. 35, No. 4 (July-August 1992).
See, also, "Management Brief: Food For Thought,"
Economist, 29 August 1992, pp. 62-64, a case study examining
the way McDonald's coped with protests about environmental
damage caused by the fast-food industry.
See, also, Erik Ipsen, "A Royal Plan to Drape the World's
Hotels in Green," International Herald Tribune, 21 May 1993,
p. 1. describing the Prince of Wales Business Leaders Forum's
International Hotels Environmental Initiative. The Forum'
directors include the heads of Coca-Cola Co. and British
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or what Schmidheiny referred to as "eco-efficiency."
While these environmental concerns of businesses to date may
not be specific to climate change, they reflect a shift in
attitude which may eventually incorporate climate change
concerns more specifically.
6.4.3 Domestic Regulations
Domestic environmental regulations have the potential to
foster international regulations in the same area. There is
a hint of activity in this area in the United States where a
lawsuit was recently filed against the US EPA for failure to
implement strong enough regulations for pollutants that cause
climate change, required under the Clean Air Act.'° If the
EPA were to be legally bound to do so, this would surely act
as a catalyst for the United States to seek international
regulations of the same strength in order to protect its
economic interests. Thus, domestic regulations remain a
potential catalytic tool in the climate change regime, at
least in those states where strict domestic regulations are
enforced by a stringent legal system. However, at this point
in the climate change regime, domestic regulations have not
proven catalytic, since substantive legislative proposals from
major greenhouse gas contributors have either not materialised
or are conditional on similar action from other states. °
Petroleum PLC.
'° 66 See, The Earth Summit, supra, n. 971, p. 10.
Lo67The case is still pending. In a similar case decided
August 1990, the US Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit found that while petitioners had standing to
sue, their challenged failed on the merits, 286 US App DC 78.
to€8For example, an EC proposal to introduce carbon taxes,
supra, n. 1038, is conditional on the United States and Japan
doing the same. The United States has shown no signs of doing
so and Japan has decided against a tax for the time being: "In
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6.4.4	 Crisis
The climate change regime has failed to acquire the same
sense of urgency as the ozone layer depletion regime.
Although certain low-lying states feel quite differently about
the matter, the effects are still perceived as too remote, at
least among the western industrialised states whose
participation is critical, to evoke the sense of crisis
necessary to stimulate action. While scientists are sure of
a warming trend, they are still unsure as to the cause
possible ramifications.'° 6 Thus, the Villach Conference,
the Toronto Conference, the UNCED negotiations, as well as the
overall regime, lacked the same urgency of action. Until that
time, the view of climate change may very well be "apocalypse
tomorrow-but there is plenty of jam today."°1°
6.5 Compliance in the Climate Change Regime
Compared to the ozone layer depletion regime, compliance
mechanisms are not in place to the same degree. However,
while the ozone layer depletion regime may be more straight
forward on this point, this is not to say that the climate
change regime does not provide for compliance at all. Even
without mechanisms fully in place (and thus the greater
emphasis in this chapter than in the last on the evolving
aspects of compliance within the regime) the climate change
regime has begun to provide for compliance.
the event that such an initiative lacks international
conformity, it would invite the international migration of
industry." See, Robert Thomson, "Japan Hedges on Carbon Tax,"
Financial Times (London), 9 December 1992, p. 14.
'° 69 See, Chapter 1, supra, Section 1.2.1, Climate Change.
'° 10 Peter Wilby, "Apocalypse Tomorrow-But There Is Plenty
Of Jam Today," Independent on Sunday (London), 11 November
1990, p. 20.
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6.5.1	 Evolution of Norms and Rules
Within international law, compliance is expected when
there are legal rules laid out for state behaviour. Regimes
provide an extremely conducive atmosphere for the evolution of
normative behaviour into legal rules, as cognitive
expectations lead to normative or shared expectations
regarding future behaviour.'07'
The FCCC itself is the tangible result of the evolution
of cognitive expectations into rules, albeit weak rules at
this stage in the development of the regime. The Villach,
Toronto and World Climate Conferences, the INC negotiating
sessions, and the many meetings leading up to UNCED all aided
this evolution for expected state behaviour.'" 2 The
expectation that developed states must at least "aim" to
control greenhouse gas emissions at 1990 levels is now
codified in the FCCC.'° 73
 From this Convention, protocols
can be added as normative or shared expectations develop, thus
providing a mode of evolution for new regulations. Richard
Benedick, who, as chief US negotiator for the ozone treaty has
first-hand experience of environmental negotiation, stated
that the Rio Conference on climate change "should not be
judged by immediate results, but by the process it sets in
motion," namely the evolution of normative expectations.""4
Thus, as cognitive expectations emerge regarding the
'° 7t See, supra, Chapter 3, Section 3.4, Maintenance or
Development of Regimes.
° 72 See, supra, this Chapter, Section 6.1, International
Action Regarding Climate Change.
'° 71 See, supra, FCCC, Art. 4(2)b, n. 922.
' 4 Stevens, "Rio Raises Environment Issue To Lasting
World-Class Status," supra, n. 1054, p. 2.
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critical issues of the regime, then normative expectations or
obligations will ensue. While these obligations will
eventually harden into formal law, at certain times the
obligation will not rise to that level if the degree of
consensus cannot yet support more, as is the case with the
climate change regime.
6.5.2	 Dispute Settlement Mechanisms
Dispute settlement is obviously important to the climate
change regime, and is probably the most difficult aspect of
the regime to administer. There are provisions in the regime
convention for the reporting of information regarding
implementation to the Conference of the Parties.107
As of now, settlement of disputes between any 2 or more
parties regarding the interpretation or application of the
Convention is to be resolved through negotiation or any other
peaceful means of their choice.!Olb States may agree to
submit disputes to the International Court of Justice or to
arbitration in accordance with procedures to be adopted by the
Conference of the Parties as soon as possible.'°7'
Submission to the ICJ does not seem likely, given the past
practice of states and is present in the Convention more as
legal "boilerplate," just as it is similarly present in the
Vienna Ozone Convention.' 078	The agreement, following the
Vienna Ozone Convention, goes on to say that if states have
'° 75 See, supra, FCCC, Art. 12. n. 622.
'° 76 Ibid., Art. 14(1).
° 77 Ibid., Art. 14(2).
'° 78 Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer,
International Legal Materials, Vol.26, No. 6 (1987), pp. 1516-
1540, Art. 11.
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not been able to settle a dispute within 12 months, then any
of the disputing parties may request conciliation. A
conciliation commission shall then be created chosen by the
parties concerned, which shall give a recommendation to be
considered in good fajth.°	 The Convention requires
additional procedures relating to conciliation to be
adopted. 11)8))
The Convention may follow the example of the non-
compliance procedure agreed upon in the Copenhagen Adjustments
to the Montreal Protocol, although this cannot be
assumed.'°81 Regulations arrived at and adjusted by
agreement of the parties tend to limit the "sphere of
autointerpretation by the states of their obligations."1082
Although compliance can never be guaranteed, it stands to
reason that where states have worked out the rules of the game
for themselves which they believe are legitimate, non-
compliance will probably be less than if states were not
involved in the rulemaking process. At this time, however,
such a mechanism does not yet exist within the climate change
regime.
bol5, FCCC, supra, n. 922, Art. 14(5), (6).
'° 80 Ibid., Art. 15(7).
'° 8t See, supra, Chapter 5, Section 5.1, International
Action Regarding Ozone Layer Depletion. See, also, Daniel
Bodansky, "The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change: A Commentary," The Yale Journal of International Law
Vol. 18, No. 2 (Summer 1993), p. 548 where the author states
a significant degree of consensus has emerged on creating such
a mechanism.
108 'Oscar Schachter, International Law In Theory and
Practice (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1991), p.
75.
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6.5.3	 Accountability and Transparency
Because rule-making and dispute settlement are internal
to a regime, accountability and transparency are very
important considerations. The climate change regime to date
has begun to deal with accountability through reporting
and targets, ° albeit very loosely, as well as provisions
for further negotiation.boR5
Internal accountability is very important since
compliance with international law is ultimately based on
cooperation and good will, particularly when the issue at
hand, namely greenhouse gas emission reduction, is still very
contentious. As the regime gains strength and overcomes
uncertainty, so will the reporting requirements, thus assuring
greater accountability and transparency as to non-conformance.
6.5.4	 Exclusion and Conditional Cooperation
Exclusion, in the form of trade bans, from the climate
change regime is most likely not possible at this time, since
the sources of greenhouse warming are too many to allow for
feasible trade bans. If trade restrictions did manage to
evolve, trade with non-parties "would have a major impact on
the principles of the multilateral trading system," due to the
vast requirements that would be necessary to regulate the
'° 83 See, supra, FCCC, Art. 12, n. 922.
'° 84 Ibid., Art. 4(2)b.
t085 The convention allows for review of the provisions.
Art. 4(2)d, Art. 15. The dates for the reviews were chosen to
correspond to the anticipated dates for completion of the next
IPCC assessments, late 1994 to mid-1955 for the 2nd full
assessment and 1998 for the third. See, R.A.
Reinstein,"Climate Negotiations," The Washin gton Quarterly
Vol. 16, No. 1 (Winter 1993), pp. 92-93.
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trade.	 Concerned by this, GATT has adopted a programme
on the follow-up of UNCED regarding trade results.
It will be difficult, therefore, to sanction free-riders
to the regime, which makes cooperation all the more
important. But states can hedge their bets by making their
cooperation conditional on other states' acquiescence to the
regime's regulations. Thus, conditional cooperation can play
a large factor in the regime since parties are likely to base
compliance on the mutual compliance of other party
members.
'°'See, Alice Enders and Amelia Forges, "Successful
Conventions," in The Greening of World Trade Issues (London:
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992) pp. 141-142.
lOB These include the GATT Committee on Trade and
Development to promote sustainable development through trade
liberalization and the GATT Group on Environmental Measures
and International Trade to be involved with making trade and
environmental policies mutually supportive. See, "GATT to Play
an Active Role in UNCED Follow-up," Focus: GATT Newsletter No.
96 (January-February 1993), p. 5. GATT, however, while
allowing trade restriction on products whose use or presence
causes pollution, views the setting of production and process
standards as being done through international bodies
possessing competence on environmental matters, and not
through GATT. There is nothing in the GATT or in the draft
Uruguay Round text permitting trade restrictions based on
production methods. See, "Trade and the Environment," excerpts
from an address by GATT Deputy Director-General Charles R.
Carlisle, Focus: GATT Newsletter No. 97 (March 1993), p. 4.
'° 88 Abram Chayes and Antonia Chayes argue that "the free-
rider problem has been overestimated," since (citing Mancur
Olson) "if the benefits of the collective good to one or a
group of parties outweigh the costs to them of providing the
good, they will continue to bear the costs regardless of the
defections of others." On Compliance Vol. 47, No. 2 (Spring
1993), p. 201.
supra, Chapter 3, Section 3.6.4, Conditional
Cooperation and Exclusion.
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6.6 The Legal Status of the Climate Change Regime
With the adoption of the FCCC, the climate change regime
undoubtedly entered into the realm of binding international
law. But as with ozone layer depletion, formation of the
regime came before a treaty was negotiated. Instead, this
thesis argues that formation of the climate change regime came
about with the creation of the International Negotiating
Committee (INC)
In keeping with the requirements of regime formation laid
out in this thesis and following the policy-oriented approach
to international law, formation and legal obligations ensue
from the creation of shared expectations regarding future
behaviour.' 09' The formation of the climate change regime
created an obligation among its members to combat climate
change, with the accompanying expectation of future
commitments in order to fulfil that obligation. In order to
illustrate this, it is necessary to once again identify the
various phases of the lawmaking process as adhered to by the
policy-oriented school. These are the participants, their
subjectivities, the situations where subjectivities are
mediated and expectations about authority and control are
shaped, the resources available to the participants, the
strategies of communication used, and the outcomes in shared
expectations •1092
' ° 90Supra, this Chapter, Section 6.2, Formation of the
Climate Change Regime.
' ° 91 See, supra, Chapter 3, Section 3.3, Formation of
Regimes.
' ° 92 See, supra, Chapter 2, Section 2.3, Policy-Oriented
Lawmaking.
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6.6.1 Participants
As described above regarding international action on
climate change, a number of significant international
initiatives took place leading to the establishment of the
INC. The most important of these were the Villach Conference,
the World Conference on the Changing Atmosphere, the Ottawa
Meeting, the Hague and Noordwijk conferences, as well as the
World Climate Conferences. The IPCC also contributed to the
prescriptive process. In addition, UNGA Resolutions
contributed to the creation of the climate change regime and
the ensuing legal obligations.t094
The principal participants in these initiatives included
states. The fact that these state participants also represent
the principal participants among the target audience is also
important, since it is the expectations of the target audience
that are critical to law-making.'°" International
organisations, both governmental and non-governmental,
particularly UNEP, WMO and ICSU also played a large role.t0'
6.6.2 Subjectivities
An analysis of the subjectivities of the participants, or
perceptions about the content of their communications reveal
attitudes indicating an intent to combat climate change.
Since the subjectivities of one participant are not open for
'° 91 See, supra, this Chapter, Section 6.1, International
Action Regarding Climate Change.
'°94Ibid.
° 45 See supra, Chapter 2, Section 2.1.3 Policy-Oriented
School.
°96Ibid.
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direct examination by another, they can only be ascertained
from a contextual analysis of past behaviour. From the
international action concerning climate change, the pattern of
behaviour is that of states seeking international regulation
of greenhouse gases. At Toronto, an Action Plan for the
Protection of the Atmosphere was called for, in Ottawa the
legal and policy experts called for the development of the
legal and institutional framework for a climate change
convention. At Noordwijk, the Declaration acknowledged in
principle the need to control greenhouse gas emissions with a
climate change convention. At Bergen, ministers pledged
support for a climate change convention and to establish
national strategies and/or targets to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions.
While the demands regarding degree of regulation varied
considerably'° 98 , the underlying expectation that states had
a duty to combat climate change was present throughout the
international activity described above. The UNGA Resolution
creating the INC provides evidence of this, and thus capped a
long display of behaviour by states towards the combatting of
climate change, through some as yet unknown degree of
regulation of greenhouse gas emissions.
6.6.3 Situations
The arenas or situations where the above subjectivities
were played out were formal and organised conferences, as well
'° 97 See, supra, Chapter 2, Section 2.3, Policy-Oriented
Lawmaking.
'° 98 The report of the IPCC Response Strategies Working
Group, Legal Measures: Report of Topic Coordinators,
emphasised this, stating: "views differ substantially on the
role and powers of the institutions to be created" by a
regulatory process. See, supra, n. 951.
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as meetings of the General Assembly. The extent of
international activity reveals that the interaction was not
infrequent or merely regional, thus indicating a general and
sustained pattern of behaviour that showed general support for
the asserted claim of combatting climate change through future
regulation of greenhouse gas emissions.
6.6.4 Resources or Bases of Power
Regarding resources, or knowledge and skill, scientific
knowledge was the most important resource in the hands of the
participants, since climate change is ultimately a scientific
problem.'° 9
 As such, the science was subject to
manipulation by the participants, both for and against
regulation."°° The IPCC played a large role with respect to
use of science as a resource, in effect raising the profile of
climate change with its warnings of dire consequences should
the problem go unheeded.'101
Economic and development knowledge have played a role in
the negotiation of the FCCC, and will continue to play a role
in the further development of the regime,"° 2
 particularly as
monetary costs become more clear. Those resources, however,
were not utilised to a significant degree in the formation of
the climate change regime, as they were not that necessary
since the general obligation to combat climate change was weak
and did not yet require any specific commitments.
supra, Chapter 1, Section 1.2.1, Climate Change.
"°°See, supra, this Chapter, Section 6.3.1, Scientific
Uncertainty.
supra, this Chapter, Section 6.1, International
Action Regarding Climate Change.
"° 2 See, supra, this Chapter, Sections 6.3.2 and 6.3.3,
Economic and Development Uncertainty.
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6.6.4 Strategies
The strategies used in generating the flow of words and
behaviour in the prescription process were relatively
explicit, ie declarations and UNGA resolutions. Thus,
diplomatic strategies on the international level were used.
Economic strategies were later utilised in the FCCC, with
regard to prospective aid for developing states in the
implementation of the regime."°4
6.6.6 Outcome
The outcome of the above ongoing process of interaction
is a prescription entailing a general obligation to combat
climate change, through the future regulation of greenhouse
gas emissions. As with the formation of the ozone layer
depletion regime, while the obligation is vague, it lays the
groundwork for more substantive obligations, as shared
expectations evolve.
As outlined in Chapter 2,"° the critical test for
determining legal obligation under the policy-oriented
approach is the existence and content of shared expectations
of politically relevant groups and individuals, that are
maintained by the continuation or abatement of communication
regarding the authority and control intentions of those whose
"° 3 See, supra, this Chapter, Section 6.1, International
Action Regarding Climate Change.
"° 4 Namely, the finance mechanism of the FCCC. See, supra,
this Chapter, Section 6.1, International Action Regarding
Climate Change.
hbosSupra, Chapter 2, Section 2.1.3, Policy-Oriented
School.
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support is essential for the norms' efficacy. ' If the
practice of states is perceived by the target audience as
having been carried out by appropriate entities and in an
appropriate manner, and is perceived as likely to be complied
with, then it can be characterised as "practice accepted by
law."'° 7
 The test in brief is one of authority (legitimacy)
and control (effectiveness).
The content of the norm giving rise to the climate change
regime had been ( and continues to be) constant: a general
obligation to combat climate change through the future control
or regulation of greenhouse gas emissions. While this is
certainly far short of specific targets and timetables, this
policy content that consistently comes through in the relevant
international activity taking place prior to and including the
creation of the INC."° 8
 As one observer of the climate
change regime process noted, the lack of firm commitments does
not prevent the implicit message that more stringent measures
may be on the way and that it is not business as usual. As
such, "a cautious government or business should already be
thinking about how to limit or switch away from its use of
fossil fuels."°°
IIObW Michael Reisman, "International Lawmaking: A Process
of Communication," Proceedings of the American Society of
International Law, April 1981, p. 113.
" ° 7 See, supra, Chapter 2, Section 2.1.3, Policy-Oriented
Lawmaking.
1108 Supra, this Chapter, Section 6.1, International Action
Regarding Climate Change.
'°Bodansky, "Framework Convention on Climate Change,"
supra, n. 1081, p. 558. Professor Bodansky is in a good
position to evaluate the expectations of the participants in
the climate change regime, as this work is the culmination of
extensive research observing the INC process.
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The expectation that climate change is to be combatted
with the as-yet-undetermined degree of control of greenhouse
gas emissions needed to be (and must continue to be) sustained
through an ongoing authority signal and control intention.
As authority is necessary in order to distinguish a
prescription from demands backed up only by credible threats.
It is difficult to dispute the authority present in the
creation of the climate change regime - the individuals
involved acted in an official capacity for the states they
represented, as did those individuals associated with
international organisations, such as the United Nations and
its various bodies. In addition, the fact that these states
represented the principal participants among the target
audience is important, since it is the expectations of the
target audience that are critical to policy-oriented
lawmaking.
The capacity and willingness to make the prescription of
regulating greenhouse gas emissions effective was also present
at the formation of the climate change regime. While all the
international action concerning climate change was
important," the formation of the INC was the most
meaningful, as it best demonstrates the participants'
willingness to make the policy of controlling greenhouse gas
emissions meaningful. Control does not require unanimity or
even wide consensus, but requires enough interest and
willingness on the part of participants to make it effective.
The creation of the INC appears to meet this requirement, as
its sole purpose was to negotiate a framework convention on
supra, Chapter 2, Section 2.3, Policy-Oriented
Lawmaking.
"Supra, this Chapter, Section 6.1, International Action
Regarding Climate Change.
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climate change.
While the authority signal and control intention were
weak at the formation of the climate change regime, they were
present at a degree sufficient for the policy content
entailing a general obligation to combat climate change. As
such, it can be characterised as practice accepted as law, as
required for the formation of customary law, at least
under the policy-oriented approach. While "it is often
difficult to determine whether or not a new custom has
crystallized into international law, and, if so, at what
point, "4 the attempt must be made. This is particularly
true in the policy-oriented approach, which emphasises the
creation of shared expectations regarding future behaviour.
While it is easier to make the argument that the
formation of the climate change regime coincided with the
FCCC, a formal treaty undisputed as a source of international
law, making the more difficult argument that the regime was
formed prior to the FCCC allows for a greater view of the
scope of the legal order.
In so doing, "the what of inquiry is necessarily broader
than the what of conventional analysis." 5	This is not to
"2lbid.
" 3 See, supra, Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2, Customary Law.
" 4Birnie & Boyle, International Law & the Environment
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), P. 15.
" 5W Michael Reisman, "The View From the New Haven
School," in American Society of International Law: Proceedings
of the 86th Annual Meeting, by the American Society of
International Law, Washington, DC (1992), p. 121. Professor
Reisman's comment on the New Haven School underscores the
compatibility of the policy-oriented approach and regime
theory, as both seek a wider explanation of why states
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say that the legitimate process of lawmaking is ignored. It
is, however, a view of lawmaking that requires an acceptance
of the policy-oriented approach. Without this viewpoint,
regime study is still useful to legal scholars, but
unnecessarily restricts the study of law by excluding
communications conveying authoritative information about
community policies that can be designated as law, so long as
it is both consistent with the expectations of legitimacy by
the target audience (authoritative decisions) and effective
(controlling).
6.7 Evaluation of the Climate Change Regime
The above discussion illustrates that the climate change
regime, even with the FCCC, does not yet have substantive
obligations. General reporting requirements and an "aim" to
return to 1990 emission levels are certainly not very
substantive. This is because uncertainty surrounding critical
issues has not yet been overcome to a degree sufficient to
shape cognitive expectations, which in turn shape normative or
shared expectations regarding future behaviour. In addition,
while transnational organisations are starting to catalyse the
regime development, the catalysts of leadership, domestic
regulations and a sense of crisis are missing.
An analysis of the compliance mechanisms reveals that
while there are mechanisms for accountability, the evolution
of rules and dispute settlement mechanisms are weak, and
exclusion mechanisms are not yet in place.
An objective, overall assessment of the climate change
regime, then, reveals that it is regulatory-weak. This does
not, however, mean that there are no prospects for
cooperate than traditional theories do.
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improvement. The regime is in place, and will evolve should
shared expectations evolve as well. ' How the regime
evolves (ie in a progressive or a regressive manner) depends
on the expectations involved. If expectations do not evolve,
then neither will the regime. While the climate change regime
may not appear to be of much value in terms of substantive
regulations at this point in its development, the regime in
its present (and past) state highlights part of the
international legal order often overlooked. By revealing the
presence of the regime, the presence of the legal order is
also revealed and thereby strengthened.
While realist sceptics may disparage this "legal
presence" as little more than an academic exercise in a futile
search for evidence of an international legal order, it is
difficult to ignore that the shared expectations of combatting
climate change necessarily had to be in place for the FCCC to
come into existence and for its future evolution. The
important point is that there is a path or a process (ie
regime formation and maintenance) to substantive legal
regulations - a path that if overlooked, may prevent the
reaching of one's destination.
111&While the media coverage of the UNCED conference
portrayed a sense of failure; see, for example, Nicholas
Schoon, "Fog of Self-Interest Blocks Views From Rio,"
Independent on Sunday (London), 14 June 1992, p. 12, Barbara
Crossette, "A Rio Lesson: Nations and Grass Roots Are Often
Poles Apart," International Herald Tribune, 16 June 1992, p.
4., and Harvey Morris, "Pessimists Fear That History May Well
Repeat Itself," Independent (London), 3 June 1992, p. 10, it
is the view of this thesis that successful groundwork has been
laid for the development of a climate change regime.
328
CHAPTER 7
"International relations and foreign policy, then, depend on
a legal order, operate in a legal framework, assume a host
of legal principles and concepts which shape the policies of
nations and limit national behaviour." I
THE FUTURE OF REGIMES IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
While the detailed study of regimes within the
international legal order may be relatively new,m8 regimes
themselves are not a new phenomena. Indeed, regimes are
present wherever states share expectations regarding their
future behaviour concerning the regulation of an issue-area.
These shared expectations, in the sense that the policy-
oriented school interprets that phrase," 9 create legal
obligations. As a result, regimes provide a rich source of
material for the study of the international legal order, as
they allow for the analysis of how and why states undertake
lawmaking. It is appropriate, then, for international law to
take account of this concept.
7.1 The Limitations of Traditional International Legal Theory
The classic international legal paradigm whereby binding
rules are derived from the sources of treaties, customary law,
or general principles of law is not wrong, but is incomplete.
" 7 Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave, 2d ed. (NY: Columbia
University Press, 1979), p. 22.
"'As mentioned in Chapter 3, Section 3.1, Introduction
to International Regimes, supra, the study of regimes in the
context of international law with regard to the conceptual and
theoretical issues of regime theory, until quite recently, was
virtually non-existent.
supra, Chapter 2, Sections 2.1.3, Policy-Oriented
School and 2.3, Policy-Oriented Lawmaking.
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In an attempt to rectify this, the policy-oriented approach to
international law takes full account of all aspects of the
decision-making process within the international legal order.
This is particularly important in the light of such present
day scenarios as implicit understandings between states,
social revolutions overturning traditional orders, the
interdependence of states, the permeability between the
domestic and international affairs of a state, and the
expansion of science and technology which has given way to
informal standard setting."2°
The policy-oriented view of international law as an
ongoing process where policy content, an authority signal and
a control intention are necessarily present, attempts to
explain how law is made. This is important to the legal
scholar, since, "if we fail to learn how to prescribe, the
individual and collective consequences may be grave."2'
However, the school is "concerned not only with the processes
in which certain policies that self-describe as law are made,
but with the aggregate of processes in a community by which
political perspectives at varying levels of consciousness are
shaped and changed." 122 It is this concern that makes the
school amenable to the use of regime theory;" 23 indeed, the
" 20 Chapter 2, supra, n. 167.
" 21 W. Michael Reisman, "International Lawmaking: A Process
of Communication," Proceedings of the American Society of
International Law, April 1981, p. 103.
''22Ibid.
" 23 See, Michael G. Schechter, "The New Haven School of
International Law, Regime Theorists, Their Critics and
Beyond," paper given at the annual meeting of the
International Studies Association, 26 March 1993.
330
school's definition of what it calls an arena t4
 (or a
social situation specialised to the shaping and sharing of
power outcomes) is strikingly similar to that which
international	 relations	 specialists	 have	 labelled
regimes.' 1
 Within that arena, there is a decision-making
process in which lawmaking occurs, a process of great
importance to legal scholars.
7.2 The Concept of Regimes As Part of the International Legal
Order
The concept of regimes was discussed above as the process
of development of legal regulations by both state and non-
state actors through collective decision-making, governing a
specific issue-area and creating legal obligations among the
actors.
Regimes are formed when shared expectations exist
regarding future behaviour. t127
 As a result, regimes fit
within the policy-oriented approach to international law,
which views the legal order as a process of decision-making
" 24 "The identifying characteristic of an arena is a
structure of expectations shard among the members of a
community." Myres S. McDougal and Harold Lasswell, "The
Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public
Order," American Journal of International Law Vol. 53, No. 1
(January 1959), p. 8.
" 25Regimes are "principles, norms, rules and decision-
making procedures around which actor expectations converge in
a given issue-area." Stephen Krasner, "Structural Causes and
Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables," in
International Regimes ed. Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press 1983), p. 1.
l2bSee supra, Chapter 3, Section 3.2, Definition of
Regimes.
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and not lust as a set of rules. Although these shared
expectations are difficult at times for states to achieve, (as
well as for scholars to identify) it is a critical aspect,
since:
The strongest circumstantial evidence for the sense of an
obligation.., is the care that states take in
negotiating 129 [these shared expectations].
As cognitive expectations evolve with respect to critical
issues, then normative or shared expectations governing state
behaviour regarding the issue-area are shaped and the regime
is further developed," 30
 so long as the elements of
authority and control remain present.
How uncertainty regarding critical issues is overcome is
specific to the regime and the nature of the critical issues.
In general, however, the flexibility of the regime in adapting
to changing knowledge is important, particularly when
knowledge is rapidly acquired. Catalysts can aid in the
formation and maintenance of the regime, helping to overcome
uncertainty, but are not critical to the regime itself."
" 28 See supra, Chapter 3, Section 3.5, Legal Status of
Regimes.
" 29Abram Chayes and Antonia Chayes, "On Compliance,"
International Or ganization Vol. 47, No. 2 (Spring 1993), p.
186. While the authors were speaking of treaties, they were
alluding to very weak treaty obligations. In that respect,
their comments are applicable to regime formation.
""Chapter 2, Section 2.1.3, Policy-Oriented School and
2.3, Policy-Oriented Lawmaking, Chapter 3, Sections 3.2,
Definition, 3.3, Formation, and 3.4, Maintenance of Regimes,
and Chapter 4 with regard to critical issues concerning
development, supra. See, also, Stephan Haggard and Beth A.
Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes, International
Organization, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Summer 1987), pp. 491-513,
regarding cognitive theories of regimes.
"See supra, Chapter 4, Section 4.2, Catalysts.
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Compliance with international law cannot be enforced in
the same manner as domestic law. Thus, other methods must be
utilised in international law, and in regimes as well. These
include the evolution of rules harmonious with the regime1s
objective, dispute settlement procedures, accountability and
transparency, and exclusion and conditional cooperation.' 2
Dispute settlement procedures allow for the dispute to be
settled by the members of the regime on the basis of the
regime norms and rules, 	 thus reducing ambiguity.
Accountability is obtained through procedures such as
reporting and monitoring. Exclusion from the regime can be
forced upon recalcitrant members, and members can also rely on
conditional cooperation.1133
These elements for compliance may take time to evolve
within a regime. As seen from the description of the ozone
layer depletion regime, these methods utilised in compliance
are present to a much greater degree than in the climate
change regime." 34 Whether or not such methods will evolve
within the climate change regime will depend on the extent to
which the shared expectations of the members evolve. However,
the climate change regime has begun to address accountability
and dispute-settlement. There are reporting requirements in
place in the FCCC, and it does provide for a dispute
settlement mechanism." 35 More importantly, the FCCC calls
on the Conference of the Parties to consider at its first
supra, Chapter 3, Section 3.6, Effectiveness of
Regimes.
Ibid.
" 34 See, supra, Chapters 5 and 6.
See, supra, Chapter 6, Section 6.1, International
Action Regarding Climate Change.
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session the establishment of a "multilateral consultative
process... for the resolution of questions regarding the
implementation of the Convention." During the INC
process, "delegations generally agreed that the mechanism
should be forward rather than backward-looking," and so "would
be similar to the non-compliance procedure established under
the Montreal Protocol." 37
 It appears, then, that the
climate change regime is slowly evolving to include these
compliance measures.
7.3 Climate Change and Ozone Layer Depletion Regimes
Analyses of the climate change and ozone layer depletion
regimes were made above.' 138
 The regimes can be compared on
the basis of the similarity of the issue-area underlying each
regime. Both climate change and ozone layer depletion are
global environmental problems based on scientific theory that
require international cooperation if the problems are to be
successfully dealt with.
The analysis of the ozone layer depletion regime reveals
a regime that has overcome uncertainty regarding critical
issues and has been developed to include substantive
regulations, with substantial success." 39 The climate
change regime has not yet developed to that stage, because of
" 36 lnternational Legal Materials, Vol. 31, No. 4 91992),
pp. 840-873, Art. 13.
" 37Danie]. Bodanksy, "The United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary," The Yale Journal
of International Law Vol. 18, no. 2 (Summer 1993), p. 548.
"8 See supra, Chapters 5 and 6.
"9 Scientists are now predicting that the increase in the
build-up of ozone depleting chemicals in the atmosphere should
halt before the end of the century. See, Chapter 1, supra, n.
99.
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remaining uncertainty concerning critical issues. Cognitive
expectations, then, have not yet been shaped to the degree
where substantive normative or shared expectations have
evolved regarding future behaviour. Nevertheless, the regime
does contain obligations for its members and so plays a vital
role in the legal order.
	
As Abram and Antonia Chayes note:
It is a mistake to call these... merely 'aspirational' or
'hortatory.' To be sure, they embody 'ideals' of the
international system, but... they were designed to
initiate a process that over time, perhaps a long time,
would bring behaviour into greater congruence with those
ideals. These expectations have not been wholly
disappointed. The vast amount of public and private
effort devoted to enforcing these agreements - not always
in vain - evinces their obligational content."4°
7.4 Prospects for Progress in the Legal Order
International law must take account of the success of
regimes in implementing regulations in such contentious and
global areas as the environment. Regimes are found not only
in the realm of environmental protection, but throughout
international law. There is nothing in the definition,
formation or maintenance of a regime that limits its
application to the regimes employed in this thesis.4t
Rather, regimes can be found throughout the international
legal order, in various stages of development. For example,
the regime regulating international air traffic is much more
established than the regime regulating human rights, where
there is greater uncertainty regarding critical issues. While
" 40 Chayes and Chayes, "On Compliance," supra, n. 1129, p.
197.
""See, Winfried Lang, "Diplomacy and International
Environmental Law-Making: Some Observations," Yearbook of
International Environmental Law Vol. 3 (1992), who states "the
concept of regime and the idea of an evolutionary or step-by-
step approach, are not, of course, restricted to international
environmental regulations," p. 122.
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a detailed study of other regimes cannot be undertaken here,
a brief sketch of the nuclear nonproliferation regime can be
undertaken to show that regimes exist in other areas of the
international legal order.
Research into the nuclear nonproliferation regime has
been plentiful." 42
 This regime includes two major treaties,
the Nonproliferation Treaty and the Latin American Nuclear
Weapons Free Zone Treaty; an international organisation, the
International Atomic Energy Association which accounts for
nuclear materials; a treaty and other ancillary measures
dealing with the related issue of protection of nuclear
materials;" 43
 nontreaty agreements on export controls;
informal understandings that certain technologies will not be
exported; intelligence sharing; and a very active diplomacy
carried out regarding the regime."44
This regime was not always in place. Rather, it has
evolved as shared expectations regarding future behaviour
concerning nuclear nonproliferation have evolved. Similarly,
regimes exist in such diverse areas as international
" 42 See, for example, Joseph Nye, Jr., Maintaining a
Nonproliferation Regime," in Nuclear Proliferation; Breaking
the Chain ed. George Quester, pp. 15-38 (Madison: University
of Wisconsin Press, 1981) and Lawrence Scheinman,
"Nonproliferation Regime: Safeguards, Controls and Sanctions,"
in The Nuclear Connection ed. A. Weinburg et al, pp. 177-210
(NY: Paragon Press, 1985).
" 43Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material, International Le gal Materials Vol. 18, No. 6 pp.
1419-1433 (1979).
" 44 See, Richard Williamson, "Building the International
Environmental Regime: A Status Report," Inter-American Law
Review Vol. 21, no. 3 (Summer 1990), pp. 741-743.
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trade	 and international currency.
Regimes, then, are not new phenomena within the
international legal order. They have just not been the
subject of much serious study by international lawyers. The
examination in this thesis of the climate change and ozone
layer depletion regimes reveals that there are great prospects
for progress in the international legal order. From
previously unregulated areas, legal obligations have evolved
regarding areas of great environmental significance.
But the climate change and ozone layer depletion regimes
have also shown that merely studying the resulting obligations
is not the best method for examining the legal order. Rather,
observing the regime process whereby cognitive expectations
form, normative or shared expectations regarding behaviour
follow, and obligations ensue, is very significant. Not to do
so is to ignore the fact that international law does not exist
in a vacuum. By understanding observing how and why states
willingly regulate an issue area, through a policy-oriented
approach to international law, the prospects for strengthening
the legal order are enhanced.
Examining the regime process strengthens the argument
that the international legal order exists and that it has a
large role to play in the affairs of states. While the idea
that the legal order is a process is not a new idea, the
exploration of that process in a discussion of institutional
arrangements or governance systems has not been undertaken in
45 Trade matters are handled by GATT, the UN Convention
on Trade and Development, Coordinating Committee on
Multilateral Export Control, and other bilateral trade
agreements and common markets.
It4bthe regime includes the IMF and numerous central banks,
among others.
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great detail within international law.
Because laws heighten public expectations, it is
important that policy makers ask whether prospective laws are
consistent with a government's ability to achieve the goals
established by those laws." 47
 Because regimes take account
of the underlying critical issues, they are adept at realising
regulations that the regime states can implement and, in the
process, are able to strengthen the overall legal order.
Thus, "the value of regimes for the development of
international environmental law should be self-evident."44
Regimes help to "explain the different levels of normativity
within a treaty," they highlight the "latent conflicts of
interest (economic, political, North-South) that determine
regime building and regime-maintenance," and they "allow
ambitious actors to accept meager initial results... while
maintaining expectations of more decisive action during the
later evolution of the regime.
It may be true that for international law to change or
evolve, "it will be ... pressure that makes that change."5
" 47 See, Gary C. Bryner, Blue Skies, Green Politics: The
Clean Air Act of 1990 (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1993), p. 34.
" 48See Lang, "Diplomacy and International Environmental
Law-Making," supra, n. 1141, p. 121. While Lang maintains that
regimes "are initially established through framework
conventions or protocols," thus differing from the
requirements for formation put forth in this regime, his
observations with regard to the value of regimes are
applicable here.
''4Ibjd.
"°Anthony Day, quoting David Scheffer, senior associate
at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "Morality
Versus International Law", International Herald Tribune, 15
February 1993, p. 6.
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Knowledge of how that occurs is of great importance in
bringing change about. Regimes, then, are worthy of study by
international lawyers, not least because they are already part
of the legal order, in which they play a vital role.
Regimes are valuable for study even for those legal
scholars who do not subscribe to the policy-oriented school.
While such non-policy-oriented scholars may not agree on the
timing of formation of a regime, because of theoretical
differences as to what is "law," this does not mean that
regimes are of no value to them. Regime study can still allow
for analysis of extra-legal factors that may influence
lawmaking, and so can provide empirical evidence for
comparative study of different areas of lawmaking.
7.5 Incorporating Regimes into International Legal Studies
If regime theory is to take hold within international
law, and the above studies of the climate change and ozone
layer depletion regimes are testimony that they should, then
international legal scholars will have to become more involved
in interdisciplinary research, to a greater extent than mere
collaboration on joint projects. As Oran Young has put it,
there is between disciplines:
a deeper division concerning not only what we know but
also what there is to know and how we come to know what
we know."5'
" 51 Oran A. Young, "Understanding International Regimes:
Contributions From Law and the Social Sciences," paper given
at the annual meeting of the American Society of International
Law, Washington , DC, 1-3 April 1992, p. 39.
One promising project about to be undertaken is a three
year study of the effectiveness of national fulfilment of
international environmental commitments, sponsored by the
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
(Austria). The interdisciplinary and international team
selected is composed of scholars from political science, law
and economics.
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Such a pessimistic view does not mean, however, that the
methodological difficulties that may arise from the attempt to
bring international law and regime theory together are so
large as to prevent meaningful interdisciplinary work.
The relative ease with which the policy-oriented school can
absorb regimes into its framework of law, as well as the
similarities between the two with regard to basic
definitions," 5
 point more towards a meeting of the two
mindsets than to the opposite. This, of course, may well
depend on the perspective that this thesis has taken, namely
that of international law from a policy-oriented approach.
But it is difficult for the international relations scholar to
ignore similarities as well.1154
However, the picture is not completely perfect. Within
regime theory itself, different perspectives are taken. This
was outlined in Chapter 3 with regard to regime definition and
formation. Thus, there are divisions within the regime
literature in international relations between those who view
cooperation in rationalist, game theoretic terms, and those
who view cooperation with greater regard for questions of
" 52 See, Oran Young's comments regarding the "two-cultures
problem" between international law and international
relations. While he admitted that it would not be easy, there
was some opportunity for collaboration. "Remarks," American
Society of International Law: Proceedings of the 86th Meeting,
Washington, DC (1992), pp. 174-175.
" 53 me policy-oriented definition of arena and the regime
theorists' definition of regime, see, this Chapter, supra, n.
1124, 1125.
54 See Schechter, "New Haven School," supra, n. 1123,
Although there are still IR specialists disregarding the
linkage, see supra, Chapter 3, Section 3.1, Introduction to
International Regimes.
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normativity and obligation.
Such differences are important and should not be
overlooked. This is true not only for those studying regime
theory from the perspective of international relations, but
also for those coming from a legal perspective, since both
disciplines are eventually working towards the same goal of
identifying why states cooperate, although legal scholars may
view it in more prescriptive terms than international
relations specialists. If differences are too great within a
single discipline, then it complicates interdisciplinary work
as well.
But while these underlying divisions may appear to pose
problems for unity regarding regime theory, it has not served
to impede progress towards understanding regimes. Indeed, it
appears to have served to propel more research in the area,
with scholars suggesting a closer look at the domestic policy
level with regard to regimes and cooperation in an attempt to
overcome divergent theoretical perspectives.
Thus, divisions between regime theorists are not
necessarily irreconcilable, nor does it suggest irreconcilable
differences between international law and international
relations with regard to regime theory. The closeness of the
policy-oriented school and regime theory in general attest to
that.'t57
" 55 See, Haggard and Simmons, "Theories of International
Regimes," supra, n. 1130, pp. 491-517, and Helen Mimer,
"International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations," World
Politics Vol. 44, No. 3 (April 1992), pp. 466-496.
ItsoHaggard and Simmons, "International Regimes," supra,
n. 1130 and Mimer, "Theories of Cooperation," supra, n. 1155.
" 57 See also, Young, "Remarks," supra, n. 1152.
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While international law is not politics or economics or
sociology, it is surely shaped by these areas, and
understanding not only that but the manner in which those
disciplines go about their scholarly pursuits is essential.
The use of regime theory within international law requires
that this interdisciplinary linkage be observed and
incorporated as part of international legal studies. It may
not be an exaggeration to say: "The stakes here are very high;
the consequences, very significant. "
ttGeorge Bush, "US Committed to Safe Environment," an
address to the IPCC, Washington, DC, 5 February 1990.
President Bush was referring to the crucial
[interdisciplinary] components to global resolution of the
climate change problem: science, social and economic impacts,
and appropriate [legal] strategies.
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